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FOREWORD
Pathological States The Origins, Detection, 
and Treatment of Dysfunctional Societies
The essays in this volume were written for the third in the senes of Ford Foundation supported 
interdisciplinary graduate seminars on global issues The purpose of these seminars has been to encourage 
and enhance multidisciplinary inquiry into issues of contemporary global importance In 1993-94 the 
seminar focused on new concepts of the international system especially the growing regionalization of the 
world it was co taught by Professors Kolodziej Kathleen 'cloud and Marvin Weinbaum In 1994-95 
Professor Kolodziej was joined by Professor Salim Rashid of the Department of Economics the seminar 
examined the growing global market economy and its impact on power legitimacy and welfare
In 1995-96 the seminar codirected by Professors Stephen Cohen political science and history and 
Kathleen Cloud agricultural and consumer ecnomics and director of the Program in Women in 
International Development moved in a different direction It studied how states and societies turn 
pathological directing their power either against their own people—which in its extreme form can lead to 
genocide—or against other states—war It also explored the ways in which we might better detect 
prevent or ameliorate the actions of such states
For the purpose of this course pathological was defined as the presence of one or more of the 
following phenomenon acute famine genocide against a state s own people or in the course of a war 
with a neighbor large refugee populations and the attack during wartime on unarmed civilian 
populations—the latter obviously includes city busting attacks which culminated in the bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki but also includes the sowing of mines that cripple or kill civilians for years 
afterwards
Approximately two thirds of the course was organized around a series of intensive case studies These 
covered Western and non Western states industrialized and non industrialized societies They examined 
famine Bengal and Sahel total war Hiroshima genocide Cambodia and the Holocaust the generation 
of large refugee populations an African case study and chronic social conflict Northern Ireland Each 
case study examined the history and evolution of the event(s) and its (or their) cultural cinematic and 
literary representations using the case studies to test various explanatory theories drawn from 
anthropology political science sociology and psychology The role of technology and economics was 
also studied
The research papers—written by students from a wide variety of disciplines ranging from nuclear 
engineering to philosophy and including two medical scholars Mathew Doolittle and Niranjan Karmk who 
were enrolled in a special joint MD/Ph D degree program—deal with a variety of state and social 
pathologies from a suitably wide set of perspectives There were also two outstanding undergraduates who 
asked and were permitted to join the seminar Jennifer Bashaw and Claire Sheahan their papers are also 
included The papers are organized into four parts
The first is a group of three essays that deal with various aspects of known and familiar case 
studies Claire Sheahan examines the moral and political consequence of the Irish Diaspora Adam 
Ciralsky literally takes a fresh look at the issue of bombing the gas chambers at Auschwitz by an 
examination of photographic evidence available to policy makers and Jason Sharman attempts to 
recalculate more accurately the victims of Stalin s repression and internal nationalities policies
V
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The four chapters in part two provide fresh insights into contemporary or emerging situations of 
mass social violence two political scientists Sardesai and Eisenhuth look at the policy issues 
surrounding ethnic and regional conflict in India and Iraq two sociologists Karnik and Pintar look 
at the plight of refugees caught in episodes of ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and Bosnia
The third section examines the role professionals soldiers and scientists play Jennifer Bashaw 
now a navy officer wrote on the role of women in the most violent of all professions the military 
Solomon Woods a commissioned officer in the U S Army compared military professionalism in 
the United States and Nigeria and the role of scientists in developing weapons of mass destruction 
atomic bombs is the subject of an essay by Ji Qiang a nuclear engineering student from the 
People s Republic of China
The final section contains four papers three deal with the ethical dimensions of contemporary 
social and political violence Matthew Doolittle who wrote on measuring suffering and pain 
Donald Moulds who developed a theory of social violence and Robert Manaster who attempted to 
develop a new global ethic to guide policy makers and citizens alike when confronted with 
episodes of state violence The final paper by Jennifer Wheary from the Department of Educational 
Policy Studies examines the way in which the internet is used by extremist as well as human rights 
groups
The course syllabus and additional student writings produced during the course of the seminar 
appear in the Appendixes
One of the most welcome aspects of this seminar was the participation by a number of students who 
were ACDIS Interdisciplinary Fellows in 1995-96 Ji Qiang Niranjan Karnik Jennifer Wheary and 
Donald Moulds As the papers m this volume reveal their work and those of the other participants in this 
seminar is suffused with a sense of what is of supreme human and moral importance as well as rigorous 
in its approach and methodology It is no chore to teach such students they suggest the accuracy of the 
Latin phrase doce ut discas Teach that you may learn
None of the papers presented in this volume would have been possible without the financial support of 
the Ford Foundation Their support has made an impact on this campus and contributed more generally to 
the development of interdisciplinary studies and their utility in solving global problems Thanks are also 
due to Merrily Shaw assistant director of ACDIS who coordinated the seminar and served as publisher for 
this collection
Stephen Philip Cohen 
Professor Political Science and History 
Director Program m Arms Control Disarmament and
International Security
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____________ PART I_____________
Historical Case Studies of Violence
CHAPTER 1
The Irish Diaspora in American and Irish Politics
Claire Sheahan
In examining political conflicts identifying the important actors is a crucial step The problems m 
Northern Ireland concern many different individuals and institutions among them the large contingent of 
those who have emigrated from Ireland to the United States As the American government has tremendous 
power internationally this group has been substantially influential in the political crisis that has emerged 
there Insh-Americans have been active players in the area of Irish government sporadically since the first 
major migrations to the United States in the mid 1800s In the years that followed their immigration Insh- 
Amencans struggled with their identity greatly affecting the degree of interest and activity in the field of 
Irish politics However a strong core of those who protested the British power in Ireland has remained a 
constant since the first migrations of the Irish to the New World Their concern with Irish politics 
coupled with their physical distance from the actual problems has put them in a unique situation The role 
played by Insh-Amencan activist organizations in Irish politics throughout the 150 years has varied in its 
productivity as a result of the various means they have implemented to effect similar goals
Between 1815 and 1845 more than one million Irish people emigrated to seek a better life in the 
United States 1 This laid the foundation for those who followed when the Great Famine hit the island and 
over 500 000 left between 1845 and 1854 The vast majority of those who made the move were working 
class Irish Catholics from agricultural areas When they first arrived the Irish were largely politically 
impotent and widely discriminated against 2 Farm raised and Catholic in a largely Protestant and urban 
society they were perceived as dirty and foreign
This marginalization served only to strengthen their cultural identity Forced to leave Ireland or die of 
starvation these immigrants brought with them a significant grudge against the British government which 
the rejection by the largely Anglo-Saxon American culture only deepened Feeling ostracized also 
provided the immigrants with a strong reason to band together both socially and politically The 
community established thus had strong ties to the homeland and increasing political power It also 
resulted in the separation of those interested m Ireland from Ireland itself and an increasing tendency to 
romanticize dear old Ireland grew seemingly m proportion to the degree of separation The new 
surroundings provided an isolated area in which rehash old wrongs and nurture bitterness This combination 
of hatred of England naive utopiamzation of the homeland and high levels of political activity left a 
legacy that was greatly exploited This phenomenon evidences itself m the influence of this community on 
Irish politics
The void that the emigrants left behind had a tremendous impact as well as the new community they 
developed In Ireland itself it was impossible to ignore the major exodus In fact the experience of 
leaving Ireland became an intrinsic p-rt of Irish history and identity making it a culture of emigration 
Since 1850 the Irish population and j overnment have been ever aware of the diaspora created in the 
Famine years and the connection that exists between the island and those who left it Unlike the 
communities of Irish emigrants that e /olved later m England Australia and other parts of the world the 
Irish-Amencan population had a unique foothold in a younger society They grew to have a significant 
voice as they arrived only one hundred years after the inception of the U S government and played a 
significant role in the developmental stages of the American political system Although there was an 
established government it was not so entrenched as it was elsewhere that such a large and unified group 
could not have such a strong voice Their unusual role that developed in the United States resulted from 
their well timed political consolidation
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The community of those who left gradually gained power through cooperation and collective activity 
This progressed to such a degree that a British Member of Parliment lamented that British policy in 
Northern Ireland had created a new Irish nation on the other side of the Atlantic recast m the mold of 
democracy ready to strike a blow at the heart of the Empire 3 When this comment was recorded in 1867 
Irish nationalism in the New World was already relatively well developed Revolutionary and 
constitutional republicans soon realized the potential power that such a group wielded Subsequently they 
began to recruit the support of such emigrants playing on the anti British prejudices and desire for some 
link to the home country that this population expressed 4
In keeping with this philosophy Insh-Amencans formed many official social groups and one among 
them was the Ancient Order of Hibernians Founded m 1836 its mission was to protect Insh-Amencans 
from native Amencan hostility This pnmanly social and militantly Catholic group still exists today It 
spread from New York to everywhere in the country that the Insh settled Today it is the founder of many 
of the St Patnck s day parades and other social events throughout the country 5 Its functions often serve as 
meeting places for more politically active Insh-Amencan groups
The first major American group to declare an interest in Irish politics and leave a real impression on 
Irish history was formed in 1858 The Fenian Brotherhood was denved from the leader of the intellectual 
group in Ireland whose members called themselves the Young Irelanders These rebels called for a 
preservation of all that was purely Celtic in their country They encouraged doing so in the face of the 
sinister English forces They believed were such forces were destined to coerce the noble savage element 
m Insh culture to surrender the pastoral simplicity of traditional Insh life for the impending rum of 
industrial society 6 After the defeat of the Young Irelanders one of their members John Mahoney came to 
the United States and created the Fenian Brotherhood On the same date as the birth of the Fenian 
Brotherhood his counterpart and fellow Young Irelander began a parallel organization in Dublin in 1858 
called the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) The two organizations worked cooperatively 7 Femanism 
grew substantially during the American Civil War and anti British feeling especially among demobilized 
soldiers was prevalent 8
By 1866 the Fenian brotherhood was well enough established to boast large scale picnics in New 
York Troy Cleveland Columbus and St Louis as well as marches like the one in Jones Wood New 
York where 100 000 Fenians demonstrated and raised $50 000 They also organized military training to 
prepare for the day when they would sail to Ireland to fight for the independence of their nation They 
wore green uniforms complete with a phoenix and shamrock and organized drill units They financed 
these measures by selling bonds to fellow Insh-Amencans These bonds were basically worthless pieces 
of paper One side showed a Union soldier ready to depart and fight for Erin and the flip side bore the 
images of Irish heroes like Wolfe Tone and Robert Emmet These bonds promised six percent interest 
redeemable six months after the declaration of Irish freedom The Fenians also started a provisional 
government of Ireland modeled on the American system and they developed complicated military 
strategies These plans aimed ultimately at the British Government with the goal of driving them out of 
Ireland took different forms The first involved a direct attack on the British m Ireland and this resulted in 
the failed rebellion of 1866 The British squelched the rebellion before it really began and suspended 
habeus corpus arresting many American Civil War veterans and naturalized citizens The Irish Amencan 
community put great pressure on officials to secure the release of those involved in the upnsing 9
After the failure of such a direct attack by the Fenians leaders considered other methods In fact they 
now began to plan for the immediate invasion of Canada Their elaborate plans included a right flank of 
their army in Buffalo and a left one in Chicago On June 1 1886 a prominent Civil War veteran named 
John O Neil led a Fenian army of 800 men to Fort Erie in Canada They issued a proclamation urging the 
Canadians to declare their independence and then engaged in some skirmish with the Canadian army 
Twelve Canadians were killed and forty wounded and among the Fenians eight were dead and twenty 
wounded The two thousand Fenian reinforcements in Buffalo never got the order to join the attack as the 
U S S Michigan blocked the correspondence 10 In the next few days Amencan troops cut off the supply 
lines and many of the retreating Fenians were arrested once they crossed the border
The Irish Diaspora in American and Irish Politics 5
Another follow up venture took pl'ace June 7 but was just as unsuccessful However the Fenians 
represented a significant and politicali / vocal voting block and this was important During the political 
chaos of the Reconstruction era pohtn lans avoided offending such groups at all costs as evident in their 
treatment of these men They were sent home at government expense and their arms that authorities had 
seized were returned Although their plans to agitate in Ireland and Canada in hopes of Irish independence 
with U S recognition had failed thus fir such weak punitive measures by the U S government were hardly 
disincentive to further revolutionary activity The Fenian Brotherhood deteriorated as the press printed 
scandals regarding their exploitation oi young impressionable poor immigrants who largely financed the 
extravagant finery of the Fenian offices This m combination with internal conflict led to the dissolution 
of the organization 11
The last Convention took place in 1885 but the membership had been dwindling since 1870 There 
was never another group that took as clrastic measures as the Fenians They have the dubious distinction of 
being the only organization to prepare for war and take part in an attack on a foreign country while the 
United States was in peacetime 12 If not as flamboyantly as before Irish-Americans still continued their 
interest in Irish politics and after the I eman Brotherhood dissolved they found other outlets for this 
enthusiasm
Several organizations became popular with some ideological divergence between them At this time 
the Clan na Gael emerged as did the Home Rule movement and the Irish Land League the latter of 
which was founded by supporters of a complete agrarian revolution and its political thrust was against the 
landlords in Ireland Led in Ireland by^  Michael Davitt these activists maintained that the problems in 
Ireland could only be ameliorated through the overthrow of the hierarchical landlord structure They 
encouraged farmers to refuse to pay rent resist evictions and assist others who had been evicted 13 The 
movement had the support of the Irish party in Parliament and found considerable monetary and political 
backing among Irish-Amencans as w< 11 The rallying cry of this movement was land for the people'
Over 10 000 people went to hear Land League representatives speak in Chicago many state legislatures 
passed measures sympathetic to Ireland and many clergymen supported the cause However when the 
Land League s policy of non violence deteriorated support in the United States dropped sharply The Land 
League also presented a quandary that many Irish-Amencans were unwilling to face the prospect that the 
problems in Ireland were something be yond British imperialistic domination The landlords that Davitt and 
his supporters so adamantly opposed were in many cases Irish not British Many in the Irish-American 
contingent had no patience for such complication of the issue 14
More conservative Irish-Amencans opted for membership in such organizations as the Clan na Gael 
which formed in 1867 encompassed many former members of the Fenian Brotherhood Its main mission 
was to organize Irish-Amencans to fi£ ht British influence m the United States It developed as a covert 
society complete with clandestine meetings secret oaths and handshakes They were full Republicans 
and like the Fenians encouraged regular military drilling and adopted an affiliation with the Insh 
Republican Brotherhood They took part in and supported the Easter Rebellion in Ireland in 1916 which 
going so far as to attempt to collaborate with the German government which was warring with England in 
the planning of the rebellion 15 During World War I most dedicated Irish nationalists with identified with 
Germans and German-Americans on the old principle that a common enemy makes good friends Once 
again this demonstrates the lengths that Irish-Amencans were willing to go to advance their cause
The Clan na Gael continued to be active after the Easter Rebellion failed When the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) formed as a group fightin a guerrilla war for Irish freedom the Clan na Gael supported them 
and their political wing the Sinn Fein as the strongest proponents of Republicanism turning a blind eye 
to their espoused socialist beliefs Joe McGarnty became the driving force behind the Clan and his 
somewhat simplistic outlook on the crisis consisted of drawing the British as the one and only enemy In 
this vein he supported Eamon De Vali ra who was the first head of the Sinn Fein De Valera was a 
member of the IRA and visited the United States in 1919 to raise money for the Republicans McGarnty 
raised millions for the IRA and sent many shipments of Thompson machine guns 16 The period of Irish 
Revolution from 1920-1921 was the pi ak of Irish-American nationalism
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When the Anglo-Irish treaty was signed in 1921 separating the Northern six counties which 
maintained a pro English majority from the rest of Ireland which was granted independent state status 
Irish-Amencan interest subsided greatly For many the cause had been won if not with perfect results at 
least well enough 17 The hard line republicans however could not accept this compromise The Clan na 
Gael continued to support the IRA even after Eamon De Valera left to form the Fiana Fail party which 
was committed to achieving Republican goals of a united Ireland through diplomatic means In 1939 the 
IRA declared war on England and used their guerrilla warfare tactics in crudely bombing many British 
targets McGamty and Clan na Gael backed these enterprises but the American organization suffered a 
mighty blow when McGamty died The IRA practice of routinely killing many civilians did not appeal to 
the majority of Americans and these acts succeeded in decisively turning Irish-Amencan nationalism 
downward for almost thirty years
During World War II the Republic of Ireland remained neutral which had interesting ramifications 
The Bntish were considering invading Ireland to take advantage of the Irish ports but the importance 
assigned to American support outweighed the possible strategic gain of holding the Irish ports Public 
opinion regarding Ireland s neutrality varied The Friends of Irish Neutrality formed in 1941 and many 
like them agreed that Ireland was too new and its government s strength too tenuous to join an 
international war Wary of any alliance with Britain many supported this position early in the war 
However as the war went on this decision also led to a decline in Irish-Amencan nationalism Insh- 
Amencans whose sons sailed off to fight the Nazi threat could not understand why Ireland would not grant 
them safe passage through their waters 18 During this time the arms routes from the United States to IRA 
members ended and the IRA maintained a feeble existence during the war years For Northern Irelanders 
World War II strengthened ties to Great Britain as many of their units fought in Europe The war not only 
provided a deepening in the divide between Northern Ireland and the Republic but also created a gap 
between the Irish Republic and Insh-Americans 19
In the 1950s the Irish-Amencan community continued to drift away from the preoccupation with Insh 
politics The culture of conformity and emphasis on return to normal living after the war found many Insh- 
Amencans moving from urban ethnic neighborhoods to the suburbs There they assimilated rather than 
retaining an ethnic identity that encouraged political activity The Irish-Amencan community was by 
now a conservative middle class group whose community identity was largely declining 90 Many 
newspapers radio shows and organizations went into decline along with the loss of the sense of ethnic 
solidarity
This isolationist trend went on into the mid 1960s when trouble in Northern Ireland became more and 
more internationally recognized The crises that developed in the province greatly renewed American 
interest From 1921 on the Unionist party had political control of Northern Ireland and it largely ignored 
the Catholic minority The central authority was thus biased and discrimination was a major problem at 
the local level Districts were gerrymandered to maintain Unionist control of some councils and official 
administrators became widely known as engaging in discriminatory practices especially concerning 
housing and hiring The changes m the educational system in Britain following World War II allowed 
many more Catholics to attend universities and as the education level raised among Catholics so did 
criticism of the discriminatory system 21
The Civil Rights movement in the United States inspired many protesters and the Catholic minority 
found concessions the Unionist government made too weak
A proponent of Civil rights in the province James Cahir Heaney called a meeting in the United 
States in 1967 The groups in the remaining Irish-Amencan network many of which had undergone a brief 
popular resurgence in the celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Rebellion in 1966 came 
together for it This meeting was the birth of the American Congress for Irish Freedom This organization 
was formed to consolidate the efforts of many groups to publicize the discnmination in the province They 
received a great boost when the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association began demonstrating in 
Northern Ireland to protest the discrimination This group was dedicated to the organization of peaceful 
protests against the government s abuse of power Their methods owed much to the example of Gandhi and
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Martin Luther King Jr In Derry m the summer of 1968 (against government orders) they were met by the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and a not ensued The vivid images of armed police attacking peaceful 
protesters with billy clubs and water cannons were the first widely reported aspect of the growing Northern 
Ireland crisis 22 As media coverage increased the American support movement mushroomed The ever 
present network of Insh-Amencan organizations took advantage of this renewal of interest and new focus 
of energy The original goals of this group became obscured by the American understanding of the conflict 
Organizations used events like Bloody Sunday where peaceful demonstrators were fired upon (albeit 
with rubber bullets) by the RUC and ten killed for propaganda purposes The American Congress for Irish 
Freedom (ACIF) became a highly efficient political group publishing a newspaper and lobbying the UN 
and U S government to address human rights issues in Northern Ireland There was a significant 
divergence however between the ACIF and the organizations that they supported in Ireland The ACIF 
saw discriminatory practices and human rights issues as a means of achieving eventual Irish unification 23 
The ultimate goal in these actions wa that continued pressure regarding discrimination and ensuing bad 
press would force the British to sevei all ties with Northern Ireland According to James Heaney Our 
[the ACIF] ultimate objective is the e> pulsion of Britain from Northern Ireland The present civil rights 
movement is merely one step in that direction 24
The ACIF s main means of achieving this goal was publicity They organized continuous letter writing 
meetings and appeared on nationally syndicated television shows attacking the Northern Irish 
government They sponsored lectures ind tours of civil rights activists This was especially effective when 
these individuals met with politicians 1 as Gerry Fitt did with Senator Edward Kennedy and Democratic 
presidential candidate Hubert Humphn y in 1968 25
The biggest contribution that the ACIF made to the international consciousness regarding Northern 
Ireland was the suit that Heaney filed on behalf of six residents of the province They alleged that the 
actions taken by the British government and the legislation that protected these acts were m contradiction 
to the guarantees on human rights und< r the Council of Europe The court at Strasbourg found that the 
charges were legitimate and requested a reply from the British government The British government 
responded by working on a legal initiative to stall the court 26 The case had to be dropped as it was too 
expensive to fund but the ACIF had succeeded in greatly embarrassing the British government 
internationally It also forced Prime Minister Harold Wilson to publicly condemn the civil rights situation 
in Ulster 27 The success also encourage d Heaney to seek further assistance in Europe He went so far as to 
make an agreement with Spain where the government saw Northern Ireland as a thorn in England s side 
that could be manipulated to further their objectives in Gibraltar Spain promised $50 000 to the 
Republican forces but as Spanish power changed hands before the promise was fulfilled the money was 
never received Heaney unsuccessfully attempted to sue for breach of contract 28
Another less successful tactic employed by the ACIF was concentrated in the United States They 
attempted to malign the British government by revealing information that supposedly proved British 
collaboration with Communist forces < specially in Vietnam They wrote letters to major newspapers 
alleging that the British were shipping supplies to Haiphong Heaney and others did not achieve the 
intervention or the sanctions that they lequested in Northern Ireland but they did raise interest on Capitol 
Hill In 1969 Tip O Neill and one hundred other congressmen wrote to President Nixon at Heaney s 
urging that they were concerned but the overriding attitude remained that the Northern Irish crisis was an 
internal problem of the British government 29
Heaney and the ACIF also attempt d to fight Britain on economic grounds They discouraged 
American investment in Northern Ireland and published notices in Ulster papers asking workers to report 
any discrimination they experienced atithe hands of American companies 30 This dealt another significant 
blow to the Unionists image
The ACIF was not alone in its Insh-Amencan nationalist activity It was accompanied most notably 
by the National Association for Irish Justice (NAIJ) This association was founded m 1968 and had a far 
more leftist slant than the ACIF Many of its members hoped for a Marxist revolution in Ireland and often 
promoted both the anti Vietnam war eflort and the American Civil Rights movement They supported a
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radical militant group in Northern Ireland known as the People s Democracy The ACIF roundly criticized 
the NAIJ as an unreasonable faction and Heaney assured fellow conservative Insh-Americans that the 
majority of activists in Ulster seek a just society not a red society 31
The NAIJ-ACIF conflict mirrored the one between the People s Democracy and the Northern Ireland 
Civil Rights Association across the ocean These ideological divides led to the end of the Northern Ireland 
Civil Rights Association (NICRA) and a subsequent transition of its members to supporting groups like 
the Social Democrats or the IRA In 1969 there was a split in the IRA and the provisional IRA was 
formed These were the members who believed in the achievement of Insh Unification through an active 
guerrilla campaign in the North whereas the Official IRA which had many internal splits in itself and 
eventually dissolved Many former NICRA members became supporters of the Provisional IRA As the 
civil rights movement died down in Ireland the NAIJ became obsolete and collapsed m 1970 Its 
members too were funneled into various other organizations The ACIF was substantially weakened by 
the same changes and its membership dropped off significantly It had achieved a good deal especially in 
reconstructing the network of Insh-Amencan organizations but Heaney refused to support the IRA as he 
felt that alliance with a violent paramilitary group would not be a good public relations move 32 
Conversely the overwhelming majority of Insh-Amencan activists at this time however seemed to think 
that the Provisional IRA was the most effective means of refuting British control and advancing the 
Republican agenda so that many left the ACIF in favor of a more immoderate alternative
In the wake of the ACIF s demise the more extreme factions within the organization with Micheál 
Flannery leading formed the Irish Action Committee which was dedicated to many of the same 
principles as the ACIF but was more militant Concurrently in Northern Ireland the IRA realized that 
continuing the guerrilla war and supporting the families of IRA men who died or were arrested was a 
costly undertaking and looked to the Irish Action Committee to provide a traditional Insh-Amencan 
funding source Flannery agreed on the condition that the agreement provided no explicit direct ties to the 
violence of the operation Micheál Flannery and two other former IRA men Jack McGowan and Jack 
McCarthy headed this new enterprise which was named the Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC) 
which became known as NORAID It was originally linked to the Northern Aid Committee in Ireland but 
soon became affiliated with the Green Cross which under the auspices of the An Cumann Carbah looked 
after the dependents of IRA prisoners Since its inception the leaders of NORAID have maintained that 
their contributions are not direct aid to the IRA The activities of the British government which launched 
full scale attacks on the nationalist ghettoes in Northern Ireland in 1970-72 drove thousands to NORAID 
It is the largest and most active Insh-Amencan political group ot its day Like the predecessor large scale 
organizations the members of INAC supported the anti British element but not any of the socialist beliefs 
that often accompanied Republican rhetoric They have raised funds to through dinners speaking 
functions and in local bars and doing so have collected somewhere between five and fifteen million 
dollars since it started These numbers are difficult to estimate due to the increased pressure the FBI and 
federal government have placed on this group and their subsequent habit of sending unclaimed donations 
to Ireland in cash NORAID s leaders have always claimed however that theirs is a purely benevolent 
organization 33
This contention is constantly challenged by the U S government which has monitored INAC s 
activity since 1973 The two institutions have been at odds since this time although in 1970 FBI memos 
described NORAID as a conservative and responsible organization 34 The increasing political pressure 
that accompanied IRA bombings across the ocean led them to declare the same group undertaking the 
same actions as a terrorist organization The FBI adopted the view that terrorists including Irish [are] 
individuals involved in criminal enterprises With this emphasis there is less concern with why this 
activity is being committed than the fact that crimes are being committed 35 The acts the FBI focused 
on were those which would force the group to register under the Foreign Agents Restriction Act as an 
agent of the IRA which would require them to report income and its destination and limit the information 
the group dispensed Since 1971 NORAID had been registered in the Foreign Agents Restriction Act 
(FARA) under the Northern Aid Committee but the FBI continued to gather evidence that would 
definitively link the INAC with the IRA This information was eventually considered substantive enough 
for the Justice department to demand the registration in 1982 INAC leaders protested to the best of their
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ability but registered under duress in 1984 36 In the course of obtaining this information the FBI used the 
opportunity to thoroughly investigate illegal activities of individual members of NORAID They have 
succeeded in imprisoning several individuals on illegal transport and procurement of weapons charges but 
have never proved the organization s activities as illegal The FBI did however attempt to discourage 
legal activities such as fund raising which they suspected may have illegal applications They have even 
incited the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to defend NORAID on the basis some FBI activities 
have been inexplicable except on the understanding that the government s policy was to harass and deter
fundraising which it emphasized was quite legal 37
As the 1970s progressed however the FBI s attempts to discourage NORAID membership (many quit 
when they learned from the FBI thait there were probable links to the IRA) coupled with the brutal 
attacks the IRA claimed responsibility for and the fact that the war was dragging on and on contributed 
to a large drop in NORAID income There was action on the parts of the prominent Irish—American 
politicians referred to as the Big Foui m 1977 Tip O Neill Patrick Moymhan Hugh Carey and Ted 
Kennedy made an appeal to Irish-Ame ncans on St Patrick s Day to stop funding groups that were 
associated with violence 38 This represented another ebbing of the tide of Irish-American activism one 
which was reversed only a few years 1 iter
In 1981 the crisis in Northern Ireland was suddenly newsworthy again as IRA members who had been 
imprisoned by the British government went on hunger strikes to protest the revocation of their status as 
political prisoners They refused prison uniforms and food and in the course of two years ten men seven 
from the Provisional IRA and three from the more radical and socialist Irish National Liberation Army had 
died NORAID took advantage of the limelight and staged many protests outside of the British Embassy 
as well as massive fundraising tours of family members of the strikers 39
Another organization that became active in this time was the Irish National Caucus led by Father 
Sean MacManus which was formed in 1974 Many NORAID members were involved in its inception Its 
main purpose at the outset was to lobby the U S Congress to support Irish unity There were two main 
plans of action for doing this The first was through lobbying for the Congress to hold hearings on the crisis 
The second was to lift visa restrictions on prominent Sinn Fern and IRA members so that they could 
travel and raise funds in the United States They enlisted the help of U S Congressman Mario Biaggi and 
met with Jimmy Carter in 1976 The soon to be president proposed after that meeting an international 
commission to investigate human rights abuses in Northern Ireland 40 The growing power of this 
organization frightened those in government who adamantly opposed the support of any group that allied 
itself with the IRA They in response backed the more moderate power sharing methods that were being 
expounded by the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) leader in Northern Ireland at this time and 
the so called Big Four rallied around this new hope They roundly condemned unnamed organizations 
that supported violence However they became more impatient with British policy which was being 
condemned more vocally by Amnesty International for their regular practice of obtaining arrests through 
forced confessions often elicited through torture The ACIF succeeded through Congressman Biaggi in 
establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on Ii ish Affairs in Congress The Irish government objected strenuously 
to the idea of any hearings as it found Ihe probable attempts of the IRA to prove its legitimacy far too 
threatening to be outweighed by the benefits of British responsibility for its human rights violations The 
Committee was behind legislation that the Congress passed prohibiting sales of arms to Unionist forces in 
Northern Ireland based on the declared neutrality of the U S government and the human rights abuses m 
Northern Ireland 41 In the mid to late eighties the political influence of the Caucus diminished as a result 
of the special relationship between the Reagan administration and that of Margaret Thatcher In these 
years Congress passed an extradition treaty which eliminated acts of violence from the political 
exception clause so that IRA men could be extradited from the United States 42 The Anglo-Irish treaty 
signed in 1985 which gave the Republic of Ireland the privilege of input on the administration of Northern 
Ireland and recognized the Unionist s rights to remain in the United Kingdom This compromise was not 
completely satisfactory to the most radical on either side but it was recognized by the majority of Irish 
Americans and the Irish American Caucus as a step in the right direction The Caucus and many other 
groups have recognized the importance of subsequent moves toward peace such as the Downing Street 
Agreement and the recent move to peace talks The main agenda of the Irish National Caucus within the
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last several years has been the promotion of the MacBnde Principles which are acts of legislation in 
Northern Ireland which calls for lack of anti Catholic discrimination in hiring there The organization 
publicizes the names of American companies which have not acquiesced to the principles and 
encourages Irish-Americans to act through economic means and boycott such corporations 43 It has also 
in the time of the cease fire been the main source of strong lobbying for Gerry Adams s visa in 1994 44
With the move toward conciliation between the actual parties involved in the dispute the importance 
of groups such as the Insh National Caucus (INC) and NORAID has subsided NORAID income has 
dropped and the INC s activities have become more small scale With the current ubiquity of such news 
sources such as CNN such groups are no longer the main source of information on the conflict for Insh- 
Amencans and most have become increasingly conscious of the complexity of the matter
In reviewing the role of Insh-Amencan political activity throughout American history one finds a 
general fluctuation of interest based on the perceived suffering in Ireland and the degree to which Irish- 
Amencans embraced their ethnic identity Some interest however has remained constant along with 
several other factors One is the relative ignorance of Irish-Americans Distanced from the atrocities that 
various revolutions have brought the island they can afford to give money to fight a romantic war against 
an imperialistic Goliath They fail to recognize that the conflict is primarily a civil war The conflict is 
between the pro Union Irish and the anti Union Irish for the most part They are extremely confused but 
sincere and well mtentioned 45 Such lack of understanding has caused repeated frustration on the parts 
of the British and Insh governments as well as on the parts of the true revolutionaries as all parties have 
been depicted unfairly in this simplistic picture This ignorance has been manipulated through the ages to 
promote fanatical and misguided efforts to achieve a sentimental ideal The Irish-American organizations 
have had a greater positive effects on the situation when they used diplomatic means to encourage 
fairness The ACIF s Strasbourg cases and publicizing of human rights abuses as well as the Insh National 
Caucus support of the Ad Hoc committee m Congress are two examples of effective diplomatic means 
encouraging republican goals These acts are far more convincing than attacking Canada or bombing 
civilian targets has ever been Violent action seems less horrible if it achieves some good but in this 
case the suffering has far outweighed any incremental political gain and the majonty of violence has 
been counter productive The violent elements have no mandate either within or out of Ireland and since 
they are not supported by the people This is the difference between the support of IRA interests before and 
after the Anglo-Irish Treaty It demonstrates the main difference between such revolutions as that in South 
Africa The violent interests in Northern Ireland are a vast minority Irish-Americans are far more 
supportive of such me«ns than any actual Irishmen The drastic action that Irish-American groups have 
undertaken serve as a blatant indication of both the passion and misdirection of this group The role of 
active bystander one which Irish-Americans have adopted provides them with an opportunity to affect 
the political situation However with this comes the responsibility to be educated before acting and it is 
this aspect that Irish-Americans have neglected As media exposure increases Irish-Americans should 
take a less biased and more realistic view of the conflict and support such realistic means of achieving 
Republican goals instead of blindly supporting the violent action of paramilitary groups
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CHAPTER 2
America and Auschwitz at Fifty The Questions Linger
Adam Ciralsky
First the Nazis went after the Jews 
but I was not a Jew so I did not object 
Then they went after the Catholics 
but I was not a Catholic so I did not object
Then they went after the trade unionists
but I was not a trade unionist so I did not object
Then they came after me and there was no one left to object
—Rev Martin Niemoler
?i W3P lab Why Now9
A professor of mine recently called me into his office to discuss his visit the previous week to the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in Washington D C As one who helped procure some of 
the exhibit items for the museum naturally I was interested in his comments Like most first time visitors 
my professor began by expressing his awe at James Freed s architectural triumph but quickly turned to 
something about the museum that troubled him While conceding that the museum was for the most part 
fiercely objective m its treatment of the Holocaust in his estimation the exhibit dealing with the question 
of whether the United States and its wartime allies should have bombed the concentration camps—to 
relieve their inhabitants suffering—struck him as biased He felt the exhibit answered rhetorically in the 
affirmative
A convergence of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II and the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum s increasing popularity amongst Washington tourists seems to have to re ignited a 
long smoldering debate about U S complicity in the Holocaust While the debate—which is as much 
about emotion as scholarship—oftentimes seizes upon the United State s failure to bomb the gas chambers 
or railroad tracks at Auschwitz as a metaphor for complicity the broader question people want answered is 
whether U S government attitudes shaped by domestic anti Semitism facilitated the Holocaust The short 
answer of course is yes Anti Semitism among Washington elites led to the establishment of increasingly 
draconian immigration restnctions even in the face of mounting evidence of Nazi atrocities Domestic 
anti Semitism also motivated the U S decision not to bomb Auschwitz notwithstanding the fact that doing 
so was technically feasible
1HW1 The Holocaust
Adolf Hitler s agenda for the Jewish people was never concealed Some two and a half years before the 
United States entered World War II Hitler publicly proclaimed in a speech to the Reichstag if the 
international Jewish financiers should again succeed in plunging the nations into a world war the result 
will be the annihilation of the Jewish race throughout Europe What the United States government 
made of the Führer speech at the time is unclear but Hitler himself clearly considered it prophecy and 
repeated it five times verbatim in subsequent public utterances 1
Not long after the Reichstag proclamation Hitler ordered the dispatch of Special Action Groups or 
Einsatzgruppen to follow his armies into Poland 2 Organized by Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich 
these units quickly proceeded to round up Jews and place them into ghettos
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FIGURE 2 1 Front page of the 1934 
issues of The Sturmer which names 
the Jews as ritual murders of non 
Jews The lies of this famous issue 
brought protest driven by the head 
lines Jewish Murder Programmed 
Against Non Jewish Humanity 
Unveiled and at the bottom The 
Jews are our Downfall' Source 
Dachau Memorial Museum
By the time the Russian campaign began two years later 
however the Einsatzgruppen s orders had changed rounds ups 
became line ups and ghettos became mass graves as these 
extermination units began to operationalize Hitler s self styled 
prophecy 3
What became known in high Nazi circles as the Führer Order 
on the Final Solution was apparently never committed to paper 
Evidence however indicates that it was communicated verbally to 
Hermann Goering Reinhard Heydnch and Heinnch Himmler who 
in turn passed it down the chain of command during the summer 
and fall of 1941 While the apparent lack of documentary evidence 
of a final solution order per se has become a favorite bone of 
contention among Holocaust revisionists Hans Lammers the chief 
of the Reich Chancellery proudly testified to its existence at 
Nuremberg I knew that a Führer order was transmitted by Goering 
to Heydnch This order was called Final Solution of the Jewish 
Problem 4
With the ostensible purpose of clarifying fundamental questions 
concerning the final solution of the Jewish question SS 
Obergruppenführer Heydnch convened a meeting of the various 
ministries and agencies of the SS SD on January 20 1942 in the 
Berlin suburb of Wannsee 5 At the Wannsee Conference as it has 
subsequently become known Heydnch counseled the fifteen 
officials present that European Jews were first to be transported to 
the conquered East then worked to death and the few tough ones who survived simply put to death 6 And 
so began the transition from the potent but migratory killing of the Einsatzgruppen to the more established 
and methodical ways of the Vernichtungslager or extermination camps
Auschwitz-Birkenau located on the outskirts of Oswiecim Poland was established in the spring of 
1940 as a military camp 7 With the arrival of German prisoners in the summer of the same year however
FIGURE 2 2 A mass grave and map tallying the Einsatzgruppen s work Source Photo The Good Old Days E Klee W Dressen V Ru 
(The Free Press NY 1988) Map Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (U S Government Printing Office Washington DC 1946 p 773)
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FIGURE 2 3 A family in Amsterdam is taken from their 
home Source Dachau Memorial Museum
day being gassed by war s end—a Reich record 11
the character of the camp was forever altered By the 
fall of 1941 Auschwitz which would ultimately 
encompass some thirty nine subsidiaries was a 
center for Sonderbehandlung or special treatment 
the Nazi codeword for extermination 8 As Rudolf 
Hoess noted m his testimony at Nuremberg [t]he 
Final Solution of the Jewish question meant the 
complete extermination of all Jews in Europe I was 
ordered to establish extermination facilities at 
Auschwitz in June 1941 9 For those present at 
Wannsee Auschwitz became the standard against 
which other camps would be measured
With its four enormous gas chambers and 
adjoining crematoria Auschwitz had a capacity for 
death and burial far beyond that of the other death 
camps such as Belzee Chelmno Majdanek 
Treblinka and Sobibor 10 Speed however was 
Auschwitz s hallmark with some 6 000 victims a 
Murderous zeal however was not without its price
The extermination process further taxed the already overburdened administrative and industrial bases 
of Germany a nation locked in a bitter world conflict—with its very existence at stake Even so moving 
millions of Jews across Europe to the death camps in Poland almost always took precedence over the 
transportation of troops and war material Notwithstanding perpetual labor shortages Nazi Germany was 
more interested in gassing than employing the two to three million Jews at their disposal This despite the 
fact that Jewish labor productivity was considered well above the norm because Jews viewed economic 
viability as their last best chance for survival 12
Survival at Auschwitz of course was the exception rather than the rule The camp s commandant 
Rudolf Hoess estimated the number exterminated by gassing and burning at 2 5 million with at least
another 500 000 
succumbing to starvation 
and disease for a grand 
total of 3 million 13 While 
the other camps were no 
doubt as terrifying for their 
inhabitants Auschwitz 
with its wholesale killing 
and medical 
experimentation has in 
many ways become a 
metaphor for the entire 
Holocaust It is not 
surprising then that 
America s response or lack 
thereof to the premier Nazi 
death factory should be 
used as a means of gauging 
the American response to 
the Holocaust as a whole
FIGURE 2 4 Arrival at the train station at Auschwitz-Birkenau The SS select those for 
work while others are sent to the gas chambers Source Dachau Memorial Museum
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Tisi JO TÖW ÏNU Savior or Bystander9
In measuring whether the United States exacerbated Jewish suffering through inaction pundits frequently 
lose the forest for the trees While the nature and extent of the atrocities committed almost demand that a 
measure of blame be fixed outside the Axis it is all too easy to forget that the United States was 
wholeheartedly engaged in an effort to topple the very purveyors of genocide This common cause defense 
reflexively offered in response to questions about the United State s failure to disable Auschwitz is not 
without its limits however The presence of a shared enemy m Adolf Hitler does not explain why the State 
Department constructed deliberate barriers to Jewish immigration
On November 25 1942 The New York Times ran the first authenticated report that the Nazis had 
established a policy to exterminate Jews The story appeared on page 10 That the slaughter of Jews should 
receive such short shrift is not surprising considering that in response to a U S public opinion poll taken 
around the same time that queried which groups menace the country most Jews were listed third just 
behind the Germans and the Japanese Anti Semitism was simply the order of the day Jews were 
unacceptable to many employers and unwelcome at business and social clubs Jewish immigrants were 
also unwelcome as a matter of policy as yearly quotas from 1924 onward allowed four times as many 
British and Irish immigrées as those from all of eastern and southern Europe 14
Three years before reports of the final solution began to surface in the Times American sympathy 
toward the plight of the Jews was tested by the Warner-Rogers Bill a measure designed to exempt 20 000 
Jewish children from prevailing immigration quotas Many prominent Americans believing that Europe 
was trying to dump its Jews on the United States called for the bill s defeat President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt s cousin Laura Delano one of the bill s most virulent opponents even commented twenty 
thousand charming children [will] all too soon grow into 20 000 ugly adults Cognizant of the Warner- 
Rogers Bill s unpopularity President Roosevelt opted to take no action and the bill subsequently died m 
committee 15
Even after the defeat of the Warner-Rogers Bill the coalition of one hundred so called patriotic 
societies brought together to obstruct its passage kept up their anti Semitic campaign and brought it 
national Always at the forefront with weekly radio broadcasts to millions of listeners was Father Charles 
Coughlin a Roman Catholic priest Coughlin s popularity and listenership seemed to grow in spades as he 
repeatedly warned [t]he system of international finance which has crucified the world to the cross of 
depression was evolved by Jews for holding the peoples of the world under control 16 Not surprisingly 
government institutions seemed to reflect prevailing anti Semitic sentiments both in terms of priorities and 
composition of the workforce The State Department—with its singular control over immigration 
decisions— was unfortunately the prime example
Composed almost exclusively of white northern European stock the State Department under the 
leadership of Secretary of State Cordell Hull was anti alien anti immigrant and anti Semitic 17 No one 
represented the biases of his department better than Breckinridge Long Assistant Secretary of State for 
Refugee Affairs Charged in 1940 with primary responsibility for Jewish immigration Long wrote a 
memorandum to the American consuls in Europe outlining how they could secretly and illegally cut into 
immigration [w]e can delay and effectively stop for a temporary period of indefinite length the number 
of immigrants into the United States We could do this by simply advising our consuls to put every 
obstacle in the way which would postpone and postpone and postpone the granting of the visas 18
Not only were immigration quotas for Jews smaller by design then but the American most 
responsible for the fate of Jewish refugees was instructing his subordinates to leave the quotas unfilled 
Quota usage dropped precipitously during Long s tenure While 60 000 Jews should by law have been 
granted entry into the United States by 1940 only half that number were actually allowed in In 
subsequent years just as Hitler s genocidal machine was gathering steam quota usage dropped still 
further to twenty five percent—or 20 000 persons—at the beginning of 1941 and 10 percent at the end of 
that year 19 In 1942 the year most historians agree the United States had direct knowledge of Hitler s 
Final Solution only 6 000 Jewish refugees were granted safe harbor in America
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While the serious decline m Jewish emigration to the United States might well be attributed to the 
effectiveness of Hitler s final solution it is no doubt a strange coincidence that the State Department 
revised its visa application form in 1943—some six months after having been made aware that Jews who 
could not get out would be killed—so that it ran four feet long on each side 20 Had Roosevelt been at all 
concerned it would only have taken a phone call to his appointee Breckinridge Long to see that the 
quotas were filled Instead the Chief Executive allowed the Executive Branch to construct illegal barriers 
to Congressionally mandated quotas 21 For their part American Jews lacked sufficient political clout to 
insist that Congress investigate the calculated bureaucratic delay Jews were also extremely reluctant to 
criticize Roosevelt publicly a man they considered the least disparaging to their cause 22
Rumors of mass Jewish deportations began to reach the west in early 1942 That summer the Nazi 
plan to exterminate the whole of European Jewry was leaked by an anti Nazi German industrialist to 
Gerhart Riegner the representative of a Jewish organization m Geneva Riegner m turn relayed the news 
to the State Department requesting that they alert Rabbí Stephen Wise—a Jewish activist and personal 
friend of Roosevelt s Ever vigilant the State Department simply dismissed the report as a wild rumor 
inspired by Jewish fears and proceeded to suppress the information Two weeks later however Wise 
received the same information through independent channels and approached the State Department about 
it Wise was asked to remain silent until the department verified the reports that millions were slated for 
death 23It did not take long
By November the State Department had pieced together the horrifying puzzle from press accounts 
refugee workers the Red Cross the Polish government in exile and the Vatican A reporting cable read
Evacuated whole Warsaw ghetto murdered 100 000 Jews Mass execution of Jews continues killed by 
poison gas in chambers Convoys of Jews led to their death seen everywhere
The State Department had finally confirmed the systematic annihilation of European Jews 24 Confirmation 
however was not enough for Long to eliminate the barriers to immigration he himself had constructed
For ordinary Americans the horrific nature of the stories coming out of Europe at the time made them
difficult to believe After all twenty 
years earlier the same generation of 
Americans had believed stories of 
German atrocities against the Dutch 
which later turned out to be 
fabrications 25 Roosevelt s sources 
however were of far less dubious 
veracity The president himself met 
with Jan Karski a courier sent to the 
west by the polish resistance who 
described the Belzee death camp in 
sickening detail Karski also alerted 
both Roosevelt and Supreme Court 
Justice Felix Frankfurter to the 
Germans plan to exterminate all of 
European Jewry 26 Human 
intelligence however was but one of 
Roosevelt s sources of information
Evidence corroborating the 
extermination of Jews was also 
derived from the Nazi codes broken 
daily by the British at Bletchley Park 
Unbeknownst to the Germans the 
British listened in as daily logistical 
orders for Auschwitz were transmitted
FIGURE 2 5 A mass grave in the Bergen-Belsen camp Source The 
Belsen Trail Edited by R Phillips (William Hodge and Co 1949)
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in the communications traffic 27 For Winston Churchill the horrific rumors his government had for months 
been receiving finally had independent confirmation Interestingly enough public outrage in Britain to the 
unclassified reports of atrocities was such that politicians were obliged to take action Co opting a 
reluctant Breckinridge Long the British Foreign Office put together a two power discussion of the refugee 
problem in Bermuda98
The outcome of the Bermuda Conference can best be described as underwhelming Then again as 
John Pehle a U S Treasury Department official at the time later noted the Bermuda conference was a 
conference set up to not accomplish anything and the people who represented the United States there 
were given those instructions [sic] Representatives of the Foreign Office and the State Department did 
conclude however that the war had to be won before the Jewish problem could be addressed 29 While 
delaying the rescue of European Jews was no doubt a defensible policy choice considering the scope of 
the allied war effort it does not explain why the State Department saw fit to interfere with the efforts of 
others who tried to pick up the slack
Not long after the failure m Bermuda Rabbí Stephen Wise arrived in Washington with a plan for the 
U S Jewish community to bankroll the rescue of 70 000 Romanian Jews To prevent funds from falling into 
enemy hands however the government required a special wartime license to be approved by both State 
and Treasury Wise quickly submitted the necessary paperwork to State which then proceeded to sit on 
the license for 11 weeks When the request finally reached the Treasury Department it was approved 
within 24 hours Five months after issuing the license during a routine follow up Treasury Secretary Hans 
Morgenthau and his staff discovered that the State Department never transmitted the license to the 
executing authorities in Europe 30
Angered by the State Department s interference with what otherwise would have been Jewish self 
help Secretary Morgenthau the highest ranking Jewish member of the administration demanded a 
meeting with the president On January 16 1994 Morgenthau and his staff made their case for establishing 
a separate refugee agency outside the State Department The president agreed and six days later officially 
reversed the government s policy of obstruction with Executive Order 9417 creating a War Refugee Board 
(WRB) with orders to take all measures to rescue victims of enemy oppression in imminent danger of 
death 31
No victims of enemy oppression were in greater danger of imminent death than those at Auschwitz It 
is no wonder then that among the Board s first orders of business was a request by American Jewish 
leaders that the allies bomb the gas chambers at Auschwitz 32 As WRB director John Pehle observed 
The Jewish agencies themselves weren t sure that they wanted us to arrange this Bombing railroad lines 
is not very effective cause they can be rebuilt overnight so it involved wiping out the extermination 
facility And finally after much soul searching we recommended this to the War Department 33
Notwithstanding the WRB request the War Department was content to peddle the State Department s 
policy of victory before rescue outlined at Bermuda Moreover the War Department maintained that 
bombing the extermination facilities at Auschwitz was impossible for logistical reasons while bombers 
could in theory be dispatched from England accompanying jet fighters lacked the requisite fuel supply to 
make the trip After the war however John Pehle would learn that the War Department had sent bombers 
out of Italy to destroy targets all around Auschwitz and that the WRB had been misled all along 34
The location of Auschwitz after all was no coincidence As early as January 1944 allied bombing 
strategists were analyzing the camp as a potential target on account of its connection to synthetic oil and 
rubber installations 35 Located in a strategic oil refining district the crematoria at Auschwitz were never 
more than forty five miles from the refineries the allies sought to hit And hit they did Some 2 800 sorties 
were flown against the oil refineries during the months when 150 000 Jews were being gassed On two 
occasions in fact fleets of heavy bombers flew past the gas chambers aiming for the I G Farben fuel 
factory less than five miles away A few bombs even hit Auschwitz itself killing eighty five prisoners 
civilians and SS guards 36
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FIGURE 2 6 Photography of the Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination camp taken by a U S 
reconnaissance plane on 25 August 1944 Krema III is clearly seen and the roof vents 
through which the Zyklon B was introduced are visible Source The Pictorial History of the 
Holocaust Edited by Yitzhak Arad (Macmillan Publishing Co NY 1990 p 287)
In 1979 two photo interpreters for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) re analyzed photos taken by 
allied reconnaissance aircraft m preparation for bombing raids Albeit it with the advantage of hindsight 
and better equipment with which to analyze the pictures Dino Brugiom and Robert Poirier discovered that 
beginning with a mission flown on June 26 1944 the purpose and scope of Auschwitz was ascertainable 
Aerial photography taken on August 25 1944 actually recorded the extermination operations in process 
Imagery from September 13 1944 captured a column of some 1 500 Hungarian Jews marching down the 
camp s main road through the open gates into the awaiting gas chamber 37
While the area around Auschwitz remained a hotbed of allied bombing activity throughout the latter 
part of the war the only ordinance that managed to fall on the camp itself were strays And yet the War 
Department incredulously refused repeated requests to bomb the gas chambers and crematoria noting 
that doing so would require the diversion of airpower from decisive operations elsewhere 38 It wasn t that 
the allies couldn t bomb Auschwitz they simply chose not to The question then becomes was such a 
policy defensible—at the time or m retrospect7
Insofar as bombing the railroad tracks is concerned no real benefit could have been derived 
considering that the tracks would probably have been repaired within twenty four hours The Nazis one 
must remember always assigned a higher priority to genocide than to the war effort Bombing the gas 
chambers and crematoria is another story however
There is little doubt that destroying the very instrumentalities of death at Auschwitz would have 
slowed significantly progress toward the final solution Mass murder continued unabated—and Reich 
records were even being set—throughout the fall of 1944 at a time when Hitler s forces were losing on 
almost all fronts 39 Destroying the gas chambers therefore would likely have relegated the SS detachment 
at Auschwitz to the primitive ways of the Einsatzgruppen Guards would have had to kill their prisoners 
close up a psychological burden Himmler sought to avoid with the creation of the death camps This is 
not to say however that the guards at Auschwitz would not have risen to the occasion
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FIGURE 2 7 One of the cremation pits used to bum the victims of the 
gas chambers at Auschwitz These burning pits were used through 
out the summer of 1944 when the extermination was proceeding at 
such a rate that the furnaces could not handle the number of corpses 
Source Auschwitz Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers 
J C Pressac (The Beate Klarsfeld Foundation NY 1989 p 422 )
FIGURE 2 8 Death before liberation Source Dachau Memorial 
Museum
Faced with the prospect of being 
overrun by the allies in April 1945 the 
guards at Dachau dispensed with the 
usual pleasantries and simply shot their 
prisoners One can imagine that without 
more methodical means like gas 
chambers the guards at Auschwitz 
would have opted for the low tech 
approach shooting or burning their 
victims
Bombing the gas chambers 
although feasible would in all likeli 
hood have slowed but not stopped the 
Nazi death machine Hindsight 
unfortunately has framed the options as 
either bombing the gas chambers and 
stopping the killing or doing nothing and 
allowing the killing to continue The 
truth lies somewhere in the middle
While American Jewish leaders 
were the ones proposing the bombing of 
Auschwitz the fact remains that had the 
allies followed their recommendation 
suffering of one sort would have been 
replaced by suffering of a different sort 
Had the proposed raids gone forward 
Jewish prisoners would have died right 
alongside their Nazi captors death by 
shrapnel being only slightly more 
humane than death by gassing Those 
fortunate enough to have survived an 
allied bombing would almost certainly 
have been shot or sent on a death 
march Jewish leaders may or may not 
have understood all the consequences of 
what exactly they were requesting They 
must have known however that any 
bombing scenario would take a heavy 
toll in Jewish lives The stakes were 
great but the suffering still greater
7»r TT X*? tup- What s Past is Prologue
Our seemingly visceral need to blame the United States for not targeting Auschwitz is a function of the 
lingering sense of guilt we share about the atrocities committed there For many the debate over U S 
complicity in the Holocaust is reducible to the hackneyed political expression if you re not part of the 
solution you re part of the problem Applying the phrase to U S actions in World War II however 
clearly paints with too broad a brush The United States was after all bent on Hitler s downfall and 
marshaled its forces accordingly If we are to assign blame the State Department—with its country club 
anti Semitism—should bear the brunt of it Fifty years later it is fair to say that more Jews died as a result 
of trumped up immigration barriers than could possibly have been saved by destroying the gas chambers at 
Auschwitz 40
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CHAPTER 3
“Sizing the Problem” How Many Victims of Soviet State Repression,
1928 to 19539
Jason Sharman
This essay is primarily undertaken as an exercise in quantifying a historical process in this case the 
process of mass repression by a state of its own citizens in the Soviet Union under the rule of Joseph 
Stalin 1928-1953 As perhaps the most bloody episode in a century distinguished by its genocides the 
number of victims of Communism in the Soviet Union in its formative period of industrialization and path 
to super power status retains a strong intrinsic historical interest The contours of the Soviet system—its 
economy and political structures until its demise in 1991—owed a great deal to crucial decisions taken 
and patterns established in the period under examination More broadly the historical analysis on the 
death toll of Stalinism marks an attempt to show what a historical investigation along these lines should 
look like possible methods to be applied and pitfalls to be avoided when investigating historical instances 
of state mass repression In this sense this essay is replete with negative examples of misconceived 
methods and inaccurate conclusions suggestive of the substantial difficulties inherent in such an exercise
The importance of attempting to specify the magnitude of such an event often arises from the fact that 
it marks an important first step to other ends a production of historical raw material then adapted to other 
purposes These other ends are primarily political and moral The number of deaths in the USSR under 
Stalin has been of great political importance both internally and abroad at the time and subsequently 
The Communist regime evinced a peculiar fascination for statistics gross output figures literacy rates 
norms and plan targets were the ubiquitous benchmarks of success and achievement Not all numbers were 
for public consumption however for one of the most important priorities of the authorities in Moscow was 
an obsessive and often counter productive desire for secrecy Subsequently at home and abroad numbers 
(of those killed by state repression as well as those relating to Soviet GDP growth and defense spending) 
have had an important impact in creating or undermining political support for the Soviet Union Finally 
numbers provide an important base from which to reach moral judgments It must be emphasized from the 
outset that this is far from a simple or mechanistic process two million dead is twice as bad as one 
million but only half as bad as four million victims Despite the centrality of positive concerns this essay 
begins with the normative judgment that historical truth is a better foundation from which to reach moral 
conclusions than either falsehood or ignorance
The structure of the essay largely follows a historiographical debate about the number killed as a 
result of state repression m the Soviet Union 1928-1953 By the conclusion of this article readers should 
not only be able to gain a relatively clear idea of how many perished under Stalin s rule but also judge 
the difficulties pitfalls and possible solutions of trying to lift the shroud of secrecy that surrounds state 
crimes in closed societies and thus simplify the process of sizing the problem in comparable instances 
As mentioned above the moral conclusions to be reached largely depend on the reader because numbers 
inform moral judgments they do not determine them It is important then to establish that numbers also 
often have vital political consequences both at the time and retrospectively This paper begins with some 
examples from contemporary Soviet documentation
On March 25 1937 Pravda the official newspaper of the Communist Party announced that the 
glorious Soviet intelligence service headed by the Stalinist People s Commissar N I Yezhov have crushed 
a serpents nest of traitors in the apparatus of Soviet statistics who had exerted themselves to diminish the 
numbers of the population of the USSR The 1937 census board was tried and shot on charges of double 
counting deaths and under recording births as part of a conspiracy with Western imperialism Two years
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later the next census board faked a result hiding the very large number of deaths that had occurred which 
then became the official figure until 1990 On July 2 1937 the Soviet Politburo issued guidance figures 
for the liquidation of social trash and scum for a four month period beginning August 5 the secret 
police were to fulfill targets of 72 950 executions and 186 500 people deported to labor camps to serve 8- 
10 year terms 1
For the Soviet authorities of the time it is safe to say that numbers mattered For Mikhail Gorbachev 
too numbers mattered in that every revelation of the crimes committed by his predecessors complicated 
his efforts to rejuvenate the Party As a Western observer noted statistical revisions have had a political 
role in de legitimizing the Soviet regime and contributing to its collapse 2 Whether the number of those 
killed matters to Genardy Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhinnovsky two long time admirers of Stalin running 
for election will in part be determined by the result of the Russian Presidential election in November 
1996
The processes of revolutionary change in the structures of Soviet state and society that began in the 
late 1920s and continued through out the reign of Joseph Stalin were central to the rise and fall of the 
Soviet Union as a political and economic entity and to Communism in general Collectivization and 
industrialization ended the stalemate of the New Economic Policy and advanced the Soviet regime s 
power both at home and abroad The most outstanding feature of this transformation was the ubiquitous use 
of coercion that resulted in massive and prolonged suffering for the people of the Soviet Union not 
excluding the apparatus itself For this Stalin widely stands condemned by commentators from USSR 
premier Nikita Khrushchev to Russian novelist Alexandr Solzhenitsyn Indeed much of the debate over 
the development of the Soviet Union from 1917 has been an attempt to either temporally extend 
Stalinism so as to condemn the Communist system from October 1917 on or to present Stalin s reign as a 
terrible aberration It is symptomatic of the degree to which this period is associated with the most brutal 
forms of state terror Implicit m most of the debate over Stalinist precursors and continuities is the notion 
that if something produces or is the same as Stalinism it is ipso facto bad
This essay will seek to quantify the scope of state repression by examining the debate initiated by 
S U Rosefielde and S G Wheatcroft concerning the number of victims of Stalinism This exchange 
escalates to include a wide range of sources germane to the topic and nearly all previous prominent 
inquiries along these lines and includes contributions from many other scholars The evolution of their 
debate will be traced with reference to the sources and methodologies employed and the conclusions 
reached More recent material from the post glasnost and post Communist eras will then be used to 
evaluate competing strategies and propositions by comparison with the documentary evidence now 
available which has enabled a substantial degree of confidence that a reasonably firm estimate of the 
number of victims of Stalinism can be given Working in parallel and seemingly in ignorance of this 
exchange is the work by R J Rummel3 whose work provides a counter point in sources and conclusions to 
the mainstream debate This account will cover dekulakisation and the resulting famine deaths resuming 
from Gulag4 forced labor camps and deportations and the recurring purges the greatest of which the 
Yezhovchina 5 convulsed the USSR in the late 1930s
Those persecuted include deported disloyal nationalities 6 kulaks those sentenced under Article 58 
(counter revolutionary crimes) Article 107 (social and economic crimes against the state) the 
collectivization related decrees August 1932 and December 1934 or the 1937 Politburo decree mentioned 
earlier on the execution of former kulaks active anti Soviet elements and criminals Also those not 
tried at all and convicted as a Socially Dangerous Element (SOE) Socially Harmful Element (SVE) 
or being suspected of espionage Sentences were death 7 imprisonment without the right to 
correspondence 8 forced labor in a Gulag camp labor colony special exile banishment or forced labor 
without confinement9
The Pre Glasnost Debate
The number of Stalin s victims has often been characterized by references to thousands tens of 
thousands 10 or millions of people and left at th a t11 Typical of this approach is Graeme Gill who states
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that the number of people killed in the 1930s is held to range from the hundreds of thousands to about 15 
million 12
Historians have often demonstrated a clear aversion to becoming involved in the ill fated numbers 
game 13 While it may seem irrelevant whether the Narodyi Kommisanat Vnutrenmkh Del (NKVD)14 
caused the death of one million two million or twenty million it has a crucial bearing on Soviet 
demography general economic and historical matters as well as the political and moral aspects referred 
to above
Rummel s work is interesting not only in light of the vast disparity between his conclusions and the 
ranged accepted by almost everyone else but also as an example of the failure to communicate research 
and findings among scholars working on the same problems Dominating Rummel s work is the sheer 
enormity of his figures some 62 million dead attributable to Soviet Communism and 44 7 million 1929- 
1954 15 Rummel prefaces his work by alluding to the difficulty in compiling accurate statistics for 
regimes and their agents usually do not record all their murders and what they do record is secret 16 In 
response Rummel seeks to bracket the true figure with composite high and low figures of which a 
prudent or conservative mid range estimate 17 is taken The total figure is broken down into a number of 
sub figures which in turn are taken from a highly selective sample of the relevant literature on Soviet 
history and demography Although both his works on Soviet population catastrophes are published in the 
1990s Rummel makes little mention of the new sources available in the aftermath of glasnost or the 
collapse of the Soviet Union His detailed results are included in the conclusion for the purposes of 
comparison but most significant is his lack of response to the scholarly consensus that his figures are 
much too high in several cases by orders of magnitude Rummel does not enter the broader debate and is 
thus only included parenthetically in the main body of the essay In the context of the debate explored 
below involving historians arguing over figures between half and one tenth of Rummel s the dangers of 
misinformed historical investigation are starkly apparent
In 1980 Steven Rosefielde s article An Assessment of the Sources and Uses of Gulag Forced Labor 
1929-1956 18 sparked off a controversy on the number of Stalin s victims after an earlier article19 sought 
to evaluate the success of Soviet industrialization and the role of forced labor in the economy These 
pieces together with the replies from Wheatcroft 20 draw together almost all of the pre glasnost sources of 
information on Gulag totals Rosefielde estimates his total by using the number of newspapers distributed 
in all places of detention in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Ukraine and 
Byelorussia in 1931 (365 728) together with the newspaper to prisoner ratio of 5 1 21 to produce an 
estimate of 1 8 million prisoners of all types in the three Republics With this a prison29 production index 
for the First Five Year plan—showing an increase of 450 percent between 1930-1933 and a base figure of 
700 000—is used to show a range of 5 5-6 million in Gulag throughout the mid 1930s Several vital 
weaknesses in this tenuous figure are pointed out by Wheatcroft The base figure of 700 000 for 1930 is 
gained by way of sworn testimony from two ex NKVD officers a kind of evidence referred to by 
Wheatcroft as really nothing short of guesses handed down from subjective sources 23 Furthermore the 
assumptions that the production index is directly proportional to prisoner numbers (that is no productivity 
changes) and prisoner numbers are directly proportional to Gulag numbers are highly questionable Even 
more damaging Wheatcroft points out that the prison production data refers only to common criminals 24
The other major stream of evidence referred to economic data The 1941 Secret Soviet Economic 
Plan25 listed the production targets of some of the sectors of the economy Adjusted by Naum Jasny to 
allow for lower zek (Russian slang for a labor camp inmate) productivity and the sectors omitted 26 the 
target set for the NKVD was calculated to employ 2 9 million laborers This figure was attacked by 
Swiamewicz27 as substantially incomplete as forced laborers were usually contracted out to other 
ministries and on this basis Swiamewicz estimates 6 9 million zeks28 were necessary to fulfill the plan 
but this involves some fairly arbitrary estimates of his own 99 on the scale of contracted labor according 
to Wheatcroft In general the 1941 Plan raises as many questions as it answers
The second form of economic evidence deals with discrepancies m wage and employment data 
primarily from censuses30 and projections based on them which are closely examined by Wheatcroft
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Warren Eason writing in 1963 attempts to locate forced laborers m the 1939 census by three methods 
labeled by Wheatcroft the grand residual and residuals A and B 31 The grand residual is the 
difference between Eason s estimate of the 1939 labor force and the size of reported labor categories a 
figure of 8 3 million people 32 Wheatcroft states that the presence of 3 3 million females in this category 
indicates a large non zek population 33 while the remainder is due to an understatement of the size of the 
agricultural work force Residual A is the number of workers in industry construction transport and 
communications m the census (23 7 million) compared to those reported by establishment (17 4 million) 
Residual B is the overstatement of the military by 1 4 million While Rosefielde considers the 7 7 million 
from the two sub totals as zeks 34 Wheatcroft feels that residual B contains enough females to make it 
another unreported category besides the military while residual A includes 2 8 million handicraftsmen and 
individual farmers leaving a total of 3 5 million The Gulag numbers suggested by some of Rosefielde s 
sources35 provoked incredulity from Wheatcroft and others one such skeptic descnbing them as 
fantastic and that they would possibly be closer to the mark if a zero were omitted at the end of each 
of [their] figures 36 and are again dismissed as subjective
An alternative approach is to find out how many Soviet adults had lost their voting rights due to 
incarceration Both N S Timashev and Harold Wool arrived at figures of 2 and 3 million zeks respectively 
for 1937 from analysis of all Union Republican and local elections 37 Wheatcroft bases his estimate on 
this method with provision for SOE and SVE (who were technically able to vote) in conjunction with 
census employment data to arrive at a figure of 4 million in the camps in December 1937 38 in contrast to 
Rosefielde s 10 million39 at the beginning of 1939 It may seem that a disproportionate share of effort is 
spent on Gulag population to the detriment of other factors but Gulag was widely believed to be the most 
common punishment for those who suffered épuration as well as being the biggest killer 40 By way of 
comparison Rummel posits 32 5 million Gulag deaths alone 1929-1954 41 Exiles and forced labor 
colonists were largely ignored before 1988 the assumption being that other forced laborers added around 
20 percent 42 to the Gulag total As there is very little evidence of the death roll from judicial and extra 
judicial executions m isolation Wheatcroft does not seek to find this total but there is no doubt that he is 
uncomfortable with Conquest s 700 000 plus or Medvedev s one million plus43 totals that are supported by 
Rosefielde Wheatcroft implies that a more probable number is at most half of the lowest of these 
suppositions
The focus of attention then began to shift to aggregate deaths and those deaths caused by 
collectivization This includes three separate components First dekulakisation removed those considered 
to be most hostile to the Communists agricultural policies by either execution or deportation 44 
Collectivization was the coercion and resistance that accompanied the actual expropriation of the land 
These were then followed by a catastrophic famine in 1932-1933 concentrated in the North Caucasus and 
especially the Ukraine Famine victims are included in the body count of Stalinism because the mass 
starvation was the result of deliberate political policies and not natural disasters It is however debatable 
whether the famine was due to a poor harvest45 as a result of forced collectivization or an average harvest 
being withheld from the populace 46 Both Rosefielde and Wheatcroft take the regimes culpability for 
famine deaths as a given Both examined the events of 1929-1933 largely in the broader context of 
excess deaths in general
Excess deaths (or excess mortality ) apply to the deficit between the projected number of adults 
surviving from one date to another using normal mortality rates compared to the number that actually did 
survive To this is added the number of children born that die in excess of normal rates 47 If the debate had 
been obstructed by Wheatcroft s rejection of first hand information something similar had been produced 
by Rosefielde s ambivalence toward official statistics 48 The distortion of census results particularly 1937 
and 1939 and their reliability was a vexed question in a series of articles dealing with total deaths for the 
whole 1930s 49 Soviet officials had a strong interest in gaining accurate information to properly manage 
the economy and the 1939 census was widely accepted as genuine in the West This was forcefully 
countered by the fact that Soviet statisticians were subjected to extreme political pressure50 and the 1937 
census was suppressed for political reasons
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The different excess mortality totals put forward in various articles are direct results of assumptions 
on the normal rate of birth and death the problem being normal can be any standard the researcher 
chooses 51 This conundrum is exacerbated by the other major events impacting on Soviet population 
World War I and the Civil War World War II and the resulting annexations 52 While all this does not 
negate the utility of demography per se it does mean that as with other methods employed only an 
estimate can be given and any impression of strict mathematical precision is illusory
Rosefielde writes that higher excess death rates were concealed through out the 1930s and 1940s 
including the 1939 census which was inflated to 170 5 million to hide the massive loss of life since the 
1926 census These deaths were then carried over to the 1959 census where they were attributed to the 
Great Patnotic War 53 Central to Rosefielde s massive excess deaths of 28 6-32 4 million 1929-1949 54 is 
the figure he claims represented the suppressed 1937 census 156 million supplied by Anton Antonov- 
Ovseenko 55 Rosefielde also uses the Soviet demographer Urlams s higher birth rates 1940-1949 The 
benchmark for Soviet demographic studies of this period is the work of Frank Lonmer 56 Rosefielde takes 
issue with his statement that natural mortality in the USSR was understated by 27 percent in the 1926 
census (that is Rosefielde feels the life expectancy of the average citizen was higher than Lonmer allows 
for) More tentatively a break down of excess deaths is suggested including 4 7 million deaths from 
Gulag 1929-1939 5 8 million from famine another 11 4 million zek deaths 1939-1949 and a terror 
residual of 6 1 million 57 based on Rosefielde s camp estimate of a mean level of 5 5 million for the 
1930s with a 10 percent per annum fatality rate 58
These figures are rejected as highly inflated not only by Rosefielde s nemesis Wheatcroft but also by 
Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver59
Wheatcroft comments that apart from his over imaginative reporting Rosefielde yet again fails to 
investigate the data thoroughly 60 Antonov-Ovseenko s 1937 census is rejected as pure speculation 
The Urlams birth figures are attacked as they are merely an estimate of 1932 birth rate applied 1931-1934 
when the figures are almost certainly lower for 1933 and 1934 Wheatcroft is more comfortable with the 
estimates of Lonmer and other Western demographers like N Sifman61 and S Biraben for birth rates New 
evidence claimed by Rosefielde to support a figure of 5 8 million collectivization deaths is dismissed as 
suppositions Wheatcroft prefers a significantly higher war time military and civilian casualty totals than 
Rosefielde and all of his opponents feel Rosefielde s birth rates for 1941-1945 are inflated Wheatcroft 
states that there is little demographic evidence to indicate that the numbers [of 1929-1933 deaths] were 
nearly as large as 5 million 62 Using a slight modification of Lonmer s population trends Wheatcroft 
asserts at most 3-4 million were victims of collectivization 63 while excess deaths 1926-1939 were at 
most 6 million 64 Furthermore he feels that wild unscholarly estimates serve neither science nor 
morality 65 One can only wonder what Wheatcroft s reaction to Rummel s conclusions would be Barbara 
Anderson and Brian Silver produce figures of 500 000 3 2 million and 5 5 million excess adult deaths 
1926—193966 (thus the maximum figure is 11 times the minimum figure) and a 1939 population deficit (a 
population deficit does not represent actual deaths but rather the difference between the actual population 
and a projected one based on given birth and mortality rates)67 of between zero and 24 million68 people If 
any further proof was required to show demographic conclusions sensitivity to the researcher s 
assumptions this is it Seemingly minor adjustments in assumed base figures for birth and death rates 
result in radically different totals
The Post Glasnost Findings
By 1988 the debate over the scope of the Stalinist death toll in the various economic and demographic 
contexts had escalated to include nearly all the relevant sources on collectivization Gulag numbers the 
Great Purge and population trends of the time Rosefielde s estimates were greeted with skepticism at 
best and every commentator who mentioned his methodology was implicitly or explicitly critical New 
material from the Soviet Union publicized under the auspices of Gorbachev s glasnost subsequent to the 
collapse of Communism provided for the continuation of the debate and a refinement of earlier tentative 
and disputed conclusions At the grass roots level m the USSR the Memorial association was founded69
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and sought the opening of those archives containing material on the state repression which were divided 
into three branches state archives proper 70 institutional archives71 and party archives 72
At the most basic level evidence to support the roughly one million executions was produced by the 
excavation from mass graves from Minsk7"1 to the Altai three of which contained a total of 146 000 
bodies 74 The KGB released a figure of 786 098 sentenced to death and shot under Article 58 1931-195375 
and 3 778 234 arrests under Article 58 but at the time it was held that it is in the highest degree unlikely 
that this represents anywhere near the total executions 76 Wheatcroft mentions the literary support for 
the high end of the body count77 before going on to the need for serious unemotional historical 
investigation in a 1990 article 78
Wheatcroft and Alec Nove79 go a long way to conclusively rebut Rosefielde s death toll by way of 
new primary population data and information pointing to a very low Gulag total The Gulag population is 
shown to be 994 000 in 1937 1 360 000 in 1939 and 1 560 000 in 1941 80The Gulag archipelago was at its 
most populous in 1953 having 1 727 970 inmates 81 My instinctive reaction writes Nove must have 
been the same as others surely much too low7 82 This is emphatically true as these figures are less than 
half of the lowest pre glasnost estimates (although by way of comparison the number held in all forms of 
detention in Tsarist Russia peaked at 184 000 m 191283) even if exiles and colonists are more numerous 
than earlier supposed 84 Gulag fatality averaged 70 per 1 000 a year between 1934 and 1947 reaching 233 
per 1 000 m 1942
While this marked a very important addition to knowledge of Gulag some uncertainties remained 
Nove s data is based on that of the Soviet historians Viktor Zemskov85 and V V Tsaplm 86 but both have 
slightly different totals for some annual Gulag figures Also troublesome is the categonzation of 
spetsposelentsy (special settlers) and trudposelentsy (labor settlers) who lived in a state of semi freedom 
having to live in specified Gulag colonies do specified jobs without civil rights (such as they were) and 
regularly report to authorities numbering 1 017 133 in 1936 and 938 552 in 1939 87 Controversy over the 
spetskontingent census heading which covers the armed forces NKVD88 and all under NKVD jurisdiction 
mean that the total in forced labor camps and colonies m January 1937 varies from 1 3 million to 2 
million 89 In early 1953 at least 5 346 178 people had been serving terms in prisons and labor camps or 
were in exile 90 From 1937-1950 there were 8 803 178 people who passed through the labor camp system 
and over 11 8 million91 between 1934-1953 (again remembering that Rummel holds that 32 5 million 
deaths occurred in Gulag 1929-1954 almost three times the number that passed through) The 1937 census 
was revealed as 162 million (Rosefielde s projection based on 156 million is thus shown to be spurious) 
and distrust of official statistics was fully vindicated with the revelation that not only did TsUNKhU92 
compile ersatz figures for public consumption but even some of the secret figures were faked 93 The 1939 
census was 168 8 million (not 170 5 million the official figure) discounting the fact that many deaths in 
NKVD custody were not registered 94
The new census data enabled excess mortality for the 1930s to be estimated with a reasonable degree 
of accuracy With past experience in mind it is of course prudent to state that any such figure is a fragile 
construction at best more optimistically it must be recalled that previous estimates have been attempted 
with very much less reliable data A figure of 10 million95 excess deaths 1930-1939 is produced by the 
Soviet demographers Mark Toits and Vsevolod Vasilievich Tsaplin working from secret official birth and 
death statistics 1928-1937 the 1937 census the 1939 census and unregistered death estimates 96 
Contributing to this were 1 4 million Kazakhs said to have fled but who actually starved 1 3 million 
NKVD registered deaths over 3 2 million Ukrainian famine victims (from total famine deaths of 7 
million97) and 1-1 5 million other dekulakisation deaths a remainder of 1 5-2 million is left for the period 
from the beginning of 1937 to the end of 1938 Possibly adding to this is the anomalous position of 803 000 
prisoners transferred from other places of detention or released but who may have in fact comprised 
additional unregistered deaths 98 Including executions for 1939-1953 99 Gulag deaths of approximately 1 3 
million 1940—1953100 (though Rummel estimates 23 million) and the death of those in exile prisons and 
colonies 101 a total figure of 12-13 million dead as a result of Stalinism is obtained assuming that the 
803 000 prisoners were in fact released or transferred Because Rummel uses slightly different categories
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it is not possible to make unadjusted comparisons across most of his categories but as mentioned earlier 
the total he comes to in 1994 for the period 1929-1954 is 44 7 million
Supplementing this total are further figures for Gulag numbers and collectivization deaths in separate 
articles by J Arch Getty Gabor Tamas Rittersporn and Zemskov 102 and Wheatcroft and Davies The latter 
is a synthetic account of population catastrophes in Russia and the USSR from World War I to the end of 
World War II Under the category of the second demographic convulsion (1926-1939) they posit excess 
mortality to the scale of 10 million The largest source of uncertainty which may mean this figure is 
understated by several million is once again initial assumptions regarding birth rates during the famine 
1932-33 103 Including those deaths after 1939 Wheatcroft and Davies findings are closely congruent to 
those of Nove as they are based on almost the same data but with differing assumptions Getty 
Rittersporn and Zemskov provide more details on officially registered executions 681 692 shot 1937-38 
799 455 shot 1921-1953 104 As can be seen the most recent material serves to fill in the broader 
understanding achieved by 1991-1992
The post glasnost and post Communist totals are the most accurate available and will be serve as a 
benchmark 105 The most striking conclusion is the failure of all methods of estimation (or perhaps less 
euphemistically guessing) even the most broad and cautious demographically based estimates of 
Anderson and Silver 106 to consistently produce figures even in the right order of magnitude Even with the 
benefit of new information Wheatcroft suggested only 4-5 million deaths 1929-1933 in 1990 107 before 
revising this upwards in 1994 Wheatcroft s figure for the excess deaths category 1926-1939 was slightly 
closer to the post glasnost total but official distortion of census results and seriously understated birth 
rates for the early 1930s foiled his efforts Over reliance on census data is difficult to excuse and is 
surprising when Wheatcroft s normally cautious approach is taken into account As early as 1930 the 
statistical bureaus were purged and it was announced that Statistics are a weapon in the fight for 
Communism 108 Clearly data compiled by these organizations were not going to be an unbiased reflection 
of statistical realities This said it must be added that problems with census data does not excuse Rummel 
from failing to even mention it m his 1994 work
Rosefielde and a host of others109 (apart from Rummel) were guilty of grossly exaggerating the death 
figures for 1929-1949 particularly those relating to the Great Purge Rosefielde s stubborn adherence to 
the unsubstantiated hearsay of Antonov-Ovseenko s 1937 census despite the fact that this source110 
contained many other dubious claims invalidates most of his demographic material Rosefielde s 
ignorance of Soviet military and civilian casualties 1941-1945 is inexplicable and as a whole his 
writings are constantly dogged by an air of implausibility largely a result of his persistence in using 
evidence after it has been discredited 111 Rosefielde s failure to ascertain the number of forced laborers is 
much more understandable as it must be stressed that the glasnost Gulag figures112 ran counter to all 
expectations and completely refute the ability of first hand accounts or extrapolations in trying to discover 
such figures
It may have been expected that much of the debate over how many million deaths the Soviet elite 
was responsible for could be traced back to ideological factors that in calculating the body count the 
hawk went high and the dove low 113 Perhaps surprisingly this does not seem to have been the case 
Wheatcroft goes to some lengths to point out that he fully appreciates the massive scale of suffering and 
does not regard himself as defending Stalin s historical record To this end he states The memory of 
the millions who died prematurely in this period is not honored by having their numbers inflated by a 
factor of 3 or 4 so that the figures become meaningless 114 As Rummel s earlier work particularly Lethal 
Politics Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder since 1917us would suggest he certainly has no time for 
apologists but Rummel s massively overstated totals seem to have more to do with flawed methods rather 
than political bias as such The four dekamegamurders investigated by Rummel involve two totalitarian 
regimes of the Left and two of the Right and m general the degree of exaggeration seems to hold across 
governments of all political persuasions
The secrecy and confusion surrounding the true extent of the scope of Stalin s crimes seems in many 
ways to have been one of his enduring successes 116 Forty years after his death reliable figures are only
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just beginning to emerge on the scope of the suffenngs endured under his rule In this sense the 
investigation into the magnitude of state repression in the Soviet Union 1928-1953 provides a daunting 
precedent for scholars attempting to reveal the costs of comparable crimes in Cambodia Rwanda and 
China where census data is unavailable and (in the last case) any documents that do exist and are 
relevant to state terror are locked away by the successors of those who perpetrated the repression In the 
Soviet Union though the advent of new sources has meant a more secure range of figures has been 
established strengthening consensus that whatever the exact number of deaths it represents a 
sufficiently large and disgraceful scale of inhumanity 117 to justify Conquest s reference to the Stalin 
holocaust 1,8
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Appendix 1 Summary of Estimates Advanced
In order to clarify the range of estimates for the number of victims of state repression the following table 
shows pre and post Glasnost estimated deaths An immediate caveat that must be noted is that it is 
difficult to get a set of estimates that compare like with like Different scholars examine different periods 
bounded either because the existence of census data (for example 1926) or political happenings (for 
example the onset of collectivization 1928-29) Where a range has been estimated the mid point has 
been taken The composite figure is a synthesis of the most widely accepted post glasnost figures for 
between 1928-1953
TABLE 1 Pre and Post Glasnost Estimated Deaths
Number of Victims Period Examined Population Examined
Pre Glasnost Estimates
Anderson and Silver 3 2 million 1926-1939 Adult Excess Deaths
S G Wheatcroft 6 0 million 1926-1939 Excess Deaths
S U Rosefielde 30 5 million 1929-1949 Excess Deaths
Post Glasnost Estimates
Wheatcroft and Davies 10 0 million 1926-1939 Excess Deaths
Toits and Tsaphn 10 0 million 1930-1939 Excess Deaths
Composite figure 12 0 million 1928-1953 Excess Deaths
R J Rummel 44 7 million 1929-1954 Excess Deaths
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PART II
Contemporary Case Studies of Violence
CHAPTER 4
Images of Rwandan Refuge, Public Health and Security
Niranjan S Karmk
The camera has an interest in turning history into spectacle but none in reversing the process At 
best the picture leaves a vague blur in the observer s mind strong enough to send him into battle 
perhaps but not to have him understand why he is going
—Denis Donoghue Irish educator author 
The State o f the Language Radio Talk 1980
Introduction TVs and Death
Over the course of 1994 I watched as did many Americans with horror the images of slaughter and death 
that were beamed from Rwanda each evening to my television and covered the pages of my morning 
newspaper As the focus of these images shifted from those of civil strife and genocide to those of 
malnutrition and disease I became confused and lost Why were these people killing each other and why 
did children have to die of treatable diseases9 As I began to search for answers to these questions I came 
across many disturbing and disquieting findings concerning the media and international humamtariamsm 
This paper discusses these findings and provides a series of steps that can be taken to more responsibly 
address disease and war
Disease and war have moved hand in hand throughout human history to often profoundly affect the 
course of human events War has traditionally been given the spotlight because of the human actions and 
decisions which push war and its consequent tragedies forward The historian William McNeill in his 
monograph Plagues and People examines how disease has played a significant role in the course of human 
history For example he argues that it is a mistake to view the European conquest of the New World 
purely as one in which armies battled Native Americans when in fact it was largely the actions oí 
diseases like smallpox (and the human aspects of its intentional spread) that decimated the native 
populations The narratives of disease and war are partially intertwined m this way producing death on 
both large and small scales making it easy to mix thoughts about disease and warfare 1
Emily Martin has shown the ways in which military metaphors become embedded m discourses about 
disease and immunity in the Western biomedical canon 2 Such metaphors begin to close the rhetorical 
distance between disease and warfare by analogizing and thereby equating the two Consequently we 
must begin to ask whether it is possible that the moral distance and agency differentials between disease 
and war can also become obscured9 What happens when narratives about disease and warfare become 
clouded as in the case of Rwanda9 How do the stories change when disease is portrayed as an agent of 
action and what other stories are hidden in this process9 These are just some of the questions that both the 
media and medical community need to seriously consider when addressing both infectious disease and 
modern warfare
Part I No Images of Death3
As early as 1991 human rights monitors were warning of the impending danger of a significant civil war in 
Rwanda 4 These monitors noted consistently that the level of angry rhetoric had increased and that 
significant centnst/moderate leaders had either disappeared or been killed under suspicious circumstances 
All of these calls went unheard by the major media sources of the Western world In 1990 the year that 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda the only images m sixteen New York
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Times stones5 are two pictures and two maps The first photo (October 23 1990) shows a refugee camp in 
southern Uganda where there is large sea of people standing m an open field In the foreground stand a 
woman and child The scene is one of refugees patiently waiting for the distribution of humanitarian 
supplies As the year came to a close the RPF and President Habyanmana appeared to be on the road to 
a peaceful settlement The images of death and destruction remain hidden quietly behind the veneer of 
humanitarian aid and international disinterest
In 1991 The New York Times returned to its standard Third World topics by presenting articles on 
AIDS and birth control in Rwanda with a brief mention of ongoing civil unrest evacuation of foreign 
nationals and another peace accord Such a myopic glance toward Africa and the Third World shows the 
fear mongenng and exoticisizing that takes place when covering the Third World Many have noted that 
when covering Africa Western writers seem to only focus on AIDS and monkeys and their theoretical 
interrelations 6
The extent to which simians resurface in narratives about Rwanda is indeed surprising On May 29 
1992 the world is shown the first casualty of the Rwandan civil war The headline reads Famous Ape 
Tounst Lure Is Shot Dead and the first photo of an individual killed by the Rwandan civil war is of a 
silverback gorilla7 named Mnthi The article portrays Mrithi s killing as one of mistaken identity by 
claiming that a Rwandan solider or RPF rebel probably mistook Mnthi for an enemy solider and shot in 
panic This explanation at once conveys moral outrage at the killing of a basically peaceful animal while 
on some level legitimating the possible murder of an enemy By depicting the gorilla as the innocent 
victim and the humans as rationalist soldiers who are caught m the midst of a ethnically based war the 
story and image serve to strip away the immorality of killing itself in favor of eliciting a sympathetic and 
angry response from the reader And there can be little doubt that the story and an editorial that followed 
in March 1993 by anthropologist Dieter Steklis helped to engage international support for the protection of 
the mountain gorillas
I do not wish to reduce the fact that a great animal and endangered species was killed needlessly but 
I do want to draw attention to the way in which this story obscures many others and appeals to a type of 
pop psychology journalism where the minuscule is made large and the significant made small What of the 
hundreds of people who were simultaneously being killed because of their political views9 Loss of tourist 
dollars due to the reduction of a wild type safari seems to herald greater international attention m this 
circumstance than political and social repression We still do not hear the voices of the human dead or see 
their faces until well into 1994
Part II Images of Tribal War
The magic o f photography is metaphysical What you see in the photograph isn t what you saw at the 
time The real skill o f photography is organized visual lying
—Terence Donovan British photographer 
Guardian November 19 1983
Significant news coverage of the Rwandan civil war and depiction of deaths appear in The New York 
Times beginning on April 7 1994 This is one day after the aircraft carrying President Juvenal 
Habyanmana of Rwanda and President Cypnen Ntaryamira of Burundi was shot down during a return trip 
from a conference of African leaders President Habyanmana was m the process of negotiations with the 
RPF to establish a power sharing regime outlined m the Arusha Accords The peace plan and concurrent 
cease fires collapsed completely after the downing of the aircraft Many scholars and human rights 
activists have outlined and examined in detail the politics of these assassinations and have generally 
concluded that Habyanmana was targeted by hard line members of the Hutu elite (of which he was a 
member) who did not want share power with the RPF consisting of Tutsi members 8
The images that began to assail the world were largely centered on the human dimensions of war and 
violence Tens of thousands of people were killed Initially Hutu were slaughtering Tutsi then as the RPF
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remobilized Tutsi began to kill Hutu The numbers killed and the scale of refugee migrations were and are 
still staggering Up to one million dead and as many as 2 2 million people displaced 9
It is difficult to be critical of news coverage of crises of this magnitude Many defenders of the media 
may claim (perhaps somewhat correctly) that it is a small miracle and a testament to the reporters of the 
various news agencies who place themselves in these difficult circumstances that enable people around 
the world to witness first hand the violence and horror that exists in our modern world Nevertheless while 
I am hesitant to lay blame directly on individuals there can be little doubt that news coverage not only 
portrays situations but also shapes them and affects them in multiple ways An awareness of this is 
critical both for the viewers and for the reporters/photographers who create the images and stories we read 
and see This paper attempts to bring critical spotlights to key factors that recur in media portrayals of the 
Third World or Developing World 10
The Western media portrayed the Rwandan conflict as a product of tribal factions On the surface this 
is exactly what Rwanda embodied Hutus killing Tutsi and Tutsis killing Hutus Journalists unaware of the 
history or politics of the region who dropped into Rwanda for the few months of the conflict were unlikely 
to uncover any deeper stories Nevertheless long term observers and regional specialists have produced a 
strikingly different a much more subtle and fearfully complex narrative which implicates the countries in 
the West quite directly in the tragedy of Rwanda
Several scholars and journalists have detailed some of the external international connections which 
were obscured by major Western news media and continue to remain hidden 11 They show that three 
significant policies play into producing the human dimension of destruction in Rwanda First Belgian 
colonial policies formalized and standardized the tribal classifications that we now know as Hutu and 
Tutsi 12 These classifications originated from local tribal groups and have extended from the end of 
Belgian colonial occupation post World War II to the present In terms of physical differences the tribes 
are virtually indistinguishable therefore without identity cards (also a Belgian colonial tool) with which 
to specify tnbal grouping it would have been difficult to distinguish Hutu from Tutsi
As the stereotypes of physical characteristics do not always provide sufficient identification— and can
even be totally misleading— it was the identity cards demanded at the roadblocks set up by the militias that
acted as the signature on a death warrant 13
In many respects the identity cards imprinted with tribal group served the same purpose that 
eyeglasses served for the Cambodian massacres and circumcision for the Jewish Holocaust by the Nazis 
Combine these markers with angry rhetoric against the enemy and you have given the tools of violence to 
an entire population 14
Second Bourmaud and Shalom point to the growing evidence that the French government supported 
the Hutu government with arms and weapons because they found their politics much more appealing 15 
These connections remain squarely outside the highly focused media narrative which plays to ancient 
hatreds and tribal wars The small handful of historical pieces in the mainstream media emphasized 
the ways in which previous slaughters by one group or another led into the current round of violence None 
of these stories sought to show how the residues of colonial policies combined with current French foreign 
policy16 to favor certain classes of Rwandan society and in turn fed the hatreds which appeared as ethnic 
and tribal conflicts
Finally one of the most important stories which was left out of mainstream reports centers on the 
critical role that international economic institutions played in producing the conflict in Rwanda The 
pictures that assail us through The New York Times simply are unable to capture the institutional roots of 
the conlfict Michel Chossudovsky has'traced out many of these factors in his paper Economic Genocide 
in Rwanda 17 In it he argues that the actions of the Worldbank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
their zeal to reform Rwanda s economy and remove it from international assistance programs forced 
economic policies on the Rwandan government which removed all official economic safety nets and left 
the Rwandan economy in shambles after the collapse of the international coffee market in the late 1980s 
With the price of coffee plumetting and the Rwandan franc repeatedly devalued (by order of the
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Worldbank and IMF) the general population which depended on coffee production as the country s major 
industry was left destitute and impoverished
This recreated conditions in which power hungry officials and leaders could sow the seeds of civil war 
and genocide Hatreds which in a prospering economy could not and would not have surfaced soon 
became apparent and the collapse of civil society soon followed Where are the Worldbank and IMF in 
the depictions of genocide and mass death that coat the pages of The New York Times in 1994? The New 
York Times staff would have done better to show a picture of the Worldbank headquaters in Washington 
alongside the destruction in Rwanda rather than trying to hoist the blame on the implausible and racially 
biased depictions that tribal war stories showed The Worldbank and IMF while not directly responsible 
for killing people in Rwanda are examples of the institutions whose actions are critical to understanding 
the dynamics of genocide and mass death in Rwanda
Part III Images and Agency
In America the photographer is not simply the person who records the past but the one who invents 
it
—Susan Sontag U S essayist On Photography18
Agency plays a critical role in evaluating imagery from Rwanda The ways in which agency is ascribed or 
stripped act as a powerful medium through which to influence public policy and international perception 
Agency and its related topic power figure prominently into current academic debates Anthropologist 
and philosopher of science Bruno Latour has tried demonstrating the importance of bringing both human 
and non human actors into discussions of social phenomena 19 Such an equalization has produced a great 
deal of insightful scholarship in social studies of science and many other fields Nevertheless as Susan 
Leigh Star has shown focusing purely on agency risks reifying existing power relations 20 In such a frame 
looking for the absent agents (or those who fail to act) becomes just as important as examining existing 
actors
In Rwanda an initial view could equate disease and warfare The former is largely a non human agent 
and the later is the human agent In several respects the media accomplished this task by showing that 
both disease and war killed significant numbers of people in Rwanda Such a simplistic one dimensional 
analysis leaves the nature of non human agency m this context unexplored and the layers of human 
agency beneath disease can escape unexamined In fact Rwanda demonstrates some interesting rhetorical 
maneuvers Disease becomes more like war and the agency of war almost disappears As Alain Destexhe 
has argued that
there is a great danger in the way the media applied the term Holocaust to the devastation wrought by 
the cholera epidemic in Goma which has the largest concentration of Rwandan refugees in Zaire This puts 
the medical disaster that resulted from the massive influx of refugees as a consequence of genocide on the 
same level as the genocide itself a premeditated mass crime systematically planned and executed 21
The images that the media sent to the United States show the multiple ways m which agency remains 
unproblematized especially with regard to gender and stigmatization Placing disease on the same moral 
and agency plane as warfare hides the subinteractions produced by these phenomena and risks placing 
undue emphasis on the non human aspect of agency Responsibility is easier to abrogate if a non human 
agent can be blamed for causing the deaths m Rwanda
President Clinton failed to use the term genocide with regard to the events in Rwanda until after 
cholera began spreading through the camps of Goma 22 The inversion of morality and culpability questions 
some very basic tenants of the new world order and its concomitant dissolution of humanitarian norms and 
boundaries Can cholera ever be genocidal and if so then what of other non human agents9 Will the future 
of moral judgment rely exclusively on the destructive capacities of non human agents9 Finally will 
citizens continue to allow their politicians and leaders to escape through rhetorical holes by merely 
examining the superficial aspects of social and political events9
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Gendered Soldiers/Ungendered Diseases/Gendered Sufferers
The imagery from Rwanda seems to play with issues of gender by constantly switching between highly 
gendered contextual scenes to ungendered layout centered on the destruction wrought by infectious 
diseases In the early phases of media coverage of Rwanda (that is April and May 1994) soldiers and 
military scenes play prominently in stories and the front pages of The New York Times These images are 
almost exclusively of men holding and carrying weapons or riding in trucks with other soldiers Guns and 
the power that they portray depict a country in the midst of a military coup and the shifting of power from 
one masculinist center to another As the tables turned and the RPF gained some success the Hutus began 
fleeing the country and a radical shift in imagery occurs With the first few killings when single bodies 
are the focus of images they appear to be largely male Political violence seems to be the preserve of 
males and as objects and actors they retain the central thematic power
Women and children21 become the centers of attention as refugee becomes a keyword in the stories 
originating in Rwanda When the crowds of people begin flowing into neighboring countries they are 
portrayed as women and children or the very old and infirm These are the people who deserve protection 
and are not the killer males who originated the violence or so the international humanitarian mantra goes 
Nevertheless males did flee just as often as females—the able bodied as often as the old or young The 
re gendering of violence takes place again when refugees begin to have skirmishes with the Zairian 
soldiers guarding them in Goma and other refugee camps The media reports once again filled with 
masculinist narratives that Hutu rebels were rearming and retraining themselves in the camps Gender 
becomes essential to creating a threat because women and children can hardly be seen as threats to the 
Zairian military
Late in the summer and fall of 1994 infectious disease once again shifted the imagery of Rwanda to 
an ungendered phase Bodies dying of cholera were shown stacked and thrown pushed into mass graves 
and buried in open ditches These bodies have no specific gender they are simply deaths attributed to 
infectious disease and contaminated water supplies Absent from these images are the actors who could 
have prevented these deaths The international community and United States remain silent Western 
countries had the portable water purification systems food and medicine that could have saved many of 
the ungendered bodies who died in the camps of Goma In a desperate attempt to bring in needed supplies 
international humanitarian aid agencies began their own media campaign by regendering these bodies 
The standard image became that of a child left motherless because the parent had died of cholera After 
weeks of stalling the United States and international humanitarian bureaucracies (which in many 
circumstances can respond overnight) began to flow into the beleaguered refugee camps Gender in this 
context served a powerful role in defining the nature of both war and disease and their relations to 
international humanitarian action
Stigma A Very Old Killer
Sociologist Erving Goffman argues that an attribute is a stigma especially when its discrediting effect is 
very extensive sometimes it is also called a failing a shortcoming a handicap It constitutes a special 
discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity 24 He continues by saying that not all undesirable 
attributes are at issue but only those which are incongruous with our stereotype of what a given type of 
individual should be
Cholera played a powerful role in stigmatizing Rwandan refugees because of the relation between 
disease and international asylum procedures International law recognizes the rights of the refugees to seek 
protection and sanctuary in foreign countries Although recently many Western governments have begun to 
restrict and reduce their generous asylum laws the possibility still existed for many refugee women and 
children to gain protection in the West As soon as the stigma of infectious disease was placed on these 
refugees asylum became a virtually impossible outcome Recent reports concerning infectious disease 
have created the concept of emerging infectious diseases and portrayed them as significant threats to 
the United States 25 Invariably these diseases originate from the wilds of Africa or Asia and threaten the 
safety and security of the United States and its European neighbors
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Ebola Richard Preston s Hot Zone and the blockbuster movie Outbreak26 have all fed the fears of 
U S citizens about infectious disease 27 Refugees who carry cholera became seen as harbingers of death 
via disease and resettlement in the West becomes a risky political move for government officials What 
community would want to have cholera stricken children in their midst7 What about our American 
children and their health7 These fears originating from the lay understanding of infectious disease never 
consider the fact that cholera is largely treatable through Oral Rehydration Therapy or that cholera and 
many other infectious diseases are endemic to North America as well as Africa and Asia Yet citizens of 
the United States never see or hear about cholera( in their midst because it is a disease of poverty and poor 
sanitation In addition the few cases that do emerge in the United States are successfully identified and 
treated by the current health care system
Nevertheless the stigma of disease has played and continues to play a significant part in the portrayal 
of immigrants refugees and minorities as threats to the national safety of U S citizens Historian Alan 
Kraut shows how the fears of disease have always accompanied successive waves of immigrantion to the 
United States 28 The current wave of anti immigrant rhetoric which fills much of the airways of U S media 
can be seen as part of greater whole which perceives all outsiders as potential threats Refugees labeled 
with the infectious diseases of cholera and dysentery can hold little of hope of finding a sponsor country 
who will to take them in from Africa This diverges significantly from the rhetoric that came forward 
through Bosnia where Europeans were being slaughtered Initially the United States rescued many 
Bosnian children through foster care and special refugee resettlement programs In the Bosnian example 
religion played a role m stigmatizing refugees In the current politics of international refugee protection 
you are likely to be saved by Western governments if you are a white Christian girl from Europe rather 
than a black Muslim man from Africa The stigma of disease is disproportionately carried on the back of 
the later than the former for no other reason than this is where people want to see the stigma It is far 
easier to deny refugees asylum because they are a potential disease threat than it is to ’deny them on the 
basis of religion or race Even those who are completely racist and bigoted must answer to the United 
States Constitution m its present form But the Constitution provides very little protection to those who 
carry disease whether they are treatable or not Given these circumstances Rwandan refugees hardly 
stood a chance
Structural Violence and International Humamtarianism
Paul Farmer has taken several initial steps to define a pragmatic analytical conception of structural 
violence 09 He argues that simply pointing to factors is insufficient and that these factors need to be seen 
in the light of a geographically broad and historically deep political economy of suffering He suggests two 
axes along which suffering can be analyzed gender and race/ethmcity These are hardly the only axes 
along which to trace analytic thinking but they are ones which shape events m significant ways Farmer 
goes on to argue that cultural explanations that stress the plasticity and diversity of human experience 
cannot and should not be used as a justification of suffering
In short it is one thing to make sense of extreme suffering— a universal activity surely— and quite 
another to explain it The social and economic forces that dictate life choices in Haiti s Central Plateau 
affect many millions of individuals and it is m the context of these global forces that the suffering of 
individuals receives its appropriate context of interpretation 30
In essence this paper has been an initial attempt to trace out the dynamics of just one of the forces 
that Farmer alludes to in the later part of the quote the media As one of several social forces the media 
exerts a strong structural influence on the lives and outcomes of catastrophic events and deserves some 
degree of focused analysis to understand its effects
What does such an analysis bring to the study of imagery from Rwanda7 First this analytic model 
allows us to the see the multiple ways in which agency tribalism and gender play into the narratives 
surrounding Rwandan refugees The media created false or error ridden stones intentionally or 
unintentionally (the former due to planned violence and the later due to ignorance) In either case these 
stories made use of the very markers that we traditionally rely on to make judgments as to who deserves
I
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humanitarian assistance By taking Farmer s conception of a political economy of suffering senously we 
find that the structural violence wrought upon Rwanda through preventable disease and internationally 
supported warfare was one in which international structures manipulated other structures leaving the pawns 
(Rwandans) to die for causes whose purposes may never be absolutely clear
The debates that came forward through the structures of media and government were those that had no 
answer Were the Hutu using refugee camps to hide rearm and enter into more violence9 Should 
humanitariamsm turn a blind eye to these actions or should they act punitively against the entire refugee 
population by shutting down all relief operations9 Such questions have no answer because they hinge on 
each individual person s moral position Nevertheless it is certain that these debates had a chilling effect 
on the goals and actions of humamtananism The costs of inaction in these circumstances can be counted 
in bodies Structural violence is a complex phenomena because it originates from policies and institutions 
put in place by for the most part well meaning individuals I have little doubt that most aid agencies 
international organizations and governments believed that they were helping to relieve suffering m 
Rwanda but in doing so some of these same structures caused tremendous suffering on other often hidden 
or obscured levels
The Importance of Theory in a Crisis
The greatest felony in the news business today is to be behind or to miss a big story So speed and 
quantity substitute for thoroughness and quality for accuracy and context The pressure to compete 
the fear somebody else will make the splash first creates a frenzied environment in which a blizzard 
of information is presented and serious questions may not be raised
—Carl Bernstein U S journalist 
Guardian June 3 1992
Given Bernstein s rather dour pronouncement on the state of mass media the importance of theory 
becomes obvious Paula Treichler argues that in debates about science and medicine
Not only are the basic definitions and self images of these constituencies at stake but also the 
institutional and cultural structures that shape their relations to each other and their relative empowerment 
and effectivity within the culture as a whole 31
In examining the plight of refugees we can draw many of the same conclusions that Treichler does 
Questions about the nature of images of refugees disease and warfare not only raise questions about 
fairness in reporting and gendered depictions of suffering but also question the very nature of humanitarian 
protection the agencies which participate in this process the many violations of human rights and the 
culpability of governments and international institutions
The simple recommendations are as follows insist upon greater accountability from the media and 
recognize that the media is an institution just as governments international agencies and corporations are 
In this regard calling for institutional controls and monitoring is both important and fair These need not 
mean censorship Instead it could involve a critical dialogue over how to cover crises and in what ways to 
gather information so that vital stones do not disappear
A more complex recommendation stems for the recognition that viewers must be ever vigilant about 
the media and its role in society It is not sufficient for viewers to sit passively in front of their televisions 
or newspapers Social theory in this regard can and should play a central role in helping to focus and 
understand actions The Rwandan conflict seen through the multiple lenses of culture gender human 
rights post colonialism and medicine give startlingly different pictures of the course of the conflict Some 
may argue that there is little time m the midst of a crisis to consider the role that all of these embedded 
social forces play It is precisely due to the new speed of the media that we must have able eyes and ears 
that can watch and listen for problems in the media
Speed distorts images and understandings at a faster pace than before and theory is all that we have 
to check our understanding against those that the media delivers The media can be just as culpable as
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governments and institutions to produce what Farmer terms structural violence 32 Our best defense against 
this type of violence and the destruction it can play directly or indirectly is therefore to have a sound 
cntical sense Theories about gender post colonialism race/ethmcity and post modernism in and of 
themselves do not provide the answers but simply provide the tools to be critical it is up to the viewer of 
images to deploy these tools to question and reconsider what is beamed into their televisions or printed on 
their morning paper Therefore it is both fair and vital for critical viewers to judge for example how the 
short terms gains in newspaper sales due to exaggerations of the health dimensions of the Rwandan 
conflict weigh against the long term stigmatizing effects of the labels of infectious disease It is also vital 
to gauge what international actors are left out by highly contextual depictions of suffering and what their 
roles are in producing suffenng Finally the roles of gender and race/ethmcity need to be carefully traced 
to see who benefits who is harmed and how In addition these same types of critical comparisons need to 
be carried out with regard to the multiple ways in which disease and war become conflated and confused
Physicians have a unique role to play in this regard because they are both producers of knowledge 
about infectious disease and the principal users of this knowledge As such they can demand accurate 
portrayals of disease and fight against the fears of infection that change the moral political economic 
landscape of international decision making Physicians can also begin the process of questioning the 
institutions that make use of medical imagery and the ways in which they appropriate medical metaphors 
Such questions are likely to challenge the very basic principles and beliefs about war security and 
humamtarianism Physicians have long held politically powerful positions in societies and through 
organization such as Physicians for Social Responsibility and Physicians for Human Rights they have 
made their voices heard on a number of social issues including nuclear weapons environmental 
degradation and gun violence Expanding the focus of these discussions to include the media and its 
position m creating these debates and producing policy can substantially change not only the approaches 
to these issues but also our understanding of disease warfare and their social impacts
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CHAPTER 5
Policy Considerations on the Kurdish Question
Amy Eisenhuth
If one has decided that national rights are essential and that individuals can only be truly free if they 
can develop their own language and culture if  the choice o f cultural assimilation is theirs to make 
rather than being imposed upon them and if the aspirations and interests o f their national group are 
not subordinated to those o f an alien hegemonic ethnic group then one has no right to deny to others 
what one has demanded for oneself To claim otherwise is to reveal that behind the idealistic 
motivations one has invoked in the past there was only sordid selfishness communal rapactiy and a 
lust for power Such sentiments are just as despicable in groups as in individuals By embracing them 
one loses the right to appeal to a universal conscience ever again Any political situation is 
infinitely complex but most o f the essential ethical options are quite straight forward The rights o f 
the Kurdish people should be obvious to everybody We have here a specifically defined people with 
a language and a culture all their own living in a geographically coherent area and refusing en 
masse the cultural assimilation which others seek to impose upon them
—Maxime Rodinson1
Introduction
The Kurdish question—Do the Kurds have a right to freedom and self determination9—creates uneasiness 
whenever it is raised Although it may appear to be simple question merely relating to self determination 
a complex web of inter related issues results in a complicated situation with many other issues at stake
The Kurdish question concerns the future status of the Kurds The Kurds a population of 30 million 0 
have been divided among Iraq Iran Turkey Syria and parts of the former Soviet Union They represent 
the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East yet even though the Kurds comprise one of the largest 
ethnic groups in the world they have been denied their own state 3
The Kurds have been subject to repression relocation torture and genocide They have been 
abandoned and used repeatedly by foreign powers trying to achieve other political aims The United 
States the USSR Israel Turkey Iran and Iraq all have used the Kurds to achieve their own political 
goals Their cultural identity has been consistently denied or negated The repressive policies vary from 
state to state however all subject the Kurds to treatment unacceptable by world wide human rights 
declarations and standards
Two recent changes in the world order makes the Kurdish question both more pressing and relevant 
The first is the end of the Cold War which created a change m the balance of powers and resulted in 
changes in the world order The second change in the world order resulted from the Gulf War The 
conclusion of the Gulf War itself was a manifestation of the end of the Cold War The aftermath of the 
Gulf War created a situation in Iraq that permanently altered the pre Gulf War status quo The creation of 
a Kurdish autonomous region by Kurdish declaration and protected by the West and United Nations 
simultaneously recognized the Kurds as a separate ethnic group that and one that had the right to a certain 
degree of autonomy
State breakup and state re unification are currently important issues Stephen Cohen states The 
break up of multi ethnic states not the demise of communism may be this generation s most profound 
event Ethnic nationalism self determination demands and demands for a separate state are being
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voiced in Asia Africa the Middle East Europe and North America Most multi ethnic states are in a 
state of crisis Multi ethnic states are everywhere trembling in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet 
Union and the civil war in Yugoslavia 4
The primary issue of concern is not will the state wither away but rather how many new states will 
come into existence and under what circumstances Currently an established universal criteria governing 
the breakup or coming together of states does not exist Moreover the conditions under which groups have 
a right to a state has yet to be established If new states are indeed established then the types of 
acceptable governments also becomes an issue
The Kurdish question provides an illuminating case to investigate the inter related issues of the 
break up of multi ethnic states ethnic nationalism and the right to self determination and freedom 
Similar to other movements for self determination or for separate states the existing state boundaries do 
not coincide with previously existing nations The Kurds similar to others found themselves subject to 
imposed boundaries by foreign powers and divide and rule tactics The Kurds as in other self 
determination movements consider themselves to be a distinct ethnic group with their own language and 
cultural traditions Also similar to other groups economic issues and control over resources are important 
issues Finally similar to some but not all the Kurds have faced severe repression and violation of human 
rights The Kurds provide an excellent case to study these issues
This paper addresses the following interrelated issues pertaining to the Kurdish question First the 
current status of the Kurds in Iraq Iran and Turkey will be examined The status quo supports a hostile 
environment toward the Kurds Second the issues and actors involved in the Kurdish question will be 
analyzed The external actors who support the status quo and their justifications require understanding to 
realize the complex nature of the Kurdish question Third existing approaches to self determination will 
be discussed Finally the future status of the Kurds will be addressed
Current Status of the Kurds
The Kurds were promised their own state in the Treaty of Sevres 1920 The treaty stated that a scheme 
of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates 5 should be created The 
treaty was abandoned and denied primarily through Turkish nationalist policies and the state of the 
international system The Treaty of Lausanne 1923 superseded the Treaty of Sevres and certified and 
legalized the victory won by the Turkish War of Independence 6 Since the abandonment of the Treaty of 
Sevres the Kurds have been subject to foreign rule divide and rule tactics and have been denied the 
right to form their own state
Several reasons partially explain the Kurds continual denial of their own state First the international 
system attempts to prevent irredentist or nationalist movements due to the accompanied violence and 
chaos In addition many interests would be threatened by an independent Kurdish state Second the Kurds 
are viewed as a tribal people that have yet to be united They do not possess a national vision Many do 
not view them as a nation waiting for a state Third geography prevents the Kurds from forming a nation 
They are physically dispersed between mountain and plain and among various states 7 Fourth during the 
Cold War it was not in the U S interest to support the Kurdish movement as they received money from 
the Soviets Similar to actual states the Kurds found themselves as proxies in the Cold War These 
negative attitudes and stereotypes regarding the Kurds persist Fifth the land the Kurds inhabit is rich in 
resources It has both oil and fertile land which other states will not willingly give to the Kurds
Turkey
Although the Kurds fought with the Turks for Turkish independence since its inception the Kurds have 
been oppressed The teaching of Kurdish in schools was forbidden in 1924 Article 89 of the Turkish law 
pertaining to political parties stated that organizations must not claim that there are any minorities in the 
territory of the Turkish Republic as this would undermine national unity 8 Kurdish deportation and 
relocation began as early as 1924 and continues Kurdistan was considered a military area until 1965 In
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1970 when the Turkish Workers Party passed a resolution to recognize the existence of the Kurds they 
were banned as a party 9
Turkey the most democratic state where the Kurds form a minority of the population denied the 
actual existence of the Kurdish population until the late 1980s Approximately 20 percent of the Turkish 
population are Kurds Kurds were classified as Mountain Turks who had forgotten their original Turkish 
identity
Only those Kurds who assimilate or deny their Kurdish ethnicity can participate as citizens in the 
economic and political system To achieve high offices of power Kurds must consider themselves to be 
Turks not Kurds Only those who suppressed their Kurdish identity prosper in Turkey 10
Cultural repressive policies in Turkey are more extensive than Iraq or Iran Until 1991 the use of the 
Kurdish language was illegal Printing or broadcasting in the Kurdish language remains illegal Schools 
also are not permitted to teach m Kurdish Kurdish dress is forbidden Kurdish armies were permanently 
stationed in southeast Turkey in 1983 to control the Kurdish population 11
Relocation human rights abuses torture killings and detention without trial all have been used 
against the Kurdish population in Turkey 12 The European Convention on Human Rights has been 
suspended in the Kurdish areas of Turkey under the justification of national security 13 Kurdish villages are 
attacked regularly with Western military equipment towns and villages are destroyed and villagers are 
forced to flee 14 Eight journalists were murdered in 1993 for publishing Kurdish publications and over fifty 
seven were arrested Also in 1993 thirty eight dead bodies were discovered in a mass grave following a 
military action that killed over a hundred Kurds Over 180 Kurds have disappeared since 1991 15
A low level guerrilla war continues m Turkey between the military and the PKK (Kurdistan s 
Workers Party) The war has cost over 6 200 Kurdish lives 16 Although several cease fires have been 
negotiated they quickly fall apart Most recently Turkish authorities denounced a cease fire that they had 
never actually acknowledged after eleven Kurdish village guards (employed by the Turkish government) 
were burnt alive in a van that was supposedly set on fire by the PKK It is doubtful that the van was set 
fire by the PKK which had just implemented its own cease fire
Villagers who voted for Hadep the party based on peace democracy and recognition of the Kurdish 
identity in the recent elections are continually persecuted against Houses animals and crops have been 
raided or burned large numbers have been arrested and beaten and at least four have been killed 17 Even 
electricity has been cut off m villages that voted for Hadep Hadep received a clear majority in the region 
and would have twenty three representatives m parliament if electoral laws were fair Hadep and its 
supporters have consistently sent a clear message that they desire peace
Despite Turkey s repressive policies toward the Kurds the government has not been held liable to 
international condemnation or sanctions The United States and the West continues to reward Turkey with 
arms and aid Following the Gulf War the United States rewarded Turkey with eight billion dollars worth 
of military equipment After the Turkish military attacked civilian Kurds in March 1992 a State 
Department official said that he sees nothing objectionable in a friendly or allied country using American 
weapons to secure internal order 18
The Kurds are an important political issue in Turkey due to its desire to join the European Economic 
Community Turkey has found it increasingly more difficult to negate and deny the reality of the existence 
of the Kurdish population The end of the Cold War has dramatically decreased Turkey s geo political 
importance Hence to appease human rights groups m the West Turkey now admits that the Kurds are a 
people distinct from Turks and no longer insists that they are merely Mountain Turks Turkey s domestic 
and foreign policy is continually motivated by the Kurdish question
52 Amy Eisenhuth
Iraq
Iraq accepts the existence of the Kurds as a distinct population Linguistic and cultural markers are 
accepted to a certain degree Recently although Kurds have been arrested for wearing Kurdish traditional 
clothing
In Iraq the Kurds have been subject to genocide relocation and other forms of torture and 
repression 19 Chemical weapons mass executions mass disappearances destruction of villages and 
destruction of infrastructure all occurred in Iraq on a large scale from 1987 to present Up to 100 000 non 
combatants were subject to genocide over 182 000 people have disappeared and over 4 000 villages20 
have been destroyed by the central government21 The overall death total committed by the Iraqi regime is 
between 200 000 to 300 000 22 Land mines have also been planted m large areas of usable land 23 
Following the Gulf War thousands of refugees fled to Turkey They refugees died at a rate somewhere 
between 500-2 000 a day during the first couple of weeks following April 1 1991 when Saddam crushed 
the uprisings of the Kurds and the Shi a 24 In Iraq the Kurds are in the best of times a disenfranchised 
minority and in the worst of circumstances a national enemy to be destroyed notes a United States 
executive summary 25
The Kurds have been relocated on a daily basis since the 1970s The regime also pursued policies of 
arabization and deportation of the Kurds from the oil rich areas of Kirkuk Khanaqin and Sindjar Arabs 
have been brought in to takeover Kurdish homelands 26 Iraq has and continues to deport Kurds who live in 
the fertile and oil rich areas between Arbil and Kirkuk
The Kurds in Iraq currently live in dire circumstances They are subject to a double economic 
embargo the UN sanctions against Iraq and the internal blockade imposed by Iraqi forces This double 
embargo has the potential to result in mass starvation of over 3 5 million Kurds Malnutrition is increasing 
and undernoursihment is a constant problem Hunger is evident m certain regions 27
The unity of Iraq is an important U S policy objective The United States supported the Ba ath regime 
m the 1980s to undermine Iran The unification of Iraq is also a commonly cited reason for the lack of U S 
support for the anti Saddam uprisings staged by the Kurds in the north and the Shi a in the south following 
the 1991 Gulf War 28 The ruling Ba ath regime who are mainly Sunni Arabs are a minority in Iraq Shia s 
comprise more than one half of the population and the Kurds comprise nearly one fourth of the 
population 29
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 created an area or safe haven protected by 
allied air cover up to the 36th parallel for the Kurds This region covers approximately one half of the 
Kurdish population in Iraq 30 The Kurds formed the Kurdistan National Front (KNF) to run the affairs of 
Iraqi Kurdistan Due to the decision making crisis within the KNF Barzam the leader of the Kurdish 
Democrat Party (KDP) called for elections of a legislative council and a supreme Kurdish leader 
Elections based on proportional representation were held on May 17 1992 The elections were 
pronounced free and fair by the London based Electoral Reform Society 31
The Kurdish parliament declared that the Kurds should receive federal status The boundaries should 
be based on the 1957 census before the deportation and relocation policies began The Kurds want to have 
self government on in their own land
Iran
In December 1945 the Kurds declared the Mahabad Republic which lasted for a year until the Shah 
executed its leaders The Kurds were forcibly settled by the Shah Thousands were deported or massacred 
Circumstances for the Kurds did not significantly change following the revolution in Iran The Ayatollah 
Khomeini declared a holy war against the Kurds in 1980 Iran allows a small degree of cultural 
independence of the Kurds Education in Kurdish is banned in Iran however some radio stations are 
allowed to broadcast in Kurdish The Kurds are isolated from the political process Political discussion is 
forbidden people who talk about politics lose their lives said one Kurd in Iran 32 They have been
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suppressed militarily for every attempt to attain a degree of autonomy Over 200 000 Iranian troops are 
stationed m Iranian Kurdistan They shell Kurdistan and kill civilians The peshmerga the Kurdish fighters 
continue to fight for their independence Over 20 000 peshmerga have been killed since 1980 33 When 
captured they are subject to extreme forms of torture The leader of the Kurdish Democrat Party of Iran 
(KDPI) Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was assassinated by Iranian government agents in Vienna in 1989 
Little is known of their struggle in the West due to the Iranian news blockout Lack of investment and lack 
of development of infrastructure in Kurdish regions is similar to that of Turkey or Iraq Only four factories 
exist in all of Iranian Kurdistan
Three times as many refugees fled to Iran compared to Turkey Due to U S -Iran relations the United 
States has been unable to help these refugees Few reports are available to ascertain the conditions of the 
Kurdish refugees in Iran 34
The Kurdish Right to Self Determination
An important issue relating to the Kurds is do they have a right to self determination9 As a separate 
ethnic group spread among several states in conjunction with their repressed status m these states the 
Kurds have argued that they have the right to self determination and to form their own state Some groups 
support the Kurdish fight for self determination however most only support autonomy or the maintenance 
of the status quo
The Kurds have occupied a geographical region known as Kurdistan since antiquity 35 The majority of 
the Kurds live in a geographically continuous area They have possessed a sense of self community and 
of shared space since medieval times The Kurds view themselves as ethnically and culturally different 
from Turks Persians and Arabs They have their own language culture and traditions 36
The mountainous geographical region the Kurds inhabit positively and negatively effects their 
strength Geography gives the Kurds a degree of isolation from others More recently however geography 
restrains the collective ability of the Kurds due to their situation in a zone of interregional conflicts and 
great power rivalry 37
The right to self determination is recognized by several international covenants Article 1 of the UN 
charter elevates the conception of self determination On the contrary Article 2 Paragraph 7 of the Charter 
recognizes domestic jurisdiction in internal affairs and state sovereignty The conflict arises from varying 
interpretations of self determination 38 The United Nations has yet to equate the right to self 
determination with the right of secession 39 However the Kurds have appealed to other UN resolutions the 
include principles of nondiscrimination and Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
rights which upholds cultural religious and linguistic rights of minorities
A Kurdish sense of self and Kurdish unity are necessary for self determination 40 The Kurds have a 
sense a self and share similar cultural features including language traditions religion music and poetry 
The Kurds are currently not united across countries Their disunity is mostly a result of regional politics 
Cold War politics and divide and rule tactics Whether the Kurds would be united in the absence of these 
conditions remains a question that can only be answered in the future
The Actors
The obvious actors influencing the Kurdish question are Turkey Iran Iraq Syria the Kurds and the United 
States 41 The other actors involved and affecting the Kurdish question include Russia Saudi Arabia Israel 
and the West All have a stake in the outcome or any change in regard to the Kurds
The entire Arab world Iran and Turkey oppose the break up of states in the Middle East42 Syria and 
Saudi Arabia both fear a democratic government in Iraq if the Shi a majority have power or influence 43 
However Graham Fuller notes that the Shi a of Iraq currently do not favor Iran and it is unlikely a 
democratic Iraq will either44 Foreign ministers from Turkey Iran and Syria met in November 1992 and 
February and June 1993 to coordinate their policies regarding the Kurds m Iraq and the Kurdish
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movements throughout the Middle East In 1992 Turkey Syria and Iran signed security agreements 
intended to contain control and crush the Kurdish nationalist movements in their respective countries and 
to undermine the viability of the safe haven of the Kurds in northern Iraq 45
Turkey j
Turkey has cooperated with Iraq to control the Iraqi Kurds Bombings of the Kurds from Turkey were often 
made in conjunction with Baghdad Turkey opposes any independent efforts of the Kurds in Iraq Refugees 
fleeing from Iraq due to the economic embargo and Saddam s policies of terror also concerns the Turkish 
government46 The Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan are currently cooperating with the Turkish government
United States
An important issue governing U S policy considerations is its relationship with Turkey Turkey is critical 
to the United States as an ally and is one of the most important bulwarks against a resurgent Islam 47 
The dual containment of Iran and Iraq has also been a driving force behind U S policy The United States 
also does not want to endanger its relationship with Saudi Arabia
Syria ,
Syria s position regarding the Kurds primarily relates to the issues of water and its desire to be removed 
from the U S list of states supporting terrorism Turkey reduced the flow of water form the Euphrates river 
which runs through Syria Syria supported the PKK and allowed them to conduct training operations in 
Beirut Supporting the PKK has given Syria leverage over Turkey s control of water48 Recently Turkey 
and Syria have signed security agreements regarding the PKK Syria declared that it would not support 
those who are against Turkey s interests The Syrian State Minister for Security added that Syria would 
ban the PKK and other terrorist organizations operations in Syria 49
Iran
Turkey and Iran have signed a joint security protocol that forbids the existence of any terrorist 
organization specifically the PKK on its territory Iran has agreed to pursue military actions against the 
PKK in Iran A representative of Rafsanjam stated Iran has issued an order for any PKK member trying 
to infiltrate Iranian territory through northern Iraq to be shot regardless of whether they are wearing PKK 
uniforms or are smugglers 50
The Issues
Internal or External Affair
Turkey Iran Iraq and Syria all claim that the Kurds are an internal matter that should not be subject to 
outside interference However Kurdish claims over human rights violation genocide torture and forced 
relocation have been substantiated in Turkey Iran and Iraq They are violating international law and 
international conventions and treaties that they have signed The treatment of the Kurds can no longer be 
considered an internal matter
Oil
Oil has been an important issue regarding the status of the Kurds since 1920 Mosul and Kirkuk both oil 
rich areas inhabited by Kurds were given to Iraq following World War I by the British to ensure their 
control over their oil interests Saddam has attempted to deport most of the Kurds from these regions to 
ensure his control over the oil Neither is currently part of the safe haven The Kurds claim these oil rich
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regions based on their historical occupation of land and want to extend their autonomous region over these 
areas
The Setting of Precedent and Influence on other Nationalist Movements
Turkey Iran and Syria are particularly concerned about the de facto Kurdish region m Iraq They fear that 
it will set a precedent in their own states This issue extends beyond the Kurds to all ethnic nationalist 
liberation movements Other groups will wonder if the Kurds can have their own state (regardless of who 
initiates it) then why do we not have our own state7 Russia is particularly worried about the precedent the 
Kurds could establish in regard to Chechnya
Existing Models
Ethical Considerations
Maxime Rodinson views the current approach toward the Kurds as lacking an ethical dimension One 
should begin with the assumption that people have a right to an anatomies existence and to make their 
own decision in the framework of their own political institutions backed by forces whose allegiance is to 
a body established as its leadership by the people concerned 51 Most individuals and groups having 
claimed freedom for their own people or their fnends often deny freedom to others This political strategy 
is morally and intellectually incoherent 52 Those who have achieved their own freedom or defended 
freedom in the past often become reticent to defend equally justified cases in the future Moreover in 
every other case it is accepted that the strategy and tactics of a movement s leaders are m no way 
relevant to the assessment of the validity of the cause 53 yet in the Kurdish case every past failing of the 
Kurdish leaders are made constant reference to m every discussion of the Kurdish question Rodinson notes 
that to defend justice is to commit oneself to fight against all iniquities even those exercised in the 
name of the oppressed ethnic groups and exploited classes of the past and the present 54 When self 
determination is subsumed under national unity then it results in entire groups being forced to remain in a 
national framework unrecognized as their own Rodinson notes One should always enquire as to whose 
national unity one is talking about who has fixed the frontiers and who gains thereby7 55
Supporting policy based on strategic interest opposition to balkanization or ideological differences 
ignores the basic fact that minorities are being oppressed Chaliand states the right to preserve its 
cultural identity is absolute and that its right to self determination has usually been denied for so long that 
armed struggle has become the only form of freedom left to it 56 Demands for self determination and 
cultural rights are almost always justified from an ethical perspective The relationship between a state 
and its minorities requires examination a priori Ideological or other entena not rooted in ethical 
considerations should be considered only after assessment has determined whether or not minorities are 
indeed oppressed by the state or the ruling elite 57
Several models exist regarding the issues of self determination and the nght to a state The two most 
opposing models that ethnic groups have a nght to a state and that ethnic groups must work within the 
status quo will be analyzed in relation to the Kurdish question
Nations plus States Approach
Self determination movements and demands for states surface when state boundaries do not coincide with 
nations or cultural ethnic groups Gidon Gottlieb argues that groups fighting for their own states should 
pursue a states plus nations approach He states The principle of self determination must be 
supplemented by a new scheme that is less territorial in character and more regional in scope The states 
plus nations approach favors the status quo s existing boundaries He favors the remainder of the world 
community over the nations without a state 58
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The nations plus states approach provides a soft solution that does not involve boundary changes or 
the creation of new states Rather national communities are reordered internally and receive new 
international diplomatic means externally Functional Spaces and Zones are created and supplement 
existing boundary lines Functional spaces and zones allow for the free flow of information and ideas free 
movement of persons and what else these spaces allow is unclear Who creates and ensures these spaces 
is unspecified Cooperative governments are a prerequisite to allow the free flow of peoples and 
information In the Kurdish case it is evident that the states use the Kurds against the other regional 
states Moreover the Kurds are actually expelled from the states that they reside It is unlikely that Iraq 
Turkey or Iran will allow the free flow of Kurds or the free flow of ideas The existing governments are 
trying to stop both the movement of the Kurds and their ideas Liberal democratic (much more liberal and 
democratic than Turkey) may also be necessary to allow these functional spaces and zones not only to 
emerge but also to operate effectively
Historical Homelands also need to be erected and protected by an internationally recognized 
regime inconjuction with the local government in the nations plus states approach Even if an even 
handed international regime could be found to effectively operate historical homelands many self 
determination movements do not involve the concept of historical homeland
Groups living in states need to be given the right to assert their national identify and given civil and 
social rights Gottlieb does not however extend rights to political rights States should recognize the 
legitimate civil rights of members of national and ethnic communities as well as their social rights and 
entitlements a recurring demand in the former Soviet Union But the exercise of political rights is a 
different matter It involves the relationship between a state and its citizens a relationship built upon their 
undivided loyalty and mutual obligations 59 How civil rights can be guaranteed without or even with 
political rights is not evident
International status needs to be given to national ethnic groups that do not have a state of their own 
International practices need to be changed to allow for recognition of groups that do not have a state in 
international bodies Nations without states need to be recognized and given international standing 
although in a different manner from states This is necessary to give ethnic groups a voice in international 
bodies However it is not evident that the existing states will allow these groups to be formed without 
serious repercussions In regard to the Kurds Gottlieb states It [international standing] would buttress 
their [Kurds] security in northern Iraq without impairing the formal unity of the Iraqi state but it 
[Kurdish community] must be content not to challenge the international borders that run across Kurdish 
lands 60 One can only wonder why the formal unity of the created Iraqi state is so desirable or so 
necessary
States plus Nations Approach
The states plus nations approach expands the current framework of states to include nations that do not 
possess an independent territory How this will work within a status quo framework is unclear Under 
authoritarian regimes or even in democracies groups seeking their own states are not being allowed to 
function as groups Similar to territorial change change can only come about through imposition by non 
governmental organizations or foreign powers or through violence An element of fiat from above is 
necessary for both approaches It is not clear that the states plus nations approach offers a more viable 
realistic or peaceful means of giving repressed ethnic groups a degree of autonomy
The states plus nations approach attempts to move beyond the territorial approach Although the 
peaceful breakup of repressive states could be beneficial if liberal states resulted Gottlieb argues that the 
breakup of states will most likely follow the Yugoslavia case with its violence and oppression One should 
note however that the existence of the repressive multi ethnic state is often a result of its multi ethnic 
character The dissolution of repressive multi ethnic states (where repression is an effect of the multi 
ethnic state) could result in more liberal states
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The territorial approach is also dissatisfactory when boundary changes do not provide a simple 
solution for scattered communities that are discontinuous across space Many regions where self 
determination movements have surfaced are in fairly continuos regions The Kurds are an absolute majority 
in a continuous region Moreover people move Pakistan and Israel both demonstrate that when given an 
opportunity for their own state people move More importantly circumventing the territorial approach in 
this manner does not address the issue of why once continuos ethnic groups have scattered The repressive 
nature of the state itself lack of economic opportunities in repressed regions and forced resettlement 
(both of the ethnic groups itself and so called settler communities) all have created circumstances that 
scattered once contiguous groups Previous repressive policies are hardly a justification for the 
maintenance of status quo boundaries
According to Gottlieb the states plus nations approach is preferable for Western political 
civilization Uncontained ethnic conflict could result in a brutish culture of xenophobia racism and 
hatreds incompatible with Western political civilization He views nationalism as a new organizing 
principle for authoritarian rule 61 This is not a new phenomenon Nationalism has justified authoritarian 
rule in almost every multi ethnic state in Africa in much of the Middle East and parts of Central Asia It 
is unclear how the states plus nations approach will counter the tendency for authoritarian rule in multi 
ethnic states
The states plus nations approach is preferable to the territorial approach specifically for the Kurds due 
to the geo politics of the region Gottlieb writes This step [the creation of a new state] would require 
major changes in the map and geopolitics of the Near East that are opposed by the powerful states of the 
region 62 Geopolitical concerns does not provide sufficient justification for continued repression of the 
Kurdish population He notes that the Kurds survive m dire circumstances among countries bent on their 
annihilation or submission 63 How the states plus nations approach can sufficiently deal with authoritarian 
(totalitarian) regimes like Iraq the theocracy m Iran or even the near liberal democracy m Turkey is 
unclear If the geopolitical situation will not allow for territorial changes then it also will not allow the 
Kurds the necessary autonomy to live free from oppression
The state plus nation approach does not provide a workable framework for many self determination 
movements including the Kurds most of the movements in Africa or some of the movements in Asia An 
alternate approach is Liberal Nationalism Michael Lind argues that liberal nationalist movements 
should be supported for both strategic and moral reasons 64 Nationalism has an enduring quality that needs 
to be contended with rather than ignored or treated as an anachronistic or dangerous relic of a previous 
age Nationalism is and continues to be a very powerful idea in the current world
Support for the status quo over self determination results in maintaining authoritarian or democratic 
regimes that suppress and in some cases oppress national minorities This is the case in Turkey now and 
has been the case off and on in both Iran and Iraq over the past quarter century It is by no means clear 
that defense of the status quo is preferable to boundary changes even if a power vacuum results or 
regional balance of power systems change
In addition self determination movements that engage in oppression themselves should not 
automatically disqualify them for their own state Lind comments Without condoning any injustice the 
fact that a secessionist nation engages m oppressive behavior does not mean its complaints about its own 
oppression at the hands of a central government or dominant imperial ethnic group are not legitimate 
Even criminals may be victims of crime 65
The potential for global chaos resulting from the creation of new states is overstated The possible 
number of new possible states is only in the dozens not the hundreds The United Nations had fifty two 
member states in 1946 and 183 now The number of states has more than tripled without creating global 
instability A few more new states will not likely result in global chaos Major interstate wars also will 
most likely increase due to the creation of new nation states The total amount of conflict should actually 
decrease as the causes for intrastate conflict between multi ethnic groups would largely disappear with the 
creation of new states
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National self determination movements or the dissolution of states into smaller states are not 
inherently violent The division of the Czech and Slovak republics many of the cases of post colonial 
independence and for the most part the dissolution of the Soviet Union were all relatively nonviolent66 
Violence is currently being used to hold states together
The small or weak nature of new states is not sufficient justification from preventing people s right to 
self determination Security alliances and trade allow small states to function as viable entities Individual 
nations also could diversify their economies and increase their economic leverage that is currently being 
denied Although neighbors could threaten new states the overall amount of safety felt by citizens will 
likely increase Lind comments on the Kurds Kurds would be safer from Baghdad even in a weak 
Kurdish nation state than they ever can be as part of Iraq 67
Only three somewhat successful cases of multiethnic democratic states exist Canada Switzerland 
and Belgium 68 Canada and Belgium have had considerable trouble over their linguistic divisions The 
lack of peaceful democratic multiethnic states indicates the difficulties involved in culturally and 
linguistically distinct societies living in one state Many multinational countries have failed including 
Cyprus Lebanon Sri Lanka Sudan the Soviet Union Yugoslavia Czechoslovakia Nigeria Rwanda 
etc
The Liberal Nationalism Approach
The Liberal nationalism approach does not advocate supporting nationalism in its tyrannical or imperial 
manifestations 69 It is necessary to differentiate from liberal and illiberal nationalism Lind distinguishes 
the two Liberal nationalist tend to favor a linguistic cultural definition of nationality and a liberal 
constitutional (although not necessarily democratic) organization of the state Illiberal nationalists favor a 
religious or genetic definition of nationality as in Iran or Serbia and usually an authoritarian populist 
constitution Illiberal nationalism and militariamsm is frequently associated with atrocities This is a 
result of lllberalism and not nationalism per se This definition should be viewed with caution Religion 
and culture often overlap A further distinction needs to be made between religion as a marker of cultural 
identity versus a religious dictatorship It should be the goals and means of achievement that should be of 
concern not whether self determination movements also have a religious element as it often coincides 
with culture
The Liberal nationalism approach does not view nationalism as mutually exclusive with democracy 
Rather it views nationalism and the coincidence between a cultural nation and a state as a necessary 
yet not sufficient condition for democracy National communities last longer and are more stable than 
states It may not be possible to hold together multiethnic states through democracy Most are held 
together through force and oppressive means
Liberal nationalism should be supported over repressive regimes If not the United States appears to 
license vicious repression 70 Territorial boundary changes should not be viewed as a last resort effort 
National independence should at least be considered as a viable option States should be allowed to 
separate or expand in a peaceful manner with the consent of those seeking separation 71 Minority rights 
would still have to be protected within the new states
The Liberal nationalism approach offers a more realistic and viable approach than the states plus 
nations approach Liberal nationalism at least recognizes the lack of justice and immorality of supporting 
repressive regimes Moreover preventing further radicalization of groups is more likely to be achieved 
through the Liberal nationalism approach
Constitutional Legal Approach
International laws exist to promote constitutional and legal arrangements that can lead to the 
accommodation of minority rights and the lessening of ethnic tensions in multiethnic societies 72 
Reforms both constitutional and statutory can be implemented to protect minorities Locally designed
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systems of rights need to be enacted Changes in electoral laws and proportional representation would help 
to integrate minorities Nader Entessar notes A carefully crafted constitutional scheme leading to the 
establishment of a genuine pluralistic polity is the best means to promote Kurdish integration m Iran Iraq 
and Turkey 71 Pluralism rather than forced assimilation offers the best method to allow ethnic groups to 
coexist Real equality must be achieved for this model or any other model of autonomy to succeed The 
promotion of ethnic autonomy is not equivalent to state disintegration Another option is federalism with a 
democratic participatory system Ethnic minorities need representation in the state and other decision 
making bodies in order to promote an interest in the state
The constitutional legal approach recognizes the inequities present in the status quo in many 
multiethnic states One has to wonder how this approach would be implemented with existing power 
structures and state regimes A strong element of fiat exists throughout this approach It is not entirely 
clear who will implement and enforce these necessary changes to bnng about equality On the other hand 
the legal constitutional approach appears to offer protection for micro minorities embedded in society with 
larger minorities Moreover the Kurds are in a stronger position than ever before to demand for a federalist 
form of government
Keeping ethical implications m mind the constitutional legal approach seems most realistic at this 
juncture to improve the status of the Kurds Ideally the Liberal Nationalism approach offers the best 
solution for the Kurds However in light of the actors involved this approach has little support in the 
international community The nation plus states approach does not offer the Kurds any political rights It is 
difficult to imagine how civil rights can be maintained without access to the political system
Future Policy Options
Several options exist for the world community and the Kurds Both long term and short solutions should be 
considered In the short term the United States and the United Nations need to pursue several policies to 
ease the suffering of the Kurds First the UN embargo needs to be lifted on Iraqi Kurdistan Second the 
United States and the United Nations needs to support the Iraqi National Congress Third Saddam and 
those working under him need to be brought to trial for genocide Fourth the Kurds need to be considered 
an asset Finally continued support is necessary
UN Blockade Against Northern Iraq
Saddam s new method of terror against the Kurds is economic Electric power is frequently cut off for 
periods of more than two weeks and in certain places indefinitely 74 Food rations for the Kurds are only 
half of what Iraqis receive 75 Rebuilding northern Iraq is impossible without electricity as hospitals 
businesses and homes cannot operate Economic rebuilding activity is currently next to impossible The 
internal blockade prevents shipments of spare parts and raw materials which results in the impossibility of 
traditional farming and light manufacturing Telephones work in all areas of Iraq except the north The 
currency has been debased and the twenty five dinar note has been withdrawn to eliminate personal 
Kurdish savings Over ten million of personal savings was eliminated when the twenty five dinar notes 
were withdrawn Kurds could not get replacement currency due to the economic blockade 76
The UN embargo effects all of Iraq The Kurds are victims of this embargo Hence the UN embargo 
needs to be removed from the area currently protected for the Kurds The UN embargo is not only an 
economic issue Representative Torricelli notes It is costing lives Daily And we are doing Saddam 
Hussein s work for him until this embargo is lifted for the Kurdish people 77 The Kurds are not violating 
the UN sanctions The current policy is disturbing because it treats the Kurds and other refugees equal to 
those loyal to Saddam In some cases the embargo is more vigilantly enforced in the North than in 
Saddam s Iraq 78 This policy sends the wrong message to the Kurds who are attempting to rebuild their 
lives
Lifting the embargo on Iraqi Kurdistan has several benefits It would decrease the refugees fleeing to 
Turkey and prevent a new possible refugee crisis Second lifting the embargo in Iraqi Kurdistan would
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further undermine Saddam The more contrasting Iraqi Kurdistan is from Iraq the further his support should 
be eroded Third increased economic prosperity in Iraqi Kurdistan may stem the growth and influence of 
the Kurdish Islamists 79 Fourth excessive allied bombing in the North destroyed much of the existing 
infrastructure The Kurds need an opportunity to rebuild their infrastructure Finally it would prevent 
Saddam from starving the Kurds 80
Support for the Kurds and the Iraqi National Congress (INC)
The Kurds and the Iraqi National Congress based in Iraqi Kurdistan constitutes the opposition to Hussein 
and his regime Almost the entire basis of democratic opposition to Hussein currently operates in Iraqi 
Kurdistan The INC is the only existing institution that coordinates activities of resistance against Saddam 
Economic activity m Iraqi Kurdistan should be encouraged to undermine Baghdad 81 Baram notes By 
helping the Kurds and the INC in Kurdistan m every way either de facto lifting embargo over Kurdistan or 
de jure you are going to undermine Saddam s rule in Iraq 82 The INC needs both political and financial 
support from the United States Strategically the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan opens up a new area to 
establish intelligence gathering to obtain information on both Iraq and Iran
Genocide Trials
Ample documentation exists to bring Saddam Hussein and his workers to tnal under the auspices of crimes 
against humanity under the Nuremberg Charter83 and genocide under the Genocide Convention 84 Iraqi 
secret police files discovered m the Kurdish uprising of 1991 moved to the United States provide 
invaluable proof of extraordinary crimes and extraordinary insight into an entirely criminal organization 85 
The files document the al anfal campaign that razed villages attacked villagers with chemical weapons 
death certificates for those executed and video tapes of executions 86
The rate of killings of the Kurds in three years and the character of the killings indicate that the Kurds 
were targeted because of their ethnicity 87 Hussein and his collaborators should be held legally liable 
under international law for the killings and policies supporting the destruction of the Kurds Documentation 
exists to prosecute members of the Iraqi regime for crimes against humanity and genocide Trials need to 
be held to protest the extreme forms of oppression including genocide used by Saddam against the Kurds 
and the Shi a
The boundaries imposed upon the Kurds were without regard to the distribution of peoples 88 The 
challenges of ethnonationalism to the states where the Kurd live results in policies to destroy cultural 
identities and values 89
Reconceptualizing the Kurds
Maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq as a top priority problematizes U S support for the Kurds 
Mylroie advocates re conceptualizing the U S position especially if Saddam is the greatest challenge 
facing the United States If eliminating Saddam and his coterie is the top priority of the United States 
then the Kurds should be viewed as an asset to the United States despite the problems they create for the 
territorial integrity of Iraq Mylroie notes The Kurds are also an asset to the United States because they 
form the backbone of the Iraqi opposition the Iraqi National Congress Iraqi Kurdistan should not be 
seen only as the home of the Kurds but the base of the democratic opposition to Saddam 90 Strategic 
opportunities exist for the United States to work with the Kurds Saddam through his policies against the 
Kurds and the Shi a actually threatens the territorial integrity of Iraq In reality the territorial integrity of 
Iraq no longer exists
Continued Support
The coalition forces must continue to protect Iraqi Kurdistan until other measures are m place The Kurds 
continue to be at a high risk of slaughter torture and deportation as long as Saddam remains in power91
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Sufficient security measures should also be installed beyond the 36th parallel Only an expanded safe 
haven encompassing towns along Iraq s borders with Turkey and Iran can accommodate all two million 
Kurdish refugees 92
Long Term Policy Considerations
Four policy paths can be pursued through either or through both United States or United Nations 
involvement in regards to the Kurdish question
The Creation of a Kurdish State which includes Territory from Iran Iraq and Turkey
The creation of a Kurdish state in the Middle East would bring considerable changes m the region The 
current balance of regional power would be upset Creating a Kurdish state currently seems unfeasible due 
to the other states involved the lack of a world wide commitment and the problem of boundaries It is 
unlikely that either Turkey or Iran would ever allow this option The United States and United Nations also 
would not likely support this option Turkey is too close of an ally to the United States to upset The 
precedent set by this option would be enormous and could potentially bring considerable chaos to the world
Some degree of Kurdish unity is a necessary condition before a separate Kurdish state can truly be 
conceptualized Moreover if a Kurdish nation were established then they would have certain obligations 
to the surrounding states to the world community and to the minorities remaining within Kurdistan
The Iraqi Kurds recognize that an independent Kurdistan is not realistic Talabam (leader of the PUK) 
stated before the Foreign Relations Committee It is very difficult to change the borders of five countries 
We are not for an independent Kurdistan we are asking for our national rights within the framework of 
Iraq I know of dreams and reality All Kurds dream of an independent unified Kurdistan but we have to 
face the reality 93
The Creation of Autonomous Regions within States
The development of autonomous regions within the states under a federal democratic system is the most 
realistic option that benefits the Kurds Democracy in Iraq would create considerable changes in the 
balance of power unacceptable to much of the Middle East and the West Shiites form the majority in Iraq 
Neither the West nor Saudi Arabia want to see the Shi a in power Although as noted above these fears 
are largely unsubstantiated
The issues surrounding the Kurdish question are complex due to multiple interests that are effected by 
the changes in the status quo in the Middle East The creation of autonomous regions involves the 
countries where the Kurds reside They would have to consent to the autonomous regions and work with 
the Kurds to formulate autonomous regions Changes in electoral laws and a new system based on 
proportional representation would have to be implemented
A de facto Iraqi Kurdistan has already been established with the consent of the United States Turkey 
and the United Nations Turkey allows both Operation Comfort and Operation Poised Hammer to operate 
from its borders Although Turkey and the United States want to see the territorial integrity of Iraq 
maintained Iraq in its current state lacks territorial integrity Without severe future oppression of both the 
Kurds and the Shi a the autonomy the Kurds have gained will be difficult to eliminate This option does 
not involve the changes of borders or territory
The United States should encourage this option for strategic reasons and to maintain consistency of its 
values of democracy and freedom A federated power structure based on some form of democracy is in the 
interest of the United States Some form of democracy m not only in Iraq but also in Turkey and Iran 
would benefit U S interests both strategic and ethical This option also gives Turkey the best chance of 
furthering its relations with the European Economic Community
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The Maintenance of the Status Quo
Maintaining the status quo will come at considerable cost to the Kurds the Middle East and the world 
Violence repression and human rights violations of the Kurds will continue It will also set a precedent for 
other states in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world that continued and excessive repression of 
minorities is acceptable The emerging democratic order in the developing world could be seriously 
threatened particularly in countries with minority populations Human right violations consistently are 
related to dictatorships and both internal and external aggression 94
Over the long term this is not a viable policy option U S and UN support and funds will not last 
indefinitely Moreover with the economic embargo against the Kurds intact they will be unable to build 
the necessary institutions to maintain their region Once Saddam falls from power this also is not an option
Ending U S and UN Support for the Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq
From both an ethical perspective and an U S strategic perspective this is the least desirable option The 
Kurds will face dire circumstances including mass genocide if the United States and United Nations pull 
out from Iraqi Kurdistan Moreover Saddam will in all likelihood be able to increase his position vis a vis 
the West Saddam s power will not decrease if the United States and United Nations leave All opposition 
to his regime would be destroyed if this option were pursued
Conclusion
The traditional balance of power in the Middle East has already been altered The Kurds need both UN 
and U S support to survive as long as Saddam remains in power At this moment the only realistic and 
viable option for the Kurds is the constitutional legal approach to create autonomous regions within 
existing states
The Kurds have suffered almost continually since 1920 either from suppression of the states they live 
in or as pawns in the Cold War It is time the United States and the United Nations implement more 
policies to help these people who have suffered from genocide mass deportations and torture
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CHAPTER 6
The Mobilization of Genocide in Bosma-Herzegovina
Judith Pintar
My mother was angry but it was too late
this is what /  remember 
my Grandmother cried when she told me
about Theresa her sister using a word I had never heard before
rape it was rape
then she told me how the soldiers killed Theresa
how all the women in the convent were cut with knives
their faces their arms and their breasts
cut off and thrown in the river while they were still alive
they bled to death that s what she told me
breasts cut off and thrown
even I knew this was no story for a seven year old 
I had nightmares and when I first grew breasts 
I kept them hid for fear 
My mother was angry but it was too late 
some damage that s done is done and
done and done again and
can t be undone with silence
A Disclaimer
Every commentary about the former Yugoslavia will tell some kind of story and this story no matter how 
personal or true is necessarily a political statement When a writer or commentator decides to talk about 
the former Yugoslavia the setting the time the characters in question all of these will prefigure who 
eventually will be presented as the victim and who the perpetrator The truth of the situation—that all 
parties concerned are both victims and perpetrators—is more difficult to express This is not to say that 
every individual m the former Yugoslavia has blood on his or her hands innocents died there by the 
thousands But every political unit in the conflict is clearly guilty of intolerance discrimination 
terrorization and murder
I grew up hearing true stones about violence committed by Chetmks during World War II against 
Croats and others (my Grandmother s family was Hungarian living in Croatia) But I heard nothing about 
the mass murder of Serbs by the Ustasha during the war until I was an adult If we want to understand what 
is going on in the former Yugoslavia we can t settle for half truths All victims of the war must be 
remembered and mourned regardless of nationality just as all perpetrators of violence must be 
condemned Failure to recognize the breadth of responsibility in any summary statement about the 
situation is to take real sorrow and turn it into propaganda
At the same time it is crucial to distinguish accurately between the victims of any particular conflict 
and the feeling held by the perpetrators that they are the real victims—a position that may be propaganda 
may be paranoia or may in fact be based on past historical events But we cannot consider a prior 
experience of genocide to be a justification for genocide—by the same ethical logic that allows us to hold
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a man responsible for the crimes he commits as an adult even if we know that he was horrendously 
abused m childhood
It is often said that prosecuting individuals tor war crimes is an important part of the healing process 
It prevents the diffusion of responsibility so that victims will not seek revenge against entire groups but 
rather justice against those who actually committed the crimes both those who gave the orders as well as 
those who earned them out But a war enmes trial serves in another way as well it can have the effect of 
separating motivations for acts from the acts themselves so that only the acts are judged In the Balkans 
where motivations for violence are culled from collective memories reaching back a thousand years this 
distinction is crucial
In this paper I will be focusing on the conditions that led to Serbian perpetration of violence against 
Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina Much of what I will describe happening in Belgrade has exact parallels 
in Zagreb Croatian nationalism has shown itself to be as vicious and ugly as Serbian nationalism and 
Franjo Tudjman clearly wanted a Croatia ethnically cleansed of its Serbian minority and had aimed for 
(and perhaps will still achieve) a Greater Croatia wrested from the Muslim and Serb inhabitants of Bosnia 
But the Croatians stopped a few massacres and atrocities short of genocide (this time) while the Serbs 
by all indications chose it as a strategy of war In this paper it is in that commitment to genocide and the 
mobilization that allowed it to be earned out that I am chiefly interested 1
Introduction Genocide as a Social Movement
M ost descriptions o f social m ovem ents especially  descriptions by their advocates suggest that they 
resem ble dragons living continuously som ew here in the social underground but em erging recurrently from 
their labyrinths to stom p around roaring In fact they cannot have se lf reproducing natural h istones 
because they consist o f  in term ittent interactions am ong challengers pow erholders audiences and often 
many o ther parties such as rivals enem ies repressive forces reporters and opportunists 2
It is a mistake to reify the genocidal actions of Serbs against Muslims in Bosnia Herzegovina to treat 
genocide as if it were a living creature—a dragon of raging ethnic hatreds that lay dormant during Tito s 
regime only to be magically awakened at the moment of his death That fairy tale interpretation of the 
violence that overtook the former Yugoslavia during the first half of the 1990s has a traceable literary 
lineage and concrete political ramifications Rebecca West s epic travelogue of Second World War 
Yugoslavia Black Lamb and Grey Falcon presented the hatred between Catholic Orthodox and Muslim 
Slavs and between Serbs and Albanians as essential and in the case of the Serbs justified and even 
noble 3 This view was passed on to Robert Kaplan 4 among others whose eloquent transmission of the 
ancient hatreds interpretation of current events in his book Balkan Ghosts reportedly influenced the 
foreign policy of the Clinton administration 5
The narrative of ancient hatreds has been popular with the media and of course with the 
perpetrators of violence but decidedly unpopular among academics More papers than not (including this 
one) set out as their first task to refute the claim that violence in the region was the inevitable expression 
of essential ethnic divides In the view of most evenhanded commentators on the war whatever their 
personal or political loyalties the genocidal violence that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not 
awakened but made created m plain sight
It is helpful to think about the genocidal activities as part of a wider mobilization of nationalistic 
social movements in the former Yugoslavia during the late 1980s and early 1990s In this paper I will 
argue that genocide can be productively analyzed as a social movement in itself
The focus of most recent sociological literature on social movements has been the workings of 
oppositional movements whose goals have to do with some collective good rather than the mobilization 
of violent movements that have as their goal the disenfranchisement or death of certain sectors of the 
population In the years since Hannah Arendt wrote her classic The Origins o f Totalitarianism 
nationalistic social movements have seemed to fade into history eclipsed by the anti war and civil rights 
movements of the 1960s followed by the New Social Movements of the 1970s and 1980s But in the
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1990s we are surprised to be faced again with nationalistic movements exploited by totalitarian leaders a 
phenomenon that needs to be addressed
Wars even civil wars and insurrections are not typically included within sociological definitions of 
social movements That is to say political actions in which powerholders are challenged by some segment 
of the population living under the jurisdiction of those in power If a political opposition group succeeds to 
the extent that it becomes a political party and begins to jostle for power within the mainstream political 
process it ceases to be considered a social movement Charles Tilly clarifies this definition by explaining 
that the actions taken by social movements are indirect actions that display will and capacity but that 
would not in themselves accomplish the objectives on behalf of which they make claims Social 
movements call instead for powerholders to take the crucial actions 6
Because the ethnic cleansing of Muslim parts of Bosnia by Serbian forces were both systematic and 
planned the orders for which came down from the highest political offices the basis for my claim that 
genocide constitutes a social movement is not obvious But the political events that preceded the war are 
idiosyncratic—a liminal period in which a previous political system and interconnected set of institutional 
and cultural structures was dissolving but in which the new systems and structures were not yet in place 7 
Traditional hierarchies were turned on their heads as nationalistic social movements which had not only 
been oppositional but illegal became mainstream in a blink of an eye forming parties and winning 
democratic victories State boundaries were exceedingly slippery recognition and denial became a kind 
of currency traded on the world market of international politics
Although Slobodan Milosevic was by 1990 already president of Serbia which included the 
autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosova the boundaries of his territory were not certain because 
his new Serbian nation was not yet a recognized state His (even now only alleged) plans to annex an 
ethnically cleansed Bosnia-Herzegovina into a Greater Serbia may have been his own official policy but 
it could not be openly so while international eyes were upon him In addition he could not act directly to 
commit genocide because popular or no he still lacked the power to command ethnic Serbs to torture 
rape or kill civilians against their will or inclination But what he could do he did do and that was to 
commit indirect acts that as in Tilly s definition of the actions of a social movement display will and 
capacity but that would not m themselves accomplish the objectives on behalf of which they make 
claims By censoring and manipulating the mass media by mobilizing (and fabricating) protest by co 
opting existing social movements by manipulating real grievances and by empowering (and arming) 
criminals he created a genocidal movement that seemed to have a life of its own—a sleeping dragon 
awakened breathing the fire of ancient hatreds Milosevic called for rather than commanded ethnic 
Serbs as a people to act
To avoid falling into the trap of either reifying or naturalizing the genocidal war of ethnic Serbs 
against Bosnian Muslims it is crucial to keep in mind that a social movement is not a group a quasi 
group or a group like composite but a complex form of social interaction 8 The social interactions of 
genocide involve multiple actors a collection of assorted perpetrators witnesses and victims from the 
Serbian irregular on the ground in Bosnia to the Cable Network News (CNN) watcher in the United 
States Instead of asking ourselves how could this genocide happen7 we need a series of questions— 
posed at several different levels—reflecting the complexity of interactions that are involved At the macro 
level where shifting political opportunity structures allow social movements to thrive we need to ask the 
question How did the political interaction of states facilitate the genocidal events7 At the meso level 
where social movements are organized we must ask the question How did nationalistic movements with 
democratic aims come to be the vehicles for organized violence7 and at the micro level where specific 
acts are mobilized we need to ask the question How could these men rape their neighbors7
My analysis of genocide in Bosnia has three parts corresponding to these traditional macro 
meso and micro levels of sociological analysis of social movements Moving top downwards first I 
will survey the historical and political conditions both internally and internationally that provided 
Milosevic with the political opportunity to mobilize genocide Making use of William Gammon s 
suggestion that political opportunities work both ways 9 that social movements create political
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opportunities at the same time that they take advantage of them I will argue that m their eagerness to 
support democratic challenges to the Communist system m Eastern Europe Western nations failed to see 
the danger m the nationalistic movements they were facilitating Secondly I will outline the events 
leading up to the war in Bosnia during which time Milosevic was able to reframe preexisting movements 
and networks and make them part of an eventually genocidal movement Following Louis Zürcher and 
David Snow who have argued that identification with a social movement and adoption of its ideology does 
not precede an individual s participation but follows it 10 I will suggest that Milosevic s strategy was not 
to transmit an ideology of genocide to the Serbian people but to induce participation in a variety of ways 
from military conscription to staged rallies to strategic use of the mass media Finally I will briefly 
consider the tactical use of rape as one part of a pattern of genocidal intent Young adult men of all ethnic 
groups have been disproportionately the perpetrators of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia (as was not 
the case for instance in Rwanda) Though Balkan women can hate as intensely as men it was men who 
murdered and mutilated and raped obviously hatred alone cannot explain genocide Focusing on the 
process by which complex social interactions (including gender relations) come to be replaced by the 
simplistic formulations of genocide I will argue that the destruction of complexity is an intrinsic dynamic 
in the mobilization of genocide
Political Opportunities from Above and Below
The concept of political opportunity structure is used widely by sociologists studying social movements 
to describe the conditions and circumstances within which social movements take place and which 
constrain or facilitate their activities The term is used so broadly that critics have suggested the term is in 
danger of losing its explanatory power In an attempt to resuscitate the usefulness of the concept Gamson 
and Meyer offer a taxonomic breakdown of political opportunities which reflects the full complexity of 
social and political contexts 11 Political opportunities which arise both from political institutions and 
cultural attitudes may be stable or volatile A stable institutional condition for example is the relative 
strength of weakness of a state or its degree of centralization Stable cultural conditions would include 
widely shared world views values and myths Shifting economic conditions and political alliances are 
volatile institutional contexts while a volatile cultural context might be a shift in national mood or a 
changing pattern of public discourse as communicated through the mass media
This breakdown of opportunity is particularly useful for examining the events in the former 
Yugoslavia The failure to distinguish between stable cultural symbols and their volatile meanings can 
explains the tenacity of the ancient hatreds view There were many dramatic social cleavages in 
Yugoslav society The historical split between the orthodox East and Catholic West the colonial 
experience of the Serbs within the Ottoman empire and the Slovenes and Croats within the Austro- 
Hungarian empire and more recently the traumatic events of the two World Wars have produced quite 
different cultural narratives and collective memories within different ethnic groups The existence and 
general awareness of these differences constituted a fairly stable cultural condition in the former 
Yugoslavia In the United States a comparable cleavage might be the differing feelings of black and white 
southerners toward the display of the Confederate flag because of the different meaning the Civil War has 
to them That the difference in viewpoint can lead to acts of violence or that the symbol of the flag may 
be used by an extremist group to promote racism or hatred is not an inevitable aspect of the cleavage
In the former Yugoslavia stable historical and cultural differences became volatile when they were 
manipulated on behalf of political and social movements Infusing modern meaning into existing symbols 
is a particularly powerful tactic because if it succeeds in renarrating history current events and concerns 
can seem to be causally connected to ancient events and concerns A combination of stable and volatile 
cultural conditions thus provided Milosevic with the opportunity to advance a genocidal nationalist 
movement Historical cleavages and a tradition of Serbian poetry and folklore celebrating heroism in the 
face of extreme persecution provided the material for a modem master narrative of Serbian victimization 
a narrative which could be (and was) employed to disguise opportunistic economic and temtonal 
motivations
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The opportunities provided by volatile institutional conditions are also important to consider The 
rapidity of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia gives the observer the idea that the country was ready 
to fall apart held together only by Tito s will It is true that Tito suppressed (indeed criminalized) 
expression of nationalist sentiment and certainly Tito s death constituted a massive political opportunity 
for both nationalistic and anti nationalistic reform movements but there was nothing inevitable about what 
followed his death In fact it may be the events of the last ten years of his life rather than the ten years 
after that shed the most light on the tragedy that followed If there was a dragon that awoke at Tito s 
death in 1980 it was the revelation of the nearly twenty billion dollar foreign debt amassed as Tito had 
endeavored to maintain the illusion of economic prospenty Since the mid 1960s Tito led Yugoslavia on a 
zig zag course between freedom and repression Economic reforms instituted in 1965 led to student revolts 
and worker s strikes m 1968 and increased activity of nationalistic and anti nationalistic democratic 
movements in both Croatia and Serbia during the early 1970s all of which Tito repressed in massive 
purges In 1974 in an attempt to quell nationalistic grievances a new constitution decentralized the 
federation giving more power to the Republics and giving equal representation to the two autonomous 
regions of Serbia Vojvodina and Kosova When he died Tito left a disastrously weakened federal 
government a governing body which if it had been supported politically and economically by the world 
community might still have survived the demise of the Communist party and ushered in an era of real 
democratic reform
A combination of stable and volatile institutional conditions within Eastern Europe and in relationship 
to the West contributed to the political context which made genocide possible In the Cold War world 
Yugoslavia was the most accessible of communist countries to the West Because of its political 
independence from the Soviet Union it played an important role as a buffer and a moderator between East 
and West With the end of the Cold War Yugoslavia became less important in the big picture and its 
particular differences from the rest of the Communist world which previously had been so important were 
obscured in the West by a certain self congratulatory eagerness to facilitate the fall of Communism Calls 
for nationalistic self determination in the Republics of the former Yugoslavia were seen as expressions of 
democratic reform while the authoritarianism at their root was overlooked 12 As Tilly has pointed out there 
is nothing about a social movement that necessitates it will be a democratic one 13 Pluralism and market 
reform do not lead naturally to the creation of a democratic society and it was naive to think they 
would in the former republics of Yugoslavia Democratic reform was sponsored by oppositional 
organizations which were nationalistic in orientation it came as little surprise that the first free elections 
in Croatia and Serbia were won by nationalists whose inclination was to strip their minority populations of 
rights they had enjoyed as citizens of Yugoslavia Traditional alliances (Russia France and Great Britain 
with Serbia and Germany with Slovenia and Croatia) also produced selective blindnesses
In sum nationalistic movements were facilitated by the political opportunity offered by certain stable 
cultural attitudes in the popular imagination of the West that elections can produce a democratic society 
that a market economy is a basic good The ponderous politics of NATO and the tentative nature of the 
European Union as a political force constituted the fairly stable institutional contexts while the collapse 
of the Communist world and the resulting shifts m economic political and military power provided 
volatile windows of opportunity All this is not to say that the genocidal actions of the Serbs were caused 
by the conditions that made them possible nor did the nationalist leaders now in power simply wait 
passively for the windows to open before they acted Gamson and Meyer point out that political 
opportunities work both ways Opportunities may shape or constrain movements but movements can 
create opportunities as well 14 The preexistence of nationalistic movements at the forefront of Democratic 
reform provided Milosevic with an opportunity from below at the same time that the ending of the Cold 
War provided one from above The intricate interaction between nationalistic movements within the 
Republics had this dynamic as well Slovenian secessionism was certainly facilitated by the swift growth 
of extreme nationalism in Serbia and Milosevic would have had a harder time whipping up fear among 
Serbs living in Croatia if Tudjman had not been busy resurrecting World War II War Criminals (literally 
and figuratively—in commemorative reburials) changing the Croatian flag and monetary unit to those 
used by the Ustasha and depriving the Serbian minority of various civil rights
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Interestingly the same set of opportunities that facilitated the rise of nationalistic movements made it 
almost impossible for anti war groups and others opposed to the new nationalist regimes to mobilize 
effectively against them The strongest organizational force in the former Yugoslavia eschewing 
nationalist identifications had been the Communist party it could hardly offer a basis for a non nationalist 
identity or for an effective opposition as it was being toppled Other sources of opposition in Belgrade and 
Zagreb (chiefly academic and intellectual networks of European style New Social Movements associated 
with women s rights and environmental protection) were anti nationalist in nature but they had previously 
existed in coalition with nationalist pro reform groups On their own as the target of repression by 
nationalistic regimes their numbers eroded by a flood of emigration and their ability to mobilize curtailed 
by economic sanctions particularly in Belgrade their impact on political process and their ability to 
reach the unconverted was severely limited 15
In spite of its extreme inclusivity the concept of political opportunity does provide a useful framework 
for considering the conditions in which social movements develop or fail to develop But it is important to 
recognize that opportunities are not essential structured phenomenon but socially constructed 
conditions which are subject to negotiation and interpretation that is to say according to Gamson and 
Meyer they are framed Like the concept of frame opportunity balances elements of structure and 
agency Frames are on the one hand part of the world passive and structured on the other people are 
active in constructing them Events are framed but we frame events This vulnerability of the framing 
process makes it a locus of potential struggle not a leaden reality to which we all must inevitably 
yield 16 In the former Yugoslavia where every event can be politicized and narrated along such different 
lines it is particularly the case that political opportunities are sources of struggle contested resources 
claimed by everyone and ultimately controlled by the powerful The mass media considered in Gamson 
and Meyer s terms to be a volatile condition of opportunity was skillfully used by Milosevic to reframe 
historic and current events A memo on the bulletin board of one Belgrade television station is testimony 
to how far this process can go all images of dead bodies that were broadcast were to be identified as 
Serb victims 17
Ideology and Identity
It has become a truism within the study of social movements that the reasons why individuals may 
become involved in a social movement have less to do with social psychological predispositions than 
with who they happen to know 18 Still it seems commonsensical that some process of ideological 
conversion must precede individuals involvement in a social movement Zürcher and Snow have argued 
that in fact the adoption of an ideology follows participation 19 What this means in the case of the 
Serbian nationalism that led to genocide in Bosnia is that Milosevic didn t need a population of Muslim 
hating Serbs in order to begin a genocidal campaign All he needed to do was to mobilize participation 
through existing nationalistic community religious and family networks Acceptance of genocidal 
ideology and identification with its goals would follow In other words Milosevic didn t win people over to 
a genocidal cause rather he coerced tricked forced and manipulated them into participation until cycles 
of violence and revenge made the hatred real
Resistance to military conscription was intense at the beginning of war as thousands of young Serbs 
fled to the West or went into hiding But what I mean by participation in this context is quite broad 
including not only forced conscription or even attendance at mass rallies but also the involvement of 
simple witnessing When the media is controlled so that the only images you see reinforce particular 
narratives about the ethnic group with which you already identify watching television becomes a kind of 
forced participation Serbian television transmitted so many images of Serbian victimization both 
documentaries of newly discovered atrocities against Serbs from World War II and current violence 
that it has been referred to as death porn 20 Children in Belgrade far from the fighting reportedly 
suffered symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder traumatized only by television images 21 I would 
argue that Milosevic coerced participation by traumatizing and terrorizing his own people
Milosevic began the transformation of Serbian nationalism into a genocidal force as early as 1987 
The conflict he chose to launch his career upon was ironically not between Serbs and Muslims or Serbs
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and Croats but between Serbs and Albanians in the autonomous region of Kosova in which Albanians 
were the majority population Since 1974 when the new Yugoslav constitution had given equal 
representation to the autonomous provinces the Albanians finally enjoyed a degree of political and civic 
participation that they had been denied violently because the formation of the federation after World 
War II Unfortunately economic recovery did not follow this change and Serbia and the autonomous 
province of Vojvodina carried much of Kosova s debts After Tito s death in 1981 Albanians took to the 
streets by the thousands demanding the protections of Republic status on a par with Croatia Slovenia 
Montenegro Serbia and Macedonia This demand was followed by a wave of strikes m 1983 and assorted 
acts of violence and intimidation against the Serbian minority
Complaints from Serbs m Kosova were seen by the federal government in the years after Tito s death 
as nationalistic and thus counterrevolutionary It had been Tito s official policy not to acknowledge 
nationalistic troubles as such but the tide was definitely turning In 1986 two thousand Serbs from Kosova 
carried a petition to Belgrade saying that Serbs were threatened Officially the petition signers had broken 
the law There was an attempt to arrest them (which was resisted by protesters) but they were not 
prosecuted That year Serbian Academy of Sciences wrote a memorandum which was leaked to the 
press which presented Serbs as victims of the Titoist regime and the 1974 constitution The memorandum 
claimed that Yugoslavia had been maintained at Serbia s expense which had suffered both culturally and 
economically and that ethnic Serbs were in danger in regions where they had a minority status This 
memorandum had a tremendous impact on public discourse References to the Kosova Serb Tragedy 
Genocide Against Serbs Serbian Holocaust Enemies of Serbia and the Anti Serb Coalition 
began to appear 22
This nationalist rhetoric provided the volatile cultural opportunity that Milosevic needed to rise to 
power In 1987 Milosevic went to meet Serbian leaders in Kosova at a highly politicized site the 
medieval battlefield upon which Serbs had been defeated by Turks He ended up addressing a pro Serbian 
rally of some 15 000 ethnic Serbs followed by a Night of Hard Words m which the Kosova Serbs 
expressed their grievances to him 23 From this point nationalistic rallies were not only no longer criminal 
activities but were officially organized and sanctioned They were also widely reported in the press and 
had full video coverage which always represented the crowds to be larger than they really were It was in 
this year that Milosevic betrayed his old mentor Ivan Stambolic then head of the Serbian Communist 
party (who was somewhat sympathetic to the Albanian cause) by carrying on a Stalinist like defamation 
campaign against him until he eventually resigned This left Milosevic the de tacto leader of Serbia 
though he did not actually become president until 1990
Milosevic used the Kosova Serb grievances to spread Anti Albanian sentiment around the republics of 
Yugoslavia with devastating success There are few reliable predictors of success of social movements 
but bureaucratization m combination with centralization seems to be one 24 It is not difficult to imagine 
what happens when a social movement is suddenly installed into power with the infamous bureaucratic 
system of a formerly Communist state still in place In Novi Sad the capital of Vojvodina m 1988 a 
reportedly 100 000 Serbs assembled in solidarity with Kosova Serbs 25 Protesters maintained their 
activities around the clock week after week until the whole government resigned The same thing 
happened m Montenegro in 1989 Ironically these nationalist uprisings and the resulting defeat of existing 
political regimes in the Republics were received by the West as positive signs of anti Communist reform
Serbia sent trainloads of Serbian protesters to Serbian communities in Croatia ostensibly to rally in 
defense of Kosova Serbs but clearly meant to mobilize ethnic Serbs in Croatia When Milosevic 
attempted to send Kosovar Serb protesters to Slovenia however where there was no significant Serbian 
minority population the Slovenian government forbade them entry acting for the first time as an 
independent sovereign state Serbia responded to this action by Slovenia with an aggressive trade war 
which arguably hurt Serbia as much as it did Slovenia In 1990 at the fourteenth and last Congress of the 
League of Communists the Slovenes walked out After Slovenia abolished the Communist party in its own 
republic and instituted a pluralistic system Milan Kucan leader of the moderate reform Communist party 
won easily in free elections in Slovenia
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In Croatia Franjo Tudjman who had not so long before been the joke candidate of the extreme 
right of Croatian nationalist movements 26 was elected President Among his first acts were to repress the 
free press and to change the constitution downgrading the position of ethnic Serbs to minority status 
Serbs in Croatia defied these changes and declared the sovereignty and autonomy of ethnic Serbs in 
Croatia Meanwhile m Kosova the Serbian parliament disbanded the local government and purged 
Albanians from all political academic and police positions Kosova was ruled by army and police from 
Belgrade and Albanians became essentially the colonial subjects of Serbia In response the Albanians 
have mobilized a deliberately peaceful movement distancing themselves from the tactics of the Serbs 
and hoping to get the attention of the international community 27
In 1991 before Bosnia had declared its independence Tudjman and Milosevic reportedly met 
secretly and the division of Bosnia Herzegovina was the subject of their deepest mutual understanding 28 
In the next year independence would be declared and war and genocide would follow Slovenia and 
Croatia had already declared their independence in the summer of 1991 and war came and went 
Germany recognized Slovenia and Croatia in December of 1991 the United States recognized Croatia 
Slovenia and Bosnia the following April The logic of this recognition was to allow the boundaries of these 
republics to have the added protection of international laws regarding the territories of sovereign states 29 It 
didn t work in Bosnia chiefly because Serbia s strategy was to represent the conflict as a civil war 
occurring only within the boundaries of Bosnia and over which it had no influence or control and of 
course because the international community was unwilling to protect Bosnian Muslims with force
From the beginning of his political regime through the years of the war Milosevic also waged what 
amounted to a war on the free press m Belgrade In 1991 80 000 citizens and university students 
demonstrated in Belgrade for freedom of the press The government rolled in tanks to suppress the 
gathering When journalists staged a walk out the government declared journalist strikes to be illegal and 
dismissed 1500 journalists and technical staff members for reasons which ranged from absenteeism to 
insufficient facial optimism 30 Opposition newspapers and television states were purged where they 
could be harassed where they could not be purged Offices of anti war groups were demolished activists 
were arrested and beaten This control of the official press allowed perpetrators of war crimes in Bosnia to 
be transformed into media heroes some of whom later won high offices in free elections
Alternative media provided the only sources of accurate information about what was going on in 
Bosnia during the war But economic sanctions against Serbia made it difficult for them to operate as 
even the price of a newspaper rose beyond the reach of most Serbs 31 The war in Bosnia began in 1992 
with the Serbian attack on a peace demonstration at the Sarajevo Holiday Inn Belgrade TV showed a 
blank screen and a voice over had this explanation I can t say for sure what happened in Sarajevo today 
except that some men broke into the Holiday Inn Hotel TV Novi Sad reported that the gathering in 
Sarajevo was part of a pro Moslem anti Serb movement to overthrow the government32 The effects of 
such a media blackout are predictable According to a 1992 public opinion poll in Belgrade only twenty 
percent of Serb respondents knew who had shelled Sarajevo from the heights above the city in May and 
June of that year33
In spite of Milosevic adamant denial of responsibility for the actions of the Bosnian Serbs there is a 
general consensus that the source of the pan Serbian mythos of victimization that provided the 
justification for pre emptive genocide was Belgrade Rabid paranoia was deliberately seeded wherever 
Serbian minorities lived in the former Yugoslavia in the years before the war and the actions of the 
Bosnian Serbs were covered up or rationalized in Serbia during the war All this is not to say that the 
Serbs in Kosova did not have real grievances or that Serbs in Croatia were not in danger of losing 
significant civil rights But legitimate fears do not justify criminal acts and Milosevic did not in fact act 
to protect the rights of ethnic Serbs in Kosova Croatia or Bosnia through legitimate federal or 
international channels but chose rather to mobilize ethnic Serbs m a nationalist movement which was to 
become a genocidal one
I would argue that the Serbian people were deliberately traumatized by their own government through 
an onslaught of distortions and misinformation The power of an authoritarian state to reframe events and
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to rationalize atrocity is so great that for those Serbs with limited education and no access to the rest of 
the world there was no opportunity for a personal identification with anything but nationalistic Serbdom 
Because violent genocidal acts were committed m their names they became participants in the 
genocidal movement simply by being Serbs That was the beauty of Milosevic s plan Serbs found 
themselves alone m the world seemingly persecuted and misunderstood by the international community 
just as their mythos told them that they were a perfect self fulfilling prophecy
Rape and the Loss of Complexity
Although officially ethnic Serbs from Serbia were not fighting in Bosnia there is no question that 
irregular units in Bosnia originated in Serbia Denitch describes this group of Chetniks criminals and 
psychopaths
There are the Serbian Chetniks with greasy long beards and hair traditional peasant caps (combined 
with the latest model of sneakers) and daggers They dress like the villains of old Communist era partisan 
films Then there are volunteers in the hundreds organized by Belgrade gangsters (junkyard owners and 
black marketers) These are refugees from movies about Marseilles gangsters and the resistance they dress in 
Ramboesque costumes and are clean shaven but for their mustaches American movies on Vietnam and on 
special forces have had a heavy influence on Yugoslav military fashions as have Ninja and Rambo movies 34
These units are responsible for the worst atrocities of the early periods of the war but they also socialized 
local Bosnian Serbs into the practices of genocide In very short periods of time local Serbian men who 
lived in social networks with people of other ethnic groups as neighbors co workers schoolmates and in 
laws participated in organized terror torturing raping and killing these same neighbors co workers and 
schoolmates It is important to ask how such a degree of participation could have been mobilized
To begin with we can say that if a genocide is going on something else is not That something I 
would suggest is complexity The former Yugoslavia and Bosnia m particular was a region characterized 
by complex social relations and equally complex identities For perpetrators of ethnic violence social 
relations were polarized and simplified there s us and there s them and we can t live together As an 
ideology this is rather like saying white is black and black is white for people who had been living 
together in relative peace (historical cleavages and cultural differences notwithstanding) It seems like a 
cliche or letting these men off the hook to say they were coerced but in fact many of those who 
refused to harm their neighbors were killed or carted away themselves Kadira a Muslim woman who was 
repeatedly raped at a women s camp in Doboj explained
I knew a lot of them they were our friends and neighbors some of them enjoyed doing it and others 
were forced to do it I know a few guys who used to work with me they were forced to do it You can tell and 
one of them in particular a close friend of my husband s that s what he told me too The local Serbs 
they went easier they weren t so extreme But as soon as the foreigners came whether they were Arkan 
people or Seselj people then they had pressure on them and you knew they just had to do it too There were 
three men I knew they re dead now they refused they didn t want to go along with it and so they killed 
them 35
Once participation is coerced denial and dissociation makes further atrocity much easier and the 
acceptance of narratives that justify the violence follows Again and again in reports from soldiers and 
testimony of men who witnessed and perpetrated atrocities you hear the same things they say they never 
hated Muslims before nor had reason to hate them but that they believed the things they were told about 
atrocities committed by Muslims against Serbs they say they were ordered to rape and to kill and they 
say that raping Muslim women made them hate Muslims more
This is the psychological pattern we would expect to find following Zürcher and Snow s insight that 
adoption of ideology follows rather than precedes participation in a social movement They don t rape 
because they hate they hate because they rape The transformative experience of participation in this 
case is heightened by its traumatic nature Forcing someone to witness atrocity to facilitate it and 
eventually to become a perpetrator of it inevitably causes psychological damage Many of the rapists
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describe a kind of dissociation from their actions to the extent that they do not seem to perceive their 
victims as persons at all This dissociation is chemically induced as well invariably m rape accounts the 
perpetrators are drunk Tactically the expectation that soldiers will commit atrocities also forces them to 
accept an identification with the larger pattern of violence committed by their ethnic group Kadira the 
woman cited above refers to the paramilitary soldiers from Serbia not as Serbs but as foreigners and 
she distinguishes between them and the local Serbs that she knows
I m sure our Serbs wouldn t have done that to us on their own not our neighbors There was only one 
Muslim village that was our village we were all mixed up together there The other villages were Serbian 
but we never had any problems with one another we were good friends we watched out for each other and 
helped each other out The orders came from Serbia those were Serbian directives 36
An important part of the mobilization of Bosnian Serbs involved breaking their complex local 
identities and associations and encouraging a realignment with their simple ethnic identity as Serbs 
Forcing them to commit atrocities was one way to bring this about One young defector from a Bosnian 
Serb unit who claimed that he had been forced to rape and kill explains why
It s because of territory— they have to drive out the non Serb people in Brcko and annihilate them so 
that Brcko can become Serbian Otherwise this Brcko could never belong to Serbia too many Croats and 
Muslims would be living there The rape is part of it it spreads fear and terror so that the people flee and don t 
come back This expulsion and all it s made the Serbian people in Bosnia into haters it s sown hatred The 
killing and the raping were supposed to teach us to hate 37
The attention of Western countries to the rape of Muslim women m Bosnia was a reflection of its 
mass use People squabble over the numbers how many thousands of women were assaulted but no one 
can credibly contest the fact that the rapes took place and the evidence points convincingly to the fact 
that the rapes were systematic and tactical The experience of rape for the victims when they were 
allowed to live was intended to devastate and terrorize them along with their families and their 
communities In some cases it seems that the rapes were specifically intended to produce pregnancies m 
other cases rapes were used as a way to emasculate and humiliate Muslim men In other words women 
were raped not only because they were women but because they were Muslim But it is also true that they 
were raped not only because they were Muslim but because they were women It is important to say that 
Serbian women have been raped too by Croats Muslims and Albanians as they have claimed and the 
fact that these rapes were not perpetrated as part of a larger pattern of genocidal activities does not make 
them less devastating to the women who suffered them
I began the paper by saying that every personal story about the Balkans is necessarily a political 
statement one which prefigures victims and perpetrators By sharing the story of my Aunt s rape 
mutilation and murder by Chetmk soldiers during World War II it was not my intention to essentialize or 
condemn Serbs as rapists nor to say that rape is happening still but rather to say that it is happening 
again Rape accompanied by bizarre mutilations is part of an historical repertoire of violence in the 
Balkans much as bride burning has a historical lineage m some regions of India and lynching is part 
of the repertoire of racist violence in the American south Though the Serbian men in Bosnia who 
committed rapes and murders may never have witnessed these atrocities before performing them 
themselves they are likely to have heard of them from propaganda from folk narratives or from their 
fathers and grandfathers
The underlying sexual politics of the region sheds light on the cultural context of rape as well What 
does it mean for instance that the penalty for an Albanian man to rape a Serbian woman is ten years 
imprisonment while the penalty for a Serbian man to rape a Serbian woman is only five years9 Why is 
there no law against marital rape at all9 Although many of the Serbian men who raped Muslim women in 
Bosnia were clearly coerced many were not Testimony of rape victims report the enjoyment of their 
perpetrators more often than they do their perpetrators anguish or ambivalence
The existence of a tradition of sexual violence in ethnic conflict in the Balkans constitutes another 
stable cultural opportunity for the mobilization of genocide But just as the existence of cultural
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cleavages does not mean that war is inevitable the existence of rape in a repertoire of violence does not 
mean that its use is inevitable Prior cultural conditions of sexual inequality are an important piece of the 
puzzle but they cannot be said to be the cause of mass rape They cannot explain how so many men who 
previously had related to women as sons brothers fathers husbands neighbors peers and co workers 
could become sexual predators witnessing abetting and perpetrating acts of extraordinary dehumanization 
and brutality I believe that a crucial part of the process of mobilizing genocide was manipulating and 
traumatizing Serbs into exchanging their complex local identities for simplistic nationalistic ones 
Mobilizing rape also required that complex gender identities be torn apart and replaced by caricatures and 
nightmares Thus the dragon was made
They came and went they drank and smoked marijuana They laughed they had fun They said they 
were going to show us what real Serbian men were like But they weren t men at all they were animals 
monsters 38
Conclusion
So much has been written about the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian that it is difficult to know 
where to jump into the conversation In this paper I chose to look at the genocide of Muslims in Bosnia by 
ethnic Serbs as part of a larger nationalist Serb movement making use of the sociological literature on 
social movements as a framework I have argued that the genocide was a historically contingent set of 
social interactions between states between ethnic and political organizations and ultimately between 
individuals It has been said that the first casualty of the wars in Yugoslavia was complexity and indeed 
the social relations encouraged by extremist nationalist politics are significantly impoverished the human 
relations of genocide are pathologically spare If there is ever to be peace in the region it will have to 
involve a slow deliberate remaking of the complex relations that were sundered when trusts were brutally 
and systematically betrayed
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CHAPTER 7
Role of Modernization in Ethnic Conflict—The Case of Kashmir
Shonali Sardesai
Introduction
While both inter state and internal wars have increased dramatically in this century the number and 
deadliness of the latter wars is significantly greater 1 This internal strife expresses itself in many forms 
The focus of this paper is on one of these manifestations violent clashes (between groups) that assume an 
ethnic dimension Division of society on ethnic lines—on the basis of race language religion and caste— 
is not a new occurrence However it is only in recent decades that there is an increasing tendency among 
ethnic groups for self determination As Ernest Barker notes ethnic groups
were always there they had been there for centuries [it is only in the past few decades] that ethnic 
identity has become an idea and as an idea vested with emotion become a cause and spring of action a 
dynamic force demanding change 2
Conceptualization
Before laying out the framework of this paper it is important to clarify relevant concepts For present 
purposes terminology conceived by Walker Connor3 is used as the base for amving at my own definition 
of conflict between ethnic groups In general the terms ethnic group nation and state are used 
interchangeably Connor questions and consequently rejects this illegitimate use of terms Nation 
comes from the Latin word nasci conveying the idea of common blood ties while ethnic group is 
derived from the Greek word for nation ethnos meaning common descent The fact that ethnic means 
nation in Greek could be a source of confusion However Connor holds that academics are aware of the 
distinction between the two and hence should not use the terms interchangeably He states
One of the most common manifestations of terminological license is the interutilization of the words 
state and nation This tendency is perplexing because at one level of consciousness most scholars are clearly 
well aware of the vital distinctions between these concepts far more detrimental to the study of 
nationalism has been the propensity to employ the term nation as a substitute for that territorial juridical 
unit the state unfortunately American sociologists came to employ ethnic group as being synonymous 
with minorities [the wrong usage of these terms] has exercised it s own negative impact on the study of 
nationalism 4
Connor clarifies these terms and using Max Weber s interpretations of state and ethnic groups 
formulates his own definitions The state is defined as an agency within society that possesses the 
monopoly of legitimate violence It is a legal concept describing social groups that occupy a defined 
territory organized under common political institutions and having an effective government
Conceptualizing ethnic and nation is difficult because their essences are intangible Ethnic 
groups are human groups that entertain a belief in their common descent These groups are readily 
discernible to an outside observer by virtue of some features defined in terms of socio cultural terms those 
traits that are inherited through birth However when these groups become aware of these 
characteristics—the onset of the we they syndrome—such that they desire a separate state that a 
nation and nationalism is bom Thus an ethnic group is a potential nation while a nation is a politicized 
self conscious group that is self defined
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For the purposes of this paper it is more accurate to use the term ethnonationalistic 5 conflicts the 
struggle between nations within a state These are ethnic groups that become nations and demand special 
concessions from the state and in extreme cases their own state 6
Objective
It is important to trace the processes through which these ethnic groups become nations and subsequently 
engage in the politics of hate Several explanations are proposed for the high frequency of bloody 
ethnonationalistic conflicts 7 and this paper examines the relationship between modernization8 and 
ethnonational conflict More specifically it investigates the role played by the development process in 
shaping ethnonational struggles
Toward this end I review the literature of the impact of modernization on ethnic groups and discuss 
the three predominant approaches These explanations are representative of the broad traditions of many 
disciplines 9
The Integrationist School of Thought10
In the late 1960s and early 1970s scholarly widely believed that modernization leads to a dilution of 
ethnic identities According to the exponents of this school the grand process of modernization acts as a 
bridge between traditional and modern groups 11 A shift takes place from ascribed to achievement criteria 
and from particularistic to universalistic value orientations Moreover the processes of secularization 
industrialization urbanization and education have a homogenizing effect on social groups
According to assimilatiomsts economic development brings benefits that permeate throughout 
societies Such development originates from a certain center spreads throughout this core area and 
eventually extends itself into the peripheral areas It broadens opportunities and induces men to leave 
parochial identities and join together in a wider national entity As Karl Deutsch notes
the process o f m odernization will draw many o f the m ost gifted and energetic individuals into the cities or 
grow ing sectors o f the econom y away from their form er m inority o r tribal groups leaving these traditional 
groups w eaker more stagnant 12
Development leads to an expansion of core periphery interaction finally leading to their integration It 
brings the magic potion of wealth and prosperity that makes people forget their ethnic differences and 
consequently attenuates conflict competition and social antagonism With this view of society as their 
background these scholars make four predictions
Arguments First individuals cling to their ethnic identities to seek refuge from the chaos of rapid social 
change But such traditional behavior weakens as industrialization is perceived as promoting general 
welfare With time the peripheral regions merge with the core and the state becomes culturally 
homogenous Thus the language and culture of the dominant group radiates into the peripheral and 
subordinate groups
Second with development of the country as a whole inequalities between groups cease to exist and 
cultural differences if any become meaningless
Third assimilatiomsts assert that social mobilization is more rapid in states whose people share 
common ethnic institutions In the same vein mobilization is difficult in multicultural states However 
governments play a crucial role in determining the final effects of social mobilization A government able 
to distnbute economic benefits to its people transcends the problems posed by the character of 
multicultural states In turn social mobilization follows smoothly and cultural assimilation is a success 
The reverse situation also holds
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With the homogenizing influence of culture on groups and the reduction of inequalities the potential 
for ethnonational conflict diminishes Thus ethnic attachments decline over time leaving class 
inequalities more prominent Any occurrence of conflict is now on class lines 13
Criticisms Contrary to the positions assumed by the assimilatiomsts historical realities illustrate that 
ethnic consciousness is a more potent force challenging the legitimacy of states First modernization 
does not bring economic prosperity for all In fact there is an unequal distribution of gams with one group 
thriving at the expense of others This can lead to the intensification of the we they syndrome and a 
clash between groups 14
Second with modernization ethnic groups that have little contact with each other and are poorly 
integrated come into direct communication with each other At such times two situations arise Groups 
that are unaware of the existence of other groups use in group values as a yardstick to evaluate outgroups 
This m turn fosters negative outgroup stereotypes The outcome is the origin of antagonistic and 
distrustful attitudes toward each other 15 In other cases groups holding negative attitudes toward each 
other reach back to pre existing myths for reinforcement16 In both situations there is a sharp increase of 
hostilities
This does not mean that modernization does not take place without ethnic groups competing It does 
but in heterogeneous societies these phenomena generally intersect and shape each other
The Kulturkamph 17 Jihad versus or via Transnationalism
With the assumptions of the integrationist school challenged it is proposed that modernization leads to 
large scale personal and social dislocation The transition to modern society is a painful one and people 
need tangible identifications to see themselves through this process Ethnic groups serve to protect this 
shaken identity This school of academics contend that the world is caught between two opposing forces 
traditionalism and modernity As Benjamin Barber notes
Jihad (traditionalism) is the division of states and societies on tnbal and sectarian lines McWorld 
[modernity] is the globalization process that finds itself up against the restraining forces of the past 
Jihad and McWorld operate with equal strength in opposite directions They have one thing in 
common they both make war on the sovereign nation state 18
Arguments These scholars posit that McWorld is responsible for Jihad Transnational organizations bring 
with them abstract concepts and modern beliefs that unsettle people and lead them to search for 
something more palpable Ethnic groups provide them with this tangibility In a world of universalizing 
markets and anonymity Jihad delivers a sense of identity community and solidarity
What ends as Jihad may begin as a simple search [by societies] some set of personal attributes to 
hold out against the numbing and neutering uniformities of industrial modernization and the colonizing 
culture of McWorld These are frightened tribes running not to but from civic faith in search of 
something more palpable and electrifying 19
The majority of people in these societies undergo severe dislocation as a result of accelerated socio 
economic reforms As people see the traditional ideas of the nation state and as they know and understand 
them while they are being challenged through modem technology—which is an evolving market 
structure—as well as economic unions they feel a need to reaffirm their identity In such a climate of 
crises ethnicity20 acts as the guardian against technological advances that challenge traditional social 
customs
The above seems to indicate that McWorld does not compete with Jihad but is a path to it 
Encounters with modernity intimidate people and they attempt to recapture a world of traditions that 
existed in ancient times and was defined on ethnic lines To combat the forces of modernization these 
newly formed ethnonationahstic groups make demands in the present for a recreation of the past while in
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reality they shape their future However such a movement toward Jihad is short lived Once societies 
come to terms with the elements of technology Jihad dies a slow but certain death Thus Jihad is short 
run sentiment while the domination of transnationalism is a future reality On this point there are 
underlying similarities between this perspective and the assimilationists 91
Criticisms While this perspective makes some interesting propositions 22 it has three significant 
drawbacks First modernization need not always lead to jihad Some societies readily embrace 
modernization—assimilation is an exciting idea for them They adopt some Western values and blend 
them with their prevailing culture
Second the optimism that in the struggle between globalism and retnbalization transnationalism 
vanquishes Jihad is questionable Present day occurrences show that though the quest for Jihad begins as a 
simple search for local recognition it permeates through societies to pursue a bloody politics of identity
Third globalism leads to the origin and exacerbation of Jihad While an ethnic group acts as a 
security against transnationalism the literature says nothing about why these groups become hostile 
toward one another There is no discussion of the elements within globalism that may lead to 
ethnonationahstic conflicts for example what does McWorld possess that makes for inter Jihad 
conflicts9 This approach does not address these questions and is incomplete in this respect Nonetheless 
it sets the stage for the most prevalent tendency among academics the explanation of ethnonationahstic 
conflicts in economic terms
The Instrumentalist Approach A Socioeconomic Explanation
Advocates of the instrumentalist perspective hold that the dynamics of ethnic relations can be best 
understood by understanding the social structure of entire societies Ethnonational groups acquire meaning 
only in their relationship with other ethnonational groups Such interaction is best personified in 
modernizing societies These societies are characterized by asymmetrical development In such an 
environment the source of nearly all conflicts between ethnonationahstic groups are the political and 
economic inequalities real or perceived m access to resources This competition for resources is a salient 
feature of multiethnic societies undergoing modernization and a catalyst for the growth of ethnic group 
solidarity 21
It is accepted that modernization is characterized by uneven development and competition creating 
relatively advantaged and disadvantaged groups As a consequence there is a crystallization of the 
unequal distribution of resources between the two groups
The goods of modernity are desired by all but are scarce m supply which creates status 
differentiation and promotes competition Members of the more advantaged group want to maintain their 
leading position and more importantly want to exclude members of other groups from partaking in the 
benefits of modernity They have to devise methods to do this As Max Weber notes
When the number of competitors increases in relation to the profit span the participants become 
interested in curbing competition Usually one group of competitors takes on some externally identifiable 
characteristic of another group of (actual or potential) competitors— race language religion — as a
pretext for attempting their exclusion 24 (and for increasing solidarity within their own ethnic group)
They enlist the support of the less favored members of their ethnic groups These poorer members 
readily support the more advantaged members so that they too can receive gains In fact they place 
immense pressure on their more advantaged brothers for a share in economic gains 25
Arguments First elites lead the way in constructing ethnonationalism Elites of the dominant group 
activate a sense of ethnic obligation among members of their group so that they can practice the principle 
of exclusion The result of consolidation is two fold to reserve roles that are defined as having high
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prestige for members of one s own groups denying members of other ethnic groups access to them and to 
create among members of other groups a sense of threat and disadvantage 26
Second in response to its exclusion by the dominant group elites of the subordinate group take 
matters into their own hands They reactively assert the culture of their group as equal or superior to that 
of the advantaged group Hence they consciously use ethnic symbols to infuse a separate identity 
Demands are justified in terms of the perceived inequalities between itself and the dominant group To 
rephrase Brass ethnic transformation begins when elites realize that they can change the social and 
economic structure of society with the support of the less advanced members of their groups They 
deliberately choose ethnic symbols m their competition with other elites for the control of the resources of 
a society 27
Third as uneven development continues a group s subordinate position amplifies its members loyalty 
and attachment Similarly members of the dominant group intensify their ethnic claims to sustain their 
leading position However it is important to note that with industrialization tensions based on ethnic 
divisions need not decrease even if there is a more equitable distribution of resources The group that is 
advancing will want to move into the economic niches of the dominant group and the dominant group will 
want to prevent them from attaining this goal In all the above scenarios less advanced members of ethnic 
groups are mobilized and manipulated by elites of their groups
Fourth Marxists assert that the cleavage between capital and labor constitutes the primary source of 
antagonism Such an outlook of societal conflict on class lines finds limited applicability in contemporary 
times In multiethnic modernizing societies competition for valued resources leads to conflict manifested 
in ethnic terms 28 Thus negative attitudes reflect the struggle for economic and political power between 
ethnic groups In such circumstances intra category differences diminish and inter category differences 
increase
Results of a research on inter group evaluations of Hindu (the dominant group) and Muslim 
(subordinate group) secondary school pupils with a high status and low status social background in North 
India confirm this assertion The research showed that responses of the different groups were on a 
communal basis An important reaction was of the upper class Muslims They initially defined themselves 
on class lines rather than on religious grounds However their status claims were rejected by all Hindus 
Hence they the elites of the subordinate group were forced to resort to their religious identity and react 
in a communalized manner 29
This fits in with the general arguments of the instrumentalist approach First the competition for 
resources leads to a clash on ethnic lines rather than on the basis of class Second the elites of dominant 
group attempt to exclude the elites of the subordinate groups from the benefits of modernization The latter 
have no alternative but to respond in ethnic terms
Limitations The above comments suggest first that the dominant group is the more advantaged group and 
is it is the group primarily responsible for the aggravation of ethnic conflicts It wants to prevent the less 
advantaged group from sharing in the elements of modernization The subordinate group is an active 
reactor It counters claims of the dominant group with its own demands Second groups are not willing to 
worsen their socio economic status This is not necessarily the case
As Connor30 shows ethnonationalism can become overt with an improvement of the economic 
conditions of the subordinate group This is seen presently in the Basques and Catalans of Spam (and was 
illustrated by the Croatians and Slovenes in the former Yugoslavia) These groups enjoy a decided 
economic advantage over their state s dominant groups This advantage leads them to resent and resist 
being ruled by (in their view) aliens
In general ethnonational clashes occur when each group wants a larger share of the scarce resources 
However many of these groups are aware that conflict will worsen their economic situation They fight 
against economic discrimination but m the process accept a lower standard of living even economic
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impairment Examples of this to mention a few include the Tamil struggle for its own homeland in Sri 
Lanka the Hezbollah s fight against Israel the clash between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda
With these views as their backdrop the instrumentalists reach certain conclusions To gain access to 
the elements of modernization groups invent differences Conflicts between ethnonational groups are 
precipitated by an uneven distribution of valued resources and the attempt by one ethnic group to increase 
its control vis a vis a rival group These conflicts are the product of modernization It is inaccurate to place 
the entire blame on the development process First society does not construct differences Instead its 
elites take advantage of the existing differences Second the assimilatiomst argues that modernization did 
not take place the way it should have It was to bring equal advantages to members of society 
Unfortunately the elites incited ethnic tensions for their own gains Also the trickle down process of 
development takes several years before it bears fruit Some gains from it are already visible 31 A 
combination of equal access to resources and cooperation between ethnic groups is required to achieve 
this goal
Proposition
The three frameworks describe the role of modernization m identity formation that is they analyze the 
relationship between modernization and ethnonationalism On the basis of their evaluation I propose the 
following An existing history of antagonism between ethnic groups can exacerbate conflict between these 
groups in a situation of uneven economic development Elites play a dominant role in this process
In other words neither the existence of objective cultural distinctions or economic inequality is 
sufficient on its own to create ethnonationalism 32 Two conditions are necessary One it is imperative that 
ethnic groups share past animosity Two inequality arising from modernization should be manifested m 
the form of an uneven distribution of resources between ethnic groups and the attempt by one ethnic group 
to increase its control—politically economically and socially—vis a vis a rival group
Illustration
If a society has these two factors it is relatively easy to mobilize ethnic sentiments During the early 
twentieth century Indian Hindu and Muslim elites in economic and political competition with each other 
created a complex past and consciously manipulated selected symbols A similar situation is replicated in 
Sri Lanka The Tamils and Sinhalese have negative stereotypes of each other and use them to compete for 
political and economic control Other instances of a combination of negative attitudes and uneven 
economic development leading to ethnonationalism abound For example the clash between Malays and 
Chinese in Malaysia Hausa and Ibo m Nigeria Assamese and Bengalis m Assam Hindus and Sikhs m 
Punjab Québécois and Canadians in Canada In all these cases primordial attachments were infused with 
subjective and symbolic meanings to strengthen claims for economic privileges
It is also possible for elites to change their definition of an ethnic group or the number of elements 
that constitute ethnic groups depending on the situation As Brass notes
The movement from ethnic category to ethnic community and from ethnic community to nationality 
involves an effort to increase the number of attributes and symbolic referents that an ethnic group or a
people has in common with each other and that distinguishes them from other groups 33
In 1947 believing that the Muslims would be discriminated against in independent India the East 
Bengalis and the West Punjabis fought for independence m the name of religion The result was Pakistan 
However in 1971 East Pakistan seceded from the West and a new country Bangladesh was born The 
East Bengalis assert that the more powerful West economically discriminated against them Hence they 
used the element of language to unite against the West In both periods the perception of economic 
deprivation led to the usage of different ethnic elements to mobilize people
The Shiv Sena a Hindu fundamentalist party emerged in 1966 in Bombay to protest against the 
exclusion of Maharashtrians (who constituted 40 percent of the population of the city) m the professional
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sector Their rallying cry was Maharashtra for Maharashtrians This did not have the anticipated results 
as it was narrow in its approach The party changed its strategy The Shiv Sena today calls itself a party 
for the Hindus and has met with substantial success These examples illustrate that elites extend and alter 
the criteria constituting ethnic to mobilize and intensify ethnic consciousness 34
Argument
Drawing from the debates of the modernization school I argue when there is a potential to form ethnic 
groups disparities35 can bring charges of discrimination and injustice leading to the demand for special 
concessions or even political separatism It is now imperative to test the proposition against a case study 
to determine if development actually increases the probability of ethnonational clashes or whether it is a 
convenient tool used by academics to explain the rise of nationalism— an exaggeration of the influence 
of materialism upon human affairs 36
Experiment Kashmir37
In the last few years India has witnessed a dramatic escalation of strife 38 This has assumed a virulent 
form in Kashmir Since 1947 Kashmir is a contested territory a contested people and a contested 
idea 39 It is similar to other intra state conflicts in that it did not originate as an ethnic conflict but 
developed into one In this case religious thus being referred to as a communal conflict40 However 
unlike other domestic conflicts the Kashmir issue permeates into the international arena
The militant movement led by Kashmiri Muslims seeks secession from India 41 In this communal 
conflict the Kashmiri Muslims receive assistance from the Islamic world in general and Pakistan in 
particular While the actions of an aberrant neighbor and the resurgence of Islam have precipitated the 
conflict it is inaccurate to blame the present burst of violence solely on these actors This argument 
exonerates the Indian government of any accountability and deposits at Pakistan s doorstep the 
responsibility of lighting up the valley with armed insurgency 42 It is crucial that India looks into its own 
backyard to determine the root causes of this ethnoreligious separatist movement
Since partition m 1947 there has existed a separatist sentiment in Kashmir This movement was 
moderate even non existent at times The present situation is significantly different both in form and 
intensity First the costs of the present movement are enormous 43 Second m the past the Kashmiris 
desired their own nation state Today the Kashmiris in the Valley44 demand secession or even accession 
to Pakistan Third a significant portion of the population is in emotional sympathy with the insurgents and 
extend their support to them Finally and most important the struggle for independence has changed from 
being based on Kashminyat45 to one based mainly on Islam
Linking the above with my proposition I investigate the following question Has religion inspired this 
deadly insurgency or has the situation developed in such a manner that the separatists resort to religion to 
mobilize the people9 Toward this end I analyze Kashmin history to identify the principle factors that led 
to this grave crisis 46
Background 1920 to 1947
The Hindu monarch Han Singh was crowned king in 1925 He inherited a regime in which the Muslim 
population—77 percent of the population of the state and 99 percent of the population in the valley— 
endured considerable hardships Han Singh did nothing to improve the situation Like his predecessors he 
was prejudiced against the Muslim majority and passed legislation in favor of the Hindus 47
By the 1930s the administration at all stages was dominated by the Kashmiri Brahmins Muslims did 
not have access to education either The discrimination against the Muslims from the Valley was greater 48 
Hari Singh went a step further While subjugating the Muslims under Hindu dominance he pit Muslims 
against each other 49 Although they were oppressed by the draconian systems 50 the Muslim majority did 
not revolt
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In the 1930s rising awareness of the division of benefits on a communal basis—an awareness which 
was due to an increasing Muslim educated class—made conditions ripe for ethnoreligious conflict Despite 
this discrimination against Muslims religion did not become a rallying point for them because of the 
concept of Kashmiriyat and the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah 51
Abdullah recognized that beneath the facade of amiable relations between the Hindus and Muslims 
there was bitter resentment between them 52 Abdullah beseeched the Kashmiris to recognize that the 
ruling class was creating differences between them
The challenge was to realize that the problems were not between two religions but between an 
autocratic ruler and the Kashmiris It is against this backdrop that the Kashmir Freedom Movement was 
launched in 1931 It took its inspiration from the protest march held m 1927 that raised the slogan 
Kashmir for Kashmiris 53 With Hindu leaders by his side Abdullah increased the reach of the movement 
to involve larger sections of Kashmiri society resulting m the establishment of the Jammu and Kashmir 
National Conference m 1939 As Prem Nath Bazaz notes
Though conducted by Muslims the struggle was national in essence It was a fight of the tyrannized 
against their tyrants of the oppressed against the oppressors a large majority of Hindus and Sikhs have 
also suffered at the hands of an irresponsible government They are also stepped in ignorance have to pay 
large taxes and are in debt and starving 54
Self Determination 1947
In 1947 the Kashmir principality had to accede either to India or Pakistan However Maharaja Han Singh 
preferred to remain independent a move that was supported by his people Jinnah was perplexed that 
despite unfair treatment 99 percent of the Muslims of Kashmir did not want to become a part of 
Pakistan 55 According to Riyaz Punjabi [Jinnah] failed to realize that the Kashmiri people with a long 
history of sufferings oppression tyranny and exploitation could not base their struggle for freedom on 
religion 56
The power of Kashmiriyat was so strong that despite uneven economic gains a movement based on 
religion was not an option Instead the Kashmiris wanted to create a state on the basis of their shared 
identity
Simmering Tensions 1948 to 1953
After its accession to India Sheikh Abdullah became involved m the interim government of Kashmir 57 He 
declared
In Kashmir we want a peoples government which will give equal rights and equal opportunities to all 
irrespective of caste and creed It will be a joint government of the Hindus the Sikhs and the Muslims 58
This message was essentially secular in nature but ensuing developments led to its viewing in communal 
terms
First in 1949 India passed Articles 238 and 370 conferring special status to Kashmir Hindu Parties59 
outside Kashmir protested against this They claimed that by granting special privileges to Kashmir the 
government was being unfair to the rest of India Moreover the Valley Muslims would appropriate a 
disproportionate share of gains 60 This movement had the desired impact on Kashmiri Hindus For the first 
time they felt threatened by the Kashmiri Muslim However Abdullah appealed to them by arguing that 
he
never believed in the formula that Muslims and Hindus should form separate nations We do not believe in 
communalism religion has no place in politics religious affinities do not and should not 
determine the political alliances of states
The Hindus were appeased temporarily but the seeds of discontent were sown
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Second in November 1951 Jammu and Kashmir s Constituent Assembly under the leadership of 
Abdullah was established In this Assembly Jammu had twenty nine out of seventy five seats whereas the 
Valley had forty four seats Moreover Abdullah s five member cabinet had only one representative from 
Jammu The Cabinet and the Assembly were responsible for settling the question of accession to India 
The Hindu population led by the Pundits believed that the Muslims wanted to dislodge them from power61 
With the support of Hindu parties in the rest of India they formed the Praja Partshad Its mam objective 
was to achieve full integration of Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of India They believed that their 
security and prosperity lay in joining India
Third Abdullah passed the Land Reforms Act Its primary objective was restoring land to the tiller 
and alleviating the conditions of the rural poor Though it intended to reduce socio economic problems it 
was perceived as anti Hindu The reason was that landlords in Kashmir were mainly Hindu and the 
peasants were primarily Muslims The Hindus held that the National Conference was not representative of 
their needs but discriminated against them
To counter these problems Sheikh Abdullah made immediate demands for independence The Indian 
government did not agree to this and arrested Abdullah m 1953
Political Circus and Discontent Deepens 1954 to 1970
The dismissal and arrest of Abdullah disaffected a large section of the Kashmiri population To appease 
them the Central Government introduced specific measures
First the government gave considerable aid to Kashmir It set up a highly subsidized economy 
sanctioned quotas permits licenses and contracts arbitrarily and instituted free education Ironically the 
non discretionary assistance was in the ratio of 70 percent loan and 30 percent grant62 On one hand 
government pampered the Kashmins with economic rewards while on the other the greater loan liability 
of Kashmir meant it perpetually faced deficits m budgets
Second the government held elections These were neither fair nor impartial Hence unrepresentative 
regimes were foisted on Kashmir These governments used repressive and undemocratic measures They 
resorted to political tactics to maintain power Alternately appeasing Hindus and Muslims they laid the 
foundation for their estrangement Unfortunately as long as they conformed to the dictates of the central 
government the Center turned a blind eye to their oppressive actions This state of affairs continued in the 
same fashion until 1971 This period is characterized by certain important features that had long reaching 
consequences
During this period the Hindus—particularly the Pundits—were afraid that they would come under 
Muslim domination Hence they argued for a full and irrevocable integration of Jammu and Kashmir into 
India On the other hand the average Kashmiri Muslim saw this as Hindu India s ploy to annex Muslim 
Kashmir Furthermore the political mismanagement of this period accelerated the decay of Kashminyat 
The central government made no efforts to develop the region It encouraged a class of political elite who 
were inefficient and unconcerned about the welfare of the people 63
Although the government stated that Kashmir s integration was vital for India s secularism to survive 
it soon became a pawn in the game between India and Pakistan The War of 1965 was fought between 
India and Pakistan over Kashmir However neither of the parties were concerned with the wishes of the 
Kashmiri people 64
Finally despite the problems between the Hindus and Muslims they had not reached a stage where 
they wanted to be disconnected from each other At a certain level they were aware of divisive schemes 
of the political administration
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The 1970s
The 1970s was an opportune time for India to address the grievances of the Kashmiris 65 Unfortunately the 
Indian government did not demonstrate proficiency in dealing with the Kashmir problem
First the government did not encourage projects stressing long term growth Instead administrative 
officials became part of a class of vested interests that reaped the benefits of schemes meant for the 
masses This nouveau riche class was predominantly composed of Hindus and a few Muslim elites 
Whether this was an intended or unintended consequence is indeterminate However it is clear that once 
these members assumed an advantaged position they excluded the ordinary educated Muslims—who 
formed majority of the population—from partaking in the benefits of industrialization
Second education was free in the state 66 The process itself set off other expectations and demands 
Kashmiri youth were not satisfied with subsidies alone Education broadened their horizons and they were 
no longer content seeking employment in traditional sectors However education did not guarantee them 
employment The mam employers of the educated classes was the State It was discriminatory m its 
practices The Muslims m the Valley constituted 75 percent of the population but did not get more than 
13 percent share m the central government67 The Kashmiri Muslims became increasingly disenchanted 
with the system
Sheikh Abdullah became Chief Minister of Kashmir in 1975 68 While there were incidents of violence 
they were few and far between In general the people of the state appeared satisfied However this 
semblance of peace belied the increasing hostilities between Hindus and Muslims The central 
government once again failed to see this and concentrated on improving relations with Sheikh Abdullah 
However this did not have favorable outcomes
Sheikh Abdullah was criticized by the Muslim United Front for accepting leadership of a Congress 
dominated state government To counter this he shifted his political stand 69 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
would not tolerate such dissent or opposition and resorted to coercion to deal with the challenges to 
government authority 70 The Congress government became increasingly corrupt To counter Sheikh 
Abdullah s popularity they adopted two methods First leaders of the Congress Party increasingly played 
the communal card 71 They sought to win over the Hindus by favoring them while discriminating against 
the Muslims Second they appointed corrupt Muslim leaders who were interested in promoting their own 
interests The Congress was unconcerned as long as these persons were perceived as strong opponents to 
the National Conference Unfortunately neither were Sheikh Abdullah s supporters or opponents beyond 
reproach They did little to address the underlying grievances of the people As a consequence not only 
was the system dominated by dishonesty it also succeeded in alienating the educated Muslims
The 1980s
This phase saw increasing communal tensions First Sheikh Abdullah passed the Resettlement Bill in 
1980 which gave any Kashmiri who had been a state subject prior to 1954 or a descendant of that 
subject the right to return to Kashmir 72 This bill threatened the security of India and provoked strong 
responses all over the country
Second there was a sharp reaction particularly among the Hindus of Jammu They had settled on 
property that once belonged to Muslims 73 The impending return of these Muslims intimidated them They 
laid greater emphasis on Hmdutva The Hindu parties particularly the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) and the 
Rashtnya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) encouraged them They accused the Muslims of Kashmir of being 
disloyal to India and agents of Pakistan Anti Muslim sentiments were high In such an atmosphere the 
Muslims sought solace in their Islamic identity Some factors abetted this Islamization
Primarily the educated but disgruntled Kashmiri Muslims led this movement The Indian government 
had educated them but had provided no opportunities for their economic advancement The state leaders 
had not allayed their fears either Losing hope for the future the Muslims of Kashmir looked for alternative
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avenues for expressing themselves Pakistan was a willing listener The Inter Service Intelligence agency 
of Pakistan recruited and trained them into an organized force It is vital to note
In Kashmir militancy was not born out of poverty but out of the despair a class trained in the 
schools and colleges to become salary earners in government large industry and trade an educated 
class trained to wield power but denied the opportunity of doing so 74
Second there was an influx of maulvis from Assam into the Kashmir valley 75 With funding from 
Pakistan they opened madrassas These Islamic schools experienced dramatic growth By emphasizing 
traditional values the madrassas protected the Muslims from perceived or real oppression
Third the Muslims of Kashmir lost confidence in the Indian political system as well as in the 
National Conference The successive governments had neither improved their socio economic status or 
integrated them into India 76
The Insurgency Breaks Out in 1989
The outcome is a militancy of a proportion that India has not witnessed The militants want the right to 
self determination and are willing to employ extreme measures to achieve this goal In this they have the 
support of Pakistan and the Islamic world
Limitations of a Socio Economic Instrumenatalist Explanation
The historical review indicates that a single framework cannot fully explain the intricacies of Kashmir 
Instrumentalists approach ethnonationahstic conflict m Kashmir from a specific standpoint Embracing 
such a perspective suggests that the wave of subnationalisms is due to the modernization or development 
process According to instrumentalists Kashmiriyat suppressed Hindu Muslim antagonism for several 
decades However uneven socio economic development with the Hindus gaining at the cost of the 
Muslims led to the birth of identities based on religion Both the groups sought refuge in religion to 
acquire a larger share of the elements of modernization
Such a socio economic explanation locates the roots of the Kashmiri ethnoreligious conflict in 
economics While accepting the importance of a socio economic explanation it is important to look 
beyond it to reach a deeper understanding of the Kashmir conundrum Taking the position of a student of 
political archaeology77 (if such a field existed) I dig through the different layers—that is theoretical 
explanations—to identify the variables that led to the crisis in Kashmir assuming an ethnoreligious 
dimension
Uneven Development
The government provided free education in Kashmir but did not create adequate job opportunities The 
outcome was a large educated class that sought salaried employment Unfortunately a disproportionate 
number of jobs in the government went to the Kashmiri Hindus Moreover even private sector companies 
were staffed overwhelmingly with Hindus 78 The government did little to rectify the situation 79 In fact the 
Kashmiri Muslim saw the Center as protecting and favoring the Hindu minority The impact on the 
ordinary educated Muslims was two fold They were frustrated and resented the Hindus
Political Conscientiousness as a Consequence of Education
As groups acquire literacy and their educational opportunities expand they become cognizant of the 
prospects of economic improvement80 Furthermore according to Myron Weiner situations of scarce 
resources and economic modernization m polyethnic societies lead to mobilization on ethnic lines 81 
This is avoided if governmental mechanisms are stable and effective
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The educated Muslims unlike their forefathers were not docile and submissive They were both 
politically conscious and determined to share in the development process Besides they were exposed to 
mass media which bolstered their political awareness 82 Finding institutional channels of expressing their 
discontent closed they resorted to aggressive methods to achieve their goals They blamed the Hindus 
who they saw representative of the Indian government for their plight
Role Played by the Kashmiri Hindus
The actions of the Kashmin Hindus compounded their anxieties The Kashmiri Hindus were in a better 
position socio economically Moreover for economic and political reasons they identified more with 
Hindutva than with Kashminyat They wanted an abrogation of Article 320 and the incorporation of 
Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union
Moreover the Hindus developed ties with Hindus in the rest of India Thus they had a support 
structure that made it beneficial for them to emphasize their Hindu roots On the other hand Muslims in 
the valley did not cultivate any links with Indian Muslims According to Ganguly
[Kashmin Muslims] did not air their grievances as part of a national community but as a regional sub 
community with particular parochial concerns In the absence o f a substantial Kashmin Muslim 
expatriate community the Muslims of the Valley were understandably reluctant to venture into the rest of the 
country to seek their fortunes 83
Instrumentalism and Marxism
According to the instrumentalists with modernization intra category differences weaken and inter category 
differences increase They dismiss the Marxian theory of class conflict as obsolete The Kashmiri situation 
combines elements of the instrumentalist perspective and Marxian theory
In comparison to the educated Hindus the socio economic conditions of the educated Kashmin 
Muslims worsened over time The Hindus were relatively in positions of power They had greater and 
easier access to the elements of modernity They did not want to share these with the Muslims and 
continued to discriminate against them
The Muslim elites willingly adhered to the dictates of the central government as long as they were 
allowed to partake in the benefits The political merry go round of Kashmir makes evident the 
manipulation of the Center and the corruption of the Muslim elite They were satisfied with the situation 
and did little to improve the status of their fellow Muslims
Erosion of Autonomy
The Center interfered continuously in Kashmin politics The Kashmin leaders were not allowed to govern 
the State in a manner they deemed fit In 1953 when Sheikh Abdullah made demands for independence 
the government arrested him In 1983 despite winning the State elections Indira Gandhi dismissed her 
son Farooq Abdullah 84 The injustice of the situation disillusioned the Kashmiris particularly the 
Muslims In companson the Hindu populace was not as threatened by this corrupt system because it felt 
protected by the central government85
Rigged Elections
In 1986 two years after his removal from office Farooq Abdullah formed an electoral alliance with the 
Congress In the elections held in 1987 Abdullah s party won the elections through deceptive means The 
alienation of the Muslims of Kashmir was final 86 The elections sent two messages to the people They 
would not be allowed to freely exercise their franchise and there was a collapse of the government 
machinery These electoral malfeasances played a crucial role in contributing to the disillusionment 
among the Kashmiri educated youth 87
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Role of Pakistan
Pakistan tried to instigate the Kashmiri Muslims against the Indian government since 1947 However they 
met with no success The Muslims of Kashmir did not want to become a part of Pakistan Whenever 
relations between Kashmir and the Center were strained Pakistan tried to foment grievances Yet there 
was no insurgency 88 During the 1965 and the 1971 wars 89 Kashmir could have joined Pakistan However 
the Kashmiris far from rallying behind Pakistan demonstrated their loyalty to the Indian state 90 Pakistan 
had been waiting for the situation that erupted in the late 1970s and early 1980s They took advantage of 
the discontentment developing among Kashmiri Muslims The Muslims were educated but had no job 
opportunities In such an environment Pakistan engaged m a systematic strategy of infusing Islamic 
fundamentalism into the valley and consequently facilitated the crisis 91 They encouraged the use of 
religion as a tool of mobilization that is the creation of an Islamic identity in place of Kashminyat
By the mid 1980s Kashmiri youth trained in guerrilla warfare by the Inter Service Intelligence 
Agency (ISI) were infiltrated back into the valley They were bitter and antagonistic toward the Indian 
government and were willing to resort to brutality to exact their revenge They were joined in their cause 
by more unemployed educated youth 92 Pakistan was a willing guide and accomplice in these actions
Resurgence of Islam
The crisis in Kashmir coincided with the worldwide resurgence of Islam There was an increasing notion of 
an Islamic Confederation extending from Kashmir across Pakistan and Afghanistan into Central Asia The 
belief grew that the Valley should be liberated from India in the same way as Iran was liberated from the 
Shah
The Palestinian movement Intifada motivated the Kashmiri Muslims in large part because of the 
Palestinian students who were studying in Kashmir These students played an important role in 
mobilization as they glorified the actions of Intifada However the greatest inspiration for the Kashmiri 
Muslims were the Afghan Mujahaddins This group of Islamic radicals succeeded in defeating a major 
superpower In comparison India seemed an easier opponent Moreover the Mujahaddins extended their 
support to the Kashmiri cause
Eastern Europe
With the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe the Kashmiris held that if authoritarian 
governments that engaged in extreme repression could crumble so easily in Eastern Europe they too could 
overthrow authority
Conclusion
By establishing a cause effect relationship between uneven development and ethnonationalism 
instrumentalists simplify the complex Kashmiri problem A straightforward socio economic theoretical 
framework is not able to capture integral components that led to ethnonationahstic strife m Kashmir 
Besides instrumentalism does not differentiate between the many layers existing within the socio 
economic framework that is the uneven development due to discriminatory practices political awareness 
as a consequence of education and the impact on intra and inter category relations Each of these factors 
played an important role in the Kashmiri conflict and cannot be analyzed as a single whole Moreover it 
does not account for the political machinations power struggles and external actors that contributed to 
the exacerbation of the situation in Kashmir
The Kashmiri conflict suggests that no one conceptual structure can take into consideration all the 
dynamics of complex situations Reliance on a single framework results in an incomplete theoretical 
explanation It is important to recognize the various conceptual structures so as to acquire an m depth 
understanding of the Kashmiri situation
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PART III
Professionals and Violence Soldiers and Scientists
CHAPTER 8
Women m Combat
Jennifer Lynn Bashaw
As a woman eight days from promising at least the next eight years of my life to my nation s armed 
forces I consider the headlines across America that question whether women should serve in combat This 
is a curious notion to me a woman that desires to become a warrior Women have had combat roles in the 
United States since the American Revolution and should be allowed to continue to fill combat roles in the 
United States military However the current system for integrating women into the military is inadequate 
and has been justly attacked by service members Change must occur I will use the theories of violence to 
prove that men do not have a monopoly on violent behavior m order to suggest that women as well as 
men belong m combat I will then present historical instances that document a long standing participation 
of women in combat I will then address rape of female soldiers as a reality and suggest that although 
rape occurs it is not a valid reason to exclude women from combat because the impact and incidence of 
sexual assault on female soldiers has been exaggerated and is fraught with sexist assumptions The reality 
is that men are also sexually assaulted m both society and combat I will continue to counter arguments 
that have been offered against integrating women into combat by addressing the Boy s Club argument as 
well as the argument that because the physical testing minimum standards are lower for females there is 
a lower morale and cohesion of the unit Next I will suggest that there is an inequality of obligations to 
society based on gender and that this inequality has precipitated further inequality in the opportunities that 
society has granted its people Finally I will call the reader to action in the interest of the morale and 
efficiency of the military asking readers to support women s opportunity for combat roles with equality of 
screening techniques in order to ensure that the United States has the best military personal possible 
Ultimately I ask the reader to agree that involvement in combat should be a woman s choice
Change in Attitudes toward Women in the Military 
Should Not Stop Now
Since World War II the idea of female officers has greatly improved from the status of whores and 
lesbians 1 but problems still exist Although wives of naval officers have not expressed a feeling of threat 
toward their marriage due to the integration of females into the military female service members say that 
feelings of animosity toward the female warriors are high and are expressed in the prevalence of sexual 
harassment in the military The media coverage of this leaves little doubt for spouses that activity exists 
between service membeis This leads to distrust and failing intimate and professional relationships 2 Yet 
despite the arguments against women in combat they still have a right to be there
Women have the right as human beings to sacrifice their lives for liberty and the pursuit of happiness 
for their country In 1958 Eleanor Roosevelt stated the following on equality and opportunity Where 
after all do universal human rights begin7 In small places close to home so close and so small that they 
can not be seen on any maps of the world Such are the places where every man woman and child 
seeks equal justice equal opportunity equal dignity without discrimination Unless these rights have 
meaning there they have little meaning anywhere 3 To me that little spot is on the battlefield in a quick 
moving squad or m an airplane high above the trees If women are not permitted access to these 
opportunities how can we call ourselves a nation of opportunity7
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Violence Theories
The violence and actions against women that occur as a result of this new found opportunity are mental 
physical and sexual issues that result in unique medical problems Some nations ignore or even sanction 
gender violence 4 In the United States on a regular day seventy eight women are raped or sexually 
assaulted every hour suggesting that women will not be sheltered from sexual violence if kept from the 
military s combat roles Rape has occurred throughout recorded history both in and out of war The death 
toll that has resulted has continued to grow around the globe in and out of w ar5
The accounts of sexual violence during the Gulf War sexual assault of Muslim women by Serbian 
soldiers and the actions of the Russians and Germans against each other in World War II shows the 
American public rape is everywhere that there is w ar6 In an effort to combat this reality in 1981 the 
International Convention on the Rights of Women designed objectives that require a change in the of roles 
of men and women toward equality required that governments safeguard rights for women equally with 
men s and demanded an end of discrimination against women because it halts the growth and prosperity 
of the society and of the family 7 Elizabeth Cady Stanton in 1848 included women in the beginning of the 
Declaration of Independence to stress that everyone was created equal and should be treated accordingly 8
Richard Sipes presented an argument stating that it is Man s nature to have predispositions or instincts 
toward war and violent behavior and they are therefore different that women From this stems his Drive 
Discharge Model which presumes that a threshold of aggression pressure exists in every individual and 
society Once it builds up the tension must be discharged Warlike sports diminish aggressive tension and 
therefore can be substituted for war diminishing the likelihood of war The model sets a standard of 
violence that is expected in the society but the avenues which men will express it will vary 9 Supportive 
of these assumptions the Culture Pattern Model states that behavior is learned and that each culture has 
value systems and norms for those m the community to live by It assumes that there are standards for 
each area that establishes standards of behavior From this we can assume that if we socialize everyone 
to believe in gender equality then it will be so Furthermore many researchers view sports as a natural 
release of aggression equivalent to that of war time activity From this we may conclude that sports 
prepare an individual well for combat However sports compliment combat and are not in fact an 
alternative to it Furthermore since the turn of the century a combat conflict has been engaged in the 
world on an average of one every 2 6 years 10
History
In revolutionary Pans the role of women changed from one of subsistence to that of a participating 
citizen 11 The French government during the revolution decreed that women wear the tn color badge to 
show their support for the war and their country but they could not fight12 In World War II Russia 
deployed female combat pilots and in 1993 extended appreciation to them 13 In Australia women have 
been integrated into combat units Male soldiers have a generally negative outlook on this while females 
are positive about their role and see their impact on the army in a similar light Most soldiers reported they 
support women having an option to volunteer for combat related duties 14
The female desire to volunteer for military service is highly documented Deborah Sampson disguised 
herself as a man and joined the Army during the Revolutionary War After three wounds she couldn t 
remove the bullet herself and was consequently discovered and discharged from the military In 1779 
Nancy Hart could be seen shooting a rifle m her dress in the American Revolution (See Figure 1) George 
Baker the first girl Marine served on the USS Constitution for three years during the War of 1812 Women 
were integral parts of the effort of the Japanese to fight Russia in 1905 (See Figure 2) Six thousand 
women served during the Civil War During the Civil War women nursed the wounded and moved behind 
enemy lines to spy and to gain information for their government Women supported the war by working as 
seamstresses in flag shops in the Brooklyn Navy Yard (See Figure 3) During World War I women were 
nurses clerks translators and radio electricians In World War II women served as members of the Royal 
Navy as surveillance technicians aboard warships (See Figure 4) As if fighting was not enough eighty 
eight of the 400 000 women who served during World War II were actually held as prisoners along with
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men Women made the bombs that the United States dropped to end World War II (See Figure 5) In 
Desert Storm seven percent of the United State forces deployed 37 213 in number were women During 
the Persian Gulf War women piloted and crewed planes directed artillery drove trucks served on ships 
and guarded POWs In 1996 few jobs in the military remain closed to women According to the most 
recent statistics from the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs there are over 300 000 women 
currently serving in active duty or in the reserve and guard components of the Armed Forces 
Approximately two million women serve m our nation s military forces and two hundred years after 
women began to sacrifice their lives for their country seems to be an odd time to legislate restriction on 
the manifestation of their desires 15 It is the blood sweat and dedication of men and women that has 
brought America to where it is today
According to John Sherwood after World War II Israel fought a sixteen month war for its right to 
exist in which women participated at levels of the Palmach (military) Five women commanded combat 
units Colonel Meir Pa il stated Women were excellent—there was not a single incident of a female 
soldier not behaving correctly Esther Herlitz a female officer stated that they took the Haganah girls out 
to the front of the battlefield There were many differing opinions about this even among the women The 
majority of the service females wanted to occupy jobs far away from the reaches of combat After the war 
ended the creation of a new defense establishment followed independence The orthodox religious 
minority decided that women bearing arms was against the spint of Israel The Defense Service Law of 
1949 limits participation of women in the Israeli military to this day 16
Rape the Violation of a Person Through the Use of 
Unwanted Violent Sexual Intercourse
Time magazine notes the spoils Homeric booty kill the men and take the women as prizes 17 This 
demeans women to the status of objects Many fraternal groups thrive and their members are more likely 
to be perpetrators of sexual violence toward women Evidence is strong that members of fraternal groups 
do commit rapes with greater frequency than unaffiliated men 18 encouraging many researchers to question 
the correlation between sexual assault and men s club affiliation In many comparisons the military is 
used for the men s club example Unfortunately the military has not fared well in the comparisons 
showing a large tendency toward sexually violent membership trends
Stanislav Andreski states that the inferiority of women originates from the reality of their weaker 
muscular force He claims that the societies in which women hold powerful positions are those that 
condemn the use of force to settle differences The treatment of females as booty in times of war 
increases the stakes of war because war is often engaged in for the reproductive needs of the community 
or sexual gratification of the warriors 19 A common belief was that female power would manifest from a 
division of labor that permitted women to be self sufficient and become m control of their situations 20
Marvin Hams concludes that warfare increases the aggressiveness of the people involved explaining 
that the fierceness of the males increases with the amount of warfare As a result more aggressive males 
are required by the society The fiercer males are in war the more sexually aggressive they become and 
according to Hams theory the more males exploit the females in the community This often results in the 
culture adopting polygamous control over several wives by one man as a cultural norm In turn polygamy 
increases the shortage of women raises the level of frustration in males and provides greater motivation 
to go to w ar21 Hams adds that by controlling the weapons of aggression and defense men have obtained 
greater power than women have If it is accurate that combat sports lead a person to be more able m war 
then it can be concluded that women should be allowed access to combat as they have been granted 
access to hockey and rugby two of the most violent sports 72 I offer this to be used as an access to 
opportunity argument Those sports were closed to women This is no longer the case This trend should 
extend to allow women into combat roles Anthropologist Peggy Reeves Sanday concluded from culture 
patterns of treatment of women that rape is linked with an overall pattern of violence and that part of this 
pattern concludes the concept of woman as property it is clear rape is likely to occur in what I would 
call cultures of violence 23
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Many cross cultural studies on rape have been conducted but there has been an absence of attention 
to those that are committed by a group In all the studies evidence that rape occurs was difficult to find 
One researcher who has examined the issue of rape anthropologist Keith F Otterbein tested two theories 
in 1979 that were most accurate when incorporated together a deterrence theory that suggests that rape 
is deterred by the potential of punishment and fraternal interest group theory that holds that the 
presence of fraternal interest groups which are power groups of related males that resort to aggression to 
defend member s interests predicts the occurrence of rape m a society 24
Truly those women in combat are no different than those m the society at large Violence plagues the 
hearts of women everyday as can be easily seen by the need for women s shelters sexual violence 
awareness month in April and demonstrations such as Take Back the Night The face of the perpetrator on 
the combat field is usually recognizable however the perpetrator in daily life is often that of a friend 
colleague or intimate partner The following statistics force the critics of women in combat to open their 
eyes to the fact that violence is truly everywhere but banning females from the battlefield will not 
chivalrously protect them from it
According to the FBI every day four women (1 400 women each year) die in this country as a result 
of domestic violence Authorities estimate that two to four million women of all races and classes are 
assaulted or battered annually and more than 170 000 of the battering incidents are so violent that they 
require hospitalization emergency room care or personalized medical attention Every year approximately 
132 000 women report that they have been victims of sexual assault—more than half of the victims knew 
their perpetrator—and the majority of sexual assaults go unreported Annually 1 2 million women are 
forcibly raped by their current or former male partners some more than once Women are ten times more 
likely than men to be victimized by an intimate friend or partner than by a stranger
When the number of women who have been murdered by their intimate partners is greater than the 
number of soldiers killed in the Vietnam War shielding women from combat will not shield them from 
violence Statistics show that a woman is more likely to be raped on the city streets than on a battlefield 
weakening the argument that women should be excluded from combat positions due to the possibility of 
rape especially because the number of reported incidents of rape and violence in combat is much more 
accurate than that of society Moreover committing rape is something that the soldier is taught not to be 
ashamed of they report it to get help and rehabilitation so that they may productively progress in their 
life unlike the majority of the civilian population In 1994 the Violence Against Women Act was 
enacted providing a $1 8 billion to address issues of violence against women 95
In Veterans Affairs clinics genders differ m the diagnosis of diseases that result from combat It must 
be noted that medical psychologists are much more fluid in diagnosing the female combatants than they 
are the males Women have had more affective disorders and schizoaffective disorders Men have had 
more anxiety disorders and substance abuse disorders Women have been diagnosed at much higher rates 
of every type of trauma other than combat trauma when compared to male veterans Men were more likely 
to marry and start a new life upon returning from care than women were This phenomena must be 
acknowledged as a point for the policy makers dealing with the women in combat issue If they are to be 
fully integrated into the military then the hospital systems must structure themselves accordingly to meet 
the new problems that they will face 26 Furthermore among the veterans of Desert Storm men suffered 
effects of combat exposure while women suffered frequently from precombat abuse Only those females 
attesting to Post Combat Abuse showed the post combat stress disorders that the males did as a result of 
combat exposure 27
An author affiliated with ihe James A Haley Veteran s Hospital in Florida studied the after effects of 
the three and a half years that seventy nine American women spent in incarceration after being placed in 
a prisoner of war camp in the Philippines in World War II and concludes that half the women had a 
service connected disability (the same ratio as men) None of the women showed signs of tuberculosis or 
peptic ulcer disease—an important finding because TB causes death within an average of seven years for 
men and PUD often causes men to become disabled 28 Such finding could enable the U S forces with 
women to penetrate deeper into areas than men could go for fear of biological death
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When questioned most military veterans are not open about their sexual encounters in Korea during 
the war A researcher concluded that the Vietnam War veterans were especially reluctant to participate in 
a study entitled Sexual Violence and Vietnamese Women Many of the men interviewed were married 
or engaged when they went to Vietnam and have kept their sexual exploits very private leading 
academics to believe that wrong doings occurred there 29
Rape and violence are being used now in Bosma-Herzegovma and Croatia in order to evacuate 
homes Sixteen rape camps concentration camps and death camps were found by the United Nations and 
human rights groups in Bosnia An estimated 60 000 Bosnian and Croatian women and children have 
been raped in the Serbian forces systematic plan to dehumanize and demoralize the civilian 
population 30 Those surviving genocide co habítate in overcrowded and primitive refugee camps Rape 
was a strategy of war in the former Yugoslavia In Bosnia rape was not only a side effect of war but 
became a key instrument of war According to Lance Morrow a writer for Time magazine the 
battleground was no longer limited to the battlefield but also included women s bodies
It is quite obvious that women throughout the world have been engaged in war if they like it or not As 
an industrialized nation we have had the option to send women out on the battlefield to fight rather than 
allowing soldiers to move the field to the women It is just and right because we have technological 
weapons that break the barriers of physical strength enabling women to defend themselves and their 
country When men or women are taken prisoner the Geneva War Convention is often broken Torture and 
sexual violations result onto the prisoners body
This new use of sexual power is new to war and it is used as if it is technology—that is consciously 
cynically elaborately openly systematically and with a great deal of psychological sophistication—as a 
means of destroying a whole people according to Catherine Mackinnon a University of Michigan law 
professor And this new tool of rape has been a very effective instrument m war against civilians to 
demoralize the population of civilians and of warriors
In January 1993 Newsweek reported that Serb forces had raped an estimated 30 000 to 50 000 
Bosnian women The victims aged six to eighty were raped by neighbors strangers and gangs of men 
These horrors occurred m rape camps where Bosnian women were routinely tortured and murdered as 
well as in their homes while their families watched in horror
Rape in war is a historically documented event Since medieval times raping the enemies women 
has been a privilege for victors of war However today in Bosnia rape is no longer simply the spoils of 
war it is being used as part of the Serb ultranationalists strategy of gaining land in Bosnia The Serb s 
principle war strategy is ethnic cleansing and rape is used as a tactic in order to advance that strategy 
The Serbs use rape to form a Greater Serbia using a similar strategy when they attacked Croatia Non 
Serbs were forced to leave Bosnia through murder and rape as well as forcible impregnation and torture of 
Bosnian women
Mass rape was also used to exile Bosnians from their land Rape victims are often too ashamed and 
too repulsed with Serbian aggressors to remain in their hometowns after the violent act occurred Victims 
felt demoralized and humiliated Deliberately impregnated women by Serbs were held captive until it was 
too late for them to have abortions Most victims said they would rather die abandon or kill their offspring 
than remain in Bosnia and raise these children
Another impact that rape had on the population was causing families to uproot and flee their homes 
for fear that another woman would be violated This weapon destroyed the nation s pride and honor 
According to Time magazine Rape not only defiles and shatters the individual woman but especially 
in traditional societies also administers a grave long lasting wound to morale and identity Rape 
penetrates the pride and cohesion of a people and corrodes its future When a woman is raped m war she 
her family and her community internalize the assault upon their identity The act of rape built the Serbian 
soldiers morale Soldiers obey orders form commanders to rape and many enjoy performing the act Some 
like watching the act performed In internment camps women endure sadistic sexual acts rape torture and 
murder while soldiers watched as if it was a form of entertainment Some rapes during war are filmed to
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show the conquest and victory of one army over another To fool the media the perpetrators filmed the act 
of sexual aggression dressed as the true victims The implications m the arena of the media can cause 
international powers to intervene once they realize what acts are occurring despite the fact that the 
victims and perpetrators in their mind are reversed due to costume on the screen 31
The following accounts are of civilian women who were not given the technologies of war to defend 
themselves nor were they given the option to chose to fight back with weapons because they are women 
Mirsadare called her experience at the age of seventeen
On the morning of March 3 the Chetmks [Serbian fighters] arrived in our village They wore masks and 
White Eagle insignia on their uniforms I was terribly afraid Three Chetmks entered our house They 
were drunk One of them hit my mother cursing and threatening her He said that we would regret the day we 
were bom I trembled My sister clung to me crying When we went out I realized that she had wet herself 
That day they rounded up all the women and girls As we passed through the village I saw corpses dead people 
m their own yards The Chetmks had set some of the houses on fire It was pandemonium They looted they 
smashed the windows of the food market fighting among themselves for the few bottles of liquor We left the 
village crying A village of fire blood and death We hiked for more than five hours into the forest I don t 
know where Finally we reached the camp It was very crowded— all women children and old men It looked 
like some kind of forest motel The cabins were used as sentry boxes The whole area was fenced with barb 
wire and divided into two sections They separated me from my mother and sister They told us we would be 
together later but I never saw them again They raped us every night The White Eagles would come to 
get us they would bring us back in the morning There were nights when more than 20 of them came They 
did all kinds of things to us I don t want to remember We had to cook for them and serve them naked They 
raped and slaughtered some girls right in front of us Those who resisted had their breasts cut One night 
Zeljka s brother helped 12 of us escape They caught two of us We spent days hiding in the forest in 
improvised underground shelters and we managed to get away If it hadn t been for Zeljka s brother I would 
not have survived I would have killed myself because death is not as homble as the treatment I suffered 
Sometimes I think I will go crazy Every night in my dreams I see the face of Stojan the camp guard He was 
the most ruthless among them He even raped 10 year old girls as a delicacy Most of those girls didn t 
survive They murdered many girls slaughtered them like cattle I want to forget everything I cannot live 
with these memories I will go insane
As if her pain was not enough another female child that was a year younger at the time of the assault 
recounted a similar incident
One of the Chetmks ordered me to follow him into a house in my village Rizvanovici I had to go He 
ordered me to undress I took off my clothes feeling that I was falling apart The feeling seemed under my 
skin I was dying my entire being was murdered I closed my eyes I cried twisted my body convulsively 
bled I had been a virgin He told me to be careful because my father s destiny depended on me He went out 
and invited two other Chetmks to come in I didn t even know when they left I don t know how long I 
stayed there lying on the floor alone in a pool of blood It seemed as if I were in a state of madness on the 
thin line between consciousness and madness My mother found me I couldn t imagine anything worse my 
mother finding me under such humiliating circumstances I had been destroyed But for my mother who all 
the time had an idea of what had been going on this was the greatest sorrow of our lives We both cried and 
screamed She dressed me I too would like to be a mother some day But how^ In my world men represent 
terrible violence and pain 32
Morale Cohesion and Boys Club Argument
A portion of the argument to keep women out of the military all together or specifically out of combat 
roles is that they will destroy the morale and cohesion of the group In her studies m 1965 Beatrice 
Whiting discovered that cross culturally violence and gender conflict are correlated 33 This assumes that 
the farther apart the males distanced themselves as a superior to women more physical conflict would 
result Even after women have served m combat roles Chiefs of the military services have asked Congress 
not to draw conclusions from the Persian Gulf Was about the future role of women in the military 34
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Robert L Maginms a retired United States Army Lieutenant Colonel and a policy analyst with the 
Family Research Council a Washington D C based research and advocacy program wrote the article 
Women in Combat Creating Sexual Tension arguing that [t]he Clinton Administration s women in 
combat policy has created an atmosphere which may make it difficult for officers to comply with combat 
related military service 35 Navy helicopter pilot Lieutenant Commander Ken Carkhuff refused to take a 
detachment to sea stating that I could not appear to endorse a policy [the women in combat policy] that I 
didn t agree with disqualifying him from leading his detachment36 Furthermore he stated on the day that 
his daughter was born I think that we should not be subjecting women to violence and there is no 
more extreme violence that a human can be involved in than m combat 37 When uniformed female Navy 
officers lobbied against the female combat ban the Navy ignored regulations which restrict uniformed 
sailors from personal lobbying and did not discipline these officers 38 Because of his views the 
Lieutenant Commander was honorably discharged showing the importance of not questioning the presence 
of women in combat in the military even if it is for personal39 or religious reasons Equality has the 
highest precedence in this case
There are currently about four or five men s schools in the country and eighty four women s colleges 
m the country Renee Olander supervisor of academic advising for Old Dominion University s College of 
Arts and Letters and executive board member of the Virginia Women s Political Caucus believes that the 
foundations of the single sex schools defense is that they provide a valuable alternative educational 
setting Statistically women who graduate from women s colleges achieve more than women from coed 
schools Out of fifty four women that hold seats in Congress 24 percent went to women s colleges 
supporting the argument that the military academies and the military should stay as single sex institutions 
to maintain the highest level of performance The argument also contends that communities that are 
single sex (such as combat) have strong networks that the members become a part of reaching back to 
the boys club argument which argues that higher success will be reached without women However there 
is no empirical data to support this claim except that those having power now attended single sex 
institutions This is easily refuted by the reality that the world there leaders interact in is not composed of 
a single gender
Historically military training programs are federally funded In addition the Department of Defense 
(DOD)continues to state that it is an equal opportunity employer Currently that is not the case The DOD 
has allowed for single sex schools since 1972 because the military s policy included the exclusion of 
women from combat roles when in fact women are in the military and in combat Army Major Carol 
Barkalow who was in the first class of women to attend the U S Military Academy at West Point served 
in Desert Storm 40
On the topic of physical hazing Stephen Fogleman an Alexandria attorney a graduate of Virginia 
Military Institute and the first vice president of the Virginia Military Institute Alumni Association pointed 
out that violence in educational environments has been against the law since the 1920s Fogleman 
states out that psychologists believe coed interaction differs greatly from single sex interaction Anita 
Blair an Arlington attorney executive vice president of the Independent Women s Forum and member of 
the Virginia Military Institute board of visitors acknowledged the reality that occurs from gender 
integration it diminishes the single sex programs universally because separate is not nondiscriminatory m 
this day and age even if it is equal Conclusively losses would result from the hole the single sex 
institutions would leave but clearly equality and integration for universal opportunity is better The major 
recounted her experience at the academy to illustrate the type of atmosphere that society would not lose 
as a result of the integration of females into traditionally male institutions
I went to West Point because I wanted to be an officer in the Army I wanted to serve my country But you 
know what I got in addition to that9 West Point took me to my limit every day physically mentally and 
emotionally And then it took me beyond It took me beyond what I thought I had the potential to do And it 
did that by stressing me 24 hours a day seven days a week for pretty much the whole four years I was there 
That s the kind of education that there are those out there who are looking for41
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Blair pointed out the scarcity of those women that desire the education that the military will offer Carol 
Barkalow agreed because she believes that it takes mental emotional and physical drive to be a member 
of the military The Major also added that there used to be physical hazing at West Point and the 
diminishing of it is not due to women but increased awareness and values within the society She 
continued to say
I honestly believe it is about respect I have a respect for men and men have a respect for me And I ve 
bonded with men I was in Desert Storm with the 24th Infantry Division and so I was around a lot of guys 
who were into combat arms infantry armor Never been with women before They had a problem with me 
until they saw that I could do the same things they could do That I felt the same way they did about things and 
I endured And that s what bonding is Enduring the same hardships and the same dangers Enduring the same 
stress And so that s why I think for me West Point was the best thing because I saw men cry They saw me 
cry It didn t mean they were weak It didn t mean that they were a pansy or anything like that It meant they 
had a tough time I had a tough time And what we did is we pulled each other up and we got together and we 
got through it together 42
Argument of Physical Ability
At the Air Force Academy women were pushed closer to their physical limit than were men m physical 
training 43 This shows that neither gender is challenged to reach their maximum output by the current 
standards I believe that morale and equality of gender in the military is far off but the first step is 
universally equalizing the physical standards for jobs in the military This can be done by unfreezing 
current beliefs about women such as blaming them for getting pregnant and terminating service early 
identifying and internalizing gender equality and refreezing the new standards to pass on to future military 
generations 44 The debate in the media over the involvement of women in combat has continued to rage 
on
By adjusting the standards to allow women to compete with an equal chance of success the process has 
been made fair to both men and women Manne boot camp they have one set of physical fitness entena for 
men and another for women For example there is a point on the confidence course where recruits must 
climb over a wall The male recruits must start from the ground but for the female recruits there is a step they 
may use 45
A military school requires the male cadets to do forty two push ups but female cadets are only required to 
do eighteen 46 It is impossible to hold enemies to this same standard therefore this practice breaks down 
the cohesion and trust that those in the unit must have for one another If everyone is not held to the same 
minimum there can be no consistency on the battlefield
A study was conducted from 1979-1989 at the Air Force Academy scrutinizing the performance of 
the women in physical fitness tests The findings state that women are capable of much higher standards 
than previously estimated and currently required debunking the majority of the arguments that women 
don t belong in the field After all women may not excel to meet the male standards in most cases 
because they are not expected nor required to 47
Obligations
The reality today is that in many societies men are obligated to serve in the military and therefore are 
seen as contributing more to society than women As a result they gain more concessions from the 
community The integration of women into combat would bridge this gender gap that has resulted from this 
lower standard of female obligations to society This sacrifice of time and often life is appreciated by 
society This says a great deal about our positive morals in society Only when the obligations to society 
are equally met or required by both genders will benefits and opportunities be given to genders equally
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Action toward Equality and Correction
On October 20 1992 the CDI Policy on the Service o f Men and Women in the U S Military was published 
allowing every American with a desire to serve in the U S armed forces to apply ruling out gender 
discrimination It requires that all applicants meet minimum standards for the branch of service they 
desire It acknowledges the fact that components of the military branches differ in their physical 
requirements and intellectual qualifications as the jobs differ and only individuals that met the standards 
would be admitted It offered a policy that strove to match the individual s aptitudes with the military s 
needs 48
Recognizing one of the popular arguments against women in the military in that the double standards 
for military occupations that allow women to be admitted at lower levels of ability decrease combat 
effectiveness and morale the policy also mandates réévaluation of all Military Occupational Standards 
(MOS) to come up with a single gender neutral standard for each job based solely upon battlefield 
requirements of the position The policy requires that all personal be allowed to compete for all positions 
and all types of duty It states that a gender blind military will ensure that each job is filled by the most 
capable individual 49
This policy openly strives to increase combat readiness effectiveness and esprit de corps which is 
challenging when society is gender conscious It acknowledges that a two tiered system permitting one 
groups to avoid combat is unfair and detrimental to overall combat readiness and morale It outlines 
specifically that military service members must be prepared and willing to serve in combat All these 
strive to reach a point of equality in the ranks between the genders Limitations on female s assignments 
to non combat duty are being phased out of the Navy The plan calls for facilities that incorporate women 
comfortably into the military and explicitly states that women are not new to combat roles 50
President Clinton emphasized the violation of Haitian women s human rights to justify United States 
involvement in the restoration of a democratic government in Haiti There was a pattern of soldiers and 
policemen raping the wives and daughters of suspected political dissidents The Commander in Chief 
stated that Freedom from torture is more or less understood freedom to develop your own institutions to 
serve your own needs is not The goal of United States military there was to professionalize the army and 
the police not to judge them 51 However it is quite obvious that the U S military and society is not a 
flawless instructor
Man s inhumanity against woman was a prevailing theme at the world s largest gathering of women at 
the Center for Women s Global Leadership at Rutgers University in New Jersey In open forum victims 
told of abuses at home at work and in war Speaker after speaker attacked governments the United 
Nations corporations and international financial institutions demanding they take concrete measures to 
promote and protect women The females stressed that they had reached their limit of conversation and 
diplomacy and demanded action against the current violent treatment of women For six hours women 
from five continents recounted abuses they had suffered at the hands of men or their governments They 
described rape torture and forced labor Each story represented millions of similar stories about females 
rights that are violated every day 52
The Forum on Women which is organized by private non governmental groups lobbied at the United 
Nations Fourth World Conference on Women Twenty two women testified before a packed auditorium 
about violence and injustice they or their friends suffered arriving at the realization that the injustice were 
not their own fault and they must overcome their victim mentality that set in after the mcident(s)53
It is apparent that women and governments are coming forward to address the injustices that have 
happened to women Violence against women is an old phenomena and must be treated as such It is 
deeply imbedded m the concrete of our sidewalks and the soil of the land we farm Unfortunately the 
disease of sexual aggression runs rampant and is not selective as to whom it will effect The recent policy 
of Colin Powell to not lose one life on the battle field does seem relevant here in that we are striving to 
protect every soldier from hardship or inability to perform his or her job A reduction in the incidence of
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rape would further manifest this objective In conclusion it would be a grave mistake to shelter a woman 
from an opportunity due to a phenomena that is also prevalent in areas of her daily non military life
As I enter the final days of my civilian life and promise my life to the United States Navy for at least 
eight years I ask why is women in combat an issue and how long will it remain to be one9 My answer 
is that it is an issue because the women are not integrated equally but preferentially I have shown that 
women are not new to the military Nancy Hart heroine of the American Revolution fought in 1779 with a 
nfle in hand She did not request lower minimum standards for the physical readiness test nor did she 
request fewer watches due to her menstrual cycle She fought among men with full knowledge that she 
could die among men fighting for her country and she was respected for this
There are many service members that are below average and the majority of them are male because 
the service is primarily male But when a women performs below standards it is said she lowers the 
morale of the unit because she is different and she does not meet the standards that the men do Poorly 
performing women do diminish morale but the answer is to raise the standards universally Expect the best 
and grant billets (leadership positions and job titles) in combat or grant them on bases other than ability 
and performance This will eliminate women from some billets but if they do want the position they will 
strive to attain the standards that the men have
As for the problem of sexual assault it affects all service members—male and female alike—despite 
the policies established at the Geneva Convention In addition it is unconstitutional to strip a woman of 
her right to bear arms and support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies 
foreign or domestic if the purpose is to protect her because she is more likely to be sexually assaulted at 
home To preserve the old Boy s Club is an argument that falls from it s own weight If standards for 
performance are universally raised respect for and from both genders will follow and in the best case 
scenano less sexual assault will occur and morale will increase with women protecting their country 
along side men It is beneficial to have dedicated soldiers on the front lines of combat regardless of their 
gender
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CHAPTER 9
Military Affairs The Case of the United States and Nigeria
Solomon Woods
The purpose of this paper is to explore the factors that make genocide possible I will explore the 
possibility of genocide by first explaining the disciplinary aspect of the military m order to help the reader 
better understand the purpose behind discipline and the penalties encountered by the enlisted soldier when 
laws orders and military regulations are violated I will then explore the basic military chain of command 
and how soldiers are forced to obey orders to give the reader an opportunity to objectively view the 
severity of the Uniform Code o f Military Justice and its treatment of soldiers who fail to comply with orders 
handed down from their superior officers Further I will explore the military officer and show a correlation 
between the officer s authority to command and the likelihood of him or her leading a genocide Next I 
will explore the ethical decision making process which shows how the moral struggles soldiers experience 
when followings orders could lead to genocide This section also portrays soldiers as actors who unlike the 
non humans they are often portrayed to be have feelings much like the bystander Finally I will explore 
the ethical dilemmas soldiers face during wartime missions Specifically I will investigate the 
psychological factors that influence the ethical decision making processes of the Nigerian and United 
States military forces
In the military the officer makes all of the decisions that are earned out by the soldier Without the 
consent of the officer missions are not authorized Therefore I argue that it is the strict discipline and 
coercive and positive tools used to gam cooperation in military forces that give the officer the authority to 
lead It is this power given to a select group when in the wrong hands that makes genocide possible I 
further argue that genocide is more likely to occur in third world and less developed countries in which 
orders are delegated down from a single group or person(s) The Holocaust and Hitler s reign of terror 
Sadam Hussain and his influence over the soldiers of the Arab world and other countries that have been 
affected by a single person or group of people have proven that military ^ le  under a dictatorship can 
cause genocide This phenomena makes the topic one worthy of pursuit The above examples supports the 
argument that military regimes have the capacity to cause genocide Furthermore it is less developed 
countries where genocide is more likely to occur due to the lack of any governing congress or parliament 
(or the lack of power)1 that might hold such a commander accountable
Power Kills Absolute Power Kills Absolutely
As R J Rummel argues the less freedom people have the greater the violence the more freedom the 
less the violence I offer this proposition here as the Power Principle Power kills and absolute power kills 
absolutely 2 This statement introduces the idea that power and freedom are related I say this because the 
more freedom a group of people or nation experiences the less genocide is likely to occur In a 
democracy this is evident in the fact that freedom lends rights to a majority who may freely express 
themselves and act on their constitutional rights The American military is one that protects people who 
have rights America unlike some countries has a system that limits the power of a single commander in 
chief by ultimately holding him accountable to the people Nigeria whose population experiences far less 
freedom than that of the United States is protected by a military that has launched coups against a 
government that it deemed unfit Military coups have directly and indirectly governed Nigeria from the 
day it gained independence from England in 1960 Moreover the Nigerian military is able to ensure 
greater continuity in its governing system because of the corporal integrity of the armed forces and 
because of its adherence to a rough system of succession to political office 3 Nigeria has no system that
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limits the power of a commander nor has it historically stopped the power of its military generals Thus 
the political power of the Nigerian military is one that has been regarded as a military monopoly of 
military power 4 This power that the Nigerian military has developed over earlier decades has given the 
military the ability to launch coups that have overthrown the Nigerian government
The Nigerian military has been able to effectively launch coups because it has officers in every part 
of government In fact seven of the eighteen employees in the Federal Executive Council were military 
officers Eighteen of nineteen state governors are military officers Further Harbeson argues that what is 
suggested by these appointments is that the Nigerian military appears to have an unwritten understanding 
of the lines of political succession to be invoked whenever the military returns to the political arena 5 The 
influence the Nigerian military has over civilian affairs is overwhelming and unless this power is 
controlled the Nigerian military will continue to abuse this power
Nigeria has experienced a great deal of military influence since its independence in 1960 Table 1 
offers a chronological account of the rulers that have governed Nigeria since this time
The leaders listed in Table 1 are particularly important because they make evident the amount of 
participation that the Nigerian military has m government Seven out of the twelve Nigerian presidents 
were military generals Furthermore eight out of the eleven political transitions were military coups 6 The 
amount of power the Nigerian military holds is displayed by its ability to do harm and cause genocide (in 
the Nigerian case it is total power) meaning that the Nigerian military can order death to individuals who 
protest their action—as evident in the death of Ken Sarò Wira a civilian who was hanged for his protest 
of the Nigerian military s involvement m Shell Oil Company and the destruction of land caused by oil 
spills and drilling Fortunately the American government s limitation of power on its military has resulted 
in zero military coups Therefore a correlation between power and the likelihood to cause genocide can 
be established
Rummel argues that democracies are less prone to fight than non democratic societies Furthermore 
he argues that when both participants are non democracies more genocide is apt to happen 7 One can see 
that the United States a government that has enjoyed the fruits of democracy for decades and Nigeria a 
country that has experienced military coups and lack of democracy are two examples in which power or 
limitation of power could cause or control genocide The United States is less prone to cause genocide 
because of its democratic government that ultimately places power in the hands of the majority Nigeria 
on the other hand is more likely to cause genocide because its power is given to a single ruler History
Table 1 Chronology of Nigerian Rulers since 1960
Ruler Reign
Dr Nnandi Azikiwe 1960 to 1966 First Republic o f Nigeria (Coup)
Late Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 1960 to 1966 Prime Minister of the First Republic 
(Coup)
Late Maj General J T Aguiyi Ironsi January to July 1966 (Coup)
General Yacubu Gowon 1966 to 1965 (Coup)
Late General Martala Muhammed July 30 1975 to February 1976 (Coup)
General Olusegun Obasanjo 1976 to 1979 (Transition to Civil Rule)
Alhaji Sheju Shagan October 1 1979 to December 31 1983 (Coup)
General Muhammadu Buhan January 1984 to August 1985 (Coup)
General Ibrahim Babangida August 1985 to 1993 (Failed Transition)
Chief Ernest Shonekan 1993 (?) (Coup)
Gen Sam Abacha 1993 to (October 1 1998?)
Bashorun M K 0  Abiola Winner of the June 12 1993 elections (now in detention)
Source Tunde Brihma Political Transition from Military to Civil Rule The Ghanaian and Nigenan Experiences 
Paper presented at the Center for African Studies at Northwestern University Symposium Evanston Illinois 6 May 
1996
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has shown that genocide is more likely to occur when a single person or group of people has the authority 
to influence such as Hitler s influence over the SS soldiers and Sadam Hussain s influence over the 
soldiers of the Arab world
The Military Officer
The United States government is different from the Nigerian government in that it experiences less 
political pressure from its military officers because the balance of power is shared between the political 
military and economic sectors Appendix A provides,a breakdown of the American chain of command The 
President of the United States who has much political power is the Commander in Chief This is 
particularly important because Congress holds the Commander in Chief accountable 8 The American 
political system is unique because ultimate power will never be given to a single person unlike many 
Third World countries such as Nigeria and its General Sam Abacha who has exercised full power since 
1993
When linking the possibility of genocide one has to look at who has the power and ultimately that 
person s or group s ability to cause genocide More importantly one has to determine from where the 
orders come In the case of genocide caused by military forces one must focus on the officer The military 
officer is responsible for the orders handed down to the enlisted soldier The noncommissioned officer an 
enlisted man is the link between the soldiers and the officer The officer makes the plan that is carried out 
by the noncommissioned officer and enlisted soldiers The officer has the power to influence subordinates9 
so that any mission regardless of its rationality or morality is accomplished There are five basic forms of 
influence that an officer may use to gain the cooperation of soldiers
Mapping alternatives which means that the officer may list a variety of possibilities 
Recommending that a certain action be accomplished
Urging (persuading coercing) subordinates which means that it is strongly advised that a soldier 
comply
Advising meaning that a soldier should either comply or possibly face reprimand judicial 
punishment or both
Directing meaning that a soldier should either comply or face reprimand judicial punishment or 
both
It is with coercive10 and positive tools that some officers command Influence is the key to gaining the 
soldiers trust and loyalty but there are many sources of power that an officer may use to exercise authority 
over subordinates As one investigates the factors that make genocide possible one must first identify the 
sources from which power derives There are five sources of power that one can list as factors that give 
commanders authority and in some Third World countries the capacity to cause genocide
Legitimate Power The power an officer may execute over subordinates as a result of his or her 
position A commander has the capacity at the brigade level to relieve company commanders and 
company grade officers from their duties The commander also has the capacity because of his 
position to convene court marshals 11
Reward Power A positive tool an officer may use to reward soldiers for cooperation This is a 
different style of influence because it encourages the soldier s successful performance instead of 
forcing the soldier to do well with coercive tools
Coercive Power Power that stems from the mentality that if you don t comply then I will 
reprimand you by This source of power encourages the soldier to cooperate out of fear of 
reprimand or courts marshal rather than out of a desire to succeed
Referent Power The positive influence a superior has over subordinates through respect With this 
source of power the soldier follows orders not because of a reward or punishment but out of respect 
for the superior officer
Expert Power A power earned through proficiency Here soldiers follow because of the superior s 
perfection and good role modeling 12
The aiscipline side of the military is structured around the Uniform Code of Military Justice the law 
for disciplinary action governing American soldiers Included in the Manual for Courts Marshal are the
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laws by which soldiers are to abide The possible penalties for such actions as subordination and 
misconduct are outlined in Appendix 12 of the Manual for Courts Marshal 13 As one can see a soldier 
who demonstrates insubordination can receive either a Dishonorable Discharge (DD) a Bad Conduct 
Discharge (BCD) or two years confinement as well as forfeiture of all pay or both The Bad Conduct and 
Dishonorable Discharges are the most negative discharges the army imposes Usually one of these 
discharges has a profound affect on the soldiers life Thus the coercive discipline measure becomes a 
valuable tool when total cooperation is needed enabling the officer to have complete authority over the 
enlisted soldier 14
The at all costs discipline is what makes the armies of the world so powerful and capable of 
accomplishing most missions Discipline is important to any military and it can be linked to the phrase 
we do more by 9 00 a m than most people do all day It is this power to command enabled by strict 
means of discipline that gives military forces the capacity to cause destruction and possibly genocide
The U S officers have done their job in the training of soldiers based on the army s mission statement 
The mission of the U S Army is to provide soldiers who in conjunction with other armed forces are 
capable of Preserving the peace and security and providing for the defense of the United States the 
Territories Commonwealths and possessions and any areas occupied by the United States supporting the 
national policies implementing the national objectives and overcoming any nations responsible for 
aggressive acts that imperil the security of the United States 15
A descriptive mission statement limitation of power and strict penalties for corruption are the main factors 
that give the U S military forces the ability to maintain its mission The Nigerian military is different in 
the fact that its military has gone beyond its mission The original mission of the Nigerian army was to 
protect the people of Nigeria Now the Nigerian military has dipped its hands into the political sector of 
government As I stated earlier the Nigerian military s ability to continuously appoint people to 
government positions has given it the opportunity to control the Nigerian government ultimately opening 
up the potential for corruption and military coups capable of overthrowing the Nigerian government
The Nigerian military believes in six factors that develop its mission statement The Nigerian military 
organization is held together by these ideals
Unity of Command meaning that an army should have one chief 16 thereby reinforcing the belief
that multi chiefs create a disadvantage resulting from [too many] commanders 17
Concentration of authority school of thought the idea that command and power is the ability to give
orders while authority is the right to secure compliance with such orders 18
Division of work that separates the functional specialization of soldiers Here a difference
between combatant roles and technical support roles are established
Hierarchy of relations focuses on the pyramid of relationships in the chain of command The
Nigerian militaries belief of subordinates obeying superiors 19 is outlined below
Procedures for discipline which are much like the American military s coercive measures There is
prompt action for such offenses as absence without leave malingering and insubordination A
reduction in pay loss of rank imprisonment and dismissal by death are possible results of violation
The Nigerian military is different from the United States in that it could lawfully execute to
death by a firing squad any soldier who disobeys an order In short the Nigerian military is one
that establishes and maintains rigid rule[s] of obedience and behavior allowing for little [or] no
compromise 20 and such policies makes soldier so apt to comply with orders that may seem
irregular or immoral
Esprit de Corps focuses on the unity each soldier must attain The Nigerian military promoted 
camaraderie by making their military a profession in which once can indulge similar to those in the 
teaching engineer legal and medical professions 21 This encourages unity amongst soldiers who 
may not have family or loved ones with whom they can share a sense of pride 22
The Nigerian military s involvement in political affairs is slowly tearing itself apart Its over 
indulgence in politics has shifted their focus from protecting the people of Nigeria to controlling the 
people who govern Nigeria More specifically the Nigerian military has overthrown the government in an 
attempt to control the economic sector Major General Babangida stated that the Nigerian military must
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review its position and take necessary steps to recapture and reinstate [its] professional military virtues 
or they may sooner or later become no better than civilians with guns 23 Unfortunately this has become 
the case The Nigerian military has in the past few years launched several attacks on civilians who have 
publicly spoken out against the military s desire to attain monetary value from the Shell Oil Company
The Nigerian military somewhat resembles that of the British The officers are educated men who 
exercise authority over noncommissioned officers The Nigerian Military Academy is the only institute 
that concentrates on shaping the leaders of the armed forces 24 Since 1978 the Nigerian military has 
down sized from 230 000 to 180 000 The success of the new military results from the strict training of 
its officers and enlisted soldiers The mission of the Nigerian military has become one that lists education 
and professionalism as the most important elements The educated officer—who is far different than his 
uneducated incompetent colleagues of the 1970s and 1980s—has led a military that is more mobile and 
disciplined in command and control 25 The demobilization of troops who were either immobile or died of 
old age has resulted in a military capable of launching the coups that one has seen in recent years 26
One can see that the officer is the most important link between actions that occur and the soldier who 
completes the action One can also see that the office has a vast amount of power invested in him or her 
Officer also have measure or tools which they can use to gam the cooperation of soldiers This 
cooperation is lent by the soldier for various reasons the most important being fear The Amencan military 
has its version of reprimands and judicial punishment The Nigerian military on the other hand takes 
discipline a step further in their measures to punish soldiers who have violated the rules Even though 
discipline can at some point influence soldiers to accomplish the mission delegated to them they are 
still left with the ethical dilemma caused by the conflict between their individual values and the army s 
values which require duty honor and country
I will now examine the just war entena and explore under what conditions and by what means war is 
morally justifiable Further I will explore the ethical dilemma solving process that many military soldiers 
experience as they execute the orders handed down to them from the officers appointed above
This paper is based on the assumption that taking a human life is wrong that it is murder unless it 
conforms to the principles of justice Inherent in this ethical decision making process is the warrior who 
kills Either with a weapon or bare hands and thousands of soldiers have killed Some have killed under 
just cause such as the United State s involvement in Bosnia Unfortunately many have killed 
unnecessarily such as the Nazis slaughter of innocent Jews or the Nigerian military and its attack on 
innocent villagers who publicly protest the military s involvement with Shell Oil Company
The Emotional Soldier
Unfortunately scholars often entertain the notion that the ethical dilemmas caused by a military s wartime 
missions are only experienced by the linear structured hierarchic leadership in the chain of command 
(high ranking officials) If this were the case many critics whose books issuing their prescription for 
conflict resolution and ethical dilemmas would have successfully resolved wars before they ever 
happened Unfortunately these critics have over simplified the case because many critics fail to 
understand that the men who fight the battles are themselves emotional beings The infantry soldiers who 
stands the front line continuously struggles with the notion of a so called Just War They may also be 
asking questions such as Why am I here9 Will I ever see my loved ones9 Is this war justified9 There are 
only a few things that may separate the soldier from his or her civilian counterpart These include pride in 
his or her unit belief in the mission of the military and the fear of foreign threats of invasion However 
critics of the military always seem to leave out the people who actually do the fighting
While cynics bash military officers because they fear the economic burdens of war and the death 
total who—aside from loved ones—worry about the soldiers that fight the wars9 Who examines the 
newlywed soldiers who leave their spouses because they are committed to defending the values that 
make their nation great27 Who soothes the pain of those who are too proud to share their fears and too 
scared to cry9 Soldiers are all too often forced to take a back seat to the media s coverage of the
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President the Commander in Chief No one stops to think about how the President is the commander m 
the chain of command who never sees the front line All soldiers I argue are committed to follow the 
orders handed down from the officers appointed above them 28 However this statement does not portray 
the soldiers who commit the crime of genocide and mass murder as sane Whether it was the SS officer 
who killed thousands of innocent women and children during the Holocaust the Kamikaze pilot who gave 
his life by crashing his plane onto enemy targets for Japan or the American infantry soldier who 
continuously guarded the front lines against all enemies foreign or domestic all have had feelings 29
The ethical decision making process that many soldiers follow to solve ethical dilemmas is an 
important process to evaluate when studying military conflicts because it can be use to examine the 
psychological side of the soldier I will use ethical dilemma m the context of a conflict between values 
which may include
Individual values in which one has developed moral values by which a person leads his or her life 
These values often include terms such as courage competence commitment and candor 30 
National values reflecting a consensus of moral beliefs or values of a particular nation In the 
United States such values may entail life liberty and the pursuit of happiness but in certain 
circumstances the national value could change as was the case in America during Vietnam when 
the nations values promoted love not war
Laws orders and regulations that dictate the behavior or limitations of soldiers These laws may 
includes laws implemented in the Geneva and Hague conventions in which the international laws of 
war were agreed upon
Army values in which duty honor and country rule the lives of the disciplined soldier
Unit operating procedures that dictate the ways things have always been done
Institutional pressures in which subordinates are persuaded to do something because they fear their
superior
These six values are particularly important because soldiers are often pressured to comply with them 
because the degree to which they do so may directly affects their opportunity for promotions However 
these values can affect a soldier because soldiers are often given orders that are contrary to their own 
moral beliefs Vietnam is a prime case where American troops were forced to fight wars in which innocent 
victims were killed And it it with this example that I now turn to John McDonough s book Platoon 
Leader which offers a classic example of a soldier s ethical struggle31
Perhaps the most difficult dilemma that an army officer had to resolve in Vietnam was the ethical 
struggle between individual values 32 in which one often questioned the United State s involvement in 
Vietnam and Army values 33 in which one followed orders without reservation based on the principles of 
duty honor country The ethical dilemma was further complicated when the nation s values were violated 
by war In the 1960s the nation s ethical climate promoted love not war This ethical climate created 
an inner conflict within the platoon The intensity conflict was further agitated by the inevitable calamities 
caused by war and McDonough s inability to stop the killing of innocent civilians
Ethical decisions in Vietnam seemed difficult to resolve because as the book Platoon Leader 
suggests there was little room for error Life depended on how quickly one responded One may note the 
ethical conflict McDonough s faced when his platoon sergeant s initial instinct was to kill an elderly man 
out of reflexes The elderly man who was an innocent bystander almost lost his life because a soldier 
failed to identify him as a non combatant34 Verifying a noncombatant is both a unit operating procedure 
Army value and international law of war
There was also a continual conflict between the platoon s mission of protecting the villagers and their 
own survival which was constantly threatened by local villagers who fought against the platoon As a 
result many innocent people (non combatants) almost died In one incident there was an attack on the 
platoon by the communists when a woman carrying a small object (it was discovered that the small 
object was her baby) attempted to break through the platoon s perimeter The platoon leader could have 
permitted the lady s entrance into the area and risk the possibility of her carrying a bomb This could have 
killed the entire platoon He also could have shot her down 35 The latter would have clearly violated the 
laws of war The quote the quick and the dead effectively explains this dilemma Although decisions
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had to be made quickly a single error m judgment could have cost innocent lives If decisions weren t 
made quickly they often resulted in death Thus kill or be killed was the most difficult attitude to 
control while protecting the values of the Army the nation and the international laws of war
The decisions made m the resolution of an ethical conflict which usually violated individual values 
often violated Army values This was evident as several civilians became combatants Specifically 
McDonough made the ethical decision to protect three villagers whom he believed to be innocent 
civilians This clearly violated his individual belief to trust the villagers as well as the unit operating 
procedure as many soldiers detested him for allowing the civilians inside the platoon perimeter Later that 
night one of the villagers was found unauthorized inside the ammo bunker36 The platoon leader was 
further frustrated because he struggled with the decision that he made to let the civilians inside the 
perimeter and nsk their lives against the will of his men As a result he could barely restrain from killing 
the perpetrator who violated his trust
In the case of Vietnam ethical decisions were often based on the notion that individual values took 
precedence even though the Army values were important to the wartime mission This was justified by the 
belief that one must first overcome his internal conflict before he was capable of violating ethical values 
inherent in war One might argue that it was McDonough s predecessor s failure to prioritize his values 
that drove him to keep the ears of innocent victims as a souvenir of w ar37 One might also argue that it was 
the lack of Army values that caused this lieutenant to endanger the lives of his men by his hiding out in 
the bunker and his refusal to patrol the area for the platoon s safety This lieutenant whom McDonough s 
later replaced clearly put his individual values over the Army s values as he stalled for days inside the 
bunker waiting for his replacement38
The ethical dilemmas that continually evolved in Vietnam can further explain the psychological 
process the soldier experiences during a war in which genocide occurs This ethical dilemma in Vietnam 
is classic because it conveys the mentality of soldiers who expose themselves to unnecessary dangers to 
save face This was usually the result of personal challenges on the aggressors part not end a battle on 
equal terms Both sides went to great lengths to revenge the death fellow soldiers 39 However tired the 
soldiers were from fighting there was never an incentive to stop the conflict These ethical conflicts 
which pitted one s quest for revenge against one s will to live serve as an excellent model for the ethical 
decision making process
Finally there were the moral struggles that soldiers had to resolve when they realized the grotesque 
acts they committed—even if it was vital to the platoon s survival The first example that of an American 
soldier who suddenly paused during a patrol No one could figure out why he became so sick It was later 
revealed that he came face to face with a young lady whose arm he shot off during the platoon s reaction 
to contact The girl stood in the middle of the confrontation between the two combatants and she was hit 
in the cross fire The patrol stood in awe as they saw the girl walk by missing one arm 40 This clearly 
agitated the struggle between one s ethical values and the Army values of duty honor country
One also has to note the ongoing struggle the platoon leader faced as his men violated international 
laws of war such as those established at the Geneva and Hague conventions There was the case in which 
a Vietnamese girl was raped The platoon leader had to make the decision of keeping the best platoon 
sergeant he d ever had and violate his individual values or have him transferred and abide by the Army 
and international laws of war 41 There was also the medic who put a 45 caliber round through the heads of 
two already dead enemy soldiers42—an act that clearly violated the laws of war In both situations the 
McDonough chose to accept the values adopted by the Army and transfer both offenders
The culmination of the platoon s continual ethical dilemma was when the Communists decided to kill 
their own people The enemy soldiers torched maimed and shot their own people The platoon was faced 
with its most difficult dilemma The platoon could either stand by and watch innocent people die or risk 
confrontation with the enemy and possibly killing a noncombatant it was extremely dark so the soldiers 
would be unable to differentiate between combatants and noncombatants 43
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The destruction of the village was a major defeat for the American platoon because their sole mission 
was to protect the people of the village This undoubtedly left the American soldiers with the hardest 
ethical dilemma imaginable When the village was destroyed so was their mission This was the sole 
mission of this particular American platoon This example effectively conveys the dilemmas soldiers faced 
during Vietnam
The ethical dilemmas inherent in Vietnam seems unbearable Quick decisions often times resulted in 
disaster To evaluate the results of the choices made by the McDonough would be impossible I still don t 
know what I would have done Consequently this is a very effective model to use as a model of the 
ethical dilemma soldiers experience during war
This evaluation effectively portrays the soldier as an actor who is both sane and emotional In theory 
one might suggest the best possible course of action m reality one has to deal with the effects of that 
decision Thus the soldier is forced to overcome the conflict between peace and the notion of just war
Just War7
Many of the conflicts that the American army participated in regardless of whether they were initiated by 
the United States have been put under a magnifying glass The leadership mainly the President and high 
ranking officers have tried to explain why young men and women are sent to foreign lands to fight a war 
that no one can justify Whether it be the economic war m the Middle East the religious ethnic war in 
Bosnia or the political war in Vietnam The question of a Just War is continuous One must ask the 
question is there such a thing as Just War 7 And if so at what costs7 And to whose benefit7
The American military trains officers and enlisted soldiers with various manuals that deal with the 
principals of Just War With the establishment of the rules agreed upon at the Geneva and Hague 
conventions nations are obligated to follow rules of war which are deemed international But what rules 
does the United States consider to justify a war7 The MQS Training Support Package states that the 
violation of human (and national) rights provide the moral basis for just cause International law labels 
such violations crimes of aggression 44 Although some wars are justified in soldiers minds such as wars 
where countries fight to maintain unity or independence from colonial powers many are not Just war for 
the American military can simply be explained by
• Last resort meaning that there was no other choice was available Further a war is necessary to 
save the lives of a group of people or nation
• Legitimate authority which is a war declared by the legitimate authority In the case of Saudi 
Arabia the legitimate authority would be Sadam Hussain in the case of the United States it would 
be the Congress (based on the suggestion by the President)
• Realistic chance of winning which although few countries fight wars in which victory is impossible 
the United States believes that victory is a must before war should be declared More importantly 
the United States believes m winning with as few deaths and fighting as possible
• Just cause because wars don t just happen they are started Whoever shoots first45 is the aggressor 
and just cause is in the hands of the victim who retaliates out of self defense 46
Just cause is what started the civil war in the United States Before the States were united and slavery was 
abolished there were problems within the union One could argue that these civil war was the last resort 
And even though thousands of lives were lost the civil war was necessary to maintain the union Further 
this war was the last resort when trying to maintain the union Military forces as a whole have been 
unfairly labeled into one category
The notion of just war is one that has troubled the world for years In theory the four elements noted 
above must exist for a war to be just in reality however one develops his or her own entena for just war 
But one factor that determines justification is the intention of the fighting nations or states As the MQS 
Leadership Manual states if aggression constitutes a just cause for war then stopping the aggression 
should be the goal of just peace 47 Therefore instead of looking to establish the rules in which just war is 
defined one must look toward a resolution that corrects the problem
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Conclusion
War has historically been the most controversial topic because it has the ramifications of death as well as 
the inability to effectively resolve conflicts Although it is a necessary evil military forces exist to protect 
As long as conflicts exist the militaries of the world must maintain its level of expertise and this 
expertise is fighting
I have argued that the militaries of the world are capable of causing genocide because of the power 
they exercise over subordinates Discipline measures are the most important contributor to the likelihood 
of genocide because they give the officer the power to influence the soldier to commit genocide Although 
all militaries have the ability to cause genocide the possibility of the American military causing genocide 
is highly unlikely Furthermore it is in less developed countries such as Nigeria where genocide is more 
likely to occur due to the lack of any governing congress or parliament that might hold such a commander 
accountable Lastly I argue that although soldiers are portrayed as savage they are emotional people 
who experience the trauma of the ethical dilemmas inherent m war and the notion of a just war
Unfortunately the militaries of the world have been classified under one category As one can see m 
this paper all militaries are different in their structured chain of command limitation of power and 
mission The United States has an army that limits the power of its commander This attributes to its 
ability to maintain its mission (that is to protect the people of the United States) Nigeria is different 
because it has not controlled the power of its commander This failure to control the Nigerian military has 
given military coups the ability to intervene into the political arena and to ultimately overthrow the 
government Unless this power is limited and the commander is held accountable to the people of 
Nigeria then military coups will continue to control the people of Nigeria One can see the importance of 
the military but one must also realize the possibilities of genocide when militaries stray from their 
mission to serve and protect
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CHAPTER 10
The Scientists Making the Atomic Bombs1
Ji Qiang
Introduction
Atomic bombs with awesome destruction were used to help end World War II They also carried with them 
tremendous dangers for the future of humanity Since the first explosion of American atomic bomb the 
other four countries—former Soviet Union United Kingdom France and China—had also exploded the 
atomic bomb between 1949 and 1964 Scientists the direct builders of these weapons played vital roles in 
achieving atomic bomb A number of books concerning the history of nuclear programs in these countries 
have been published Richard Rhodes books give comprehensive historical reviews about nuclear 
programs m the United States Margaret Gowing s book gives an official history of the development of the 
British atomic bomb Bertrand Goldschmidt s autobiography reveals the French nuclear program and 
David Holloway s book shows a completely historical process of building the Soviet Union atomic bomb 
and John Lewis and Litai Xue s book describes a detailed history of Chinese first atomic bomb 2 However 
no single book gives a comparative study of the activities of scientists in the above five countries Why 
would the scientists like to undertake such a sophisticated secret and hard task as building atomic 
bombs7 What roles did they play m helping set up the projects7 How concerning were the goals of atomic 
bombs technically realized7 What attitudes did scientists show the final use of atomic bombs and the 
nuclear arms race7 The answers to these questions will illustrate a pattern of scientist s activities among 
five countries and between two ideologies
This paper briefly reviews the history of the development of the atomic bomb concentrating on the 
activities of scientists in the above mentioned countries Despite the different countries and different 
ideologies the activities of scientists showed a similar pattern of motivations roles work and attitudes 
toward the use of atomic and nuclear arms race in atomic bomb projects Fear of the Nazi Germany 
possessing such destructive weapon and patriotism were the mam forces initially driving scientists into the 
atomic bomb programs Working in the field of nuclear science scientists aroused the attention of 
government about the potential of nuclear fission and persuaded government to set up atomic bomb 
projects The work of scientists in these countries and their collaborations with scientists of other countries 
led to the final realization of atomic bombs Facing the final results of their own works—the atomic 
bomb—the scientists showed different opinions toward the use of atomic bombs and the nuclear arms race
In the following sections this essay reviews the early history of atomic physics describes the history 
of the American atomic bomb gives the history of the British atomic bomb project introduces the French 
project reviews the Soviet Union s project and describes the Chinese program
Early History of Atomic Physics
On November 8 1895 the German physicist Wilhelm Rontgen discovered X rays radiating from the 
fluorescing glass wall of a cathode ray tube A year later French physicist Henri Becqueal discovered 
radioactivity in uranium salt In 1897 J J Thomson at the Cavendish Laboratory discovered electron 
having a mass about one two thousandth part of that of the hydrogen atom and carrying a negative charge 
In 1898 Mane and Pierre Curie separated polonium and radium from uranium ore using a chemical 
method In the meantime Ernest Rutherford at McGill University found alpha and beta rays when he
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studied the radiations emitted by uranium and thorium A year later P V Villard in France discovered a 
third kind of radiation—gamma rays—emanting from radioactive material
In 1900 Rutherford working with Frederick Soddy observed the spontaneous disintegration of the 
radioactive elements when checking the radioactive gas emanating from the radioactive element thorium 
In 1905 Albert Einstein established the theory of special relativity the theory that predicts that the total 
energy of matter is equal to the products of mass and the square of light speed Enormous energy will be 
released with very small mass which is the basis of nuclear power 1911 Rutherford and his collaborators 
found that the atom had a small massive nucleus m the center surrounded by a sparse uniform distributed 
electrons through alpha particle scattering experiment He proposed his atomic model as a central electric 
charge concentrated at a point and surrounded by a uniform spherical distribution of opposite electricity 
equal in amount
In 1913 Niels Bohr proposed what is now called old quantum theory of hydrogen atom He assumed 
that electrons could occupy discrete stationary states in the atom without radiation When an electron 
jumps from one orbit to another it emits light energy equal to an integer times of the product of Planck s 
constant and light frequency Bohr s model gave a good match to the spectrum experimental data of 
hydrogen
In 1918 Francis Aston at Cavendish invented the mass spectrograph which can determine the mass 
of nuclei to a high degree of accuracy In June 1919 Rutherford published his experimental studies on 
artificially transmutation in Philosophical Magazine In this study Rutherford bombarded the element of 
nitrogen using alpha particles transforming nitrogen into oxygen and hydrogen In 1922 Bohr proposed 
that atoms are built up of successive orbital shells of electrons which can accommodate up to a certain 
number of electrons and no more thereby providing an explanation of the atomic structure in the periodic 
table of the elements In 1931 Ernest Lawrence invented the cyclotron which can accelerate the charged 
particle to a high energy such an invention provides an important tool for studying the inner structure of 
nuclei
In 1932 James Chadwick discovered the neutron He used alpha particles to bombard the light metal 
beryllium to produce the radiation which was identified as neutron after interacting with the nuclei of 
hydrogen atoms within paraffin wax The neutron can pass through the surrounding electrical barrier and 
enter the nucleus making the detailed examination of the nucleus practical
Frederic and Irene Joliot Curie discovered artificial radioactivity in 1934 using alpha particle to 
bombard the aluminum Such a discovery demonstrated that it is possible to force the nucleus artificially 
to release some of its energy in radioactive decay Meanwhile Enrico Fermi and his collaborators in 
Rome discovered that when the neutrons had previously been slowed down by water or paraffin the 
radioactivity of a metal bombarded with neutrons was abnormally large
In 1938 Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann in Germany bombarded uranium with neutrons to test the 
radioactivity discovered by the Curie group using radium chemistry methods The process showed that the 
bombardment of uranium produced barium a process which was later named nuclear fission by Lise 
Meitner and her nephew physicist Otto Frisch Meitner and Frisch analyzed the experiment by Hahn using 
Bohr s liquid drop model and found that under neutron bombardment the uranium nuclei split into two 
smaller lighter nuclei that could include barium and the gas krypton If more than one neutron is released 
during the disintegration of uranium a continuous splitting of uranium atom would be possible releasing a 
huge amount of energy This process was described as a chain reaction as a theoretical possibility as early 
as 1932-1935 by Fritz Houtermans Leo Szilard and Joliot Curie
American Atomic Bomb
Fearing Germany would build an atomic bomb Szilard and Eugene Wigner approached Einstein in July 
1939 asking him to urge the Belgian government not to sell uranium to Germany Then Szilard Wigner 
and Edward Teller drafted a letter which was signed by Einstein to President Roosevelt to inform 
Roosevelt of the potentials of nuclear fission and possible dangers from Germany building atomic bomb
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This letter was read to the president by economist Alexander Sach in October After listening to this letter 
Roosevelt suggested taking action and set up the Advisory Committee on Uranium On November 1 1939 
the Uranium Committee produced a report recommending the application of nuclear reactions to the 
source power production and noting the possibility to produce a destructive bomb
In 1940 after physical chemist Peter Debye informed Szilard and Einstein of the secret German 
uranium research at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes Szilard and Einstein wrote another letter to Sach to 
capture the attention of the government again In June the National Defense Research Council absorbed 
the Uranium Committee and gave support for fission research In the winter of 1941 James Conant a 
distinguished chemist and the president of Harvard traveled to open a liaison office between the British 
government and the National Defense Research Council in London In July Ernest Lawrence told Conant 
and Arthur Compton that a uranium bomb was possible and that the Nazis were trying to produce such a 
bomb He urged the United States to press forward with a bomb project Mark Oliphant of England flew to 
the United States m late August to help set up cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United 
States He met with the Uranium Committee talked with Lawrence Conant and Fermi about the nuclear 
program and rehearsed the Maud report from British nuclear physicists that atomic bomb is practically 
possible Convinced by Compton Conant Lawrence and Sir George Thomson who officially transmitted 
the Maud Report to Conant Vannevar Bush reported to the Roosevelt in October about the potential of the 
atomic bomb
Roosevelt set up the Top Policy Group to direct the nuclear weapon policy In March 1942 Bush 
reported to Roosevelt again about the nuclear program summarizing that a completion of an atomic bomb 
in 1944 was achievable and reiterating the dangers from the Germany atomic bomb program An official 
atomic weapon program started In August 1942 the Executive Committee which included Lyman Briggs 
Compton Lawrence Harold Urey Eger Murphree and Conant concluded that the bomb project was 
important beyond all previous estimates and that an authoritarian organization should move in to take over 
the work that had been democratically begun In September General Leslie Groves was appointed as the 
head of Corps of Engineers that was responsible for the atomic bomb program code named the Manhattan 
project
Scientists had worked on nuclear fission since 1930s Szilard and Fermi worked on the chain reaction 
for a nuclear reactor John Dunning and Urey worked on the gaseous diffusion isotope separation at 
Columbia Lawrence pursued electromagnetic separation at Berkeley Murphree supervised centrifuge 
development at New Jersey and Compton m Chicago did theoretical studies and the actual designs of 
the bomb In 1941 Merle Tuve group s measurement of the fission cross section of uranium gave a 
experimental indication that the critical size for a uranium sphere is manageable Emilio Segre and Glenn 
Seaborg discovered plutonium in Berkeley which fissioned like U235 with larger cross section but could 
be chemically separated from uranium Fermi built an exponential pile in Chicago to transmute U238 to 
plutonium
In 1942 Seaborg arrived at the Met Lab in Chicago to study the separation of plutonium from 
irradiated reactor fuel In the summer Robert Oppenheimer gathered a small group of theoretical 
physicists including Hans Bethe who wanted to do something to oppose Nazism Teller John Van Vleck 
Robert Serber George Kistiakowski and two postdoctoral assistants to study the actual design of atomic 
bomb On December 2 1942 Fermi had run the pile for 4 5 minutes at one half watt in Chicago This was 
the first time that men had controlled the release of energy from the atomic energy
After the start of Manhattan project Oppenheimer was appointed as the director of a new laboratory 
now the Los Alamos National Laboratory The armv would administrate the community which was 
building around the laboratory Laboratory security would be Oppenheimer s responsibility and he would 
report to Leslie Groves Oppenheimer secured the scientific freedom of speech within Los Alamos At the 
beginning of April 1943 Oppenheimer assembled the scientific staff—mostly from his friends and 
students numbering about thirty of the 100 scientists initially hired—for a series of introductory lectures 
Averaging twenty five years of age these young men were under the lead of Oppenheimer Hans Bethe 
Teller Edwin McMillan Robert Bacher Segre and Edward Condon Isidor Rabí Fermi and Samuel
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Allison arrived from Cambridge and Chicago to serve as senior consultants A review committee 
including W K Lewis E L Rose Van Vleck and another expert was established to follow planning and 
to advise Seth Neddermeyer an experimental physicist defined a possible new way the implosion 
method to fire an atomic bomb E L Rose a research engineer realized that the weight of bomb could 
be drastically reduced using implosion
In the autumn of 1943 Scientists at Kellex succeeded in devising a promising new barrier material for 
gaseous diffusion that combined the best features of the Noms-Adler barrier and the compressed nickel 
powder barrier
Crawford Greenewalt m charge of plutonium production for Du Pont continued to plan for helium 
cooling because the noble gas had no thermal absorption cross section at all for neutrons Wigner 
designed the water cooling system of the reactor In November the chemical separation processes 
developed by Seaborg and his colleagues had been used to process slugs m a remote controlled pilot scale 
separation plant In 1944 Segre measured the spontaneous fission rate of plutonium and found it much 
higher than the previous results meaning they would not need to cleanse the plutonium so thoroughly of 
light element impurities
In December the first members of the British Mission including Frisch and Ernest Titterton joined 
Los Alamos as the Quebec agreement between the United States and Britain in nuclear weapon 
collaboration They were later followed by Jamies Chadwick Rudolf Peierls and other seventeen 
members The official head of the British Mission at Los Alamos was Chadwick who was informed about 
the whole Manhattan Project The members of the British Mission worked in nearly all the existing Los 
Alamos Laboratory divisions and were integrated into all Los Alamos Laboratory activities In Los 
Alamos John Von Neumann Seth Neddermeyer Kistiakowsky and British scientists James Tuck 
Geoffrey Taylor and Peierls worked on the implosion program
In 1944 Von Neumann designed a theoretical arrangement of an implosion lens and Kistiakowsky 
managed to make the theoretical arrangement work Condon suggested polonium as initiator the 
minuscule innermost component of bomb that serves as the neutron source to start the chain reaction off 
French nuclear scientist Bertrand Goldschmidt extracted the first half curie of initiator polonium from an 
old radon capsule Tuck designed the initiator for the Trinity bomb In the April 1945 Frisch completed 
his critical assembly experiments with metallic U235 These experiment gave direct evidence of an 
potentially explosive chain reaction Kistiakowsk had managed to produce implosive compressions so 
smoothly symmetrical that their numbers agreed with theoretical predication On July 16 1945 the first 
American atomic bomb was detonated at the Trinity test cite
In 1945 when the atomic bomb was built and ready to use in the war Szilard thought it would be a 
serious mistake to use the bomb against the cities of Japan and expressed his concerns to Oppenheimer 
In May at an Interim Committee meeting about the future of nuclear business Oppenheimer suggested 
opening the door to industrial development He thought it might be wise for the United States to offer the 
world free interchange of information about nuclear energy with emphasis on the development of peace 
time uses Lawrence thought that the United States should know more and do more than any others to stay 
ahead of the rest of the world In June a group of scientists from the Metallurgical Laboratory at 
Chicago— including James Franck D J Hughes J J Nickson Eugene Rabinowitch Seaborg J C 
Stearns and Szilard—produced a powerful memorandum urging the need for international control of 
atomic energy to forestall a nuclear arms race and argued against the use of atomic bomb to Japan In 
August of 1945 two atomic bombs were dropped in Japan
Some scientists were happy and thought it was right to force the enemy to accept the peace 
Lawrence thought the atomic bomb a terrible swift sword that would end the war and might succeed in 
ending all wars Other scientists like Einstein James Franck Szilard were unhappy After the atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Szilard felt a measure of guilt for the development of such terrible 
weapons of war and calling the atomic bombings a flagrant violation of our own moral standards asked 
that the bombings be stopped
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In September the Association of Atomic Scientists headed by William Higinbotham was established 
to tell the world the truth about the new weapon and entreat their fellow men to renounce all use of atomic 
energy in warfare Almost every scientist involved in the project at that time thought that atomic energy 
should be subject to public supervision In July 1946 McMahon Bill made the control of atomic research 
development in the United States by a civil commission become law In 1946 a group atomic scientists at 
the University of Chicago headed by Hyman Goldsmith and Rabinowitch started the Bulletin o f the 
Atomic Scientists to explain the social and political consequences of the new source of power3
In 1949 the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb ending the American nuclear monopoly Some 
scientists like Teller proposed a superbomb project so that America will not become a second class 
power Teller was a key figure in the promotion of the uses of nuclear technology but he also opposed 
various attempts to contain the nuclear arms race The opponents of the superbomb argued that it would be 
morally wrong to initiate the development of such an enormously destructive weapon In the 1949 report of 
the General Advisory Commission (GAC) Oppenheimer and Rabí suggested some effective forms of 
international nuclear arms control 4
British Atomic Bomb
In 1939 after learning of French scientists report about the uranium splitting Thomson at Imperial 
College as well as professors of the Cavendish Laboratory realized if a sufficiently large mass of uranium 
was composed it could release a large amount of heat They suggested the British government getting the 
supply of uranium from Belgian so that it would not be captured by Germans In May Professor A M 
Tyndall of Bristol University wrote the Government s Chemical Defense Committee a cogent 
memorandum about the possibility of producing an atomic bomb In 1940 Otto Fnsch and Peierls 
theoretically worked out that a small amount of metallic U235 would be enough to make a bomb Peierls 
and Frisch showed their memorandum to Professor Mark Olophant Thomson and John Cockcroft At the 
beginning of April Lt Jacques Allier from France informed Thomson Oliphant and Cockcroft of German 
interest in uranium Peierls Frisch and Oliphant suggested the super bomb
A small uranium sub committee of the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Warfare was 
officially set up and research was pursued in earnest Thomson gave his committee a new name to 
disguise its activities Maud At the end of July of 1941 the Maud committee finished two reports about 
nuclear power and the nuclear bomb discussing m detail the potential of atomic bomb and the feasibility 
of building an bomb In the report on the use of uranium as a source of power the potential of atomic 
bomb was pointed out and the building of an atomic bomb was suggested as practical This report was sent 
to the Scientific Advisory Committee of British government for final decision Before the formal 
discussion the Chairman of Defense Services Panel was approached by Professors Frederick Lindemann 
and G P Tommson After a careful discussion check and recalculation of the Maud Reports the 
Scientific Advisory Committee concluded that atomic bomb project should be urgently pursued
Before the writing of the Maud report several scientists had worked on the nuclear fission project In 
1940 Professor Franz Simon worked on the physical problems of diffusion isotope separation In one of his 
papers Simon described the main features of a plant needed for isotope separation its estimated size its 
equilibrium times its power consumption and total weight and price of the machinery Professor E Reidal 
of Cambridge explored the centrifuge separation method Professor W N Haworth of Birmingham 
University directed the chemical worked on the production of gaseous compounds of uranium and of pure 
uranium metal Haworth s group at Birmingham worked on the chemistry of uranium and tried to find other 
useful gaseous uranium compounds other than hexafluoride
Frisch and Peierls were involved in isotope separation and the measurements of nuclear constants 
The paper of Peierls and Frisch confirmed the potentialities of pure U235 for use in atomic bombs Their 
calculations showed that the explosion of one atomic bomb would be equivalent to many thousands of tons 
of high explosive In the summer Peierls and Frisch made a detailed theoretical study of possible 
separation methods and found that diffusion though fine holes was the most promising answer By the end
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of 1940 Peierls and Frisch s work suggested that theoretically a bomb was possible while the Simon s 
team had shown that the separation of U235 was industrially feasible
At Cambridge nuclear physicists Halban and Lew Kowarski from France showed that a divergent 
chain reaction maintained by slow neutrons could be produced in a mixture of uranium oxide and heavy 
water Egon Bretscher and Norman Feather discovered another fissile element 94 which was radioactive 
This element would have larger cross section than that of U235 Chadwick and his team measured the 
cross sections at Liverpool and their result tended to support the general conclusion of Peierls and 
Frisch s analysis
In the autumn of 1940 Sir Henry Tizard led a mission to Washington where the scientific secrets of 
the two countries were freely exchanged This was the first contact between American and British nuclear 
research since the outbreak of war Chadwick made further cross section measurements and realized that a 
nuclear bomb was not only possible but also inevitable In the April 1941 Taylor calculated that the 
effect of an explosive 10 kg bomb would be equivalent to about 1000 tons of TNT
After the Scientific Advisory Committee s Reports was finished in 1941 Sir John Anderson was 
appointed to take over responsibility for the project A new organization named the Directorate of Tube 
Alloys m the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research was established and headed by the research 
director of Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) Wallace A Akers Anderson formed a Tube alloys 
Consultative Council to advise on broad questions of policy At the technical level a Technical 
Committee under Akers chairmanship was established In the middle of 1941 Bush and Conant of the 
United State suggested to Lord Hankey of Britain that the uranium work should be treated entirely as a 
joint Anglo-Amencan project Anderson wrote in the March of 1942 to Bush concerning the co operation 
between the scientific groups in the two countries to express a desire for collaboration m the atomic bomb 
project At the end of July 1942 the Tube Alloys Consultative Council agreed that a full scale Bntish type 
separation plant should be built in the United States
In August of 1943 the United States and Britain signed the Quebec Agreement which restored 
Anglo-Amencan collaboration This set up the direct interchange of information between the groups in the 
two countries working on the each section of the project and determined that there should be full and 
effective collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom in bringing the bomb project to 
fruition After the Quebec Agreement the British sent to North America as many British scientists as 
could make useful contributions to the American and Montreal projects A committee was set by Thomson 
to find the best way of meeting the demands of the atomic energy project A British diffusion mission went 
to America Peierls Klaus Fuchs and Tony H R Skyrme were attached to Kellex as consultants These 
theoreticians solved for Kellex a number of problems concerned with the control of the plant and the 
effects of disturbances Oliphant worked with Lawrence at Berkeley to study electromagnetic separation 
At the beginning of 1944 most staff in Britain working on electromagnetic separation went to Berkeley 
and Tennessee At the end of 1943 a group of British scientists called the British mission started to join 
the Los Alamos Laboratory This group of scientists was officially leaded by Chadwick and included Bohr 
Bretscher Free French Frisch Fuchs James Hughes Derrick Littler Carson Mark William Marley 
George Marshall Winifred Moon Peierls William Penney George Placzek Michael J Poole Joseph 
Rotblat Herold Sheard Skyrme Taylor Ernest W Titterton and Tuck 5
To a large degree the normal scientific habits of camaraderie of free discussion of talking out a 
problem with colleagues prevailed at Los Alamos Most of the British team were concerned with the 
problems of implosion and bomb assembly generally During their work the British were able to acquire a 
wide and detailed knowledge of the whole subject of the physics and construction of nuclear explosives 
There had been one or more British scientists in the great majority of the divisions at Los Alamos
In November 1944 Chadwick Oliphant Cockcroft Peierls H W Massey and H W B Skinner met 
in Washington to clarify their ideas on the Government controlled Experimental Establishment This would 
be the basis of the nuclear bomb project in Britain which was an integration of the research development 
and plant sides of the project within one organization
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In 1945 Cockcroft was appointed as the head of Establishment They listed the minimum main 
equipment buildings and staff and calculated the total initial costs of plant and buildings The design and 
construction of a 100 000 kW graphite pile was decided upon The electromagnetic research and 
development was to be carried out at the Experimental Establishment
In September Kowarski working at Montreal Laboratory succeeded in making the zero power heavy 
water pile critical When the members of the British Mission to Los Alamos returned to England many 
returned to the academic work Penney entered full time British weapons work at the Harwell atomic 
establishment He probably knew more about the Los Alamos work as a whole than any other members of 
the British Mission team In 1952 October Britain detonated her first atomic bomb on the Monte Bello 
Islands off the coast of Western Australia 6
In the summer of 1945 a move had been made in England at a high scientific level aimed at stopping 
the use of the bomb 7 When the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was announced Sir Henry 
Dale President of the Royal Society and a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee wrote to The 
Times to suggest the dropping of the national secrecy covering scientific discoveries during the war In 
general the British Mission to Los Alamos personnel felt the bomb was a good thing because that the 
bomb demonstrated to the world that how terrible this weapon was Marshall felt triumph and relief after 
the announcement of Hiroshima In 1946 Tizard said in a major address that the dropping of atomic bomb 
opened the eyes of the people of the world Chadwick confessed that until the very end that he had hoped 
that the bomb would not work Peierls thought that the scientists probably should have more dialogue with 
the military and political leaders Frisch expressed his feeling that joy was not appropriate after the drop of 
atomic bomb on Hiroshima he wished that the first bomb could have been dropped on an unoccupied 
Japanese island and not a crowded city His involvement with the Tube Alloys/Manhattan Project left him 
with a permanent distaste for the contemporary political world
French Atomic Bomb
In 1939 Frederic Johot directed his research toward producing a controlled chain reaction which could be 
used as an energy generator At the end of 1939 Joliot sent a report to the minister of armaments 
specifying that an appropriately mixture of uranium and heavy hydrogen was a possible road to the 
development of the chain reaction and consequently a massive release of energy In the July of 1944 
Pierre Auger Jules Gueron and Goldschmidt working in the Montreal Lab informed the General Charles 
de Gaulle of the atomic bomb project in the United States and its political effects during his visit to 
Canada They suggested resuming atomic research in France as rapidly as possible In November Halban 
the former director of Montreal projects paid a visit to France where he talked with Joliot and gave him 
some information about the existence of plutonium and its fissionable property and about work on the 
separation of U235 In May 1945 Joliot and Auger approached de Gaulle and told him that some sort of 
French organization was needed in the field of nuclear energy In September de Gaulle asked Joliot and 
Raoul Dautry to draw up a plan for a nuclear energy organization to enable France to assume its place in 
this revolutionary field On October 18 1945 the Commissariat alEnergie Atomique (CEA) was formed
On January 3 1946 the CEA began its first meeting Six members of its executive committee were 
appointed for a term of five years Two thirds were scientists including Joliot Irene Joliot Curie Auger 
and Francis Perrin Perrin took charge of setting up the Chatillon center Auger the raw materials and 
Mme Joliot the chemical problems Joliot dealt with the government the various ministries and 
coordination of the other commissioner s bailiwicks In February a scientific committee was formed 
Kowarski was appointed as the director of technical side to construct the first French pile with Jules 
Gerona and Goldschmidt sharing the responsibilities for chemistry Goldschmidt was asked to purify the 
CEA s stock of uranium compounds Gueron was assigned to oversee the conversion of uranium as well as 
the production of heavy water and graphite Young students just out of school were recruited and trained 
The recruits were set to study the basics of nuclear engineering CEA s work included uranium 
prospecting the establishment of offices laboratories and shops at Chatillon the processing of minerals 
and the preparation of extremely pure matenals at a gun powder factory and the construction of a nuclear 
physics research center
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In 1946 France got ten tons of uranium oxide from Morocco due the efforts of Joliot At the end of 
1947 the French industry under Gueron s direction began to produce high purity graphite necessary for the 
piles to use In 1947 the windy plateau of Christ de Saclay was chosen as the center of nuclear studies of 
the CEA In 1947 the uranium refining plant at Le Bouchet was completed and work began on the 
purification of a few tons of uranium oxide
In December 1948 the first heavy water pile was built m France under the direction of Joliot In 
November 1949 Goldsmith succeeded m isolating the plutonium at the first French file reactor In 1952 
CEA desired a plan to produce not less than fifty kilograms of plutonium (a quantity sufficient for some six 
to eight bombs) In 1958 when de Gaulle returned to power he endorsed the work that had been done and 
the organization he had founded In 1959 the French undertook one the most challenging of all types of 
nuclear engineering projects a uranium 235 isotope separation plant In 1960 France made the first 
plutonium atomic bomb explosion at an experimental center set up in the Sahara
Joliot was a patriot In a world where nuclear energy was expected to become the backbone of 
industrial and military strength he wanted to build an independent nuclear energy organization for France 
He believed that it was dangerous for a single country to monopolize or dominate nuclear power In July of 
1946 Joliot helped found the World Federation of Scientific Workers with Paul Langevin to promote 
world peace and the control of the nuclear weapons that he had helped create In a meeting of World 
Congress of Partisans of Peace Joliot stated that atomic bombs were a shameful misappropriation of 
funds He said that if the effort spent on them were put to peaceful work science could advance to a point 
where all of France s electrical power could be supplied by nuclear centers A few days later Joliot 
publicly expressed his unwillingness to work on atomic bomb Auger openly objected to the building of an 
atomic weapon by France Perrin felt that the few bombs that France might eventually build would be 
more dangerous than useful to possess Goldschmidt thought the use of atomic bomb in Japan could save 
hundreds of thousands of dead that an Allied landing would have entailed In 1946 one or another of the 
chief CEA scientists presented as an adviser to the French delegation at the United Nations meetings 
about the nuclear disarmament negotiations hoped that an international control system could be set up In 
May Goldschmidt suggested that the members of the Scientific Committee themselves translate the book 
One World or None a compilation of articles by Bohr Compton Einstein Szilard Urey and others to 
warn public of the perils of nuclear weapons 8 However Goldsmith believed that his country should stay in 
the vanguard of nuclear arms race Some of the scientists including Goldschmidt Gueron and Kowarski 
were willing to produce plutonium even if it might be usable for weapons in the distant future
Soviet Union s Atomic Bomb
In 1940 Igor Kurchatov a nuclear physicist alerted his government to the possible military significance 
of nuclear fission In July on the basis of Vladimir Vernadskn s memoranda the uranium Commission was 
created Vitalii Khlopin was named chairman with Vernadskn and Abram Ioffe as his deputies The 
commission determined what research the Academy should do organized the development of methods for 
separating isotopes of uranium and initiated research into the controlled nuclear fission By the end of 
May of 1941 Soviet scientists had done research work on chain reaction calculations methods of isotope 
separation and the use of fluorescent tests for detecting uranium
At the end of 1941 Georgn Flerov one of physicists discovering the spontaneous fission deduced from 
the silence of nuclear physicists in the United States that America was involved in a big secret project 
concerning nuclear weapons Worrying more about Nazi Germany he wrote to the other physicists the 
State Defense Committee and even to Stalin to persuade the Soviet government to set up a nuclear 
project In one of his letters to Kurchatov he proposed a model of atomic bomb Fuchs a physicist 
working on British atomic bomb project informed of the Soviet Union the work done in Britain At the end 
of 1942 Stalin decided to start nuclear research which led to the production of atomic bomb in the Soviet 
Union
In January of 1943 Boris Kurchatov spoke to Mikhail Pervukhin of the danger that Germany might 
build an atomic bomb In February at the suggestion of Pervukhin and Kurchatov the State Defense
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Committee adopted a special resolution on the organization of research into the utilization of nuclear 
energy for military purposes In March Kurchatov wrote two memoranda to organize research outlined 
particular questions to be investigated and suggest a path to a Soviet bomb
In April a new laboratory No 2 Laboratory was set up under the direction of Kurchatov for the 
nuclear project In July Kurchatov wrote another memorandum about the intelligence on the Manhattan 
project from Fuchs in which he reviewed a list of reports on various topics methods of isotope separation 
the uranium heavy water and uranium graphite pile transuranic element and the chemistry of uranium 
Alan Nunn May a physicist who had joined the nuclear team in the Montreal Laboratory sent information 
to Soviets to ensure that the development of atomic energy was not confined to the United States He 
handed over macroscopic amounts of U235 a slightly enriched sample and some U233
Kurchatov decided to use graphite as a moderator He took direct charge of the work on the uranium 
graphite system Isai Gurevich and Isaak Pomeranchuk theoreticians in Laboratory No 2 worked out a 
theory for a heterogeneous pile in which uranium lumps were distributed in the graphite moderator in a 
lattice configuration In 1943 Kurchatov began to assemble a group of physicists and engineers to work on 
the design of the atomic bomb In April 1945 Kurchatov wrote another report about the implosion method 
after reviewing information from the Fuchs at Los Alamos In June Fuchs provided a detailed description 
of the plutonium bomb This included the components of materials dimensions and a sketch of a design
In August a special Committee for the Soviet atomic bomb was created chaired by Lavrentn Bena 
Kurchatov remained as scientific director of the project In October Kurchatov and lulu Khariton decided 
to use the information Fuchs had supplied as the design of the first Soviet bomb At the end of 1945 the 
uranium plant was ready to produce uranium metal under the direction of Nikolaus Richl a scientist who 
was brought to Soviet from Germany in 1945 In December 1946 the first reactor directed by Kurchatov 
went critical This reactor was designed to study the production of the plutonium needed for atomic bomb 
In August 1947 Kurchatov and his colleague succeeded in separating plutonium from uranium oxide 
irradiated in the F 1 reactor
In 1945 Kurchatov set up a branch of the laboratory away from Moscow to work on the design and 
development of atomic bombs Khariton was appointed as chief designer and scientific director He 
recruited Kirill Shchelkin head of the laboratories at the Institute of Chemical Physics to study 
detonation lenses for plutonium bombs and Zel dovich one of the most versatile theoreticians to study 
how plutonium would behave under pressures of high pressure and temperature and to do calculations of 
critical mass V A Tsukerman who worked at the Institute for the Study of Machines was recruited to 
study diagnostics of explosions V A Turbiner a designer and engineer joined the project to head the 
design group In 1946 Turbiner and his group prepared a technical drawing of a bomb In July General N 
L Dukhov an experienced mechanical engineer was appointed deputy scientific director and deputy 
chief designer V I Alferov director of a plant that produced naval mines and torpedoes was recruited as 
a deputy to Khariton In 1948 V S Komel kov who had worked in electrophysics was brought to the 
installation He succeeded in designing a new detonation caps that could be fired synchronously The 
plutonium metal hemispheres were fabricated under Bochvar s direction at Cheliabinsk 40 in June 1949 
After George Flerov conducted dangerous critical mass experiments Soviet Union exploded her first 
plutonium atomic bomb on the steppes of Kazakhstan on August 29 1949
At an anti Fascist rally of scientists in Moscow on October 12 1941 Peter Kapitsa talked about the 
possibility of atomic bombs and suggested that scientists should warn people of this danger In a speech to 
the third Anti Fascist Meeting of Soviet Scientists in June 1944 Kapitsa argued that scientists had a role 
to play in securing international peace The scientists who took part in the project believed that the Soviet 
Union needed its own bomb in order to defend itself and welcomed the challenge of proving the worth of 
Soviet science by building a Soviet atomic bomb as quickly as possible Lev Al tshuler Vikto Adamskn 
and Andrei Sakharov thought that the Soviet atomic weapons were needed to balance power in the world 
Khariton thought atomic bomb was necessary to secure the defense of the country Nikolai Dollezhal the 
chief designer of the first production reactor regarded the bombing of Hiroshima as a repulsive act of 
cynical anti humanism He thought the Soviet Union needed all the means of attack posed by the
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aggressor to secure the country Dollezhal s viewpoint was shared by other scientists like Lev Artsimovich 
Vitalii Khlopin Andrei Sakharov and Kurchatov They regarded themselves as soldiers in a new scientific 
war In 1960 s Igor Kurchatov was reported to play an important part in persuading Soviet authorities 
particularly Khrushchev to move toward a nuclear test ban Kapitza A P Vinovgradov and V S 
Emel îanov joined the international Pugwash movement to stop and then reverse the nuclear arms race as 
its main objective 9
Chinese Atomic Bomb
Frederic and Irene Joliot Cune also felt motivated to help China break the American nuclear monopoly In 
the spnng of 1949 shortly after the Communist takeover of Beijing the Chinese government gave the 
nuclear physicist Qian Sanqiang foreign currency to purchase the country s first nuclear instruments with 
the help of the Joliot Curies when he attended a peace conference m Europe In Pais in October 1951 
Frederic Joliot Curie urged the Chinese radiochemist Yang Chengzong to raise the level of consciousness 
in Beijing about the bomb and its potential significance for China In early 1955 facing a threat from the 
United States the Chinese Politburo launched the nation s nuclear weapons program
By the year of the nuclear decision China had available some key scientists who had been trained 
abroad in nuclear physics Qian Sanqiang and He Zehui had studied nuclear physics at the Curie Institute 
in Pans and Peng Huanwu had studied with Max Born in Edinburgh Wang Ganchang a specialist on 
radioactivity and bubble chambers studied with Lise Meitner in Berlin As the leader of the program Qian 
Sangqiang recommended Pend Huanwu his longtime friend and schoolmate to head the theoretical unit 
that designed China s first fission and fusion bombs
In January 1955 Premier Zhou Enlai ordered the Ministry of Education to form a Nuclear Education 
Leading Group Professor Hu Jimm and Zhu Guangya organized a Physics Research Section at Beijing 
University At the same time Professor He Dongchang set up the Department of Engineering Physics in 
Qinghua University From 1955 to 1958 the ministry recruited hundreds of college seniors majoring m 
science and technology for these two universities as well as one in Lanzhou
To help train them in nuclear physics the ministry hired Soviet lecturers Many Chinese studying m 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe shifted their majors to nuclear science and engineering Moreover in 
October and November 1955 the Chinese Academy of Science sent two delegations to the Soviet Union 
to study the theory and operation of nuclear reactors cyclotrons and other equipment The specialists who 
were assigned to the nuclear weapons program retained only nominal ties with the academy The moment 
they passed into that program s secret world they fell under the military s control The Central Military 
Commission asked science and all scientists to serve the party s policies These scientists gave their youth 
and their knowledge to the development of the nuclear weapons program
On January 17 1955 the Soviet government had announced that it would help China toward the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy In that year Soviet sent a cyclotron and a nuclear reactor to China In the 
mid 1950s several hundred advanced trainees received general instruction in nuclear physics after the 
Joint Institute for Nuclear Research was set up m Dubna near Moscow Soviet nuclear experts cooperated 
with Chinese engineers and designers who were busy building an atomic bomb Within a few months of 
the January 1955 decision the Bureau of Architectural Technology was created Qian Sanqiang was the 
deputy to supervise construction of the experimental nuclear reactor and cyclotron being supplied by the 
Soviet Union In 1956 the Soviet government signed an agreement to help build China s nuclear industries 
and research facilities
Soviet Polish and Hungarian experts taught a cadre of Chinese many well tested geophysical and 
geochemical research and development methods The country s geologists took three years from 1955 to 
1958 to develop the minimal scientific and technical foundation for their all out hunt for uranium and 
came relatively close to the international standard for exploration
In 1958 Lu Fuyan returning from the Soviet Union developed a simple and quick method to produce 
the uranium oxide and tetrafluounde by combining the United States s method with the one used in the
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Soviet Union In July 1960 the Second Ministry chose Professor Wu Zhengkai the British trained 
chairman of the Fudan University Chemistry Department in Shanghai to supervise the production of the 
uranium hexafluoride He studied and tested the production of uranium hexafluoride and the engineering 
requirements for enriching uranium In July 1962 Wu Zhengkai and Cao Benxi a nuclear chemist 
succeeded in producing the hexafluoride In 1962 Wang Chengxiao a young scientist accelerated the 
enrichment process in the Lanzhou plant to move the production timetable ahead to January 1964
In the summer of 1957 Li Jue was assigned the head of Nuclear Weapons Bureau known as the Ninth 
Bureau Li Jue picked three principal colleagues to run the Ninth Academy Wu Jilin Zhu Guangya and 
Guo Yinghui Wang Ganchang Peng Huanwu and Guo Yonghuai were selected into Ninth Academy 
Along with Zhu Guanya these three men were to become deputy directors of the Beijing institute and then 
of academy Then Chen Nengkuan Deng Jiaxian and Zhou Guangzhao Yu Min Qian Jin and Yu 
Daquang came In 1960 Wang was appointed director of a second technological committee of the Ninth 
Academy He assumed overall direction of both experiments on the fundamentals of nuclear detonations 
and on the design and manufacture of the bomb s neutron initiator Peng Huanwu was appointed as the 
head of the third technological committee Guo Yonghuai a Ph D from the California Institute of 
Technology was appointed as the head of fourth technological committee Guo and an engineer named 
Long Wenguang contributed greatly to the design and testing of the bomb Most of Guo s work delved into 
the mechanics of nuclear weapons structure strength distribution of pressures and vibration Chen 
Nengkuan helped to complete and test the atomic bomb explosive assembly Chen was joined by Fang 
Zhengzhi in designing the initiator for the first atomic bomb Cheng and Fang recruited promising 
graduates from science and engineering departments in China s top universities to work as their research 
assistants Deng directed the theoretical section on design of the atomic bomb In 1960 Zhou Guangzhao 
was brought to academy to work with Deng on theoretical design He did a careful calculation of the 
probability of the test s success
In early 1960 Wu recommended dividing the academy into four departments—the Theoretical 
Department the Experimental Department the Design Department and the Production Department—and 
forming an integrated technological commission to oversee four high level technological committees 
each m charge of specific bomb production tasks The first under Wu Jilin and Long Wenguang had 
overall responsibility for designing the bomb s technology the second under Wang Ganchang and Chen 
Nengkuan for testing the non nuclear components the third under Guo Yonghuai and Cheng Kaijia for 
conducting weapons development experiments and the fourth under Peng Huanwu and Zhu Guangya for 
working on neutron initiation These four committees had direct access to higher officials in the academy 
and with Li Jue s authority as director of the Ninth Bureau to ministry leaders m Beijing
In 1961 Chen and Qian Jin succeeded in designing the explosive assembly for China s first bomb By 
the end of 1962 Wang Fangding identified the key element in the initiator Qian Sanqiang and He Zehui 
worked out the theories and checked experiments on the making of initiator devices In the November 
1963 Chen succeeded in making explosive assembly and initiator m one unit By the end of 1962 Deng 
Jaxian Zhou Guangzhao and their collaborators had worked out the theoretical principles of implosion 
including the use of enriched uranium in the core and the mechanics of high explosives in the bomb 
assembly In September 1963 they completed a draft design for the bomb and performed key static tests to 
verify it In 1964 Zhu Lmfang and his team manufactured the nuclear core for the China s first atomic 
bomb On October 1 1964 China detonated its first atomic bomb at the Lop Nur base
Conclusion
The previous sections offer a brief description of the history of atomic bomb projects in five nuclear 
declared countries Despite the different countries and different ideologies the activities of scientists 
showed a similar pattern of motivations roles work and attitudes to the use of atomic and nuclear arms 
race in atomic bomb projects
Most scientists in these five countries participated in atomic bomb projects with great enthusiasm The 
immigrant scientists like Peierls and Szilard initiated atomic bomb projects in the United States and
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Britain out of fear that Nazi Germany would build an atomic bomb first Such thoughts were shared by 
many host country scientists like Thomson and Lawrence and were reinforced by the patriotism of 
scientists during World War II The French patriotic scientists such as Joliot Curie and Auger felt it right 
to inform their government of the potential significance of nuclear energy and atomic bombs and to 
persuade their government to restart nuclear research as early as possible They thought this was a way to 
recover France s prestige and break the monopoly of the United States in this field Finding out about U S 
secret nuclear research Soviet Union scientists such as Kurchatov and Flerov suggested their country set 
up an atomic bomb project in 1941 These scientists regarded themselves as soldiers in the new scientific 
war to defend the security of their country They also took the atomic bomb as a scientific challenge to the 
worth of Soviet science and as a tool to balance world power Many Chinese scientists like Qian 
Sangqiang and Zhu Guangya returned from abroad and devoted themselves to the atomic project to defend 
the security of their country Scientists in all five countnes either fearing Nazi possession of an atomic 
bomb or motivated by patriotism or both formed the main stream of those joining atomic bomb projects
The final success of atomic bomb projects in these countnes depended primarily on the hard work of 
their own scientists Meanwhile each of these countries took advantage of the benefits from collaboration 
with the other countries After the Quebec Agreement British scientists directly joined the building of the 
first American atomic bomb at Los Alamos The Anglo-American collaboration accelerated the 
achievement of American atomic bomb in 1945 and also facilitated the British atomic bomb explosion m 
1952 French scientists worked in the Montreal Laboratory m support of the British program giving French 
scientists solid experience in the field of nuclear science and background to work for their own country 
The Soviet Union gained from the espionage of scientists like Klaus Fuchs who provided important 
information about the American atomic bomb China got help from the Soviet Union in the form of 
instruments personnel and training
After the use of atomic bomb m Japan some scientists like Szilard in the United State Frisch in 
Britain Joliot Cune in France and Dollezhal in the Soviet Union thought it was wrong to use such 
destructive weapon Other scientists like American scientist Lawrence the British scientist Marshall and 
the French scientist Goldschmidt thought it was right to use the atomic bomb to end the war and to bring 
triumph and peace In 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb The nuclear arms race 
started Scientists like Teller in the United State proposed a super bomb project and opposed various 
attempts to contain the nuclear arms race Other scientists like Oppenheimer in the United State and 
Kaptisa in the Soviet Union suggested some effective forms of international nuclear arms control
In summary the brief atomic bomb history provided in this essay illustrates an integrated story of 
scientist s motivations roles work and attitudes in the atomic bomb programs of their countries Today 
the world is m a new stage of world peace and the nuclear scientists are playing and should play an 
active role in reducing and eventually destroying nuclear arms
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PART IV
Ethical and Technical Perspectives of Violence
CHAPTER 11
Expansion and Limitation Counting and Human Distress
Matthew Doolittle
In 1925 Virginia Wolf suffered from a long debilitating illness and was not able to write 1 Soon after her 
recovery she recorded her experience in an essay entitled On Being 111 2 In times of pain she wrote 
language at once runs dry 3 While the pained experience may retreat from straightforward 
representation bodily pain or injury nonetheless can call forth not only biological but psychic efforts to 
endure which can sometimes find expression that can be traced
An inflicted injury may often reproduce such psychic effort of endurance doubly Inflicted injuries 
involve not only the effort of the victim to endure but the simultaneous effort of the aggressor to crush 
endurance Both the effort to survive and its oppressive inversion can rely on the same conceptual 
significance—the original and its negative While there is no direct means to describe pain then 
examination of instances of endurance as well as of the contestation between intentional injury and 
survival may expose imaginative patterns often associated with distress and survival Before turning to a 
discussion of one of these recurring patterns it may be useful to summarize some of the most important 
strategies that have been employed in the effort to express or represent pain—to make a crude sketch of 
the larger indirect vocabulary of pain within which the subject of this paper will be located
The Language of Pain
Different strategies used to express pain cannot be divided exclusively from one another Despite 
important intersections however for rhetorical purposes the language associated with the effort to express 
and survive physical pain can be divided roughly into two categories that of production and that of 
recitation Produced language takes the form of figurative or material expression Figurative expressions of 
pain generally involve three types of images Images of the weapon are Elaine Scarry s primary 
preoccupation in The Body in Pain 4 Images of what we might term forces of nature also occur 
repeatedly—including for instance images of water as a destructive force or images of natural objects 
such as tree roots that are imagined to invade the body A third figurative expression of pam involves 
images of bodily damage or distortion—images of abscess or broken bones that pierce the skin and that 
occur even when such physical states are not present for example
Unlike such figurative strategies material expressions of pain involve an effort to enact the 
experience of suffering itself Such efforts can occur in the context of formalized rituals such as those 
sometimes observed by anthropologists or they can take the shape of paintings or other material gestures 5
The second category of the language of pain—the language of recitation—involves the recollection 
and in some cases the reformulation of familiar series The process by which remembered sequences are 
reproduced often has an implicit or explicit relation to the act of counting which of course can itself be 
seen as an act of recitation The topic to which I shall briefly turn then plays an important role within a 
larger vocabulary of pain 6
A discussion relating to the language of pain and survival may suggest questions about the precise 
relationship between the two It is beyond the scope of this essay however to propose a specific 
mechanism by which the use of language may attain significance during times of pain Psychological or 
physiological models about the role of language m early development or cultural models about the role of 
language in constituting societies might be suggestive This paper however represents an attempt to
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begin the process of identifying one sector on a larger conceptual and figurative map An effort to explain 
the tectonic forces that have produced this topography then can take place productively only after the 
phenomena under discussion have been clearly identified and is more appropriately reserved for a later 
stage in this ongoing project In the present effort attention to an ancient text of Western literature as 
well as an examination of explorations and reactions to distress in more modern life and culture will begin 
to suggest the human significance of one recurring and particularly identifiable impulse observed during 
times of pain the impulse to count
Numbers as Markers of Significance
It is almost a commonplace that newspapers often emphasize numerals in their headlines not only as a 
convenient means of summary but also to give stones newsworthy immediacy Nearly twenty years ago 
the insistent reality that can be conferred by such numbering was made dramatically clear to news 
organizations and audiences in the United States when m an effort to remember the plight of American 
hostages held m Iran during 1979 and 1980 the days of their captivity were enumerated and the sum was 
broadcast every day President Carter s self imposed sympathetic isolation in the White House 
emphasized the wait and it seemed that even the most powerful people in the nation could do nothing but 
number their moments of anxiety At the end of the crisis almost everyone in the nation who had even a 
small interest in world and domestic affairs knew that fifty two hostages had been held for 444 days m 
hostile Iran
An international crisis such as the one in Iran is a human situation that seems almost wholly public 
and largely impersonal The act of counting that became so important in this global context seems equally 
important in the most intimate and personal of human experiences however Childbirth for instance is 
almost always associated with numbers The penod of expectancy and the unfolding of the nine months 
end with the more urgent counting and pain of labor Some modern strategies for giving birth emphasize 
the importance of counting even more explicitly A mother may be assisted by a coach who times and 
counts inhalations and exhalations and this act of numbering is designed to help the mother sustain the 
intense pain of childbirth in part by linking the mother and coach
In fact the experience of Iran and the experience of the laboring mother are part of a broad continuum 
of important human events that are associated with the act of counting The intensity of distress and sorrow 
is frequently emphasized by numbers just as the significance of international events or the urgency of 
labor may be understood and emphasized in part through the sequence of numbering Lawrence Weschler 
an author who has often investigated the issue of political violence and the recovery of societies and 
governments after such abuses describes the case of one political prisoner a plastic surgeon who 
remembers spending exactly eight years and forty five days in the most feared men s prison in Uruguay 7 
This precision emphasizes the conscious act of numbering that the prisoner evidently continued over eight 
years of his life
Expressions such as counting the moments until some looked for event or relief indicate that human 
beings associate and even define anxiety and pain with numbers A phrase like the eleventh hour may 
seem well worn and weak as a figure of speech but it recalls clearly the almost unthinking human habit of 
counting moments of distress Hospital stays for instance are usually referred to and compared in terms of 
the number of days weeks or months they require—a comparison and assignment of significance that is 
made explicit m the so called Disease Related Group a category that links each diagnosis to an 
expected length of hospitalization for the purposes of rationalizing a hierarchical disease based insurance 
compensation scheme Surgeries are also labelled and evaluated according to the time they take and ac 
cording to the numerical likelihood of success or complication Indeed patients and families often press 
physicians for estimates of lifespan or the chances of survival8 The numerical replies may fill the 
hearers with hope or with anxiety may increase or decrease the patients determination to survive but 
whatever the reaction the numbers themselves will be understood as expressions of medical and personal 
significance
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Tragic fires that in the words of a reporter often claim a certain number of lives offer another 
example of the significance that can be associated with numbering Furthermore the horror and severity of 
fires regardless of whether they are fatal are also asserted by numerals in news reports that often use the 
number of alarms as an adjective modifying blaze or fire For instance The four alarm fire spread 
quickly Even an experience as profound as grief has a carefully counted duration in Western societies 
not only in traditional etiquette and in the institution of fixed periods of official mourning for public 
figures but in modern psychological understandings that emphasize the idea of particular stages of loss 
and healing Physicians may be forced to try to formulate consistent scales of human experience then but 
even without making such a conscious effort we customarily equate all kinds of numbers—durations 
intensities numbers of persons—with experiential labels To return to the example of childbearing four 
hours of labor would make us consider a birth relatively easy and hearing about a twenty hour labor 
would make us shudder even though the numbers themselves cannot fully communicate the pain of birth 
which is not exclusively associated with the duration of labor 9 In short the urgent reality of all kinds of 
profound human experience—from the labor of childbirth to the period of imprisonment and torture—is 
often asserted in terms of duration endurance and ultimately numbers
Counting as Generation
The impulse to associate counting with profound events seems to have its roots deep in Western culture In 
the understanding documented by the book of Genesis the world itself was created in an enumerated 
progression The orderliness of the description of the first seven days in Genesis 1 and 2 still resonates 
strongly in 2 19 when God forms every beast of the field and every fowl of the air Adam names every 
living creature and we assume he names one at a time each m turn as it is brought from the creative 
hand of God 10 Like a subtle shadow of the ordered six day creation of the universe in Chapter 1 the birth 
of human language in Genesis 2 suggests a sequence By verse 20 Adam has named all the creatures 
the end of the sequence has been reached and the sum of God s earthly creation has been accounted for 
in human language
Even as Adam invents the first human words then the sequence of choices and the accretion of names 
and named creatures suggest the two most basic aspects of numbering By this understanding the explicit 
ordering of language and the implicit ordering of numbers are linked conceptually as two acts that are 
original to humanity Descartes proposed that language was at the essence of humanity separating 
thinking creatures from mere animals and the apparent importance of the concept and the act of counting 
observed above might therefore be linked directly to the profound cultural significance attributed to 
language itself 11 However it may be possible to arrive at a further understanding of the implications of 
counting that emerge indirectly but unmistakably from the book of Genesis
In a complex reading that does not develop the idea of counting Elaine Scarry nonetheless observes 
that the chapters of Genesis are always attentive to creation and procreation to genesis and to 
numbers 12 Scarry notes that the entire book consists of a series of genealogical summaries (the famous 
begats of the Old Testament) that are presented in alternation with detailed stories relating the life 
events and interactions of just a few characters 13 We might observe that the genealogical lists like any 
lists suggest the sequencing associated with counting—an association that is made explicit several times 
when the number of generations recorded is given directly in the text following the list In addition each 
of the ancestors m any given list is almost always given a lifespan and the continual recurrence of 
sequences of years echoes and emphasizes the larger sequence of generations Furthermore returning to 
Scarry s reading even the detailed stories of the lives of the patriarchs—the fathers of a nation—include 
and reiterate this process of listing On^e inside any single figure she writes one is back with the 
list—the crowd of future humanity resides within the parental body 14
All of this attention to the numerical growth of populations occurs in the conceptual and moral context 
of God s initial commandment to Noah— Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth 15—and the 
original pledge to Abraham— And I will make thy seed as the dust of the earth so that if a man can 
number the dust of the earth then shall thy seed also be numbered 16 These powerful statements are
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echoed and reformulated throughout the book of Genesis and for Scarry the idea of continuing generation 
and population is fundamental to the nature of God in the book of Genesis
This abstract notion of growth—what we might term increase —is what Scarry understands as the 
word While the promise of increase can be understood as an independent concept of course it attains 
its significance not through abstract existence but through its perceived interaction with the material The 
intellectual notion of increase develops in relation to the physical fact of generation word relates to body 
In Scarry s reading the understood relation between increase and generation word and body God and 
humanity is the origin of faith the fact of generation will itself affirm and literally embody the presence 
of the authority that predicted and required such generation For Scarry then the significance of the 
relation between word and body in Genesis exists most importantly in the relative timing of phenomena
The physical and the verbal run side by side one above the other as two distinct or at least 
distinguishable horizontal ribbons of occurrence The first only participates in the second by anticipating it 
[T]he literal event of procreation and multiplication is never simply an event in and of itself but 
becomes [either] an obedient acting out [or] a divine fulfillment of the thing that had come 
before 17
For Scarry the principle significance of Genesis and the possibility of meaning in scripture derive from 
the delay in timing between the two horizontal ribbons of human experience—verbal and physical The 
meaning in scripture—the basis of faith—is then produced by an ordered relation between word and body 
which themselves are maintained as categorically distinct 18
Scarry s reading is an attempt to consider the structure of scriptural meaning In the present effort to 
explore the significance of the human relationship to numbers and counting this paper will not concern 
itself with the nature of the faith authonzed by the sequence of moral and material 19 Although we adopt 
the categories themselves this paper considers one result of the causal sequence as it is presented in the 
narrative Of primary interest is the idea of increase that can generate lists of populations—the material 
and bodily enumeration that is understood to result from and document the animating moral principle
The idea of increase as it is elaborated in Genesis allows and requires a particular identity and a 
specified destiny for the Hebrew tribes Reflected m the gesture of repeated list making in the recurring 
use of numbers in the very idea of generation itself the steady accretion of population in Genesis forges a 
unique moral relation between Israel and the world The unfolding divine promise of increase represents an 
original human identity The continuing preoccupation with the effort to count represents an attempt to 
affirm and embody the sacred principle Numbering then as it develops as a theme in Genesis is a 
generative cultural reality a component of the process that Elaine Scarry calls Making
Just as numbering is an important means by with the book of Genesis constitutes a Chosen People 
other processes of choosing and structuring political realities can derive from the act of counting 
Lawrence Weschler tells the story of Father Luis Perez Aguirre an Uruguayan priest and founder of that 
country s leading human rights group Father Aguirre helped to lead an effort to assess a law granting 
amnesty to the former torturers of Uruguay The new government feared the continuing political strength of 
the military and the destructive effects that a wave of vengeful tnals might bring to a ravaged country 
trying to build a united future For people like Aguirre to be able to force a referendum on the issue the 
Uruguayan constitution required a petition with the signatures and the more difficult to produce voter 
registration numbers of an astounding twenty five percent of the previous election s voting population 20 
After the pro referendum forces had gathered more than the 555 701 signatures required the Electoral 
Court began to disqualify signatures by the thousand with many justifications including careless 
handwriting or the the initials C C (roughly the equivalent of I D ) that the court claimed added two 
extra letters to the voter registration number 21 The Electoral Court whose duty it was to count instead 
changed the very value of numbers m an effort to destroy the opposition s ability literally and figuratively 
to count Finally however in a tense last minute rush supporters of an Uruguayan referendum managed 
to authenticate enough petition signatures to force a vote [E]very single person Weschler tells us 
pointedly did  count 22
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As noted earlier the act of counting seems to play a role in personal as well as public situations 
While numbering can enable and celebrate an act of political representation counting is also a tool used 
to sustain individual suffering bodies Elaine Scarry observes the curious strength that sufferers try to 
extract from the act of counting when she points out that Catherine s escape from a collapsing mine in 
Emile Zola s Germinal is possible only when she devot[es] her mind and legs to the dogged 
progressively more difficult feat of reciting numbers 23
The Uruguayan torture machine that Weschler describes is also filled with sufferers literally finding 
strength in numbers The plastic surgeon whose case Weschler describes remembers being tied up and 
forced to stand in a darkened room for four days One almost loses all sense of time in such situations 
but four times I heard the birds outside chirping with the rising sun—that s how I know it was four days' 24 
Blinded and bound the surgeon was robbed of his talent to rebuild bodies robbed even of his right to 
manipulate his own body robbed of vision robbed of everything except two ears straining to keep track to 
mark to count For the sufferer of agony and desperation even something as simple as being able to count 
the days becomes critically important That s how I know says the survivor and the act of counting 
seems to have given him a tenuous sustenance through the simultaneous affirmation of his will and his 
perception
A man whom Weschler calls Alberto Peña also survived torture and imprisonment m Uruguay Peña 
made it through solitary confinement by killing one fly whenever he thought a day had passed in the 
continually lit windowless room where he ended up spending months 25 The dead flies were a reference 
for Pena a tangible count that sustained him when he had no other possession Yet many victims of torture 
cannot claim even a pile of desiccated flies Nonetheless the idea of numbers and numbering can still 
make a secret claim in the minds of people suffering from intense physical distress Father Aguirre the 
Uruguayan activist recalls that
Once in a military barracks a cellmate of mine was thrown back into the cell after a session of torture
and he told me I was lucky because I knew how to pray All he could do he said was count up to a thousand
and back 26
Significantly the prisoner does not merely count up He counts up and back The exercise is a 
cycle a continuing and repeating series of oscillations Calling to mind the Church s invention of the 
Cycle of Prayer and the devout habit of counting rosary beads the act of counting in this case is 
nonetheless extracted from religious orthodoxy While perhaps deriving in part from a religious aesthetic 
established in a Roman Catholic culture the sustaining act here has primary meaning as an enactment of 
numbering The cycle the oscillations in counting may function as an approximation of infinite 
enumeration—the promise of increase that provides moral and social identity in Genesis The production 
of a cycle of numbers is a sustaining act that allows the afflicted man to cling to survival
Just as the victim of torture seems to rely on a sustaining approximation counting also allows the 
explicit and direct approximation of many life giving processes Cardio pulmonary resuscitation and 
mouth to mouth resuscitation link counting not only with the lives but with the biological patterns of 
suffering bodies Elaine Scarry calls attention to this link between the act of numbering and the act of 
rescuing
Similarly what is know[n] as the rule of nines enables those attempting to rescue someone who has 
been badly burned to determine very quickly the seriousness of the injury at a moment when the mind of 
the rescuer might shut down or be incapable of subjectively computing the scale of damage on the 
maimed visage before him 27
Stunned emergency workers use numbers to reassert the reality of an injury or the importance of 
finding a pulse or hearing a heartbeat Democratic activists assert the ability to count in the effort to 
construct the foundation for humane society Numbers become the prayer like sustenance for the powerless 
body inhabiting the torture chamber Counting then literally and figuratively helps to bring life out of the 
desperation of pain
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Counting as Limitation
I have suggested that ordered and repeated acts of counting might function as conceptual approximations 
of an infinite promise associated with humanity in the Judeo-Chnstian tradition or that they may function 
as literal approximations of bodily functions The idea of approximation however also suggests an 
incompleteness In Franz Kafka s A Hunger Artist an act of approximating a limitless series is 
perceived to be sustaining even as it ultimately succumbs to its own limits The protagonist of Kafka s tale 
is a man who is fanatically devoted to fasting who makes his body and his endurance into a 
performance 28 For days he lives without food m a cage attended sometimes by spectators but finally 
accompanied only by the all important striking of the clock that was the only piece of furniture 29 The 
act of will has significance for the onlookers because of the counted duration emphasized by the clock 
The clock marks not only the progress of the fast but its limit set generally at forty days 30 The echo of 
Christ s term in the wilderness here is only an ironic suggestion of significance and completion The artist 
himself can only dream of a performance beyond human imagination a fast that would [establish] a 
record never yet achieved 31 The Hunger Artist is interested not in the limits of endurance but in the idea 
of a limitless endurance approached through the ever increasing sum on the placard announcing the days 
of his fast through the endless ticking of the clock
In the end however people lose interest in the spectacle no one [counts] the days and this failure 
to mark means that for the Hunger Artist the world [is] cheating him of his reward 32 The act of 
enumerating the days of fast had become the only satisfaction in the Hunger Artist s life I couldn t find 
the food I liked whispers the wasted artist moments before dying If I had found it believe me I should 
have made no fuss and stuffed myself like you or anyone else 33
After the starvation of the Hunger Artist he is replaced in his cage by a panther with a noble body 
furnished almost to the bursting point with all that it needed 34 For the Hunger Artist then the experience 
and satisfaction of human life are unhappily and unsuccessfully approximated by an act of counting that 
records the willed endurance of the body The counting is broken off however and the interruption finally 
reveals the inadequacy of the approximation one that cannot approach the spontaneous eruption of joy 
that [streams] from the sated creature 35
Often numbers are not associated with human sustenance or they are associated only with an illusion 
of real sustenance Numbers are cold Mathematics and related sciences are hard Language and the 
humanities are soft Calculating means single minded and merciless less than human These 
connotations should not surprise us because impersonal numbers have a range only on a number line or a 
graph Language and its uses by contrast can be angry or lovely foul or beautiful If a number is judged 
its value is generally correct or incorrect Mathematical figures it is said do not lie In short 
numbers are often not perceived as fluid and therefore are not human Expressions such as I felt like 
another number emphasize the common understanding that numbers can be used to deny not only 
suffering but personality and humanity
The numbers that were used to mark prisoners in Nazi Germany s concentration camps have become 
an important symbol of the dehumanizing brutality of calculated mass murder In The Body in Pain Elaine 
Scarry writes about the use of kill ratios m descriptions of war numbers which despite their 
straightforward name are nonetheless used as antiseptic substantiation of the outcome of a conflict not 
evidence of death and suffering 36 In his narrative of Uruguay s struggle against a fascist regime Lawrence 
Weschler describes the strategies of oppression in addition to the tools of sustenance—and often the 
instruments of affliction and those of survival are inverse reflections of one another Year after year he 
reports [the political] inmates were referred to by number alone 37 The main prison for Uruguayan men 
was ironically called Libertad and even as the military authorities subverted language they seemed to 
embrace the anonymous power of numbering like their Nazi heroes For murderers of nations for torturers 
for armies numbers are tools used to deny the humanity of experience
In an essay entitled Moral Orientations to Suffering Legitimation Power and Healing Veena Das 
descnbes another bureaucracy that tries to contain human suffering within an artificial world of numbers 
On December 3 1984 anything between 30 and 40 tons of methyl isocyanate leaked from Union
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Carbide storage tanks in Bhopal India38 In the litigation that resulted from the tragedy the government of 
India argued against lawyers for Union Carbide on behalf of the victims of the midnight leak of what Das 
describes as the most lethal gas known 39 The legal situation following the disaster was complex and 
for the sake of expediency individual complaints were disallowed Instead the sufferers as a group were 
awarded $470 million by a judicial agreement that was reached before half of the 600 000 affected had 
even been examined 40
The remaining claims then had to be evaluated within a fixed numencal range The suffering of 
thousands was assigned a sum that it could not exceed [T]he procedure by which the status of a claim 
was determined Das reports was based on a kind of scoring system by which each symptom was given 
a score and finally the scores were aggregated 41 Das questions the actions of the Indian government and 
the lawyers for Union Carbide but even excluding such doubts any effort at assessing and 
compensating suffering clearly runs the risk of limiting human relief For Das the use of numbers and 
accounting m this case represented an attempt to make human pain fit into a bureaucratic agreement 
The suffering of the victims she writes was more of a verbal ploy [to justify the settlement] than a 
condition that caused serious concern 42 Numbers then can also be seen to function as the tools of 
indifferent limitation 43
Whatever the inadequacies of the judicial process that Das describes the numencal process of 
assessing and awarding damages is at least nominally an effort at relief The torturer on the other hand 
often imposes an act of counting with explicitly destructive intentions Franz Kafka is preoccupied with 
the pernicious effects of such external enactment of counting in his short story In the Penal Colony In 
that work an elaborate contraption embedded with hundreds of needles is designed to pierce through the 
body of a prisoner by a senes of movements that are all precisely calculated to mark and kill the body 
with wounds that inscribe the words of the purportedly applicable broken law 44
The machinery the protagonist is told should go on working continuously for twelve hours but 
the attention of the torturer focuses on the turning point evidently always reached at the sixth hour of 
mechanized injury 45 Does he know his sentence9 asks the observer before the act of torture occurs 
No said the officer There would be no point in telling him He 11 learn it on his body 46 The 
torturer describes anxious crowds and the process of waiting for the sixth hour the anticipated moment 
when the victim learns This learning the supposed realization finally imposed on the victim is seen 
by the torturer as a radiant transfiguration on the face of the sufferer 47
The judgment is carved on the body then but at the mysterious sixth hour in the twelve hour 
operation of the machine the judgment comes to be perceived not only as defining the body but as 
originating in it The sixth hour representing the significant midpoint in what is an automated sequence 
of torture is inextricably linked to the achievement of the goal of the torturer—the conflation of external 
reality with intrinsic or internal identity Through the ordered sequence of inscription on the body of the 
victim Kafka s needles might be said to try to drive out and replace human perception and identity The 
imposed count accompanies abject dispossession
The designers of prisons in Uruguay developed a system that formalized and expanded the kind of 
intuitive understanding of numbers dispossession and endurance that informs Kafka s tale Of course 
punishment itself is almost always associated with numbers A sentence of lashing for instance would 
have been meaningless without specifying the number of lashes In more mundane and modem forms of 
social discipline—terms of imprisonment hours of community service monetary fines even the 
repetitious copying expected of naughty schoolchildren—the punishment is itself an exercise in counting 
The soldiers who ran Libertad however went far beyond these kinds of counting that ensure and limit 
discipline With the help of their behavioral psychologist advisors the keepers of the prison set out to 
subvert numbering and with it the limits of discipline
The regime at Libertad was based on a topsy turvy system of negative and positive reinforcements 
Weschler reports and his use of words associated with coordinate number systems does indeed reflect 
the corrupt mathematics that the prison imposed 48 Watched at all moments the inmates were given 
scores according to their compliance with the prison s many trivial rules—which because of the
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disproportionate scale of prison reality were actually deeply consequential These rules changed all the 
time however and in the end the prisoners could not affect their scores any more than they could affect 
the numbers the prison assigned them instead of names One prisoner recalls that
Violations were recorded with mock scientific thoroughness so that you were made to see that—on 
paper anyway—you had indeed now committed three violations which had such and such a consequence 
But it was all double binds piled on more double binds 49
At Libertad then the very principles of mathematics changed daily but the appearance of scientific 
addition did not change The keepers of the prison hoped to erase the autonomous sustenance of a 
fundamental human impulse like so many figures on a scorecard One of the greatest hurts that some of the 
cleverest minds in Uruguay could inflict was the falsification of counting
By the mid 1980s fascist control had filled Uruguay with chupaderos —a word for the busy 
Uruguayan torture centers that means places that suck people up 50 Reflecting this vacuous mathematics 
of totalitarianism a general whose military had just relinquished power to a new and faltering Democratic 
government recalled thousands of deaths and false imprisonments as errors as if he had discovered 
flaws in an otherwise sound column of figures 51 In a representative government by contrast counting 
rather than ¿({¿counting should be as simple as tallying a column of election figures Governing a new 
Uruguay however was complicated by the presence of known and politically powerful former torturers in 
the midst of a nation of people clamoring to be counted rather than sucked up as m the past Solving the 
political crisis that Weschler describes then was in the words of the newly elected President of Uruguay 
the arithmetic of judging levels of responsibility 52
If the process of political recovery from torture is the arithmetic of judging responsibility the process 
by which torture is instituted is the arithmetic of destroying responsibility In the infamous obedience 
experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram this destruction is brought about through the insistence on 
scaled measurement In Milgram s project experimental subjects were given lists of questions to 
administer to what they believed to be unseen test takers—although both the test and the reaction of test 
takers were m fact simulated and the experimental volunteers themselves were the real objects of study 
In the event that test takers gave incorrect answers the subjects were instructed to push a lever on a 
device that administered shocks increasing in severity with each answer missed and then to repeat the 
sequence of questions containing the error until all were answered correctly The severity of the shocks 
could be understood by the subjects only through a series of levers an electrical dial (that included a zone 
marked danger ) and through a speaker that transmitted the voice of the ostensible test taker—a voice 
that progressed from small shouts to loud protestations to prolonged cries to silence as the severity of the 
hypothetical shocks increased Failures on the part of the subjects to administer the shocks were 
reprimanded by a member of the laboratory who wore a white coat and adopted an authoritative attitude 53
Milgram s experiments may have purported to measure obedience In fact however his 
experimental design could be said to illustrate the process of torture The simulated test takers are 
required to recapitulate a series of correct answers that do not originate with them They are ostensibly 
punished with increasing severity for any failure to echo what amounts to the voice of the experimenter 
The test subjects m Milgram s experiment therefore who provide the voice of the experimenter come 
to participate m a dynamic of torture
Significantly the transformation from subject to torturer takes place to the degree that the subjects 
will enforce a scale—to the extent that they will press the lever move the needle attempt to complete 
the endless sequences that cause suffering For the white coated authorities the advancing scale 
apparently reflects the advancement of science which is explicitly seen as divorced from human value 
By this understanding the scale the sequence of levers the advancing readings are neither intended to 
be nor held to function as measurements o f suffering but are instead measurements that proceed despite 
suffering The degree to which Milgram s experiment produces a torturer is precisely the degree to which 
the cries or ominous silences of the hypothetical sufferer become only complementary—or even entirely 
irrelevant—to the advancement of a scale Milgram s experiments may have allowed some conclusions
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about human obedience but their moral implications are much wider The obedience experiment in fact 
illustrates the production of torture through a formalized process of imposed numerical sequencing
Efforts to count then—whether part of an effort to perpetrate a documented genocide or part of an 
effort to settle an insurance claim expeditiously whether part of an effort to rationalize warfare or part of 
an effort to disorient prisoners whether part of the automatic timing of a fictional torture device or part of 
a scientific experiment in a laboratory—can become the mathematics of radical human limitation
Counting as Human Exercise
Previously I linked the act of counting with the kind of formation of original human and social identity 
presented in the book of Genesis It has also become clear however that the concept of counting has 
relevance for actions that are intended to destroy rather than sustain Indeed if acts of numbering can be 
associated with a moral promise of increase Elias Canetti argues in The Conscience o f Words that an 
inversion of human generation may be fundamental to the production of social power Canetti discusses 
the psychology and the political role of killing and survival He calls attention to various tribal customs by 
which the status power and even the physical size of warriors were enhanced each time an enemy was 
killed 54 In Fiji for instance wamors were evidently known by numerical names that represented the sums 
of enemy lives that each had taken 55 For Canetti the essence of power is an experience of repeated 
survival and [t]he man who has acquired a taste for survival wants to accumulate it 56 Canetti 
acknowledges that political power requires populations to dominate but at the same time he asserts the 
significance of what we might term an inverse generation as a prime force to be taken seriously 57 For 
the true goal of the real power wielder is as grotesque as it is incredible he wants to be the only one 58
Canetti finds an example of the realization of such a desire in the mind of Daniel Schreber a German 
jurist who was hospitalized three times near the turn of the nineteenth century for a paranoid condition 
Schreber recorded his detailed conceptual understanding of the universe in the famous Denkwürdigkeiten 
( Memoirs o f My Nervous Illness ) an autobiography published in 1903 59 In Schreber s mind he had 
attracted much of the energy and life of the universe to himself in the form of cosmic rays Those lives 
that were drawn to him were inevitably transformed or destroyed on contact with his physical or psychic 
person and Canetti emphasizes that [Schreber s] catastrophic effect on the universe could not be 
halted 60 In his mind Schreber had finally achieved a uniqueness in the universe that Canetti identifies as 
the final and most extreme phase of power —a reduction of human numbers and human significance to a 
single digit61
Counting by this understanding might link human beings not only to the idea of moral promise as 
suggested earlier but also to the threat of unimpeded accumulation of casualty These sustaining and 
destructive associations may be impossible to extricate from each other As in the case of Uruguayan 
torture in which an insidious imposed mathematics was resisted in part through secret affirmation of a 
different mathematics one use of counting may call forth the other Even the universe of extreme personal 
significance existing in the imagination of Daniel Schreber has implications that are not only destructive 
but creative
Canetti advises his readers to ignore an essay on Schreber written by Sigmund Freud 62 Freud s 
essay however identifies another element in the Schreber case that draws our attention again to the 
significance of the idea of accumulation Freud emphasizes not only the fact that Schreber critical to the 
universe and penetrated with cosmic rays is the destroyer or de populater of the world Freud notes the 
part of Schreber s system that proposes the re creation of humanity after its extinction 63
Schreber came to see himself as a Christ and the sacrifice that he undertook—great enough to save 
the world—was a painful and gradual transformation of his body effected by those same rays from that of 
a man into that of a woman The idea of the transformation and the process by which it became vested 
with universal and deeply sacrificial significance was fascinating to Freud and it is possible that he 
emphasized his concerns disproportionately as Canetti suggests 64 For this paper s purposes however it is 
interesting to note that for Schreber the idea of complete power contained not only the idea of destruction
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but the idea of re population through a moral exercise of sacrifice In this case the inversion of generation 
nonetheless calls forth a new creation Counting down allows counting up To put it in Canetti s terms 
Schreber not only wants to be the only one he wants to be the first one
The close linkage of the urge both for increase and its inversion seems to exist elsewhere as well 
Canetti for instance uses the example of a fourteenth century sultan of Delhi who removed the populace 
from his capital While it does not enter into his analysis Canetti also notes that the mogul later invited 
others—apparently not the original inhabitants—to return to Delhi 65 The desire to repopulate the city is of 
course as practical as the desire to empty it was impractical The gesture of repopulation however 
especially on the sultan s own plan rather than the city s original organic plan may not be incidental The 
megalomaniac aspires to the role of a self made Adam—or more precisely that of a self made Noah— 
and the ability to count those destroyed or to number progeny that may comprise future generations may 
therefore both offer approximations of a position of human significance
The megalomaniac violates the conditions that Elaine Scarry observes in Genesis The promise is no 
longer divine but personal and the origin of increase—the beginning of the process of counting—is in the 
human rather than the sacred This conflation of roles an elimination of the categorical distinction 
between word and body that Scarry identifies as central to scriptural reality allows the assertion of 
alternative realities The concept of increase has a complementary opposite as we have seen and both 
the concept and its inversion generate powerful sequences As Canetti suggests personal and political 
power can be expressed in terms of generation and depopulation The ideas of generation and depopulation 
are themselves understood in terms of accretion Therefore the act of enumerating becomes a reflection 
and a documentation of power
The nature of this power is determined by the origin of the sequence—either in a moral promise or m 
an oppressive desire However the sequence is generated—whether used by sufferers to ally themselves 
with cherished realities or whether used to impose other realities—the act of counting can confirm and 
magnify acts of will with significant implications for the possibility of human survival
There is dull truth m a statement such as I felt like another number There is horror m an 
administration that disturbs the human relation to counting As we have seen there is also wonderful 
exuberance in phrases like Stand up and be counted or Every person did count Just as a cramped 
rating of the suffering of Bhopal s gas leak victims limits treatment medical treatments use counting as 
an intrinsic part of rescue Even as kill ratio becomes an abstract number devoid of painful death days ot 
mourning encourage reflection and healing The mathematics of life can be the errors of torturers or the 
sustaining arithmetic of Zola s Catherine The sum of human possession can be a random score attached 
like a weight in the name of prison discipline or it can be a pile of flies asserting the secret sanity of a 
dispossessed man
We have seen that numbers can be the crushing reminders of national crisis or the tools of reporters or 
rescuers who want to reassert the reality of human events or of human life Like the carefully learned 
breathing that binds a laboring mother to a friend in the delivery room the act of counting is often used 
not just as a measure of desperate impatience but as an expression of human will to endure in times of 
pain and doubt Counting can be the instrument of broad social oppression or the invisible tool that 
sustains one suffering and isolated body
The context scale and meaning of significant acts of numbering can vary widely Returning to the 
book of Genesis we can recall the series of begats the assiduous efforts to number descendants the 
accretion of sums that creates an astonishing and impressive record as Scarry and others point out 
However of course the record exists not as an expression of the numberless sands of Abraham s lineage 
but as a document of a finite stage in the infinite prophesied journey The sums are temporary perhaps 
inadequate even as approximation A curve may be an endless increasing slope comprised of points each 
of which is itself the essence of finitude The act of counting represented in Genesis is the theoretical 
isolation of the point on such a curve one of any number of subtotals from a balance sheet with no bottom 
line Counting does function as a means of access or at least approach to generative meaning but it is not 
merely or exclusively a process that is linked to concepts of the divine Numbering is a process with
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distinctly human reference If the idea of increase can be understood as divine it can also be understood 
as a human impetus that can subvert such moral reality The idea of the count can express simultaneously 
a concept of increase and its inversion a tendency to transcendence and a limitation telos and 
punctuation Counting expresses humanity m both its primary connotations—moral and mortal
Earlier I called counting an exercise of human significance The significance of the act may reside 
more precisely not in its intrinsic property but in its communication with some of the most significant 
aspects of humanity Numbers m other words which are either imposed from without or grasped from 
within span a bridge into and out of what we think of as humanity The Nazi identification carved on the 
bodies of concentration camp victims is just as much an act of numbering as the jersey pulled on by the 
newest member of the football team 66
Unlike the Jew emerging from a cattle car however the new player aspires to the number and gives 
consent The figure on the athletic jersey will have both individual meaning and group significance The 
numeral will be closely associated with the skills and contribution of one player while it simultaneously 
binds that player to the efforts of the team and in some cases even to the history of the heroes who have 
worn that number and have made it a beloved part of the team itself If a number on a jersey allows the 
wearer to be seen and identified as an individual and as a member of a continuous community known as a 
team a number imposed in a Nazi camp denies such seeing
Significantly the imposed numbering m concentration camps was accompanied by many other acts of 
dispossession The number did not define or order a human community Instead it was part of an effort to 
break down the humanity of a community to create a group of indistinguishable tatters and shaved heads 
The number then was one of the most identifiable aspects of the (sometimes literally) naked victim it 
marked The number was as much as possible a disembodied identity Such an identity denies an 
individual denies a community denies even a connection to history by its formalized uniqueness within 
an order founded outside prior understandings of civilization Number can assert human community like 
the athletic jersey worn with pride or it can deny community like the numbered Nazi mutilations of 
unseen bodies
Count is both noun and verb action and idea To try to impose the noun without allowing the verb 
like the Nazis or the Uruguayan government falsifies the grammar of humanity Numbering is also 
powerful m asserting humanity however even in the face of such falsehood Counting can be a haven an 
explicit and abstract promise of existence even in moments ot unendurable isolation and agony Counting 
is the human paradox of expansion and limitation
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CHAPTER 12
Social Identity Theory and the Motivational Structure of Pathological Violence
Donald Moulds
This paper draws on accounts of identity from both social psychology and philosophy m order to shed light 
on some of the motivating forces underlying group violence It is primarily concerned with violence 
directed toward outgroup populations m pathological states (defined for the purposes of this paper as states 
that perpetrate mass violence against their own people) although some of the analysis is applicable to the 
study of war between states I argue that m conjunction with other causes we can trace the roots of 
violence in pathological states to two sources the need for continuity of self understanding and the desire 
for positive self esteem I draw upon both psychological and philosophical accounts of identity in order to 
make sense of the first claim and ingroup outgroup studies in social psychology for the second
Some Remarks about Identity
An individual s identity is comprised of characteristics that distinguish him or her as a member of the 
human species a member of particular groups or traditions and as a unique human being with particular 
abilities dispositions desires and projects Identities are shaped by a combination of biologically and 
environmentally determined characteristics and by the choices individuals makes in their lifetime Thus 
identities are ultimately based upon qualities one shares with other members of his or her species with co 
members of groups as well as by the characteristics that distinguish one from other human beings
Identities are also sources of action For example I go to a baseball game read a novel or eat beets 
and fish because I am a creature of a certain kind—an American a sports nut a procrastinator or an 
omnivore In each instance my reasons for acting as I do stem from certain facts about who I am My 
identity in these and other cases will shape my attitudes interests and desires But who one is is 
particularly important to questions regarding the strength and subject of one s moral commitments One 
reason is that some people by nature possess a greater capacity for moral feelings One s affiliations 
interests and beliefs also play an important part in determining the nature and the importance of other 
regarding sentiments The fact that one is a Christian an American a Libertarian or an Aesthete for 
instance plays a role in the way one views the needs of others as well as one s propensity for feelings of 
moral duty or compassion
Facts about one s identity also affect the scope of one s moral concern Some moral philosophers 
claim that the reason lies in the fact that human beings have a natural tendency to care more about the 
interests of persons with whom they share distinguishing characteristics—similar genetic composition 
ethnicity or nationality for example David Hume defends such a position He writes that the moral 
passions are generated by recognition of likeness—that is knowing that because a person is like you the 
senes of facial distortions he or she exhibits coincides with feelings of pain that are very much like the 
pain you are experiencing when you make the same gestures For Hume such feelings arise through a 
blurring of the distinction between particular individuals that is facilitated by the existence of common 
identifying characteristics The other reason is that individuals with shared group identities often feel 
special obligations toward one another The benefits of belonging to a group cause feelings of loyalty or 
gratitude on the part of their members Most groups also provide a quasi contractual framework for mutual 
advantage which in turn causes members to feel reciprocal obligations toward each other
Questions about the relation between the various sources of identity are of importance to both moral 
philosophy and the study of pathological violence By some accounts one s personal identity is little more
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than a culmination of multiple environmental determinants By others it is shaped by the senes of choices 
individuals will make in their lifetime As comprehensive views neither of these two accounts is likely 
correct Some identifying characteristics of persons are not attributable to group membership or 
participation such as basic human drives select dispositions and the capacity for reason and language 
While environment plays an essential role in the way these characteristics and capacities come to 
fruition it is nonetheless important to recognize that they will be shaped limited and thus uniquely 
realized according to causal forces other than the roles one occupies within a group
The question concerning the relation between the various sources of identity is important to the study 
of violence in particular because it speaks to questions concerning its source The comprehensive views I 
speak of above often fail to capture the motivational structure of perpetrators of pathological violence 
either because they attribute the cause of violence to a particular psychological composition—sociopathic 
personalities for instance—or because they see violence exclusively in terms of social determinants In 
fact some personality profiles facilitate participation in mass killings Other profiles—those of persons 
whom social psychologists refer to as pro socials—will tend to resist 2 But individuals are also quite 
capable of actions running counter to their profile even prosocials can be motivated to participate m 
violent activities given the right social climate The primary reason is that human beings have a tendency 
to be highly protective of their identity A strong and stable identity provides individuals with a sense of 
personal security by offering them a fixed point of reference that supplies order in a changing world 
Therefore humans have a tendency to act hostility to perceived threats to their identity They are also 
easily manipulated into accepting portrayals of outsiders as threats
The Formation of National Identities
Numerous uniting characteristics of groups can potentially serve as a foundation for common national 
identity Historically shared language ethnicity territory religion history culture and even political 
ideology have all served as foundations for claims of nationhood One common feature of all nations 
however is that they must have a political dimension they are either self ruling or else aspire toward self 
rule which is usually although not always associated with the desire for sovereignty over a territory 
Nevertheless aside from the fact that all nations seem to posses a political component it is unlikely that 
one will arrive at a conception of nationality that offers a conclusive list of uniting characteristics either 
necessary or sufficient for nation status In practice such questions are answered according to the 
perceived relevance of the uniting characteristics at issue and will depend as well on the depth and scope 
of attachment
The formation of national identity is the logical starting point for a study of violence in pathological 
states because much of the violent conflict within states can either be attributed to struggles over national 
character or conflict between nations over occupation of a common state The description of a nation I 
offer here is admittedly broad and has little if anything to do with the modern conception of nationalism 
we associate with the late eighteenth century and beyond By its lights most tribes meet the criteria for 
nationhood as would many pre modern and ancient political arrangements Nevertheless it is appropriate 
for the project at hand m that it will include most of the groups that have committed acts of pathological 
violence during the twentieth century
The Role of National Identity in Personal Identity
The role a nation plays in the identity of a person will depend in part on the desire of a member that her 
nation play a significant role in her identity In any nation some members will embrace nationalist 
ideology or covet patriotism as a virtue while others will reject the particular ideology of their nation or 
the ideal of patriotism altogether Many of the reasons an individual chooses to either embrace or reject a 
nationalist ideology flow from an individual s moral convictions or beliefs about the constituent properties 
of a good life National identity will play a smaller role in the personal identity of individuals who are 
committed to moral views that are difficult to square with nationalist commitments—for instance
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individuals ascribing to some form of universalista moral theory or those who hold especially 
individualistic or cosmopolitan views about the nature of a good life
Members will either welcome or resist integrating a national identity for self interested reasons as 
well When members feel as if their interests are well represented by the ruling body of a nation and in 
cases where there is trust that the character and values of the nation are consistent with the welfare of 
particular members loyalties are formed and from them a willingness to incorporate the national identity 
Sometimes a lack of trust will not cause a member to resist the integration of a national identity in many 
cases mistrust will manifest itself as resistance to the ruling body or government rather than the nation 
and its ideology But when persons or groups of persons experience long term institutional biases or when 
there are other groups—for example other nations ethnic groups or families—that do a better job of 
meeting their needs members of nations are more reluctant to incorporate a national identity into their 
own self conception
Group homogeneity will also often play a role in the relation between national and personal identity 
Nationalist rhetoric often draws on shared historical experiences or common culture therefore it will 
appeal more broadly when members share a common historical or cultural background A nation s political 
structure and character is even more important Because members of liberal democratic nations tend to 
participate in many different groups their identity will often be shaped by a relatively diverse range of 
groups Members of liberal democracies will typically claim membership in a family a political party a 
professional or religious organization and sometimes even several different communities or clubs In 
nations where participation is more restrictive—or in nations that define themselves in significantly more 
restrictive terms—the number of groups that play a role in an individual s life will tend to be smaller This 
difference has both direct and indirect implications for the way in which nations bear on identity Members 
of nations that place strong restrictions on an individual s freedom of association will have fewer groups 
playing causal roles in their identity Consequently the groups that are included m this set—and the 
nation in particular—will often play a more significant role than they would were they to represent but one 
among many of the groups in which a member participates This does not necessarily mean that restrictive 
nations produce members who are more loyal or who are more willing to incorporate the values of their 
nation into their own system of beliefs Often the restrictions placed on members and the demands of 
oppressive nations will yield deep distrust of a ruling body or an unwillingness to actively promote its best 
interest 4
Comparative judgment is also crucial to one s understanding of his or her own national identity s Just 
as one becomes aware of one s own sex or race by noticing differences between oneself and persons of a 
different sex or race one gams a sense of his or her own national characteristics through the recognition of 
perceived differences between co nationals and outsiders In fact nations would not exist were it not for 
such perceptions because they depend on the notion that members share characteristics that distinguish 
them from other human beings Not surprisingly the comparison of similarities plays an equally important 
role One builds a robust conception of his or her own national identity by recognizing similarities—for 
example physical characteristics traditions values or interests—one shares with co nationals
Identity and the Moral Universe
As I suggest m the preceding discussion of identity there is a strong connection between the influence a 
group has on an individual s identity and his or her propensity to make moral sacrifices (that is give up 
resources or go against personal conviction) for the sake of that group Nations and families are both good 
examples because both exert strong influence on the identity of members and because both prompt moral 
sacrifices Members of one s family and nation are the frequent objects of preferential treatment in the 
allocation of one s own resources and demand a level of sacrifice that is not expected of outsiders The 
extent to which a particular family or nation influences the identity of an individual also bears on the 
depth of a member s attachment to those groups Individuals for whom family plays a very small role for 
example tend to feel less compelled to make personal sacrifices in the interest of members The same 
holds for cosmopolitans or separatists who draw on considerations other than nationality when making 
decisions about the allocation of resources or risking life and limb for the prosperity of the nation
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Of course the moral expectations we place on an individual do not always depend on the extent to 
which group identity is integrated into an individual s personal identity Part of the reason is that moral 
requirements that flow from some roles are non voluntary parents role as their child s primary caretaker 
for instance will not require a stronger or weaker commitment depending on their eagerness to assume 
that responsibility The other reason is that some moral requirements are founded on and shaped according 
to social understandings of the norms associated with particular roles Thus we can inherit moral 
responsibility in virtue of having been bom in a certain place at a certain time and find our selves 
burdened with special responsibilities toward particular individuals m virtue of relations attached to those 
contingencies These hold irrespective of the extent to which such roles are identity determining As 
evidence consider the difference between commitments to families or nations and other groups—say a 
club that for the sake of argument plays a strong role in one s identity Even in cases where family or 
nation plays a minimal role in an individual s identity the moral expectations placed on an individual qua 
family member or national will still be more demanding than those of the club
Though such qualifiers are important it is nevertheless true that in general the relative strength of 
one s group identity will play a strong role in one s willingness to make sacrifices in the name of group 
successes Social psychologists who study the relation between individuals and groups suggest that there 
are two principle reasons Because groups are more stable and because most outlast individuals one 
reason is that group membership offers human beings a source for identity that is consistent over time 
This theory of motivation is not surprisingly called the consistency view 6 The second reason is that by 
being a member of a powerful or flourishing group an individual stands to enhance his or her own self 
esteem There are two reasons why members of powerful groups experience an increase in self esteem 
The first can be attributed to the link between one s social and one s personal identity when a nation is 
powerful its members perceive themselves as powerful The other reason is that leaders of nations also 
exploit rhetoric that covets characteristics possessed by the majority of its members—their particular 
ethnicity language or history for example Both of these reasons might explain why so many people have 
a strong interest in their nation s successes at the Olympics in the global market in arts and music or in 
war This second view called the enhancement view is derived from Henri Tajfel s Social Identity Theory 
(SIT) and is often equated with SIT 7
In contrast with these two self interested reasons some personal sacrifices made on behalf of groups 
are done out of a sense of moral duty As I suggest above one reasons is that the norms of membership 
sometimes include moral expectations that are attached to particular roles An individual might be 
required to undergo considerable personal risk in defense of her country for instance because doing so is 
one of the expectations of citizenship Equally common are sacrifices made in adherence to values 
perceived as universal such as a commitment to a conception of the good life that recognizes loyalty as a 
virtue in all persons
The other way m which moral principles can motivate both the privileging of fellow members and 
personal sacrifices on their behalf is when individuals within groups view the characteristics shared by 
fellow members as morally salient or more accurately when group members hold conceptions of moral 
agency that include members of one s group and exclude outsiders Such views are all too common and 
are usually founded on unflattering representations of outsiders Charles Taylor writes of their underlying 
psychology
There seems to be a natural inborn compunction to inflict death or injury on another an inclination to 
come to the help of the injured or endangered Culture and upbringing may help to define the boundaries of the 
relevant others but they don t seem to create the basic reaction itself The roots of respect for life and 
integrity do seem to go as deep as this and to be connected perhaps with the almost universal tendency 
among other animals to stop short of the killing of conspecifics But like so much else m human life this 
instinct receives a variable shape in culture as we have seen And this shape is inseparable from an account 
of what it is that commands our respect The account seems to articulate the intuition It tells us for instance 
that human beings are creatures of God and made m his image or that they are immortal souls or that they are 
emanations of divine fire or that they are all rational agents and thus have a dignity which transcends any 
other being or some other such characterization and that therefore we owe them respect The various cultures 
which restrict this respect do so by denying the crucial description to those left outside they are thought to
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lack souls or to be not fully rational or perhaps to be destined by God for some lower station or something
of the sort 8
Historically such views arise when group members attach moral significance to characteristics such 
as race ethnicity or birthplace Their spread is often facilitated by naive beliefs about outsiders that arise 
because groups have only limited or hostile contact with outsiders or because leaders of groups stand to 
achieve personal gains through their perpetuation
Continuity Self Esteem and Genocide
The crucial question in the study of group violence asks why humans will ignore moral convictions (by 
killing) in order to further the welfare of a group One view I would like to entertain here—a view that I 
will be using as a point of reference for discussing other views—says that the role group identity assumes 
in self understanding is one important cause of violence in pathological states To get an idea of the 
importance of continuity for individuals and as an example of the role is can play in commitments to 
groups or members of groups it is helpful to offer examples One obvious example is commitments we 
have to family members particularly to progeny Sociobiologists argue that a parent s willingness to make 
sacrifices for the sake of a child is motivated by the drive that part of one s identity—one s genetic 
identity—exist posthumously We might make the similar observations with respect to cultures and 
traditions Consider strong desires parents sometimes have that a child marry of a certain class race or 
religion or that a child raise his or her family m a manner consistent with a particular culture
It is when cultures or traditions offer a narrow conception of identity that the continuity motive can 
manifest itself as violence If I myself identify strongly as an Armenian for example and have been raised 
(or indoctrinated) to believe that being Armenian entails certain characteristics—a particular religion 
ethnicity and so on—I might support religious and ethnic cleansing because people of other religions and 
ethnicity who live in my country threaten the future of Armenian culture Similarly others threaten my 
present identity qua Armenian (just as Oliver North says hyphenated Americans threaten to undermine 
our—that is conservatives —understanding of what it means to be an American) Thus dilution of a 
culture threatens both the continuation as well as present existence of one s group identity When one s 
personal identity is heavily influenced by one s group identity it also threatens the continuity of the self
The self enhancement theory also offers a partial explanation of genocide and war Once a group has 
been delineated as an outgroup conquering that group becomes a sign of the strength of the ingroup 
Propaganda of the sort the Nazi s offered—the view that a pure Aryan population was paramount for a 
stronger Germany for example—also play into the desire to be part of a powerful group In both cases 
conquering or exterminating the outgroup offers accomplices the promise of enhanced worth as persons
So why is it that these self interested reasons generate the kind of violence that is only very 
infrequently seen when individuals are in pursuit of other self interested ends9 Why is it for example that 
few individuals will kill another for financial gain or power and yet are so easily swayed by genocidal 
rhetoric9 One reason might be that human beings are more compelled by the ends coveted in genocidal 
rhetoric perhaps threats to continuity of the self for instance are more frightening than are thoughts of 
living without wealth or power Another possibility is that when members of a group perceive themselves 
to have self interested reasons for supporting genocidal acts they are more readily compelled by 
depictions of outsiders as threats At a minimum the presence of these two motives offers an explanation 
of why a member will so often take a blind eye to governmental slaughter The fact that there are strong 
psychologically based motives for genocide also explains why individuals are so easily swayed by the 
dehumanizing rhetoric of genocide We are more likely to submit to images of outgroup members as 
vermin —to take one example—if we have both a strong motive to engage in violence directed toward 
outgroups and at the same time need to find a way of squaring that drive with moral or religious beliefs 
about the treatment of other human beings 9
It is equally important to understand what kinds of groups or cultures are prone to violent 
manifestations of these two drives Several studies in social psychology suggest that there are extraneous
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reasons why for some individuals group self esteem is more important than for others One is low 
individual self esteem 10 If group identity is highly constitutive of individual identity then we might also 
speculate that members of groups that collectively have faired poorly in comparison to other groups— 
especially those who have suffered persecution at the hands of other groups—are most likely to pursue 
discriminatory practices in efforts to gain or regain self esteem 11 This might explain why groups that 
have lost status or power because of persecution such as Serbs or Tamils tend to be especially violent 12
It is also possible that pathological violence is more likely to occur in particular kinds of 
governmental systems In closed societies where identity is most influenced by a few or a single group it 
would stand to reason that individuals would have more invested in their national identity This is less true 
in individualistic societies where liberal democratic governments allow for and even value a life m which 
persons freely associate with a large range of groups Societies where persons are influenced by a much 
larger range of groups moreover breed a kind of cosmopolitanism since the other is often represented 
among the groups in which one participates Genocide seems less likely in such an environment because 
so many members have interests in or at least an understanding of the needs of the subgroups that could 
otherwise be potential targets of slaughter It is much harder to foster religious hatred for instance when 
some members of the potential perpetrating group have affiliations with target religious groups
Toward Solutions
Perhaps one way we might overcome violent manifestations of both the desire for continuity and self 
esteem is to make concerted efforts to redefine the lines that separate groups Some American 
intellectuals try to achieve this end by focusing on the melting pot and egalitarian traditions m the United 
States rather than its more divisive traditions 13 At a minimum by expanding the lines that constitute the 
bonds of membership of a group we might be able to curb internal violence It is no coincidence that most 
genocide takes place internally within states Most often genocide is motivated by visions of national 
character not ideas about the way all people should live their lives Thus the actual content of a national 
character—pertinent traditions conceptions of the good life and the way in which lines between insider 
and outsider are drawn—can play an important role in either the provocation or aversion of violence
Perhaps also by encouraging the cultivation of individualism human beings are more likely to take on 
less violent—or at a minimum less catastrophic—competitive endeavor Persons with a highly developed 
sense of themselves as individuals seem less likely to resort to violence as a means of favorable 
comparison becausejthey cannot hide from the moral implications of violent behavior behind the veil of 
group rhetoric telling them that it is acceptable One reason is that genocide is often facilitated by a 
denial of responsibility which is more difficult to do when a person has a sense that he or she is a chooser 
of his or her own actions When persons have a developed sense of individuality it is much harder for 
them to escape their Jown conscience 14 Human beings are also more fearful about engaging in other 
directed violence when they feel personally responsible for their actions
The difficulty with such solutions is that efforts to stem pathological violence are themselves frequent 
targets of hostility Moderates reformers and other voices of reason are often the first to be killed off when 
violence erupts The principle reason is that they often represent the most serious challenge to perpetrators 
There is a certain irony in this as the literature from social psychology suggests that the most substantial 
threat to the self esteem of perpetrators is their own success While ingroup outgroup discrimination and 
violence are motivated by the desire for self esteem the individual participants do not actually experience 
an increase in self esteem ex post facto actual incidents of discrimination and violence 15 This fact 
suggests that moral motives are present even in persons who choose to ignore those motives in lieu of 
discrimination and violence Off hand it is hard to think of why else self esteem would be lowered instead 
of raised when discrimination and violence ensue The difficulty is that while perpetrators are ultimately 
affected by their moral conscience its influence does not come to bear until it is too late Instead of 
influencing behaviorj before acts of discrimination and subsequent violence perpetrators feel the force of 
moral reasons after they have committed those acts
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Even though exclusion of outsiders is often prompted by legitimate moral considerations (role 
responsibilities) or forgivable ignorance (misinformed understanding of outsiders) it would be a mistake to 
suggest that pathological violence—especially twentieth century incidents of such violence—is fueled 
exclusively by naive understanding or that it is the inevitable consequence of a world divided along 
national and ethnic lines The reason here is that perpetrators of pathological violence usually have 
frequent contact with victims and often also share some history of mutual cooperation Serbs and Croats 
lived in common apartment complexes shopped in each others stores and had children who attended the 
same schools 16 Similar characterizations are true of historical relations between victim and perpetrator m 
Stalin s Soviet Union and Pol Pot s Cambodia Most perpetrators of pathological violence remember 
occupy the same territory And even in states where there is physical separation between the areas in 
which ethnic or racial groups reside victim and perpetrator will almost always share a history of mutual 
dependence relying on one another for goods and services or for cooperation m the face of natural 
disaster All of these arrangements offer opportunities for interaction between members of segregated 
peoples and thus limit the plausibility of claims that acts of pathological violence gain their principle 
support from collective ignorance
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CHAPTER 13
Some Aspects of Cyberspace m Conflict Can the Home Page be the Home Front9
Jennifer Wheary
Introduction
We live in an age of rapid telecommunication The information superhighway 1 —comprised of computer 
networks faxes email the Internet the World Wide Web and satellites to name a few components— 
potentially puts us m constant contact with even the most remote parts of the world On this highway 
information is moving faster and faster Its status is constantly changing and it is taking on a more fluid 
quality than even before Amidst and perhaps because of all the clamor some have defined information 
as a constitutive force in today s society In other words information affects its environment by affecting 
the social political and economic relations conducted within that environment2
The importance of information and thus of the ability to buy sell or somehow control it is what 
makes electronic information networks an important area to analyze Information has always been 
important but with the information superhighway we see increased potential to gam economic and 
political power by providing or denying access to information itself or to the technologies that allow it to 
be processed disseminated and retrieved One of the most intriguing aspects of information technology is 
that it extends this potential not only to many states but also to a wide variety of groups including 
governmental and non governmental actors
What are the implications of the increasing presence and use of information technologies for 
international and intra group relations9 How do we assess those implications9 This essay begins to explore 
these questions The reader will note that I often point to things from a U S perspective There are 
limitations to focusing on the United States among them the possibility of overemphasizing scenarios not 
fully plausible in other nations But it is important to acknowledge the fact that the information 
superhighway is a growing international phenomenon and in this context understanding one nation s 
situation can provide insight into the situations of other nations because a GII is transnational therefore 
the problems and issues found in one state can easily migrate to others In addition the electronic 
information positioning of a given country can breed conditions that must be negotiated by other countries
The United States and other G7 nations (that is Germany France England Japan and Canada) 
control many aspect of information technology 3 This is no coincidence of course Over the past two 
decades global telecommunications dominance in both defense and economic capacities has become 
increasingly important in United States policy 4 This dominance has been pursued through actions such as 
machinations against the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization s (UNESCO) 
effort to help non industrialized nations ensure the development of their indigenous information 
infrastructures5 and calculated moves to extend United States intellectual copyright privileges without 
according reciprocity m entities such as the Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary 
Works and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 6
Telecommunications industries are exceedingly important in United States foreign trade policies 
There is a jingoism about this pursuit underscored by statements such as those made by John Eger 
representative of the information industry when he testified before the House of Representatives Eger 
warned Congress that when it comes to information technology We are at war We are at economic 
war 7 A content analysis of United States government documents related to GII development shows that 
about 70 percent these documents dealt with economic and defense dominance In contrast only about 30
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percent of the policy documents considered the social issues raised by a GII 8 Touting America s move 
into the information age that era characterized by a cyber hyper linked rapid fire of electronic data 
throughout global society policy makers seek to maintain and further United States economic dominance 
through communications Through these efforts the United States has moved itself into a potentially 
powerful position in global telecommunication Thus to understand the United States situation is to begin 
to understand some of the forces that will affect and thus need to be negotiated by developing nations 
The examination offered here points to larger issues raised by the possibilities of a GII
Overall this essay considers the potential for any one nation to control the GII for political purposes 
To frame some of the larger issues at stake here this essay considers the possible roles of the GII in ethnic 
and other national and international level conflicts and suggests that due to the nature of communication 
on the information superhighway its control by any other nation or particular group is unpredictable 
problematic and perhaps impossible
J Cyberspace in Conflict
Even though control is a slippery sphere the effective use of information technologies in conflict 
escalation and resolution is likely As recent articles in Issues in Science and Technology and International 
Security remind us the relatively large scale commercial production as well as the resulting relatively 
low cost of information technologies mean that a wide range of groups and governments can possess these 
technologies 9 Couple the ubiquity of electronic information systems with an increased reliance on those 
system to conduct business and other affairs worldwide and we end up with new possibilities for conflict 
In Information Warfare Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway Winn Schwartau describes just one of the 
possibilities that can (result from computer hackers technological terrorists using their access to 
information technologies to manipulate even small aspects of a GII Schwartau speaks of attacks not only 
on airliners and water supplies but upon the money supply a sure way to strike terror into millions of 
people 10 Given the| possibilities outlined by Schwartau and particularly in light of the experience of the 
military in fighting the Gulf War information warfare is becoming an increasingly significant part of 
United States investigations into non lethal weapons 11
A recent article by Joseph S Nye Jr and William A Owens discusses the value of information in 
international relations by articulating the United States s information edge its subtle comparative 
advantage m its ability to collect process act upon and disseminate information 12 Nye and Owens 
explain that this advantage comes from America s Cold War technological investments and its relatively 
open society These two factors have resulted in American dominance in communications and information 
processing technologies (such as high speed computers space based surveillance and direct 
broadcasting) and in|a sophisticated American ability to integrate complex information systems 13
The American information advantage can be used to deter or defeat traditional military threats at 
relatively low cost (to strengthen the intellectual link between US foreign policy and military power 
and to offer new ways of maintaining leadership in alliances and ad hoc coalitions 14 Information 
technology can also be used to better understand what is happening on the battlefield Nye and Owens cite 
the information edg^ as an equally important force multiplier of American diplomacy 15 This diplomacy 
includes soft power —which they describe as the
ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion [by] 
convincing others to follow or getting them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the desired 
behavior Soft power can rest of the appeal of one s ideas or the ability to set the agenda in ways that shape 
the preferences of others If a state can make its power legitimate in the perceptions of others and e tablish 
international institutions that encourage them to channel or limit their activities it may not need to expend 
as many of its costly traditional economic or military resources 16
According to Nye and Owens the United States can use its information edge to (1) engage China 
Russia and other powerful states in security dialogues to prevent them from becoming hostile (2) help 
prevent states like Ii¡an and Iraq already hostile from becoming powerful (3) bolster new democracies
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and communicate directly with those living under undemocratic regimes and (4) engage in efforts to 
prevent and resolve regional conflicts and deal with prominent post Cold War dangers including 
international crime terrorism proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and damage to the global 
environment 17 In this context power is in part controlling access to information or to the technologies 
that allow information to be transferred and processed in short power is being able to somehow 
manipulate information for achieving one s goals As Nye and Owens put it Information is the new coin 
of the international realm and the United States is better positioned than any other country to multiply the 
potency of its hard and soft power resources through information 18
A significant part of the potential power Nye and Owens suggest is related to the United States s 
ability to use information technologies to pursue or mollify aggression that is the United States s ability 
to engage in information warfare a fuzzy concept now being batted around m the Pentagon and other 
security spheres
In Cyberwar is Coming1 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt begin to define this concept They note 
that there is an ongoing information revolution that is drastically restructuring relations at all levels of 
society These drastic changes are likewise changing the nature of conflict and the kinds of military 
structures doctrines and strategies that will be used in conflict19 Arquilla and Ronfeldt believe that two 
new modes of conflict are emerging cyberwar and netwar Like Nye and Owens Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
suggest that what distinguishes victors m current warfare is their grasp of information—not only from the 
mundane standpoint of knowing how to find the enemy while keeping it in the dark but also in doctrinal 
and organizational terms 90
For Arquilla and Ronfeldt netwar is societal and national level conflicts waged in whole or in part 
through internetted communication More completely netwar means
trying to disrupt damage or modify what a target population knows or thinks it knows about itself and the 
world around it A netwar may focus on public or elite opinion or both It may involve public diplomacy 
measures propaganda and psychological campaigns political and cultural subversion deception of or 
interference with local media infiltration of computer networks and databases and efforts to promote 
dissident or opposition movements across computer networks Thus designing a strategy for netwar may 
mean groups together from a new perspective a number of measures that have been used before but were 
viewed separately 21
Arquilla and Ronfeldt see netwar as a new entry on the spectrum of conflict that spans economic 
political and social as well as military forms of war 92 Netwar can arise between governments of rival 
states governments and non state actors and rival non state actors
As Arquilla and Ronfeldt put it
Some movements are increasingly organizing into cross border networks and coalitions identifying 
more with the development of civil society (even global civil society) than with nation states and using 
advanced information and communications technologies to strengthen their activities This may well turn out 
to be the next great frontier for ideological conflict and netwar may be a prime characteristic 23
In addition to netwar Arquilla and Ronfeldt also believe in the possibilities of cyberwar which they 
describe as conducting or preparing to conduct military operations that disrupt or destroy military 
information and communications systems 24 Cyberwar might change military organization and procedure 
Commanders may see a greater decentralization of decision making an emphasis on the acquisition of an 
integrative understanding of a given situation and new and concerted efforts to strategically position 
aspects of one s information networks (for example computers databases sensors etc ) 95
A recent report from Department of Defense s (DOD) Office of the Assistant Secretary for Special 
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict succinctly states the possibilities of cyberwar In the July 17 1995 
report Strategic Assessment The Internet Charles Swett Assistant for Strategic Assessment discusses 
why a government might be interested in the GII
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The political process is moving onto the Internet Both within the United States and internationally 
individuals interest groups and even nations are using the Internet to find each other discuss the issues and 
further their political goals The Internet has also played an important role in recent conflicts As a result 
overseas segments of the Internet can be a useful tool for DoD both for gathering and for disseminating 
information By monitoring public message traffic and alternative news sources from around the world early 
warning of impending significant developments could be developed in advance of more traditional means of 
indications and warning Commentary placed on the Internet by observers on the scene of low intensity 
conflicts overseas could be useful to United States policymaking During larger scale conflicts when other 
conventional channels are disrupted the Internet can be the only available means of communication into and 
out of the affected Jareas Internet messages originating within regions under authoritarian control could 
provide other useful intelligence Public messages conveying information about the intent of overseas 
groups prone to disrupting United States military operations could provide important counterintelligence 
The Internet could also be used offensively as an additional medium in psychological operations campaigns 
and to help achieve unconventional warfare objectives Used creatively as an integral asset the Internet can 
facilitate many DoD operations and activities 26
The enthusiasm and assumptions Arquilla and Ronfeldt as well as Swett are shared by Gordon R 
Sullivan and James M Dubik 27 A General and a Colonel in the United States Army respectively 
Sullivan and Dubik suggest that in an information age speed and precision are the major requirements for 
success m battle In pursuing these objectives commanders will seek a more flexible military—one that 
makes decisions more quickly and is better able to adapt comprehend and act when new situations arise
Sullivan and Dubik s overall assessment is based on the assumptions that (1) standardization 
specialization professionalization synchronization concentration maximization and centralization 
characterized the industrial age 28 and (2) the information age is characterized by (a) networks (non 
mechanical holistic I synergistic systems structured along participatory lines of communication)29 and (b) 
mass customized goods produced and distributed on demand 30 Sullivan and Dubik believe strongly that 
given the vast differences between these characteristics and those of the industrial age facets of army 
decision and war making must evolve to take advantage of synergistic highly detailed information 
systems that can provide the specific information a commander needs at the precise moment it s needed 31
In the terms offered by Sullivan and Dubik the information revolution will push the military to move 
toward interagency ¡operations combining the armed forces with other government entities 32 Coupled 
with this will be the [development of precise rules of engagement These precise rules are necessitated in 
part by the fact that| operations will take place under the watchful eye of a media that will be on the 
cutting edge of the information age 33 These operations will have as a goal the near simultaneous 
paralysis and destruction of enemy forces war making capability and information networks throughout the 
depth of a theater 34
This goal will be achieved by military components that develop a shared situational awareness 
This awareness will come from those components having common up to date near complete friendly 
and enemy information distributed among all elements of a task force Through this information the 
military will be able to locate enemy forces quickly and precisely whether those enemies are agrarian 
war lords industrial ¡armies or an information age peer In addition the military will know where their 
own forces are much more accurately than before while denying that kind of information to their foes 
This information will be shared among all committed forces—land sea air and space—to create a 
common perception of the battlefield In addition information technology will make direct fire more 
precise Armies will be able to shoot or move directly against enemy forces or specific targets even 
though they may be tens of thousands of kilometers away j5
The use of electronic technology in warfare is a continuing pursuit But there is also another side to 
the story Chetan Khumar has assessed The Role of Technology in Civil Conflict Resolution 36 Khumar 
discusses the potential roles technology can play in alleviating problems m each of the six different stages 
through which he believes civil conflicts evolve In his analysis Khumar stresses the role of technology in 
preempting stalling ' and resolving conflicts In the first stage Khumar suggests that factors such as 
environmental degradation ethnic rivalries and socioeconomic upheaval either separately or m
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conjunction generate the potential for conflict 37 Khumar sees several information technologies playing a 
potentially important role in this stage Satellites in particular and Global Information Systems (GIS) in 
general can provide accurate early information of environmental degradation and resource depletion m 
areas prone to ethnic conflict In addition email networks faxes and satellite broadcasts can be used to 
disseminate information and create awareness among the people of the affected area and also to suggest 
possible solutions and remedial measures to resource depletion Faxes and email can also be used to 
engage a wide range of international policy makers and researchers in the pursuit of solutions to problems 
often preceding ethnic conflict38
A point not made by Khumar but which could be suggested here is the potential for the GII to 
facilitate the development of some of the conditions that might cause ethnic conflict This potential 
becomes apparent if we momentarily explore the role of social mobilization—the movement from a more 
traditional to more modern patterns of behavior—to foster ethnic competition in the competitive modern 
sector This competition results when elites try to maintain an increasingly tenuous power and rival ethnic 
groups vie for newly available but not yet ubiquitous economic opportunities 39
What are the implications of a GII that markets a higher standard of living and displays greater 
cultural opportunities than the economic and social conditions of a given area or group allow9 The 
following story one that relates experiences that have been and will continue to be played out provides 
food for thought in this area
In the late 1980s it was related to an on line discussion group by the then president of Hewlett 
Packard
We were in Guaymas Mexico riding through a small poverty stricken area with a guy from 
Chicago He was busy denigrating the area Who could stand to live here you wouldn t know anything about 
the world it is so squalid I was busy taking pictures of houses perhaps 25 feet square with a 1954 pickup in 
the driveway and a satellite dish on the roof An area of perhaps 1 000 people with about 50 satellite dishes'
He said What do those dishes do anyway9 I said Well these people can get 130 TV channels from at 
least seven nations in five languages and in addition they can get sub earner FM stereo In other words the 
have Quebec Venezuela Mexico City all of Amenca BBC and even Japan occasionally and they get the 
Chicago symphony as clearly as you do
He was stunned Then he said What do they think when they see all that and they look at this where 
they live9 And I was silent and my wife was silent and he was silent 40
This is not meant to suggest that the social upheaval possible when economic disparities are so openly 
displayed is always a bad thing To be exposed to democratic ideas and possible better ways of life can 
motivate members of a given group to fight to improve their lot This potential fight the possible conflict 
is the point here
The next stage discussed bv Khumar is a gestation period a period of mounting intergroup animosity 
m a society proliferation of weapons random violence and massive human rights violations by 
increasingly insecure elites Here information technology can provide important tools for third parties 
who are trying to forestall a conflict through negotiation economic coercion or diplomacy 41 Here a 
GII offers monitoring capabilities useful to enforcing arms embargoes and providing insight into the 
moves and maneuvers of the parties in conflict In addition Khumar outlines the following uses of 
information technology
to disseminate possible short term solutions to conflict and long term remedial measures for addressing the 
deep seated causes of corflict propaganda technology to counter the misinformation being promoted by 
leaders seeking to prolong a conflict through the use of ethnic or cultural constructs information technology 
to promote networks of grassroots organizations and individuals who have influence among the local 
population and who are working to promote short term or long term solutions to the conflict42
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In the third stage discussed by Khumar internal conflicts become widespread The possible results 
of this expansion include war disruption of economic activity further depletion and scarcity of vital 
resources and the creation of large refugee populations 41 In this stage information technologies can help 
facilitate efficient and effective humanitarian relief efforts by for example enabling communication and 
resource sharing among Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) and Private Voluntary Ogamzations 
(PVOs) 44 Changes in internal circumstances and the effectiveness of efforts undertaken by external 
parties in the previous two stages can provide ripe conditions for Khumar s fourth stage conflict 
resolution 45 In this stage information technologies can provide important resources for monitonng cease 
fires and treaty compliance As Khumar puts it the options available
include satellite monitoring technologies for verifying accord implementation by signatories ground based 
detection and monitonng technologies for detecting violations of cease fires and accords by one or more of 
the signatories integrated intelligence systems for providing advance information of unwarranted or 
provocative movements of troops and armor by one or more of the signatories and giving this information to 
all parties involved1 as well as to the peacekeeping troops involved so as to ensure the latter s safety and 
satellite and aerial guidance for peacekeeping troops and relief convoys to forewarn them of ambushes and 
natural and man made obstacles In addition command and control technologies can be developed for 
improving coordination and interaction in multinational troop contingents 46
i
Another stage of conflict discussed by Khumar is more logistical than sequential This stage occurs at 
whatever point the involvement of third parties becomes necessary or advantageous for conflict resolution 
Some possible uses of information technologies by these third parties have already been delimited here 
International organizations can use advanced technologies to solve the some of the problems that cause 
conflict Third parties can provide surveillance data that demonstrates the extent to which accords are 
being respected relief agencies can use information technology to coordinate their efforts One additional 
use of information technology is using hacker warfare to jam warring parties communications systems and 
thus to block the efficient movement of troops and supplies 47 It is at this stage of third party involvement 
where the information edge and soft power outlined by Nye and Owens and described above 
become highly relevant
Information technology can also be valuable in the final stage described by Khumar reconstruction of 
failed states KhumarJ notes that internal conflict might lay waste to an entire country and its 
governmental structure 48 Revival and replacement of dysfunctional aspects of governmental structure is 
essential to preventing relapse into conflict Information technologies can play a vital role in facilitating 
this revival and replacement Electronic communication can help NGO s network and develop common 
strategies for promoting grass roots participation in the revival of a political process
In addition satellite and other forms of telecasting can be used to disseminate propaganda for 
promoting interethnic interreligious and intertribal harmony 49 This last point could be broadly extended 
when considered in light of the Internet s ability to facilitate information dissemination among members of 
ethnic groups interested in the conflict at hand but living abroad Here we might consider the use of the 
Internet and World Wide Web among expatriates of Sri Lanka or Bosnia for example For both of these 
simple Yahoo searches using the words Bosnia and Tamil provide a host of informational 
opportunities—opportunities to receive information not available through the mainstream media
After following just two quick hyperlinks in one s Yahoo search the information resources available 
include ordering information for a video documentary Sri Lanka War Without Witness On the relevant 
home page the cybersurfer is told that the video was smuggled out of the country and shows the horrific 
situation facing the Tamil people of the North East of the island of Sri Lanka and demonstrates the bloody 
realities of the Sri Lankan government s slogan Peace through war 50 Because the Internet and WWW 
are low cost ways toi keep in touch with each other and to spread information about the situation at home 
such resources are frequently used by groups living abroad
Having presented some of the possibilities for a GII in ethnic conflict we are given a sense of how the 
proverbial home page—the Internet increment linked to other Internet increments—can on certain levels 
become the home front a place from where groups and nations can engage in propagandize for and
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perhaps resolve conflict Having delimited some of the possibilities this essay now moves to consider 
their larger implications on international scene
The (IM)Possibilities for Control Virtual States and Internetted Communication
The preceding section of this paper has discussed possibilities for GII use in conflict that can be used by 
any number of groups and governments This section will assess some of the possibilities for the control of 
electronic information by any one entity In particular this section considers the rise of the virtual state as 
a potential threat to any nation s or group s ability to control information and the Internet s ability to 
facilitate communication for groups at various levels and stages of technological development
We can question some of the possibilities for state control of the information superhighway by 
considering the fact that we may have arrived at the day of the virtual state formed by electronic and 
economic phenomena Electronic networks have the ability to facilitate the development of transnational 
communities that weaken the power of the state as an entity with which people identify And the rise of 
multinational corporations and advances m electronic banking (that enable rapid currency exchange) 
mean that an individual s or group s economic resources need not be situated in one place Thus the 
things that begin to tie people together are the networks they form through dispersed electronic 
communication based on a decentralized sharing of information
This point is nicely addressed by Martin Libicki Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic 
Studies in The Mesh and the Net Speculations on Armed Conflict in an Age o f Free Silicon 51 Libicki asks 
might not the decline of state coincide with the rise of the Net the newest venue for crime conflict and 
chaos9 52 In light of this question Libicki proposes five effects of a GII (1) the erasure of distance (2) 
the creation of fixed and floating networks (3) universal translatability (involving many more people 
wanting to learn English and advancements in electronic banking that allow people to hold accounts 
across countries and currencies) (4) mutability of truth coupled with the ability to move information past 
prior controls and (5) as a result of all of these the rise of the global villager 53
These possible GII effects present new opportunities for the individuals and groups to share ideas and 
resources and therefore to pursue goals across borders They point to the fact that a GII can communicate 
a plethora of perspectives The existence rapidity and ubiquity of communication of countless 
perspectives calls into question the extent to which information from a given source can be considered 
unbiased or factual on any level In other words with a GII assessing accuracy becomes tenuous Some 
information sources will naturally appear more credible than others but the existence of multiple voices in 
cyberspace lessens the possibility than any one voice will be heard above the din of the others
Looking on the Internet and World Wide Web we can find many examples of grassroots organizing 
efforts We can go to the Stormfront website which describes itself as a White Nationalist Resource 
Page a forum for planning strategies and forming political and social groups to ensure victory in the 
cause of preserving White Western ideals culture and freedom of speech and association 54 We can look 
to the examples of the rebellion m Mexico s Chiapas province where Subcommandante Marcos rallies 
the world to the cause of indigenous people via email or of China where telecommunications has had a 
great role in facilitating student protests and calls for democracy and which has recently experienced rigid 
telecommunications controls because of this We might also consider the efforts of the Institute for Global 
Communications The organization has produced PeaceNet
a world wide computer network dedicated to peace social and economic justice human rights and the struggle
against racism PeaceNet offers full Internet access electronic publishing and a members only network with
a plethora of information on issues important to progressive activists 55
Peacenet is comprised of nearly one hundred worldwide organizations many of these are electronic 
networks in and of themselves Consider for example the Community Technology Centers Network 
(comprised of sixty five technology centers) and the Consortium on Peace Research Education and 
Development (which has over 500 institutional and individual members)56 Given the vastness and the 
international nature of communication on the information superhighway we must be careful to not
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overestimate any nation s and any one groups s potential to control the GII While the ability to process 
information as well as the ability to allow or deny access to the technologies that permit information to 
be retrieved or disseminated is powerful it is difficult to assume that any one group or nation will 
ultimately control cyberspace
To have access to any part of the Internet is to have access quite literally to a world of information 
and of individuals with whom one can pursue a cause And this access can be ensured with very basic 
technologies technologies that are not easily controlled For example faxes and electronic mail—pursued 
through even the slowest computers and modems—have played significant roles in facilitating calls for 
democracy and for the end of human rights abuses m China and in allowing Mexican revolutionaries to 
draw attention to the plight of their country s indigenous population These efforts have by and large 
succeeded despite each nation s best efforts to stop them
While a country might be able to control some of the larger aspects of information technology such 
as the placement of satellites or the possibilities for ISDN57 lines specific control of the possibilities and 
daily routines of personal electronic communication is nearly impossible And because many of the 
activities and activists found on the Internet are internationally based governmental control seems 
difficult unless pursued internationally that is unless it is pursued by a consortium of governments This 
pursuit however may be contrary to ensuring any particular nation s status as bearing the information 
edge described by Nye and Owens
Some Concluding Remarks
I
In Time magazine s Spring 1995 special issue Welcome to Cyberspace AT&T offers readers the 
magazine s only paid (advertisement In an ad that runs through the entire issue and which in many ways 
becomes interchangeable with the text familiar fable characters such as Gulliver Cinderella Alice m 
Wonderland and Rumpelstiltskin all become involved in a technological odyssey By the end of their 
journey—a journey in which each character is somehow helped by telecommunications—a frog wearing a 
name tag that reads Mr Information Superhighway turns into a handsome pnnce who helps Life in the 
kingdom [become] much easier And much more enchanting 58
AT&T s advertisement is typical of much of the description and impressions offered59 of the 
information superhighway While the advertisement invokes familiar images in order to make us more 
comfortable with new technology its major move is to disassociate the future from the past by explaining 
that the information superhighway is a revolutionary new means of communication that will radically 
alter and improve upon all that we now know We might also make the same point of the phrase 
information superhighway itself There is something magical connoted Information and our 
consciousness are traveling on not just a highway but on a superhighway And the implication is that this 
road ahead 60 will take us somewhere new somewhere we actually want to be
These possibilities of a GII are intriguing They range from enabling new peace and understanding to 
facilitating highly effective and inte’ligent weaponry Realistically at various points and m various 
contexts we will see| most of these possibilities enacted That is both for nations and international groups 
the Internet the homb page will be the home front from which communication and social and political 
causes are pursued These pursuits will not always be great successes and they may often have 
unpredictable consequences Given this ultimate ambiguity it might seem frustrating to attempt to 
understand the stakes and range of possibilities for a GII Nonetheless this attempt is vital To be 
appraised of the stakes and possibilities is to be one step closer to intelligently negotiating them
This essay might be most significantly ended with speculation about the information superhighway s 
potential role as a facilitator of international communication and understanding In many ways this seems 
to be the GII s most (attractive possibility And it s a reasonable one Electronic communications networks 
do have the potential to enable the rapid transfer of information and ideas—something that on the 
surface—seems capable of improving communication between countries and between cultures But we 
must ask ourselves what is the context and the structure of this communication7 Who has and who is
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denied access to electronic communication9 In addition too much information or information presented 
m such a way that it is unusable to much of the world (for example by being mostly m English by being 
poorly organized or by requiring extensive background or interpretive knowledge to understand it) might 
actually debilitate understanding In addition uniform global access to electronic communication is still a 
long way off Lack of uniform access leads to the exclusion of nations and populations that cannot yet 
afford to own or develop information technologies Doesn t this lead to mis and under representation of 
certain views and of whole classes of people961 How or even can this be avoided9 What are the 
implications of these situations9
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CHAPTER 14
An Essay on Global Ethics
Robert Manaster
Why is the twentieth century seemingly the bloodiest in world history7 More people with which to 
compete for resources7 Better technology for destruction7 The fall of religion7 The dominance of 
instrumental reason7 The revolution away from feudal agrarian and religious orders toward individual 
rights industrialization and nation state sovereignty7 All of these reasons as well as others are plausible 
Are there some basic human qualities however that seem to underlie all these explanations7 Perhaps our 
modern history is so bloody because there s no unifying ethical standard or framework with which to guide 
human behavior Ideally it seems that a global ethic whether explicitly stated and acted upon or just 
implicitly acted upon would be able to prevent pathological actions before they are even considered I 
define pathological as actions causing genocide refugees acute famine ethnic violence attacks on 
unarmed civilian populations or other forms of mass suffering
One could argue that if everyone in the world would do most anything we consider positive the world 
would not experience pathological actions If only everyone for example would love care for the 
environment or each other practice a transcendental meditation act virtuously act kindly to at least one 
person a day or reach their full potential if only everyone would follow a global ethic the world would be 
a better place This argument must sufficiently addresses the following workability and opposition First 
is the global ethic really global and ethical7 How practical is it to follow for all people especially groups 
with opposing paradigms7 How adaptable is it for this and future generations7 Second to see a global 
ethic work is to see what happens to people who don t seem to follow it What happens to people who 
believe in the global ethic but don t follow it7 What happens to non believers7 How does the global ethic 
respond to pathological actions and their perpetrators victims and bystanders7
In this paper I will cover these workability and opposition issues I will first define conditions 
necessary for a global ethic I will then examine modern failures of several global ethics The God based 
attempts of Islam Baha i and the World Parliament of Religions and a human based attempt of the 
United Nations Finally I will offer my own personal statement an ethic based vision of a global ethic
Need for a Global Ethic
Definition
A global ethic should contain principles that define and guide appropriate human behavior It seems 
however that it should stress actions rather than these principles or beliefs emanating from these 
principles What is of most concern is not whether we believe in a principle but whether an appropriate 
action is carried out A global ethic should emphasize doing something to stop genocide rather than 
believing in a guiding Truth or principle that one should not murder To emphasize this distinction I use 
ethics to signify appropriate actions and morals to signify appropriate principles I am not aiming to 
divorce principles from actions rather I m just emphasizing the latter when I use ethics and the former 
when I use morals
One might ask what actions are appropriate enough to be ethical An answer depends upon the global 
ethic itself The actions could be divine commanded happy good just least painful most pleasurable 
most accepted ones having most utility ones associated with certain virtues and or actions having other 
qualities not mentioned here
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In any case a global ethic must take into account the realities of different world views One major 
view—God based global ethics—is founded on revelation Historically a god outside the human 
experience was able to provide humankind with global significance and the ethic to live out this 
significance Religions replacing tribal or imperial religions however were somewhat limited They had 
no vision of global universal history they had no knowledge of the globe Thus their moral universahsm 
seemed abstract and unreal Nowadays according to Reinhold Niebuhr this moral force has seeped into 
the nation state and integrated with a new technological force of global interdependence it forms a 
powerful impetus toward the establishment of a world community 1 and a global ethic
Which religion S| divine commands however are publicly acceptable as a global ethic9 Are religious 
ethics exclusive to their own religions or is there some common underlying ethic in all religions (and non 
religions)9 Does the Christian Muslim or Jewish God s commands lead us to the true ethics9 Can t the 
Buddha s or Confucius sayings lead us too9
Another major view is founded on the Enlightenment s ideals of autonomy and reason These human 
based ethics range from Immanuel Kant s highly abstract categorical imperative—act only on a maxim if 
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law2—to Erich Fromm s humanistic 
ethics the applied science of the art of living based upon the theoretical science of man 1 In between 
Kant and Fromm lay 'the ethics of human nghts
One problem with these human based theories is that there may not be time for rational views or 
discourse A rational response may not be accessible for all involved for whatever reason and discourse 
may not be an available option Or both rationality and discourse may be present but not available for 
those who are not in power or for those actually doing the actions And even if they were available 
rational logic or discourse may not be the best response
To any unbeliever the human based and god based world views seem to give some sense of arbitrary 
moral rightness to the rational reasoning self or to god(s) While Western ethics generally anchor to a 
god s revelation or the fully individuated self Eastern ethics generally anchor to the relational aspect of 
the self or community The Hindu Karmic ethic focuses on one s relationship to the past (karma) and one s 
escape from samsara' the cycle of karma Confucianism focuses on the relations between people Japan on 
loyalty to lords or the state and China on loyalty to family 4 Buddhism focuses the relation of the illusory 
self to not self eventually foregoing any idea of self In general the Eastern ethics are non personal 
loosely structured non narrative fertile insight versus the clear logical Western narrative The humility 
of finite understanding is opposed to the epistemology of reason (logic)5
Given communications technology and depleting resources our world is increasingly developing 
economic political religious and social interdependencies There are few unexplored (and exploited) 
frontiers left—if any No more should there be the exclusionary colonial prejudice based on a localized 
unknown Rather a global ethic must be global in all facets of life It should take into account these world 
views This completeness increases the possibility of a truly global vision
One might ask why this vision must be singular Why not multiple global ethics9 John Bowker argues 
that there are biological reasons for cultural or ethnic plurality In order to ensure survival nature does not 
put all her eggs m one basket6 With different ethics there s a good chance some society will survive But 
does one ethic mean we will lose our adaptability to survive9 Not if the global ethic is inclusive and 
adaptable It must also allow the opportunity for new meanings to open up to us if we are to survive 
Bowker seems to hedge toward this To apprehend the one in the many is to discover the raison d etre for 
the pluralistic stance (of global ethics 7 The question however remains Is there one in many9
A problem with multiple global ethics is that they could turn out to be a world with multiple 
interests—all of which actually may be appropriate under certain conditions But this strategy 
compartmentalizes the world How can a business ethic be separated from an ecology ethic9 Or how can 
two religious ethics be separate yet equally global9 If there are multiple global ethics which one takes 
precedence when there are deep conflicts9 What is the use of ethical foundations of one culture or country 
if one could go to another to get around these foundations9 And a most important question How can
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multiple global ethics unify the world9 This is not to say that specialized ethics such as religious or 
professional ethics should not exist Rather these ethics may not be global It seems a most important 
strength of a global ethic would be an underlying connection between local ethics and a global 
commitment of the world to support it as global
Assuming the global ethic can unify the world should it be an absolute ethic or can relative ethics 
suffice as a global ethic9 John Bowker claims we must be cognitively flexible and ethically relativistic 8 
in order to see how others live so we can correct our own culture thereby raising the global standard 
Actually this methodology seems to lead toward purifying and perhaps unifying cultures leading the 
world to a singular best culture Should a global ethic aim toward creating a unified culture in a specific 
historical moment9 Once this moment ends or if this culture becomes abusive perhaps there would be lots 
more suffering to those who want to break from this dominant singular culture than if there were other 
cultures to help To say that this best culture is static or forever adapting to what is best in a given 
historical moment and that this best culture will not be abused is to describe a messianic era which 
although worthwhile seems unlikely I see less problems with relative local ethics that do not aim to unify 
progressively into some best world culture rather I see more potential if they instead aim to unify 
(progressively or not) an underlying connection between their local ethics if possible
Nevertheless the foundation of a global ethic must be strong How can we follow an ethic with weak 
foundations9 Is a global ethic strong if it is a human based ethic9 Or is an autonomous will and reason 
inherently flawed leading to unreasonableness or super reasonableness9 Must a global ethic be a god 
based ethic as Hans Kung argues" Must only the unconditioned global ethic be an unconditional 
obligation of which no human can back up claims of unconditionality or universality9 Or can the human 
conscience in Kant s ahistoncal and Fromm s historical moment or Buddha s enlightened moment be 
unconditional thus having a strong foundation9 These questions seem most relevant if one needs to know 
the source of a global ethic and if this knowledge is psychologically necessary to give a global ethic a 
solid foundation
In any case a global ethic must wake us to the realities of pathological actions In order to awaken 
we must take into account localized realities A global ethic must be sensitive to the historical 
development of varied cultures in order to keep the global ethic within the living of a local society 
Otherwise the ethic would be imposed unreal and more abstract A blindness between the global 
community and a local culture or between any cultures enforces a common feature of pathological 
societies The us them categorization A global ethic must take into account this categorization 
seemingly inherent in most pathological actions The blindness usually pertains to an aggressor culture 
the perpetrator of pathological actions The Nazis ( us ) for instance would denigrate the Jews Gypsies 
and Homosexuals ( them ) as vermin A global ethic must acknowledge this possibility in human 
behavior and aim to prevent its pathological development
Can a global ethic help humankind overcome pathological violence that has plagued us since the 
beginning of our collective memories9 Perhaps part of the answer lies in the debate about human 
aggression is it learned innate or both9 If it is learned presumably we can un learn it through a global 
ethic If it s purely innate however then one could argue that invariably because of this innate tendency 
we will always be prone to pathological actions A global ethic would then be superfluous This reasoning 
however assumes innate aggression becomes pathological that the escalation or turning on of this 
innate aggression (or perhaps a sublimation of this aggression instinct) leads to pathologies In all cases 
then the path toward pathological violence is contingent upon the turning on or off of this instinct (Is this 
switching innate too9)
This opinion can be self defeatist allowing us to rationalize we can do nothing about the inevitability 
of pathological actions There can be no global ethic to overcome this innateness However even if we 
may never overcome the possibility of pathological actions we can strive to contain or redirect an 
aggression that has become pathological
Although important the nature nurture debate seems to me less relevant than the actions nature or 
nurture give nse to One however could argue more relevance because the answer to this debate will help
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us to prevent atrocities for good I m a bit skeptical First we may never get an answer to this debate 
Second The answer seems more intellectually relevant than practically This debate is on a theoretical 
level leaving little room for the more pragmatic approach of just stopping the horrors and helping the 
victims—where we learn through experience anyway Third if this debate takes center stage we are 
ignoring more pressing concerns—that of stopping pathological actions
It s sufficient to say that genocide (and other pathological actions) is somehow close to the nature of 
man10—whether as victim perpetrator or bystander—and we must stop these pathological actions This 
moves the nature nurture debate I think into a more appropriate perspective A global ethic can stop 
pathological actions period We do not need to link the rise of social pathologies to a cause or causes A 
global ethic will perhaps discover or illuminate a cause but mostly will balance or eliminate it (without 
necessarily even knowing about it) or prevent its most harmful consequences
Why can t we stop these pathological actions7 We have unlearned cultural behaviors or redirected 
instincts concerning incest cannibalism and slavery At least we have severely limited these behaviors 
without definitively knowing their nature nurture answer Why not pathological actions such as genocide 
civilian attacks famine or ethnic violence7 To assume otherwise is still defeatist Have these 
pathological actions become so pervasive in our society that we accept horrific consequences as natural 
and ignore them7
Another part of the answer as to whether a global ethic will help prevent pathological actions lies in 
the ability for everybody to agree or follow this ethic It must be all inclusive and cohesive If not it will 
fail because the un included will not follow and may perhaps actively or passively discourage others 
Slaves and the systems of slavery in effect propagated paradigm behaviors that may have led to 
pathological actions Early in their histones God based liberation ethics of Judaism Christianity and 
Islam took existing social structures such as slavery and made them more palatable Whether the ethics 
were cultural or biological adaptive in order to survive or supportive of elite status quo structures seem 
less relevant than pathological actions these ethics could have spawned
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of a Global Ethic
There are four major conditions with which to satisfy before a global ethic can prevent pathological 
actions First it must acknowledge us them categorizations At the very least it must recognize this 
possibility It must somehow neutralize the effect of these categorizations if it doesn t prevent them 
Second a global ethic must engage local realities which collectively become global It must work within 
the social political religious and economic frameworks of local areas Even if somehow the ideal is to 
change some framework the global ethic must start within the localized reality We can t change what s 
not there Without working within the localized frameworks one is not being all inclusive hence one is 
not following a truly global ethic Third a global ethic must engage global realities and have global 
participation It must1 be able to adapt to cultural perspectives—even those views and actions ignoring and 
actively denying and opposing the global ethic There must be ethical meaning behind words and other 
deeds that support it The global ethic must be cohesive and unifying And in order to communicate it 
must have its own universal language How else can it unify7 Fourth a global ethic must have a strong 
foundation All groups of people must rise against pathological actions This unity can create a world 
ethical conscience The questions still remain Should the foundation be god based or human based7 And 
does the answer matter7
1 Modern God Based Ethics
Islam Global Ethic ^
Scholars and practitioners vary widely as to what constitutes an Islamic ethic The interpretations here are 
not an exception to this fact In general an Islamic ethic is not explicitly spelled out but emanates from 
the Koran the Islam holy book loosely borrowing from Jewish and Christian sacred text Muslims claim 
that the Islamic ethip is universal and absolute since God is universal and absolute Islam means
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submission Submitting to God s will and serving God is Justice a main component of an Islamic global 
ethic
Muslims claim that Islam (and its global ethic) is tolerant of those who do not adhere to the Islamic 
faith Non Muslims who believe m God but do not profess Islam as their religion are classified as 
dhimmas 11 They are allowed the security of person property and practice of faith in exchange for a poll 
tax (jizya) to the Muslim state They are allowed to handle their own affairs if they don t interfere with the 
Muslim state They are not allowed to have authority (that is to hold public office) over Muslims This 
kind or arrangement protects the dhimmas without compromising Islam People who don t believe m God 
however are not recognized as persons Some are allowed safety and even some long term ones become 
dhimmas In any case There shall be no compulsion m religion (2 256) 12 Jihad can literally mean 
exertion or effort not holy war as some Muslims mean to use the word Ideally this effort is more 
of a defensive effort to protect Islam Violence is not excluded but it should never be used for spreading 
Islam Violence is only tolerated to defend Islam from those who oppose it
There is an idea of a just war Islam divides into two territories dar al Islam territory of Islam (a 
peaceful region) and dar al Harb territory of war 13 Therefore Islam is always in a state of war a just 
war with non Islam states Ideally this war however is mainly dormant as long as Islam is not 
threatened The al Harb is viewed as a state of nature The jihad  is dormant too peace overtakes jihad
The main problem is that some manifestations of Islam extend beyond their own contexts They 
oppose any other moral system especially those in which have no God such as Buddhism Instead they 
claim their Islam will lead the way toward God It will provide a global ethical religion These 
manifestations of Islam are not accepting of non Islamic rule in an ideal world They are not accepting 
enough of non Islam social economic and political systems as part of a global ethic especially when 
systems do not see God s will and revelations as the underlying foundation They are not accepting enough 
of those beliefs or actions that conflict with Islam even if the beliefs and actions do not destroy Islam 
Mostly it seems they stop being inclusive when some other threatens their manifestation of Islam their 
very survival When this threat happens the global ethic is no longer global The ethic is no longer an 
ethic for the other The existence of dhimmas and many other groups leave open the possibility of 
pathological actions The nineteenth century for instance witnessed more than one jihad  (holy war sense) 
for the purification of Islam from pagan influences
Another substantial problem with the Islamic global ethic lies in the corruption of the Koran It can be 
interpreted with a sacred meaning by anyone because of the Koran s accessibility A misreading of Islam 
can cause pathological actions even among Muslims themselves as experienced by the Shi ites and 
Sunnis The appeal to the Koran s revelations the appeal to this is the word of God ideology this 
literalism can instrumentalize and damage Islam itself from the inside There s a constant temptation to 
sacralize power and take some Koran statements out of historical context Jihad seems misused by some 
Muslims (as wells as misinterpreted by outsiders) as a way to justify pathological actions Islamic ethics 
have also been used for ulterior motives The rationalization of leaders personal behavior patterns and 
moralization of life of a public figure 14
Islam seems as if it is not a good global ethic especially for non Muslims It is cohesive and unifying 
but only within the context of its own religious undertakings It does not include a non believer s 
perspective Sometimes it seems to encourage the us them categorization which opens the possibility 
of pathological actions By experience too Islam does not work as a global ethic The Armenian genocide 
in the second decade of the twentieth century happened under Muslim rule Islam was not to blame for this 
genocide the political powers were to blame But the voice of Islam was not strong enough to prevent it 
Perhaps a global Islamic voice could have help prevent it
Baha i Global Ethic15
The Baha i religion is an offshoot of Islam starting in the late nineteenth century The founder 
Baha u llah is the latest in a series of prophets starting from Moses through Jesus Christ through
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Mohammed In October 1985 the Universal House of Justice the central voice of Baha i issued The 
Promise of World Peace which I take to be essentially its Universal Global ethic It lays out the three 
basic principles The oneness of god the oneness of humankind and the unity of religion 16
This ethic calls for world players to join them in their call for peace It points out the failures of 
materialist ideologies! Where is the international peace to whose ideals they proclaim their devotion7 17 
It answers Clearly a common remedial effort is urgently required It is primarily a matter of attitude 18 
Peace cannot be achieved by pure pragmatism Rather
peace stems from an inner state supported by a spiritual or moral attitude and it is chiefly in evoking this
attitude that the possibility of enduring solutions can be found
There are spiritual principles or what some call human virtues by which solutions can be found for
every social problem 19
The Key to Baha i global ethics is spiritual progress That which is conducive to [it] is good and 
whatever tends to hinder [it] is bad 20 Revelations or god manifestations are the ultimate generating 
force of all human progress 21 Baha i doesn t tell the world what these truths are Instead it encourages 
independent investigation of truth and consultative action 22 Both take place within the framework of the 
oneness of humankind If any political entity violates a world Peace Pact all the governments on earth 
should arise to reduce it to utter submission nay the human race as a whole should resolve with every 
power at its disposal to destroy that government 23
Baha is want to rid humankind of the us them categorization which has generally caused 
humankind great suffering Perhaps a world consciousness stressing unity could eliminate the deviant form 
of this categonzation if not altogether The ethic however contradicts this elimination it creates an us 
them categorization against political entities who violate the Peace Pact How can a global 
consciousness deny something which it creates at convenient times7
While this ethic seems all inclusive it is a little bit more nebulous than that Baha is assume all 
theistic religions prayj to the same God The assumption may or may not be true Baha is seem to interpret 
other religions in Baha i faith terms Other religions do not abandon faith they do not accept Baha u llah 
as the latest prophet |They certainly don t accept their main prophet as only one in a series of prophets 
come and gone The Baha i global ethic then does not seem to account for localized religious meaning It 
does not really adapt I to a cultural perspective but rather adapts a cultural perspective to Baha i
What about religions such as Buddhism that don t include God7 According to most Baha is there is 
a God in Buddhism All religions except a few which are the outcome of human perversity were ordained 
of God and are a reflection of His will and Purpose 24 Again Buddhism which Baha is don t consider 
perverse is re interpreted falsely in Baha i doctrines This religious misinterpretation may cause conflict 
especially since the Baha i global ethic is based on spiritual progress It seems the spiritual progress that 
Baha is claim as global is globally Baha i only This split does not unify humankind a main goal of their 
global ethic
Furthermore what about non religious people7 The global ethic is based upon the oneness of god The 
Universal House of Justice which ts a representation of how the world government ought to be is the 
infallible source of divine guidance 25 This does not take into account for cultural perspective It seems 
the Baha i global ethic is not all inclusive
Anyway the ideal of a world government as Einstein proposed in Why War does not guarantee a 
world ethic 26 It does not guarantee world peace There can be civil wars Governments can be 
pathological Political structures do not guarantee freedom from pathologies
Lastly there s the problem of teaching people an inner moral quality based on God It s not 
impossible but it would be extremely difficult given such diversity of belief in God and principles For the 
above reasons it seems a Baha i global ethic is deficient as a global ethic Its stress on inner Baha i 
beliefs seem to hinder it as a global ethic
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World Parliament of Religions Global Ethic27
In Chicago Illinois the World Parliament of Religions an organization of over one hundred religions 
issued an initial declaration of a global ethic The basis of this ethic since the beginning of its writing is 
humanum the truly human
The ethic seems carefully worded enough to include all religions We as religious and spiritual 
women and men who base our lives on an Ultimate Reality and draw spiritual power and hope therefrom 
m trust in prayer or meditation in word or silence 28 Ultimate reality draws a little away from the older 
conceptions of God but it includes non theistic religions and may even include non religious people In 
fact the ethic invites all persons with ethical convictions religiously grounded or not 29 to affirm this 
ethic The inclusiveness universality in language and cohesiveness of the call accounting for most 
religious cultural norms encourage people to dialogue and come to a consensus As a result of this call and 
a carefully crafted ethic it has been accepted by the World Parliament of Religions as an initial ethic— 
initial implying the ethic can continue to evolve in local realities There are several problems however 
over this ethic s inclusiveness
In Buddhism to be truly human in the way Kung and this ethic implies (as a fully actualized 
individual) is an illusion and perhaps more of a means to attain or teach Nirvana not a goal m which to 
become But Buddhism has signed on Perhaps there is nothing better Perhaps it re interprets one who is 
truly human as one who realizes the self does not exist /
A more difficult problem is that the we m the ethic seems to refer only to religious people as if 
non religious people were left out of determining the ethic This creates a rift a subtly unintentional yet 
apparent rift It s as if religions are the authoritative source of this ethic yet non affiliated people have no 
foundation This assumption is questionable It creates a substantial us them categorization without 
really acknowledging it Obviously a global ethic cannot survive without numeric foundational support and 
without non affiliated people Perhaps it is a matter of time before this support evolves
We are conscious that religions cannot solve the economic political and social problems of this earth
However they can indeed provide what obviously cannot be attained by economic plans political programs
or legal regulations alone They can effect a change m the inner orientation the whole mentality the 
hearts of people and move them to a conversion from a false path to a new orientation for life 30
The main call of this declaration is for a global moral consciousness that will lead to the global ethic 
So the moral thought and intention is necessary before the ethical actions in order for real change to 
occur
This global ethic however may turn into lip service if the moral commitments which the ethic 
seems to emphasize more do not lead to actions Prayer meditation or a change in inner orientation will 
not necessarily help prevent pathological actions It seems somehow that this commitment must be 
expressed publicly The ethic is not clear in this regard
While the ethic has the backing of religious leaders it doesn t seem to have the backing of the 
religious institutions themselves m a global way And it does not have the backing of world leaders as yet 
Part of the problem—if it is indeed one at this point—is that the ethic seems to have been constructed in a 
top down fashion by religion scholars There may have been lots of consultation among scholars and some 
religious authorities but there was not a grass roots involvement and there is still none as yet
The basic aim of the global ethic is to bnng about a new global order which is a corrective global 
order one in which is truly numane In the face of all inhumanity our religions and ethical convictions 
demand that every human being must be treated humanely 31 To affirm others as truly human (as well as to 
be or become truly human) is a fundamental principle which spawns other directives—all of which lead 
toward an ideal transformation of consciousness This absolute principle implied within the religious and 
ethical convictions seems like a pretty strong and universal foundation The unconditioned norm for all 
areas of life that actualizes this principle is the Golden Rule Don t do to others what you don t want to
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be done to yourself or do to others what you wish to be done unto yourself This Golden Rule is m all the 
faith traditions
The Golden Rule however as a global ethic rule has major difficulties It (as well as some of the 
directives derived from humanum) has not worked well in the smaller confines of religion stopping 
pathological actions by religious adherents themselves How can it be expected to work globally9 Will a 
different context—a global one—help this rule9 Perhaps it wasn t a major part of religion and in a global 
context it could become so There are other questions How can this rule be expected to work 
ecologically9 And how can this rule apply to a group intent on doing evil9 How does this Golden Rule 
deal with pathological actions9 Kung argues norms should illuminate the situation and the situation 
govern the norms 32j The problems here are that the ethic doesn t deal with situations m which the 
Golden Rule does not apply such as situations dealing with pathological societies or requiring split 
second response or eyen situations with two different cultures or ecological concerns These problems as 
well as inclusivity and practicality difficulties limit the effectiveness of this global ethic
Modem Human Based Ethics 
United Nations—Secular humanism Global Ethic33
Shortly after World War II the United Nations General Assembly approved the Universal Declaration o f 
Human Rights It seems the first article contains the fundamental principle of this global ethic All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights They are endowed with reason and consciences and 
should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood 34 The rest of the ethic articulates in broad and 
specific terms the meaning of this first article
This ethic follows a solid humanistic foundation It includes all people
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without distinction of 
any kind such as irace colour sex language religion political or other opinion national or social origin 
property birth or other status 35
One could arguej that this non distinction is also a major weakness Human beings need to be different 
not the same Actually it seems they need to be acknowledged and one crucial way is through being 
different Unlike the |Baha is oneness however inclusiveness in this ethic allows for the possibility of 
acknowledgment It allows the freedom to be different and acknowledged Who wants to be different or 
acknowledged by the fact that they are discriminated or tortured9
This global ethic however is not sufficiently global It appears only to include western oriented 
ideals such as democracy and individual human rights Since Western ideals are not necessarily the best 
it does not necessarily have the best articulations of Article 1 Article 17 for example states Everyone 
has the right to own property alone as well as m association with others 36 This ignores socialist or similar 
ideology Or Third World countries hold social economic development over some human nghts What 
is significance of arbitrary arrest of soviet dissident as compared to high death rates from malnutrition 
famine etc 9 37 Socialist critics argue for more of a collectivist bent While the ethic does identify the 
spint of brotherhood its main focus seems to be the individual human rights
The socialist cntics also argue human rights should not be too ideal and ahistoncal instead they 
should be shaped in a specific context Article 23 for example states that everyone has a right to work 
Socialist critics argue it s too ideal and not practical This kind of argument seems to reek of political 
ideology rather than jreal human concern Resolution 421e(u) in 1950 addressed their more fundamental 
human concern
The enjoyment of civic and political freedoms and of economic social and cultural rights are 
interconnected and interdependent when deprived of economic social and cultural nghts man does not 
represent the human persons whom the universal declaration regards as the ideal free man 38
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This covenant necessary to give effect to the 1948 declaration was rejected and replaced by an 
economic social rights covenant and civic political rights covenant In any case the original 1948 
Declaration was not unanimous Eight nations abstained from voting Saudi Arabia South Africa Soviet 
Union and other socialist allies 39
In some ways the ethic does not go far enough It should regard the collectivist idea of the us them 
categorization but it tails to do so For example it fails to deal with unprotected minorities States 
committing pathological actions against minorities ( them ) causing polarization m whatever way are 
not being addressed in the ethic 40 Minority groups therefore remain unprotected
One of this ethic s strengths seems that it has received global participation and support And it has 
worked to avoid pathological actions The United Nations mission in Cypress perfectly expresses its use 
The UN structure has allowed considerable charter discussions and the possibility of political consensus 
Based on this ethic there have been follow up UN covenants and declarations which has allowed the 
possibility of solidifying the ethical and political foundation of this global ethic
The most glaring weakness of this global ethic however is its political rather than ethical foundation 
Is primacy to be accorded protection against gross violations of human rights including genocide or to 
respect for state sovereignty territorial integrity and nonintervention in the internal affairs of sovereign 
states9 41 The ethic loses its ability to address localized realities In August 1983 for example the UN 
subcommsion on Sri Lanka passed a very mild resolution 42 calling for more information because 
political situations ignore root causes This political weakness undermines the authority of the ethic and 
allows lip service to be more possible since it is sometimes used more for political ends
Article 29 2 states
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms 
of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality public order and general welfare in a democratic 
society 43
This article allows states a smoke screen for pathological actions In the name of public order or 
general welfare states could limit the human rights articulated in this charter This political foundation 
seems to undermine the authority of the ethic It loses its strong moral foundations
Amnesty International however has rejuvenated the strong moral foundations of this ethic It 
emphasizes ethics regardless of political authority Even though the scope of human rights is somewhat 
limited in this organization it provides a strong realization to some of the principles in this global ethic In 
any case the Western scope and political problems seem to limit the effects of this global ethic
Vision of a Global Ethic Framework A Personal Statement
Ethic Based Paradigm
We focus too much attention on the source of an ethic Socrates asks Euthyphro Is the pious loved by the 
gods because it is pious [leads to human based morality] or is it pious because it is loved by the gods 
[leads to god based morality]9 44 Socrates never Finds a satisfactory definition of pious It seems to me 
what matters most is that pious exists in a real way affecting real people Similarly why should we 
bother defining the source of a global ethic9 Why can t the source be a global ethic itself9 Let s focus on 
ethical actions rather than ethical sources and the truths and principles about these sources In other words 
a global ethic means doing that which must be done This global ethic would not be subject driven 
(source of ethic) but predicate driven (action itself)
This action is usually given some quality we call an end as opposed to a mean This quality is usually 
defined as happiness or as the rightness goodness justice utility or pleasure of an action or potential 
action Why must we name a quality associated with the actions9 Certainly one or more of these qualities
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may exist with ethical actions But what matters more are the actions themselves rather than the abstract 
qualities we have tried to assign definitively to them Let s do actions A B and C in order to prevent a 
future genocide of thej Kurds You can call prevention of genocide goodness and rightness if you want— 
should it matter much7 What matters more are A B and C Would you get the same attention or actions 
for the Kurds if the end was happiness utility pleasure or even justice9
These end qualities seem as if they would color the means by their very definitions In other words we 
can say that an actionjis just right or good because we know the definition of just right or good and we 
know that the means of attaining these ends must be just right or good
i
Without these qualities or any other quality assigned to the actions one could argue that a global ethic 
would be purposeless I How can it be an ethic9 In other words how will we determine that which must be 
done9 The answer which I will discuss below is though a Global Ethic Method (GEM) involving public 
listening and moral struggle which both lead to ethical public action
Underlying this framework would be a fundamental principle of existence Any living or non living 
Being (individual or collective) has a dignity m being an essence—a quality or qualities in being a 
Being Non living Beings or things such as memory ideas or imagination have no existing or potential 
will to be ethical or unethical while a living Being does therefore this GEM only focuses on living 
Beings Still these non living Beings have a dignity Even concepts such as evil and love must stay true 
to their own conceptions People however are the ones who make love or war not love or war itself
This principle of existence does not mean that human beings are equal or unequal to other Beings It 
does not mean that all Beings have equal or unequal rights or responsibilities It also does not make values 
and dignities dependent on each other or independent from each other Rather each Being s dignity is a 
dynamically defining moment depending on who is included in defining and being defined This moment 
may only be a partial1 rendering of a Being s dignity therefore the more comprehensively one publicly 
listens and the more one comprehensively struggles to know dignity the more one does that which must 
be done To acknowledge a dignity of Being is ethical to deny unethical
This GEM encompasses all belief system orientations Certainly the same ethical public actions can 
originate from varied [belief systems Muslims Jews and Christians for instance can all condemn the 
pathological killings in Bosnia and support the same actions for relief Also the same ethical public 
action can occur with different intents Syria Israel and Lebanon for example all agreed that the 
Lebanon-Israel border bombings in April 1996 will stop Their intents however seemed vastly different In 
general Syria wanted U S support Israel wanted peace for Israel and Lebanon wanted its country back 
This GEM would not| be predicated upon one belief or another one culture or another or one time period 
or another rather it exists throughout all knowable space and time
This GEM would concern itself only with public space and time not private It certainly does not 
ignore the crucial moral impetus from private realms rather it has no right or responsibility to dictate 
private belief oriented actions How can a global community tell people the ethical way to live within 
their homes and behind closed doors9 While motivations and intents are certainly important and reveal 
themselves m a GEM this GEM would not impose one must change heart or reorient oneself to an 
emotional state necessary for being ethical or would not try to change a personal religious belief system 
While one or more inner changes may happen this GEM focuses on outer actions (perhaps similar to 
Aristotle s emphasis jan habits which lead to inner changes—virtue45) It moves away from a belief 
oriented (private) paradigm of some god based ethics to an action oriented (public) paradigm
i
Conditions of Being I
The central focus of this GEM is the condition of Being—not economic social political or religious 
conditions We should not ignore or separate the latter conditions rather a primacy should be placed upon 
the conditions of a Being within any other framework All action for instance may be considered political 
but all ethical public | actions are primarily ethical in a political context To solve an ethnic conflict one 
might say Let s install a new leader or let s get a democracy like we have over here While these
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solutions theoretically may help prevent abuse the human problem seems unclear a little bit more 
abstract Are human conditions or political ideology the main concerns in these solutions9 Will the human 
conditions improve9 Perhaps so perhaps not These solutions seem to ignore localized realities which 
may cause further suffering But what for example should we do for the abandoned children9 And how 
can we help repair the physical (and mental) infrastructures9 These questions seem to approach the 
conflict at a human condition level
This GEM would not supplant religious political economic or social meanings but offer a global 
framework in which they take place It would support foundations on which cultures rest A global ethic 
should open the possibility of meaning in the economic political social and religious spheres because it 
is global universal and frees the living condition so human beings and other life can thrive in these 
spheres Jews and Arabs for instance could help Jewish and Arab families of civilian victims of violence 
committed by the fringe groups of either side thus opening up many possible ethical meanings in the 
other spheres
Public Listening
We listen we always listen In order to do that which must be done a global ethic framework should 
move this essential human quality to the public sphere In doing so we transform listening What is public 
listening9 There seemed to have been public listening for example during part of the Ethiopian famine 
There was little in the United States during the Holocaust Imagine in the context of this kind of a global 
ethic encouraging people and nations to listen in a public space and time Would famines be half over 
before people and nations realize its effects9 Would genocide be able to continue or even start9
Public listening is the giving up of action to take in what is given to the listeners by the ones 
speaking m speech wnting body language image and sound Public listening is not only listening to 
words but to sound image smell taste feel and irrational senses—it is taking in that which compels 
whether consciously or not to the best of a listener s ability It is at once experiential and intellectual
Public listening listens to the whole being—intentions and non intentions feelings and actions and 
inactions The telephone is as partial as the internet is as partial as a letter is as partial as every face to 
face encounter Technologies are not wholly sufficient for they can t replace a whole being s likeness 
Technologies however certainly help because they bring others who are not physically with us at least 
somewhat closer so that we could begin to listen
Public listening denies any agenda It is not teaching or learning through dialogue It is the letting go 
of these concepts It is the letting go of any concepts that try to focus it to a purpose Public listening is 
not so we could persuade or not so we could each grow in our own being It may or may not be convenient 
for one s own self It is the receiving of the conditions of Being
Public listening does not mean agreement As public listeners we may not agree with what is being 
listened to Agreement or non agreement is irrelevant We listen because we must We are drawn to the 
speaker We depend upon the speaker like a shadow that depends upon body light and surfaces I know I 
have publicly listened if I am in awe or in admiration of the speaker as I am listening Above all I have a 
feeling of respect as I publicly listen Perhaps it is different for other public listeners
By publicly listening we are not against one another We are not even for one another While 
publicly listening we don t question who is for or against The question should be unanswerable and 
even irrelevant When publicly listening to a speaker we firmly root ourselves in a mode of being that 
implicitly accepts ourselves as public listeners trying to gather and know from the speaker a spokeness 
as intimately as possible At the same time we must be as thought less as possible We listen only on 
Public Listening s own terms—not our own terms or the speaker s terms Even if we can t fully realize 
this m practice the attempt itself seems ethical and necessary for a global ethic We suspend and are 
untranslatably suspended by a speaker s dignity Afterwards we translate and are translated
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There needs to be a public space and time for public listening to happen Today there s generally too 
much commentary on what people say or what people say is taken out of context Today people have no 
time to spend on listening There seems too much emphasis on public speaking which is an aggressive 
male public action
If one wants to look at the power dynamics of communication there seems as much power—or 
perhaps more power—in listening than there is in speaking A basic human need is to be recognized To 
withhold this by not listening is perhaps more power than any speaking And to listen to the point of 
completely knowing another is likewise as much power as any persuasive speech
Most importantly public listening is listening to self us Others them and the Sacred I loosely define 
the self us as an individual self a group self (people with common experience or goals) or the greatest 
self (all of humanity) A group self is not a corporate body but selves who have an awareness of being in a 
group it implies autonomy and relatedness
The Others them are physical lives—not necessarily just human lives—other than the self us (and the 
Sacred) The self us and Others them are not necessarily bounded to the same categories or conceptions 
when listening m different contexts The self us for instance can represent Catholics listening to 
Protestants or one Catholic listening to a Jew This GEM intimately recognizes the us them 
categorization but in|positive terms and the language here given its dynamic contextual nature allows 
the translation of an i us them into a we —all of humanity being a global we globally identified and 
potentially authentic ¡ Both us them and we exist simultaneously
The Sacred is that which is neither self us nor Others them Rather it is that which either transcends 
or that which is immanent We listen to the Sacred we gather from the Sacred that which it speaks We 
ignore whether the Sacred is ultimately different for people or ultimately the same This question is 
irrelevant since the Sacred is sacredly Ineffable The Sacred exists This is enough The Sacred may be 
God or Lord Buddha s Enlightenment or Allah or Nature or Jesus Christ or Brahma or a Sacred Conscience 
or another not mentioned here
Why are all threje aspects necessary for public listening9 In general these aspects give us all 
perspective when morally struggling to know that which must be done Our world (the Real) consists of 
these perspectives the subjective (from self us) inter subjective (from Others them) and the objective 
(from the Sacred) Essentially this Real wills that which must be done
While this GEM would be unfixed and adaptable to the Real it seems to have an absolute collective 
foundational strength through these three perspectives The strong foundation does not rely on the source of 
an ethic God or man (individual or some powerful group) Perhaps it relies on the fact that this GEM 
would glean from the Sacred humankind and Others This framework however seems less 
psychologically grounded than a source based ethic probably because this framework s universal language 
is not universal now Perhaps more likely this GEM is really grounded solidly in the Sacred What we 
gather from the Sacred is not isolated It relies on the self us and Others them The Sacred relies on us as 
much as we rely on jthe Sacred thus the foundation would still glean from the Real In any case this 
GEM does seem to have a strong foundation
What does this GEM say about persons or groups who don t listen to the self us Others them or the 
Sacred9 Or what about those who only listen to the self us9 Or only Others them9 Or only the Sacred9 
Even though those pieople wouldn t be publicly listening they are never excluded They still must be 
listened to Their own moral struggle however will not necessarily be comprehensive and will more likely 
fall into selfish pride blind obedience or idolatry Their actions may eventually become pathological
The key in this GEM would be to discover those who do not or cannot listen publicly and especially 
those who do not do ethical public actions We must still publicly listen to them We must not ignore 
potential and actual ¡perpetrators We must listen to a Hitler type leader newly in power and look beyond 
economic and social promises toward his or her deeds including writings and speeches and look toward 
his or her attitudes about any Being s dignities Do actions show dignity toward other Beings9 We cannot
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ignore those who ignore us (and perhaps this GEM) when we can recognize them We must not ignore 
potential or actual victims either We should have striven to publicly listen for example to Jewish 
refugees before and during World War II Haitian refugees East Timorese or other groups subjected to 
other horrors If we can t listen we are slaves to that which we don t listen
Moral Struggle
We somehow struggle or process what we have listened to then act upon the basis of this struggle This 
moral struggle connects public listening to ethical public action Boundanes between moral struggle and 
the other two constructs may be a little grayish and overlapping One struggles a lot or some or practically 
not at all One listens to intentions and meaning and takes these into account Knowledge imagination 
intuition instinct or habit are just several of the paradigms leading to doing that which must be done 
There s no purpose or meaning we would have to attach to moral struggle There s no unity of all 
perspectives necessary No labels of right or wrong or bad or good All that s necessary is a sincere 
struggle to know that which must be done Moral struggle leads to a solved puzzle but not solved in the 
usual sense It is solved in so far as the puzzle allows This means the puzzle may not really be solvable 
or may be solvable in the future but not in the present Though a moral struggle can be a private struggle 
within an individual or group a public moral struggle would more likely induce ethical public actions 
globally if possible
It may look like a democracy of ethics where compromise is a main tool or it may involve a struggle 
in truth seeking in a Satyagraha sense (Gandhian sense) where persuasion is a main tool There would be 
many ways helping us discover that which must be done Perhaps different theories of morality can 
guide us Aristotelian Kantian Utilitarian Pragmatic and Discourse ethics or Islamic Buddhist 
Christian and Jewish ethics are some of the many methods in the moral struggle leading to an ethic 
There may not even be a method I don t intend to explain other theories and their wrongness and nghtness 
because a moral struggle epistemology doesn t have to be explained or explainable Its process and 
results however may lead to one or more ethical public actions
Contradictions may be abound It doesn t necessarily need to be fixed in systems subsystems and 
rules Moral struggle may or may not involve a dialectic of what we would gather after we publicly listen 
it may or may not involve the unity of what we gather It may or may not reduce or increase complexity 
Moral struggle is not abstract A person or group does not say Let s be moral today and determine 
morality It is particular and concrete and perhaps theoretically  valid
Moral struggle however wouldn t work only within a particular present It is a struggle with time We 
would invoke our historical consciousness The reason some societies have lost an ethical consciousness is 
because they ve lost their real histories Without memory there is no context with which to know the Real 
and there is no responsibility within the Real but for the present moment We would use our imaginative 
powers looking into the future and consider the prudence and dignity in a public action We would struggle 
with past present and future histories The moral struggle for instance between Israel and Arab nations 
needs to be a struggle with time m order to know that which must be done We need memory and 
anticipation
Would there be such a thing as false ethical public actions discovered after moral struggle9 Of course 
Perhaps our moral struggles are insufficient All may be doubted and challenged in their moral struggle 
(and public actions) If we don t have faith in moral and ethical answers we must have faith in questions 
And perhaps we misinterpret when listening or we haven t really listened enough We cannot stop 
publicly listening though We must strive to know listen struggle with that which seems gathered and 
act If we don t act we are slaves to that which we fail to act
Ethical Public Actions
Ethical public actions are not based upon creeds dogmas and belief—though all certainly important—but 
they are based upon moral struggle Meanings and intents and universal rules may be various—as they
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happen to be—but the overall action is ethical These actions should occur in a due time and place and 
they do not contradict the principle of existence the dignity of Being
Respect seems as if it is the usual feeling attached to dignity of Being and thus the most prevalent 
and underlying feeling behind an ethical public action It would precede carry though and linger after— 
whether consciously or not—our doing of ethical public actions
How can one however respect an unethical Being7 One could argue that this GEM—actually any 
global ethic or method—will not prevent a Being (individual or group) intent on mass killing What should 
one do if a group is engaged m pathological actions7 How does this GEM suggest we respond to genocide 
famine and mass refugee movements7 First we must publicly listen and morally struggle We should pay 
heed to both perpetrators and victims I m afraid there is no panacea There may be no one response At 
the very least our responses would not be to ignore to be indifferent or spontaneously to attack
What if there are, no alternative ethical public actions to stop this pathological group—a big 
assumption—except violence7 At one extreme there is violence against a pathological group as in a war 
At the other there is | violence allowed against the Self us as in the Gandhian self suffering aspect of 
Satyagraha Can violence show dignity toward Others them and the self us7 If so what kind of violence7 
The possible answers] to these questions depend on what we mean by dignity
Universal Language
The language of human rights attests to the possibility of developing and maintaining a universal ethical 
language What would be a universal language in terms of a GEM7 It must not be blunted by 
manipulations We need a language that listens to the nuances of existence We would refrain from a 
language of specialists which may mispronounce misinterpret and ignore a Being s conditions We for 
example are not consumers producers a resource customers terrorists politicians laborers or other 
names delegating us into a functional purposefulness category rather we are people with faces names 
and concerns
I
What we need seems a language that allows listening that is not so loud as to drown out voice A 
language not presumptuous A language that does not let us forget but lets us reconnect intimately and 
know A language unafraid to doubt and suffer A language not controlled by anyone Not a language of 
nghtness or commonj sense supporting existing oppression A language usually up against abuse or 
authority of the past I It is more of a language of Real questions rather than answers
i
We need a language revealing the conditions of Being We need public acknowledgments and 
questionings over dignity How do Beings in a tragic circumstance (from nature or nurture) retain 
dignity7 These questions seem better asked after publicly listening and in the context of a moral struggle 
What public actions for example showing human dignity can bystanders take regarding Sri Lanka s 
escalation of violence7
We need a language about dignity o f living Beings not just about collective rights human 
responsibility or individual human rights All of these are a good beginning but they all seem easily to 
veer into a legalistic'realm Ethical public actions usually conform to the law Though they may not 
especially when there s an unjust law which essentially is a mechanism of force Ethical public actions 
don t exist because one follows the law rather the law should follow from ethical public actions
However important 
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legal regulation and control are they are no substitute for giving a basic ethical
Most importantly this universal language hinges on dignity of a Being s existence Is dignity 
historical or ahistoncal7 What if definitions put forth by culturally defined perpetrators victims and 
bystanders differ7 The language of dignity may need to include another broader conception of Being 
which includes perpetrators and victims and perhaps bystander This conception should be as locally 
relevant as possible in order to be more acceptable and more readily applied
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Here s how I envision how dignity might be used within this global framework The Pakistani 
government (a Muslim government) has been persecuting the minority Ahmadi Muslims who can be 
sentenced to death for their beliefs considered to be legally non Muslim It seems religious ideas are being 
used as a smoke screen for political ideology47 One listens to all Beings involved and questions this 
circumstance Where is dignity here9 A Pakistani Muslim leader insists he keep a peaceful existence and 
order A Pakistani Muslim citizen agrees and insists that in order to do this Pakistanis must follow God s 
will If the Ahmadis don t follow God s will as Pakistanis know it they must be put to death Other 
Muslims disagree with the type of punishment Still other Muslims including the Ahmadis disagree with 
any punishment What s ethical in this global framework context9 In the context of these claimed 
persecutions and actions leading up to them what then is that which must be done 9 A Pakistani might 
ask What is the dignity of Pakistani Muslims9 An Ahmadi Muslim might ask What is the dignity of 
Ahmadis9 Or all Muslims in general9 Or of human beings9 A bystander might ask What is the dignity 
of Pakistanis9
There are moral struggles for the kinds of questions that need to be asked as well as the attempted 
answers—there may not even be an answer for some questions What happens if Pakistan still decides to 
execute Ahmadis inflicting the least possible pain in order to give dignity to Islam and even dignity to an 
Ahmadi Muslim s death9 Pakistan thus would consider itself ethical Those disagreeing may consider 
asking broader questions What is the dignity of all human beings living in Pakistan9 followed by more 
specific questions about beliefs actions or freedoms They can respond in a unified voice condemning 
this intention or doing some other ethical public actions such as publicizing this Ahmadi and Pakistani 
voice asking other Muslims to listen and establishing a global commission (including Pakistanis) to work 
on this problem The commission would ensure dignity for the politically powerful Pakistani and Ahmadi 
Muslim leaders as well as the politically weak citizens
As this GEM stands now there seems to be no global standard for dignity of all human beings living 
everywhere There are strong possibilities in the UN Declaration of Human Rights and stronger in Henry 
Shue s Basic Rights (subsistence security and liberty of movement) 48 These ideals seem to address a 
skeletal dignity the bare minimum qualities for existing as human beings which are necessary for those 
people subjected to pathological actions Applying dignity and these ideals one asks How can a Being 
sustain itself (and others) and how can others sustain a Being9 What is necessary9 This idea of a Being s 
sustenance can also be applied to those Beings who are not subjected to pathological actions The idea of 
sustenance extends the dynamically defining moment of dignity
This GEM provides a common language about doing what must be done Public listening self us 
Others them Sacred dignity of Being and ethical public actions There is a global voice in this language 
and a global voice in ethical public actions which in their own right transform the languages of the self 
us Others them and the Sacred No longer are all three aspects the objects of discourse Rather the 
subjects if any are what we gather from the self us Others them and the Sacred The discourse revolves 
around an action nonaction itself and is the action nonaction itself This discourse is truly global We need 
a language of ethical public action a language of and about dignity and perhaps sustenance Not a 
subject oriented language but a predicate based one Only through Time and Experience may there 
develop one without destroying religious languages and translations of self us and Others them
Listening to the Sacred must not overwhelm us and possess this universal language We must be able 
however to draw from our own religiously authontative statements but our questions are not Who is 
Jesus or Lord Buddha9 What or how should we call God9 Where does a sacred conscience come from9 Or 
even why is there evil9 Rather What can we gather from the Sacred9 And what are the consequences of 
evil Woe to Israeli and Lebanese civilians killed and injured and woe to the families of those killed' How 
must we act toward people who now are bound to suffer9
To have the inner belief of caring is not enough To love in our hearts is not enough It is rarely 
possible to love and show love beyond our immediate realm of relations (but within our realm it seems 
vital to love as a whole being loves) To say otherwise is an abuse of the word Love cannot be the basis 
of a GEM To love is within our realm of relations but to show dignity and respect within and beyond our
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realm is within our capacity Two peoples such as Arabs and Jews or Sunni and Shi ite Muslims who 
haven t liked each other lately are more likely to treat each other with dignity than to love each other
Conscience of World
We would gather strength from the moral struggles and be a conscience of the world We must create and 
maintain an ethical public consciousness We would publicly denounce unethical action occurring or felt 
in a public space We should also publicly accept ethical actions that are ethical This public 
consciousness should not be a public opinion but a consciousness through a universal language of deeds 
and dignity
Isn t there already a global public conscience9 Were the official condemnations of China s 
Democracy movement massacre indicative of a public conscience9 Perhaps But it seemed more like 
political lip service The United States for instance let China keep a most favored nation trading status 
insisting economic engagement is the only way China will improve the conditions for its citizens Well 
China has changed very little for the better—if at all It seemed the more abstract trade policy deflected 
focus from the more real human conditions m China The political and economic seemed to overrun the 
ethical
In the context of ¡this GEM we should have publicly listened more to the Chinese before and after this 
massacre Based upon this listening we could start asking questions in an appropriate language What for 
example is dignity for a Chinese student9 For a Chinese leader9 For a Chinese laborer9 The Chinese and 
others should be held accountable in their deeds and possible answers to these questions All nations and 
people would keep asking questions Perhaps they would all unilaterally condemn China for the massacre 
and back up their words with another public action The United States for instance could have 
temporarily or permanently withheld a most favored trading status for China and request a global 
commission to investigate without destroying the dignity of any more Chinese in the process
A strong enough public consciousness must overcome other frameworks so much so that nations will 
not look at unethical actions in political economic social or religious terms Instead it would be the 
usual norm to condemn in terms of a universal global ethic language in terms of dignity and take other 
ethical public action rather than a usual follow the leader type of unethical consensus Responsibility 
could lie more in thej ethic based domain not with the subjects such as the Catholic Church or Amnesty 
International acting out an ethical action—even though these subjects are integral to the ethical domain 
too It seems the universal language to achieve this ethical domain are forming but not as yet substantial
No political system need be fastened to this Public Conscience even a system such as Democracy 
It s too presumptuous to insist that Democracy is the natural and best end of humanity and thus a public 
conscience means we must encourage every civilization to be democratic First this reasoning assumes a 
linear time model The cyclical nature of Hinduism however may suggest otherwise In fact this cyclical 
model seems to imply Democracy as the worst Second a global ethic cannot be bound by politics as is 
the case with the United Nations rather politics is bound by a global ethic
This GEM must maintain this public conscience in conjunction with localized reality It must 
participate in the Real Let the artists public speakers spokespersons prophets and great humble 
listeners show and lead us The idea is to build into leaders consciousness and public consciousness 
highlighting virtues of public listening and ethical public actions letting people know about mass suffering 
and even mass goodness
This GEM would be easier to show by example and easier to learn than love because it s easier to 
learn of (and teach) and show Public listening—which is partly a skill—than it is to learn of (and teach) 
and show love whicn can be so much greater on an individual basis In other words it s easier to define 
dignity in concrete terms through respectful actions and to identify sustenance than it is to talk about 
somewhat more internal notions such as full human potentiality or spirituality and brotherhood and 
sisterhood For example public gatherings providing a space and time for public listening could be set up 
in schools or as regular community events to listen to or about Others them self us the Sacred or listen
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about community and global issues Of course people would have time to formulate and ask questions and 
perhaps decide on ethical public actions There would be a public moral struggle On a less formal and 
more creative basis these gatherings could be decentralized going out to villages and neighborhoods In 
either case an ethos of listening modeled at these gatherings would go a long way to support public 
listening The ideal is that everyone can listen and ethically act in public No one Being is excluded
We must learn and teach how to approach and assess the human condition or the condition of another 
Being We must attain this wisdom This is especially important since there is so much information We 
must learn the art of discerning the real conditions of Being from illusory ones This could be formal or 
informal We can be flexible without being threatening Why not have it more inclusive and activist in a 
community (as Non Governmental Organization conflict resolution methods are starting to apply) rather 
than more bookish and abstract Let s cultivate Aristotle s habituation 49
We must reconnect the public with themselves and others Let s meet each other as individuals and 
groups not necessarily unifying with each other and not necessarily creating a oneness among all our 
species or all the world or all the universe We withhold from this purpose for this purpose is not 
necessarily the truth Let s move away from abstractions One state makes war on another state 50 Let s 
reconnect the state with leaders and groups with real persons within the states Let s reconnect with real 
persons as real persons We live properly [or ethically] if we develop habits of being close to things 
and to each other 51 and if we re close to ourselves and Sacred We must get in touch with our caregivers 
to lead us in this endeavor We must get in touch with our everyday living We must not alienate 
ourselves Listen to ourselves listen to Others Listen to our mothers and fathers and teachers Listen to 
our natural world Listen to our surroundings Listen to the Sacred Listen and act upon this' Eventually 
pathological actions will perhaps be less possible if humans are acknowledged recognized and respected 
in these ways
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APPENDIX ONE
Course Syllabus for “Pathological States The Origins, Detection, and 
Treatment of Dysfunctional Societies”
Instructors Kathleen Cloud and Stephen P Cohen 
with Lucy Kehinde 
Course Coordinator Merrily Shaw
7-9 00 PM Wednesday Evenings 
101 International Studies Building
Introduction
This is the third in the series of Ford Foundation interdisciplinary graduate seminars on global issues The 
series was organized by Professor Edward Kolodziej on leave this year
This seminar is supported by the Ford Foundation in an effort to enhance multidisciplinary inquiry into 
issues of contemporary global importance In 1993-94 the seminar focused on new concepts of the 
international system especially the growing regionalization of the world it was co taught by Profs 
Kolodziej Kate Cloud and Marvin Weinbaum In 1994-95 Prof Kolodziej was joined by Prof Salim 
Rashid of the Department of Economics and the seminar examined the growing global market economy 
and its impact on power legitimacy and welfare
This year the seminar moves in a different direction examining the way in which states (and societies) 
turn pathological—either against their own people or against their neighbors—and the way in which we can 
better detect prevent or ameliorate the actions o f such states Pathological is simply defined as the 
presence of one or more of the following phenomenon acute famine genocide (against a state s own 
people or in the course of a war with a neighbor) large refugee populations and the attack during 
wartime on unarmed civilian populations (the latter obviously includes city busting attacks which 
culminated in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but also includes the sowing of mines that cripple 
or kill civilians for years afterwards)
Course Organization
Approximately two thirds of the course is organized around a series of intensive case studies These will 
cover Western and non western states industrialized and non industrialized societies They will examine 
famine Bengal and Sahel total war Hiroshima genocide Cambodia and the Holocaust the generation 
of large refugee populations an African case study and chronic social conflict Northern Ireland Of 
course in some cases these occur simultaneously or sequentially In each case study we will examine the 
history and evolution of the event(s) and its (or their) cultural cinematic and literary representations we 
will then use the case study as a vehicle to test various explanatory theories These theories will be drawn 
from anthropology political science sociology and psychology but we will also examine the role of 
technology and economics in their genesis development and impact on subject populations
The course also examines strategies of anticipation prevention or amelioration We will have 
separate presentations on the theory of intervention the role of armed intervention on Track II and private 
activities and on the development of international mechanisms to cope with states that destroy their own 
people or that present a threat to neighbors Campus and visiting speakers will make presentations on both 
the case studies and different strategies of intervention
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All students willjbe required to (1) develop an annotated bibliography (or write a bibliographic essay) 
(2) to complete a major research paper and (3) present that paper to the group As in the past the papers 
will be issued as a collection by ACDIS The seminar will cover the cost of books and reference material 
Student papers will bp presented and discussed at a special two day Spring workshop probably to be held 
at Allerton Park
I
The seminar willj meet from 7-9 PM Wednesday evenings in the International Studies Building 
conference room 101! ISB (910 S Fifth Street Champaign) A preliminary meeting will be held on January 
10 to discuss the schedule readings and speakers
Books and Readings
Readings for this course are contained in the following books or in the source book of selected readings 
[SB] on reserve in the ACDIS Office
1 Rudolph Rummel Death by Government (New Brunswick Transaction Books 1994)
2 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn The History and Sociology o f Genocide (New Haven Yale University 
Press 1990 paperback)
3 Ervin Staub The Roots o f Evil (New York Cambridge University Press 1989 paperback 1992)
4 Kenneth Waltz Man The State and War (New York Columbia University Press 1954 paperback)
5 Carolyn Nordstrom And JoAnn Martin The Paths to Domination Resistance and Terror (Berkeley 
University of California Press paperback 1992)
6 Donald L HorowJz Ethnic Groups In Conflict (Berkeley University of California Press 1985)
7 David Little The Invention Of Enmity (US Institute of Peace Press 1994)
, Course Seminar and Discussion Schedule
Jan 10 Introduction |
Jan 17 Sizing the Problem The numbers of violent and famine related deaths in the Twentieth Century 
(165 000 000)1 the growth of refugee populations (10 000 000) and Historical Precedents 
Readings  ^Rudolph Rummel Death By Government entire
UNHCR The State of the Worlds Refugees In Search of Solutions (New York Oxford University 
Press 1995) jexcerpts [SB]
Historical cases Çhalk/Jonassohn The History And Sociology O f Genocide (Parti P artii 57-311) 
Presenter Stephen P Cohen
I
Jan 24 Viewing the Problem the Holocaust and Cambodia
Readings Staub The Roots o f Evil theory (Part I and Ch 15) The Nazi Holocaust (Partii)
Cambodia (Ch 13)
Chalk/Jonassohn j Holocaust (pp 323-377)
Tadeusz Borowski This Way for The Gas Ladies and Gentlemen Silence [SB]
Adolph Hitler Mein Kampf Jews (pp 66-81) Nation and Race (pp 369-406) Crimes 
Betrayal (58^-601) [SB]
Lawrence L Langer The Alarmed Vision and Social Suffering Daedalus Winter 1996 47-65 [SB] 
Also Visit the Cambodia Home Page and the Holocaust Museum Home Page on the WWW 
Films Night and flog The Killing Fields 
Presenter Stephen P Cohen
i
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Jan 31 Explaining the Problem I Theories from Anthropology and Psychology
Anthropology Robert Edgerton Sick Societies Challenging the Myth o f Primitive Harmony (New York 
Free Press 1992) Women and Children First (Ch 4) and The Death of Populations 
Societies and Cultures (7) [SB]
Nordstrom/Martin Carolyn Nordstrom and JoAnn Martin The Culture of Conflict Jeffrey A Sluka 
The Anthropology of Conflict John H Bodley Anthropology and the Politics of Genocide 
Psychology Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud Why War> [SB]
Daniel Pick War Machine Chs 12 15 [SB]
Alan Watts The Spirit of Violence and the Matter of Peace in Does it Matter9 (N Y Vintage 
197’) [SB]
Stanley Milgram Obedience to Authority Chs 10-11 [SB] 
film
Presenter Susan Rigdon (anthropology/political science)
Feb 7 Acute Ethmc/Communal Conflict Sri Lanka
Readings David Little The Invention o f Enmity (Washington US Institute of Peace 1994)
Nordstrom/Martin Carolyn Nordstrom The Backyard Front
Horowitz Ethnic Groups in Conflict Chs 1-6
Films from Tamil Tiger clandestine television broadcasts
Also examine the various Tamil Tiger home pages on WWW
Presenter Prof C R DeSilva (Department of History Indiana State University)
(6) Feb 14 Gender and Ethnic Conflict Genocide and War
Readings Ruth Leger Sivard World Military and Social Expenditures 1993 (World Priorities 1993) 
and Women A World Survey (World Priorities 1995)
United Nations (1995) Fourth World Conference On Women Platform for Action—Women and Armed 
Conflict & Violence Against Women (pp 51-59) Beijing China 4-15 September 1995 [SB] 
Presenter Kathleen Cloud
Feb 21 Communal Conflict and Memory Northern Ireland
Readings Nordstrom/Martin Jeffrey A Sluka The Politics of Painting Political Murals m Northern 
Ireland
Robert McKim National Identity and Respect among Nations(with special attention to the case of 
Ireland) in The Morality o f Nationalism (Oxford University Press forthcoming) [SB]
John McGarry and Brendan O Leary Explaining Northern Ireland Nationalist Discourses Bnthis 
Centrality or British Neutrality9 (Ch 1) Unionist Discourses Irish Irredentism and British 
Absenteeism (Ch 3) and Afterword The Sound of Breaking Ice9 (Ch 10) [SB]
Film The Informer (9)
Presenter Robert McKim (philosophy) and William Kelleher (anthropology)
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Feb 28 Solving the Problem Theories of Conflict Resolution and Amelioration
Readingsj Israel pharny Early Warning Intervention and Prevention of Genocide in Michael 
Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann Genocide in Our Time [SB]
Horowitz Ethnic Groups in Conflict Strategies of Conflict Reduction (Chs 14-16)
Ronald J Fisher land Loraleigh Keashly The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and 
Consultation ¡within a Contingency Model of Third party Intervention m Journal o f Peace 
Research Voi 28 No 1 1991 pp 29^12 [SB]
J P Lederach So to Whom Do You Turn9 Discovery and Creating of Mediation Models in
Preparing fo r  Peace Conflict Transformation Across Cultures (Syracuse NY Syracuse University 
Press 1995) !pp 85-100 [SB]
Presenter George Lopez University of Notre Dame and the Kroc Center
March 6 Diplomacy I NGOs and Conflict Resolution The Private Sector
Readings Barbara Crossette Before Rwanda Before Bosnia Waiting for Justice m Cambodia in 
New York Times 25 February 1996 [SB]
Paula Gutlove Conflict Resolution Dialogue and Training m FYR Macedonia Addressing Conflicts 
m the Education System A report on the Balkans Peace Project s program in Macedonia 
October 1994 [SB]
Paula Gutlove and Gordon Thompson Application of Conflict Management in Bosnia Mechanisms 
for Joint Action prepared for a meeting convened by The Winston Foundation for World Peace 
Washington DC 19 January 1996 [SB]
The Potential for Cooperation by the OSCE and Non Governmental Actors on Conflict
Management in Helsinki Monitor Quarterly on Security and Cooperation in Europe Voi 6 No 
3 1996 52-64 [SB]
Balkan College for Albanians Fights to Stay Alive m The New York Times [SB]
i
Presenter Paula Gutlove DMD Executive Director Balkans Peace Project Boston
I
i Spring Break March 9-17
I I
March 20 The Use of Diplomacy and Yugoslavia
Readings Albert Wohlstetter Creating a Greater Serbia The New Republic August 1 1994 pp 
22-27 [SB] '
Susan L Woodward Mopping Up A Foreboding Victory in the Balkans The Brookings Review 
Fall 1995 pp 28-31 [SB]
Warren Zimmermann The Last Ambassador A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia Foreign 
Affairs Voi No 2 March/Apnl 1995 po 2-20 [SB]
David Gompert How to Defeat Serbia Foreign Affairs Voi 73 No 4 pp 30-47 [SB]
Presenter Ambassor Vladimir Matic
March 27 Explaining I the Problem II Theories from Sociology and Political Science
Readings A classification scheme Kenneth Waltz Man the State and War
A Sociologist Elias Canetti Power and Survival The Conscience o f Words (pp 14-28) [SB]
Stephen P Cohen U S Security in a Separatist Season Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists 
July/August 1992 28-32 [SB]
The Shape of the World The Nation State is Dead Long Live the Nation State The Economist 
December 23 i 1995/January 5 1996 15-18 [SB]
Presenter Stephen P Cohen
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April 3 War and Rape
Readings Garry Chick Andrew W Miracle and John W Loy Sport War and Rape presented at 
the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association Nov 15-19 1995 [SB]
Chick Miracle and Loy Combat Sport and War A Reappraisal of the Drive Discharge and Culture 
Pattern Models paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Cross Cultural 
Research Feb 16-20 1994 [SB]
Richard G Sipes War Sports and Aggression An Empirical Test of Two Rival Theories 
American Anthropologist 75 (1973) 64-86 [SB]
Keith F Otterbein A Cross Cultural Study of Rape Aggressive Behavior 5 425-435 [SB]
Presenter Garry Chick (leisure studies)
April 10 Technology and the UN s Peacekeeping Role
Readings U S Intervention Policy for the Post Cold War World New Challenges and New 
Responses report of the eighty fifth American Assembly April 7-10 1994 [SB]
Jeremiah D Sullivan Technology for Peace Enhancing the Effectiveness of Multinational 
Interventions proposal abstract 1995 [SB]
Richard L Garwin New Applications of Nonlethal and Less Lethal Technology presented at the 
American Assembly Book/Conference April 7-10 1994 [SB]
Urban Gunfire Location System Tnlon Technology Company [SB]
Donald G McNeil Jr A Crank Up Radio Helps Africa Tune In The New York Times 16 February 
1996 [SB]
Raymond Bonner Pentagon Weighs Ending Opposition to a Ban on Mines The New York Times 17 
March 1996 [SB]
Joseph C Anselmo Commercial Imagery Aids Bosnian Peace Mission The New York Times 
Sunday March 5 1995 [SB]
DOD Study Sees Need to Rely on Civilian R&D Sector Science & Government Report April 1 
1996 [SB]
Vipin Gupta New Satellite Images for Sale International Security 20 (1995) 94-125
J Ellis The Social History o f the Machine Gun (Chs 1 7) [SB]
Presenter Jeremiah Sullivan (physics)
April 17A Manmade Famines Bengal and Ethiopia
Readings Amartya Sen Poverty and Famines Ch 6 [SB]
Kurt Jansson Michael Harris Angela Penrose Brief Chronology 1979-March 1984 The Ethiopian 
Famine (London and New Jersey Zed Books Ltd) [SB]
Jason W Clay Sandra Steingraber Peter Niggh The Spoils o f Famine Ethiopian Famine Policy and 
Peasant Agriculture (Cultural Survival Report 25 Cambridge MA) 249-295 [SB]
Film Distant Thunder (Satyajit Ray)
Presenters Bengal Blair Kling (history) and Donald Crummey (African studies)
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April 17B Technology and the Control of Nuclear War
Readings Herman Kahn On Thermonuclear War Will the Survivors Envy the Dead (Ch 2) [SB]
John Dower War without Mercy Know Your Enemy (Ch 2) plus cartoons [SB]
Spencer |R Weart Nuclear Fear Fail Safe (pp 273-280) and Artistic Transmutations (407-415) 
[SB] 1
ACDIS Swords and Ploughshares Vol IX No 3&4 Spring-Summer 1995 Hiroshima fifty Years 
Later A Retrospective (also available on ACDIS home page) [SB]
Films Black Rain (Japan) films on dismantling nuclear weapons
Presenters Stephen P Cohen
April 24 Judging the Problem Moral Aesthetic and Ethical Perspectives
Readings Edwin S Schneidman Deaths o f Man An Appropriate Death (Ch 2) pp 25-32 [SB]
Jonathan Glover Causing Death and Saving Lives Problems (Ch 1) Numbers (Ch 16) Choice 
Between People (Ch 17) [SB]
Bruno Bettleheim Surviving and Other Essays Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations 
pp 38-83 and The Ignored Lessons of Anne Frank pp 246-257 (New York Alfred A Knopf 
1979)[SB] i
Selections from M Wakin War Morality and the Military Profession Donald C Wells How Much 
can the Just War Justify7 Frederick Struckmeyer The Just War and the Right of Self 
Defense Telford Taylor War Crimes and Superior Orders [SB]
George Sterner A Season in Hell from Bluebird s Castle [SB]
DavidS Wyman The Abandonment o f the Jews The Setting Europe and America (Ch 1) The 
Bombing o^ Auschwitz (Ch 15) Responsibility (Ch 16) [SB]
Jan Howard Robert Somers Resisting Institutional Evil from Within in Sanford and Comstock 
Sanctions for Evil [SB]
Nordstrom/Martm James C Scott Domination Acting and Fantasy 
May 4-5 Retreat Student Presentations and Critique
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APPENDIX TWO
The Apple Sliced
Robert Jennings
Is there something else in it7
Yes1 I see it1 John yelled It s an apple1 I got one too1 
Now John pipe down You ve had your stocking already 
What do you see in your stocking Bobby down at the toe7 
An apple7 I said looking up at my mother 
Well you d better look and see
I stuck my arm down into the stocking as far as it would go The stocking was shiny with sequins 
decorating tiny felt packages and trains and Christmas trees The inside was scratchy with knots and 
threads At the top of the stocking was a band of white felt decorated with what I knew were letters
I feel it' I said
Well pull it out
It s stuck
I 11 help said John He took the toe in his hand and shook It fell to the floor with a small thud 
An apple' I said
That s right said my mother All the way from America where the apple trees grow Do you know 
what else comes from America7 Did you see your new stocking7 Your grandmother made that for you and 
sent it all the way from Home
Home7
Bobby s never been Home said Nat He s too little
Home said my mother Do you see your name here— BOB 7 Soon you 11 be able to read that 
Bobby said Nat you can t read yet You re not old enough I 11 read it to you BOB See7 B O B
Bob
I can read it already said John I can read anything My name has a silent h
Johnnie come over here and read me a story from your new book said my father
Come on Bobby said Nat We can play with the gun I got from Santa Claus' Nat pulled the 
trigger of the green plastic machine gun It made a grinding noise
No' Bobby' You have to fall down when I shoot'
But I want to look at the gun
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i
O K But just for a minute
Just like G I Joè' I said
Only bigger ^
Liao came to the¡ doorway and said something to my mother Boys she said it s time for dinner 
Take your apples You can have them for dessert
We ran into the dining room Nat and John climbed into their chairs I was crawling under the table 
looking for my apple
Bobby* Watch the tablecloth' What are you doing under there9 Did you drop your apple again9 
That s the second time honey It 11 be bruised
It s hard to hold I said
My mother picked up the apple and handed it to Liao This is too big for him Liao Could you take it 
into the kitchen and slice it for him after dinner9
After we had eaten dinner my mother got up and went to the window Now we 11 have to close the 
shades she said I think we re ready she said as Liao came to the door I 11 get it
Johnnie said í í^at we get to see the pudding now'
Bobby doesn t even know about the pudding said John He can t even remember last year'
My mother set aí silver stand and a book of matches on the table and sat down Liao brought m a tiny 
copper saucepan thatj he held with a cloth From it he poured onto the little black pile on the stand
Now watch said my mother as she struck a match Suddenly the entire top of the pudding glowed 
and swirled i
It s blue' I said
That s right said my father
Gradually the blue disappeared I looked at the pudding It was still black
Do we eat it9 I said
You wouldn t like it my mother said Pudding is for children to watch and grown ups to eat
I m going to eat my apple said Nat carefully lifting it from the tablecloth in front of his place He 
began to rub the apple with his napkin You have to polish it
I want to get my apple Mummy
Well run along Bobby It s in the kitchen
I ran down the concrete hallway that separated the kitchen from the house Liao looked up from a 
book as I came in
Mummy said I could have my apple now
Still hungry9 said Liao Then he laughed I looked up at the empty spaces where his two front teeth 
should have been
Where are your teeth9 I said
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Liao shrugged and then opened a drawer and took out the long carving knife He set the apple in the 
middle of a board Suddenly I heard a sharp crack and then another and another The pieces fell They 
were still rocking gently on their skin sides when Liao picked up each one He cut the core off and made a 
small stack on a plate
He picked up one slice and gave it to me Thank you I said and put it in my mouth Then I took it 
out again and ran back to the house
I m eating my apple1 I said showing the slice to Nat Nat had taken big bites out of his apple
Me too he said
I m eating my apple’ I said coming around to John s chair
That s just a slice' said John He took his apple out of the folds of his napkin I still have the whole 
thing No one else does Nat s almost halfway done You just have a slice I m the only one with a whole 
apple Mme s the shiniest You can only shine it if it s whole Ha há' You just have a slice' You don t get 
a shiny apple'
Liao looked up again when I got back to the kitchen Liao I said taking the apple from my mouth 
and holding it out will you put this back9
Don t you like your apple from America9
I want my apple back together I want to make it shiny
I can t put your apple back together Liao held two of the slices together and then let them fall back 
on the plate See9
Why not9
Liao shrugged
The light in the bedroom was pale but yellow through the white curtain and it shimmered slightly As 
little puffs of breeze blew in glimmering shapes would appear and disappear swirl and change like the 
hose water running off my father s garden shovel If you put your face right next to the curtain you could 
just see the path outside the garden and the kitchen beyond Nah was helping Pitsamai make the beds in 
the next room I climbed onto the bed and over to the window I put my nose to the curtain It smelled soft 
and old and stale and sharp at the same time I could make out my pedal car below It was red with paint 
and with more and more rust With a sudden gust the curtain billowed against may face and for a 
moment a beam of dusty yellow sunlight fell across the room I climbed down off the bed and crossed the 
floor where the light had been I sat down next to Nat s toy chest in the corner Against the back of my 
head I could feel the bumps of the rivets running along the edge of the lid Then I heard a noise 
somewhere m the house—gentle hollow ceramic—a coffee cup placed on a saucer
Mummy s home I thought as I reached up for the bannister and slowly made my way down the
stairs
Hello sweetie my mother said when I came into the living room Where s Nah9
Upstairs I said My mother was wearing a blue dress with large purple flowers stitched all over it A 
teardrop shape was cut out just below the throat It was the most beautiful thing I had ever seen
I could smell the coffee in her cup May I have some too9
No dear Coffee isn t for children She put the cup and saucer on the end table Give me a kiss 
though It s time for me to go out again I won t be back by the time your brothers get home from school I
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have to go to Bridge Club Be sure to go back upstairs and tell Nall that I ve gone to Bridge Club Be a 
good boy today
Bobby I told you to stay upstairs said Nah as she came downstairs I ve been looking for you 
Mummy was here 
Is madame at home7 
No She went to Bridgeclub
Then I heard the hum—m the distance rising and falling softly but getting stronger and deeper all 
the time
Nall' I want to go outside'
But it isn t time to meet your brothers yet
No Now Nah I want to go outside now' I want to see them I want to see them before they re gone 
again'
I took Nah by the hand and pulled her out into the yard The noise came high over the row of bananas 
but it was getting louder I looked across the field
Nah' I yelled pointing up I see them' I see the Planes'
The noise was louder almost a roar The planes were dull and dusty looking I could see the tiny lines 
where the plates were riveted together There were letters on them
!
Nah' I yelled pulling my hand out of hers and running a few steps farther from the house Look 
how close they are' Look'
Nah laughed and took me by the hand again Ma ni It s time for lunch
I
I m going to tell my brothers that I saw the Planes I said following Nah through the door Nah 
what does that mean7
Whan
Ma ni
i
You know what it means Nah said waving her hand I say it to you all the time Come here 
Nah will you teach me French for when I get old enough to go to the Ecole7 
I will teach you Lao 
Johnnie says the nuns are mean 
I will teach you Lao
Nah set the sandwich on the table while I climbed into my chair She sat next to me and dipped a ball 
of sticky rice in her bowl
Red' I said pointing May I try some7
It s hot Nah said You re too little Later I 11 get you some sweet nee You 11 like it better
Suddenly Pitsamai burst m from the kitchen like a gust of air Nah' she said loudly and she went 
on quickly in Lao a jumble of words strange ones that I did not know something about a brother 
Suddenly she kneeled down by Nah s chair and burst into tears For several minutes she remained there
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shaking but quiet her forehead resting on the wooden arm of the chair I stared transfixed I had never sen 
a grown up cry
Slowly Nall turned her head toward me Bpai ap nohn she said She didn t smile and lay her head 
on her hands the way she usually did when she said this and I didn t think of protesting that I didn t want 
a nap the way I usually did in reply Instead I left half of the sandwich and climbed down from my chair 
She said something confusing to Pitsamai and carried me up the stairs
When I woke up the afternoon light in the bedroom was white and yellow at once both hard and soft 
It filled the room with brightness but left all the boundaries indistinct I climbed off the bed and walked 
through the light to the comer I reached up and felt the rivets on top of Nat s chest running my fingers 
along the bumps and listening for a moment to the quiet of the house Carefully I pushed and the lid 
swung upward I picked out G I Joe and then put him back and took hold of the gun I pulled on the barrel 
but the rest of it stuck so I pulled harder so it would come free At last the gun rested on the edge of the 
chest and with a final tug fell to the floor with a crack I listened again then picked up the gun and went 
out to the hall I looked at the stairs and took the gun by the barrel again The butt clattered on the first 
step It clattered again on the second step It clattered again on the third
Liao looked down at me Liao I mumbled my face is all wet I want to go back to my nap
No sleep' said Liao loudly We are waiting for madame You want to see your mother don t you7 
Liao had a red cloth He was wiping my face with a red cloth
Mummy I said I m sleepy I want to go to bed 
No' No sleeping' We are waiting for your father
The doctor shined a big light in my eyes It had a mirror and was bright—brighter than the sun I 
closed my eyes
Open your eyes Bobby
What is this Mr Jennings7
Piece of a toy gun
He s lucky he didn t lose his eye
Keep your eyes open
But the light
Keep your eyes open' Mr Jennings your son 
I m sleepy
If you keep your eyes open and don t cry I 11 get you some ice cream Now come on Do what the 
doctor says
At the restaurant7
At the restaurant
Daddy has a restaurant I said to the doctor
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Oh yes9 Tell me something else Hold still 
Daddy has an Embassy 
The doctor and my father laughed 
No crying now Almost done Hold still
What kind of ice cream do you want9 said my father tightening his grip on my leg
I want chocolate
You can have chocolate then
Open your eyes again That s it
As much as I want9
As much as you want But you have to be good Don t move 
I want two scoops
How about we start you off with one and see how you do on that kiddo9 
Daddy9
What is it Bobby9
I saw the Planes today Daddy I saw the green Planes 
Hold still No tears How many did you see9 
I saw two Nall and I saw them Two Planes
The doctor snapped the light off and everything went dark Keep this bandage on for a few days 
and bring him back m about a week and I 11 take them out
I
How many were there doctor9 
Four
I want two I said
Liao finished serving everyone else I looked up at him pleadingly Don 11 get any dessert9 
No dear said my mother You re still being punished for last week You broke your brother s gun 
But I didn t cry
Well you had your ice cream for that Now go into the kitchen and Liao will get you your 
medicine
Liao took me by the hand and we went from the house to the kitchen 
I have something for you he said 
Dessert9
No dessert It s over there under the table
I looked under the table but I couldn t see anything Then suddenly I noticed it an alligator as long 
as my brother s wooden ruler a dark green alligator with a row of white teeth lining a gaping mouth The
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inside of the mouth glistened bright red The alligator was staring right at me I jumped backward Liao 
laughed I fell on the floor Liao laughed harder
See7 he said picking it up It s not real It s made out of rubber See7 And it s green That s your 
favorite color See7
Ma m ] said Nall We re going to the market I ran down the hall and through the living room and 
out the door that Nall was holding open She lifted me up to the seat at the back of the bicycle and 
climbed onto the front We pedaled slowly down the driveway past the garden and the pond past my 
father s row of bananas As we turned out of the driveway one of the geese began to make a fuss and we 
could hear him for several minutes as we bounced along the street in the sunshine
What is that7 said Nah pointing upward
That s the sky I said
What color is it7
Blue I said
What is in the sky that makes the light7 Nah said pointing upward
The sun I said
Sun Nah said in Lao Tawan
Tawan I repeated and leaned my cheek against Nah s back closing my eyes
A few minutes later I smelled something strange I opened my eyes and saw wisps of dark gray rising 
slowly through the air I sat up and looked around Ahead of us was a field burnt dark gray with heaps of 
ashes around a fire and piles of whitened sticks
Burning today7 said Nah quietly The air got thicker I coughed
Is this the Smoky Place Nah7 I said blinking
Are you awake7 Nah said Bad pi here Look the other way Bad pi Close your eyes We 11 take 
the long way Nah turned and suddenly we were pedalling in a different direction faster away from the 
smoke
The air was clearer I looked back at the gray cloud slowly rising behind us What are they burning7
Pep si1 yelled the man in the market He had a tray of plastic bags each one filled with dark brown 
liquid A drinking straw stuck out of each one and the neck of each bag was gathered and held in place 
against the straw with a rubber band Pep si Co la' the man yelled again
I want some soda
No Pepsi said Nah
Candy' yelled another man He held out a large bag filled with small squares of every color 
May I have some gum7 
No candy
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We walked with the bicycle past the man who was selling cups of tea from a shiny brass urn with a 
spigot past the voices and the quick sharp laughs past the baskets and the fruit past the tables of small 
gleaming metal objects and chop sticks and woven mats At the edge of the market Nah leaned the 
bicycle against a tree and we stood together in the shade
Look hjlali I said pointing up the hill Three bald men were walking down the road in single file
The monks said Nah and when they had reached the bottom of the hill Nah smiled and said 
something toithe first one He smiled and said something m reply I had shrunk back behind Nah s leg but 
I looked back up at the monks They were all wearing light colored orange robes that hung from their 
shoulders I studied the long folds that fell almost to the ground The monk s orange robe was the second 
most beautiful thing that I had ever seen
What is your name9 the first monk said to me suddenly
Tell him your name Bobby said Nah coaxing
Bobby I said after a moment
How old are you9
Three
You show me Show me how old you are With your fingers 
I don t know I said looking up at Nah
I 11 show you he said The monk held up his middle three fingers Now you do it I held up my 
hand That s not three’ he laughed Give me your hand I held out my hand and the monk bent my 
thumb and little finger back There he said hold that up now I held up three fingers Good' he 
said holding |up three fingers Just like mine
You know what comes after three said the monk
Four I said
I show you said the monk in English this time He held up one finger One He held up two 
fingers Two He held up another finger Three Then he held up all his fingers Many' he said 
smiling See¡9 One two three many' Do you know how old I am9 he said
No
I am many Next year you will be many too We will be the same age' He laughed and then 
spoke to Nah again After a while he turned to start down the hill again
\re  they going home now9 I said to Nah
They are going to the monastery she said
What is i the monastery9
It s where we live said the monk
Can we see the monastery9 I asked looking up at Nah
We can only see the bridge she said
What happens at the bridge9
That s where the monks go in
We can t go across the bridge9
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Not until you re old enough to become a monk' said the monk bending toward me again No more 
yellow hair The monk ran his hand through my hair and laughed again And no talking—English 
French or Lao No talking in the monastery Would you like that9
I don t know
Well wait and see then he said smiling He straightened up and said goodbye to Nah and we 
watched the monks walk away down the road single file as they had come
Time to do the shopping said Nah
I had fallen asleep against Nah s back by the time we reached the driveway again but I woke when I 
heard something It wasn t the geese The geese were quiet It was a whining sound high pitched but 
getting lower
Nah1 I said sitting up The Planes The green Planes' Let s stop so we can see'
Nah stopped the bicycle and lifted me off You stay and see she said raising her voice over the 
growing roar You come right back when you ve seen I m going inside
Nah rode off toward the house I ran down the driveway straining to look upward hoping to be able to 
count them before they had all flown over
Bobby said Nah You re a big boy now You will be going to school
Will the teacher be mean to me9 Johnnie says the nuns are mean but I don t have a nun because in 
the kindergarten they have La Mademoiselle Nat says she s not so mean because she s not a real nun 
yet
Just be good and maybe she won t be mean But let me show you what I got for you 
A hat' I said A straw hat just like yours Kohp chai Nah 
You re welcome It s a present It s a present for being a big boy
The kindergarten schoolhouse was a wooden building on stilts like the houses in the village The first 
day my mother brought me up the ramp and introduced me to La Mademoiselle After that Nah brought 
me on the bicycle and watched me until I was through the door The classroom was dark and we each had 
a chair made of rubber strips stretched across a frame as well as a little table to use as a desk
Une peinture announced La Mademoiselle one day the way she did every day before recess and 
she handed out the plastic watercolor boxes and the pieces of paper with the identical block outlines of a 
flower on each one—a flower with a center six radiating petals a curving stem and two leaves
Robert said La Mademoiselle the way she did every day looking over my shoulder No paint 
outside the lines' Encore une fo is ' No recess until you have finished your flower and she took the flower 
from under my brush crumpled the paper and put a new blank flower on the table in front of me
Encore une fois' I thought The sound of the children playing echoed m the room far off One day I 
would get to play on the merry go round too If only I could finish my flower Encore une fois Toujours 
encore une fois Toujours encore And then the merry go round
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Today lí thought one morning Today I will finish my flower Today I will go out First the leaves 
the easy part |brown like banana leaves in dry season The brown is perfect' I thought I 11 try it for the 
stem The stem is perfect' Now the hard part the petals and the center I 11 try the brown again It s 
done' Perfect! Perfect brown flower
Les fleurs ne sont pas brunes ' said La Mademoiselle sharply and the flower crumpled in her hand 
Encore une fois'
But Mademoiselle I 11 never get to go out at recess 
Les fleurs ne sont pas brunes
Pas brunes I thought Pas bruns Pas brun The flowers in school are all yellow and red and 
orange The leaves are always green
Good enough Asse*, bien La Mademoiselle said over my shoulder one day near the end of recess 
Go and play
The merry go round' I thought I ran outside I saw Le ahead of me running toward the merry go 
round where all the children were playing She grabbed hold of one of the rails All the others ran away 
laughing Le sat alone near the edge as the merry go round slowly turned By the time I reached the merry 
go round it had stopped and Le was crying
Why are you crying9 I said
Le turned away You don t understand she said
But my French is getting better I said Don t you want to play on the merry go round9 
No one| will play with me 
Why not9
They won t play with me because they re Lao and I m Vietnamese 
I 11 play with you I said 
Le turned to look at me I can t play with you '
Why not9
Because you re White'
Behind Le I saw La Mademoiselle step out the door to ring the bell Recess was over
Nah I said What is White 9 
You know what white is'
Am I White9 A girl at school said I was White 
You ask madame about this when she comes home
Mummy what is White 9 A girl at school said I was White 
You ask Daddy when he comes home dear He 11 explain it to you
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Daddy9 
Yes Bobby
What is White 9 A girl at school said she wouldn t play with me because I was White
I began to feel the tiny vibration in the air the droning sound of a far off roar I want to go outside 
They re coming1
First you come over here said my father picking me up and putting me on his lap Now listen 
White just means the kind of skin you have You have light skm and other people have darker skin Like 
Nall Do you understand9
I think so I said The sound grew louder
But listen my father went on The girl at school she didn t say she wouldn t play with you 
because you were White did she9 Now why would she say that9 She couldn t have said that could she9 
You must have made that part up
Daddy I want to go outside1
I won t let you go until you tell me that you made it up 
The Planes Daddy' I want to see the Planes'
Not until you say you made it up 
But I did not
Bobby if you lie to me I 11 spank you 
My shoulders began to shake I started to cry 
I told you I didn t lie I told you 
Come on Bobby he said gently 
I made it up I mumbled sobbing 
I didn t hear you 
I made it up
Good boy my father said letting me off his knee Now off you go 
I went outside and crossed the garden slowly But the planes were gone
Mummy guess what9 Today we heard a helicopter at school 
Did you9
And La Mademoiselle used to let us outside to watch the helicopters but now she says it takes too 
much time so we have to stay in but this time she let us all go out
Did she really9
She did And we all went out and it got louder and louder like the Planes but different and we all 
looked up and the helicopter was right there and it just kept coming down and it landed'
Really9
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I ve seen helicopters land lots of times said John
Me tool said Nat at the Cub Scouts at school at Sunday School—lots of places The Mannings 
were going to1 take the girls for a ride for Jenny s birthday but now Mr Manning says they can t go
Why can t they go9 said my mother
Too dangerous said Nat as he spread a workbook on the table
It landed right on the playground I said and it got so windy that we all had to hold hands 
That must have been windy said my mother 
And then do you know what happened9 I said
When they had a helicopter at Cub Scouts it was so windy that Tommy Bradshaw s cap blew away 
and Mrs Bradshaw had to buy him a new one' said Johnnie
She told me said my mother She said when they found it a few days later it was covered with 
mold and they had to get a new one
Mummy do you know what happened then9
What happened9
I already know what happened said Johnnie
Santa Claus got out of the helicopter' And he looked just like the pictures'
How about that
And it was a regular green helicopter and Santa Claus got right out with one of the G I Joe soldiers' 
And then what did he do9
He gave them all candy like at our school' said Johnnie
He took a big bag and we all stood around him and he reached in and he threw out candy I said 
What did you think of Santa Claus9 said my mother
He looked just like the pictures but I didn t want to get too close
1
You didn t want to get too close9
No but you didn t have to He threw the candy far
Didn t you like Santa Bobby9 said Nat
You re supposed to like Santa Claus Bobby said Johnnie He might get mad 
Why didn t you want to get closer9
I
Because I said pausing because he was big and he was wearing a big red suit and red is scary I 
like green better And you couldn t see his face But I liked the G I Joe soldier He was nice and talked to 
us He said i Merry Christmas
Bobby doesn t like Santa Claus' Ha há' Johnnie yelled
I do too I said I just don t want to get too close
Mummy I said
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Yes dear9
I never knew Santa Claus was a soldier
Aw Bobby said Nat looking up from his homework again you don t have to be a soldier to ride 
in an Army helicopter
I heard a noise from the end of the driveway Daddy s home’ I yelled and I ran outside banging the 
door behind me just as he was driving through the garden
Well hello there kiddo my father said as he knelt down to pick me up What did you do in 
school today9
Santa Claus came to school today1 In a helicopter1 
Was that today9
Did you know Santa Claus was coming Daddy9 
Well it is Christmas isn t it9 
Oh
We came into the living room and my father set me down Hello dear he said kissing my mother 
on the cheek How was your day9 And what did you two do in school today he said turning around to 
look at Johnnie and Nat sitting at the table
I got an Excellent in Spelling' said Johnnie See9 He brought a paper over to my father 
Good job troop said my father
Good for you sweetie said my mother You didn t tell me that before 
What about you Nat9
We saw some big planes today at recess over at our school 
Big planes Nat9 Are you sure9 How many9
I don t know I didn t count Maybe six or seven And flying low too We could see everything And 
right during recess so we got to watch'
They didn t come with Santa Claus9
No Santa only went to the kindergarten He didn t come to the Ecole today These were regular 
planes
My mother looked at my father 
I have to make some phone calls my father said 
Now9 said my mother Liao will have dinner ready 
Dirner will wait said my father My mother nodded
Nat and Johnnie drove off m the car with the Pauls and Nall and I started to walk back down the 
driveway The water buffalo were in the field next door The boys from the village will be over there this 
afternoon said Nall trying to ride the buffalo
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Do they |hurt the buffalo Nah when they jump on them9
No The I buffalo are too big Too slow She laughed Ma m she said taking my hand Let s go in 
and get ready
Wait I said Do you hear9 A sound was wavering somewhere close to the horizon It continued 
without getting much louder The Planes'
Nah was silent She began to walk toward the house again pulling me with her There was a sort of 
shudder a dampened crash in the distance
Did you hear that9 Nat says that s the bombs I said Nat says now they have bombs too Nah
Then suddenly a pulsing sound rose from the air in the middle distance It grew louder and closer 
and by the time we had passed through the garden we could see the helicopter
A helicopter' I said Santa Claus9
It s too late for Santa Claus said Nah Come and put your shoes on
When I came down the ramp from the schoolhouse Nah was waiting for me as usual I climbed onto 
the bicycle seat behind her and laid my head against her back
Nah I asked after a few minutes why can t we take the shortcut9
Always burning she said Always burning now Bad pi
Why don t we see the monks anymore9 I want to tell the monk how old I am now I am many 
The monks have gone away Nah said 
Are they on the other side of the bridge9 
Nah was silent
Maybe ithey 11 come back I murmured slowly I like the monks
Time to wash your hair said Nah Close your eyes
Nah poured the water over my head It echoed in my ears It s loud' I said and laughed The laugh 
reverberated from the close concrete walls louder than the water Nah laughed and our echo filled the 
room Then we were quiet for a moment A tremor still seemed to hang in the air—hanging reflected 
magnified finally a familiar roar We both looked in confusion at the single drip from the faucet before 
understanding
Nall sprang up from the side of the bath 
The Planes' I said
She shut the high window with a slam that I felt in the water
Can t be' I heard my father say in the next room Can t be' he said banging the door I m going 
up to the Embassy he said to my mother and in a minute we heard the car
Why does Daddy have to go to work m the nighttime9 I asked but Nah said nothing
Nah don t you like the Planes anymore9
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My red car squeaked as I pedalled it down the path away from the house Nat and Johnnie came 
running down the driveway toward me Something long was sticking out of Nat s schoolbag
Johnnie went into the Smoky Place said Nat breathless
But you can t go into the Smoky Place I said breathing hard It has bad pi'
I struggled to turn my car around to head back to the house
Mom' Nat called dropping his bag and running into the house Mom’ Come here*
By the time I got my car up the walk toward the house my mother had just come down to the porch 
She knelt down by Nat s bag
Dear Lord she said quietly the child has brought home some poor body s femur
Ma ni now Bobby We have to be very quick now that you re starting earlier Nah was kneeling in 
front of me helping me with my shirt
Why does Daddy have to drive me to school now9
Nah put her hands on my shoulders You have the hat I gave you
Mummy says it s only for dress up
Nall s eyes were shining But you have it
It s in Nat s trunk
Good It will keep the neige off you Nall used a French word that I didn t know 
What is neige 9
It is cold It s in the sky Cold sky 
When will it be cold9
It s cold You re going where it s cold She looked up from tying my shoe and pulled my shirt over 
my belly All the time cold You remember my hat
Will you be cold Nah9
Now she said straightening you don t want to be late for La Mademoiselle 
Nah Am I going where you can t come9 Nah'
Go down to monsieur
Mummy what happened to Pitsamai9 
Pitsamai has gone away now 
Are we going away9 
We re going home
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Will Nah come with us9 My voice was rising 
Probably not dear
Why not9 My shoulders began to shake 
Now don t cry sweetie We re going home 
Where will Liao go9 
Why he 11 stay here
But this is not his Home either He s from China And he can t go back there 
How did you find that out dear9
He told me Mummy why does everyone have to go away9 
People move sometimes We re going home
Home is cold and I don t know where it is’ I don t want to go Home1 
Of course you do dear Now don t cry It s all going to be fine
Johnnie do you think we 11 come back here when we get old enough9 
Old enough for what Bobby9
Old enough to be monks Nah told me that all the boys go away to be monks for a while after they 
get to be old enough
We re not going to do that'
Why not9
Because we re not Lao And besides we d never get to talk 
It s only on the other side of the bridge that they can t talk 
How do you know that9 
The monk told me
Nat you ve been Home 
Yeah
Do you remember it9 
Of course'
Tell me about snow I already know that it s cold 
Snow covers everything 
Everything9 How do you see9
It doesn t cover everything It s like ram But it turns everything white
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Yes'*
Is it like a flower9
But why Mummy9 Why do we have to leave9 
Because there are too many planes now 
But I like the Planes’
But when will Daddy come back9 said Johnnie 
Why does he have to go away to the Embassy9 I said
Your father has to stay longer to do some things at the embassy We 11 see him after we get back to 
America Mr Manning is coming to help us
Mrs Manning and the girls have already left Nat said to Johnnie nodding wisely
Oh said Johnnie
Mr Manning came with a Jeep and Nah and my mother began to pack the clothes they thought we 
would need for the trip I stood at the corner of the bed in my parents room and watched them packing 
Nah held up a long red dress from the closet
Oh’ my mother said and laughed I won t be wearing that on this trip I 11 probably never wear that 
again The movers can pack that one
Nah smiled and began to take another dress from the closet when she saw me Bpai ap nohn she
said
Oh yes dear said my mother turning around Aren t you in bed yet9 Are your brothers still 
downstairs with Mr Manning9
Yes
Go along with Nah then
Nall took me into the bedroom She knelt by the bed to help me take off my shoes Bobby she said
Yes Nah9
Pop gan yu dern nyon noh
You will9 I said
Yes she said She touched my nose gently with the tip of her forefinger Yes Now put your 
pajamas on
When I woke up again my mother was quietly walking around the room with a little pad making 
notes for the movers I felt a breeze on my cheek and turned my face away from it On the wall across the 
room I saw the shadow of the curtain with the evening sun shining through it—almost as light as the 
sunshine itself but with a changing pattern of darker lines and spaces shifting with the air
Are you awake9 said my mother
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Mummy I murmured when we leave can we take the curtains7 
No dear It 11 be different The window will It 11 all be different
Mummy I said after breakfast the next morning what about my car7 
Your car7
My red car My pedal car Are we going to take it7 
No dear It s rusted already There s no point
Oh I said and then slowly I want to ride in my car I want to go outside 
All right sweetie but just for a minute We re almost ready
Nah was with Mr Manning helping him carry the suitcases to the Jeep Liao was washing the 
breakfast dishes I went outside alone The red car creaked as I pedalled it down the path along the back of 
the house When I reached the end of the path I got out of the car to turn it around I pushed it into place 
and pedalled back down the path I stopped under the bedroom window Johnnie and Nat were feeding the 
geese Nah and Mr Manning were in the driveway My mother was downstairs writing Nobody was 
upstairs The curtain flapped out of my window filmy white I looked at the white curtain billowing 
outward and around it the house in different shades of brown and even above that the solid blue sky I got 
out of the car and left it just below my window and went inside again
Liao and Nall were standing in front of the house Goodbye said my mother to Liao holding out her 
hand Good luck
Liao bent down to shake the hands of each of us boys—first Nat then Johnnie then me Goodbye 
he said Grow big
Nall bowed to my mother and then to each of my brothers and then to me I bowed back the way the 
monk had taught me taking care that our eyes would never meet Good' said Nall smiling In the car 
now
Nat and Johnnie each sat on a seat in the back I climbed onto my mother s lap in the front Mr 
Manning started the engine We began down the driveway Nat looked straight ahead Johnnie turned 
around in his seat and held out his hand toward the front of the house Bye bye he called out above the 
noise of the Jeep
I rested my head against my mother looking out the side as we drove down the dnveway 
remembering the back of the house the white curtain and the blue blue above We passed my father s 
bananas and I looked above them at the sky—a tiny puff of white cloud against a whole expanse of blue 
I don t like green anymore I said quietly I like blue
My mother bent her neck and kissed the top of my head
The airport was a big gray room crowded with people People stood in little groups surrounded by piles 
of luggage A few children were playing with marbles on the floor Voices were everywhere but still the 
air seemed silent Mr Manning went away to talk to a man behind the counter He came back a short 
while later The embassy arrangements are fine Everything s all in order for the first flight out
The first flight7 said m> mother looking at the people sitting on the long wooden benches around 
the room Do we check our luggage7 she said slowly
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They don t want to do that yet They re not sure 
I see said my mother
Let s go over here said Mr Manning I think I see a space on the bench It s not near the plane 
but we can keep on checking and you have embassy tickets
My mother and Mr Manning and Nat carried all the suitcases over to the other side of the airport My 
mother and Mr Manning sat on the empty part of the bench
Nat said my mother you and Johnnie take out the books you brought and sit on those suitcases 
Bobby you can sit on my lap
I climbed onto my mother s lap I heard something I lifted my head up A middle aged woman sitting 
on the opposite bench was rocking back and forth sobbing quietly tears streaming down her face She had 
with her a crate a large laundry bag and an old suitcase and as she rocked she held the handle of the 
suitcase with one hand and touched the bag and the crate in turn with the other
Mummy' I said
Hush my mother said pushing my head back toward her again
Mom said Johnnie getting up and coming over to the bench I m scared
Now Johnnie said my mother don t be scared Think about home Grandma and Grandpa Block 
are going to meet us at the airport
Really9 said Johnnie
Who s Grandma and Grandpa Block9 I said turning my head up to see my mother
They re our grandparents Johnnie said They re really nice You ve never met them because you re 
too little Right Mom9
And you and Nat try and call me Mother when we see your grandparents Johnnie
Yes Mother
Don t call me Mother
But you said'
When we get there Johnnie When we get there and see your grandparents After we get home 
Now said Mr Manning crossing back to the bench
Now9 said my mother Come on boys get up Nat take that one Let s go
I took my mother s hand and we walked back through the airport Suddenly the man from behind the 
counter split the silence with a loud series of enes People began to take their belongings and make their 
way to one of the doors The man said something else loudly and some of the people stopped
Still go9 said my mother
Still go said Mr Manning
Mr Manning showed the tickets to one of the men near the gate and we went out the door with some 
of the other people into the evening sun Outside we saw two or three people who had already been 
waiting on the runway
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One of them raised her voice as we passed yelling to the airport men She waved something in her 
hand and yelled something about her brother and waiting The men passed by and the woman fell back on 
a mattress roll that was among her things She dissolved m tears I need she sobbed I need
How long have these people been waiting9 asked my mother
It s hard to say said Mr Manning
Mummy I said why are all the ladies crying9
Now said my mother Nat you and Johnnie sit in these two seats
I want the window' said Johnnie
You can have it said Nat I don t care
Well good said my mother Bobby I 11 sit in here by the widow and you sit nght there next to 
me
Look' I can still see Mr Manning standing outside said Johnnie It s almost too dark 
Well good said my mother Now settle down
The plane was almost full Suddenly there was a senes of loud voices from outside Kohp chai ' Kohp 
chai' said an excited voice and the woman from the runway appeared in the front of the plane with her 
mattress roll She made her way down the aisle to the last remaining seat
Look Mummy The lady
I see sweetie
Wake up Bobby Wake up now I have other things to carry 
Mummy are we there now9
No sweetie We haven t left yet It s late night The plane isn t going tonight
George' said my mother as we passed into the grayness of the airport again I am so glad you re 
still here Why won t the plane take off9
It s not safe today Maybe in the morning said Mr Manning
Do we stay here then9 said my mother
We d be better off staying where we are said Mr Manning
Is there any food in the airport9 The children haven t eaten since breakfast
I think there s a candy machine somewhere
Are we spending the night here9 asked Johnnie
I 11 need to get another book out of my bag said Nat
Why can t we go home9 I said
We are going home dear tomorrow
No I said I don t mean Home I mean home Why can t we go home9 I started to cry
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You re getting confused Bobby You re not crying are you9 said my mother gently Don t cry 
Bobby
I choked a sob I m not crying
You re sleepy Bobby We 11 find you someplace to lie down
One Hershey bar said Mr Manning as he walked up to my mother The only one left
Come on said my mother Time to go now Bobby take my hand Nat help Johnnie zip that up
It was early morning when we walked outside again but the sky was already filled with light The 
people on the runway had gone away somewhere in the night The pavement was clear all the way to the 
fence Suddenly I saw her Behind the wire She made a little hat with her fingers and put it over her head 
I pulled my hand from my mother and made a hat over my head too
Bobby what are you doing9 said my mother sharply
Saying goodbye I said Saying goodbye to Nah
My mother looked toward the fence Her eyes were wide But what is she doing here9
She said she would come I yelled laughing She said she would come and she did’
We can t talk to Nah now dear my mother said after a moment She took my hand again and we 
hurried on faster Your father will talk to her
What will he say Mummy9
Is this time for real9 said Johnnie as he sat down in the same seat by the window 
I think so Johnnie said my mother I think so
Just then we heard a loud voice and a clanging sound as one of the airport men climbed up the 
staircase from the runway He walked slowly down the aisle of the plane gazing down at the passengers 
on both sides He stopped almost across from us He looked down at the woman with the mattress roll and 
started to say something loudly The woman got up from her seat She bowed and started speaking 
speaking and bowing bowing and speaking faster and faster and louder and louder I waited My 
brother I need’
The airport man took the mattress roll down the aisle to the door of the plane The woman followed 
quiet now I need she said trembling Her cheeks glistened as she set her foot on the first downward 
step
Johnnie was turned back to look steadily out his window Nat had never stopped looking down at his 
book of French grammar Mummy the lady I said the Lao lady
You re not crying again are you9 my mother said softly
No I said turning away
Another woman climbed to the plane and made her way down to the seat that was almost across the 
aisle
I turned back toward my mother again and saw her face against the window For only a second I saw 
a flash of light in a droplet on her chin—a yellow light not quite milky not quite clear In a moment m a 
drop I saw tawan—the Lao sun
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Mummy I said are you crying9
No she said looking away
Mummy I said resting my head on her arm
Yes dear9
We re both not crying
Suddenly I saw the propellors begin to turn The plane shuddered and the tear fell from my mother s
chin
Madame the child is going to have to sit up 
My mother gently lifted me up and buckled the seat belt 
Mummy9 I said m my mother s ear 
Yes dear9
Why can t you put an apple back together9
APPENDIX THREE
Selected Poems
Robert Manaster
Holy Land
It is a scene like this that the Assembly orders 
Fences erected onto peasant lands securing 
Borders for Gush Emunim Jews to settle
Bulldozers mouth red clay and dirt razing groves 
Farmed for generations Settlers scorch leftover stumps
It is a scene like this that red keffiyehed men 
Bomb a crowded market Fruits meats bones 
With singed flesh Screams moans sirens amidst reddish haze 
Later they vow more in the name of Allah 
To nd oppressors from their land like mad prophets
It is a scene like this that belongs to America 
A cloudless humid sunset where red smooths into earth 
And daylight falls into haze but no one bothers 
To notice loss as the holy land over there 
Ingests the fiery dawn like a song of praise
Neighbors
(Bosnia 1995)
Bashings of smoke plunder our town here and there
And I look at my mother
Looking for a neighbor
Who waits to be found she says
Like the unvarnished hook by a window
She s looking past the emptied box of a room
Past mildly ghosting curtains
Loosely tattered to one side
They catch the bellow from a blast nearby
My belly rumbles on and off all day 
I look at my mother 
Looking for a neighbor
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Screams
(Bosnia 1995)
I hate them God I hate them
Shells explode way over there
Then a few closer
Smoke gangrenes our nights
Screams soak through this band aid city
A sporadic rat a tat and some goddam maniacs
Know their watching
Kills us even more God I hate them
City blocks seem more like miles 
And here I am 
Alone Screams are nothing 
It s worse when there aren t any
Wailing Walls
I f  your children throw stones they were told You 
will have to build a wall to prevent it
—HaOlam Hazeh
In pre dawn hours patrol guns rest 
In sweaty palms and haphazardly point at fathers 
Building a wall between sukkah like shanties and road 
They close gaps like false teeth
They were told someone must pay when wild boys run off
Like their wind swallowed calls
After whipping stones at a security truck
They were told the men—yes the fathers—must pay
For these wild boys who wrap their heads
Defying the war weary eyesight of soldiers
They must pay for these wild boys
Who end up pretending to be dead
This is where history resettles
This is where leaders and refugee peasants have no choice 
This is where soldiers have given up
Their original purpose while a public keeps quiet 
About the ones who weren supposed to be there anyway 
This is the chosen land where a fence
Becomes a wall becomes life and death 
This is the land where angels can t see clear 
Where both Arab and Jew wail and fret
